Ram Prakash Tripathi v. Santosh — 1987 DIGILAW 768 (ALL)

ORDER V.K. Mehrotra, J. - 310 Chhibramau Assembly Constituency in district Farrukhabad in the State of Uttar Pradesh is one of the constituencies which was called upon to elect a Member to the U.P. Legislative Assembly in the year 1985. Various persons, including petitioners Ram Prakash Tripathi and Santosh (alias Santosh Chaturvedi) respondents, filed their nomination papers. The Returning Officer rejected the nomination paper of petitioner Tripathi on the date of scrutiny of the nomination papers which was Feb. 7, 1985. In all, sixteen candidates, including respondent Santosh remained contesting candidates in the election after the date of withdrawal. The polling took place on March 5, 1985. Ault i the counting of votes, which commenced on March 6, the respondent was declared to have been elected to the U.P. Legislative Assembly from the constituency on March 7, 1985. 2. Tripathi filed this election petition on April 16, 1985. The ground of challenge is that his nomination paper had been improperly rejected so that the election of the respondent was liable to be set aside under S. 100(1)(c) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 (for brief, the Act). 3. The nomination of petitioner Tripathi was rejected on an objection filed by one Umesh Chandra, who was also a candidate at the election. The objection was that the petitioner was a teacher in Hira lal V. N. Intermediate College, Chhibramau, and was, as such, holding an office of profit so that he vas disqualified for contesting the election. The petitioner's reply was that he had taken voluntary retirement and had been relieved from the College on Feb. 5, 1985 so that he was not holding any office of profit so as to be disqualified for contesting the election under Article 191(1)(a) of the Constitution. 4. The respondent made an application for striking out of some pleadings and for the rejection of the petition as disclosing no triable issue under O. VI R. 16 read with O. VII R. 11, C.P.C. That application was dismissed on Feb. 3, 1986 by V. P. Mathur, J. who was then entrusted with the trial of this petition. Later, the petition was assigned for trial to me. After the respondent had filed his written statement, the following issues were framed on Sept. 1, 1986 : "1. 3, 1986 by V. P. Mathur, J. who was then entrusted with the trial of this petition. Later, the petition was assigned for trial to me. After the respondent had filed his written statement, the following issues were framed on Sept. 1, 1986 : "1. Whether the election petitioner has complied with the provisions of Sections 81 and 83 of Representation of the People Act and whether the petition is maintainable? 2. Whether the nomination paper of the petitioner was improperly rejected by the Returning Officer on the ground that the petitioner held an office of profit within the meaning of Article 191(1)(a) of the Constitution of India? 3. Wh ether the post of Lecturer in Hira Lal V. N. Intermediate College, Chhibramau district Farrukhabad is an office of profit within the meaning of Article 191(1)(a) of the Constitution of India? 4. (a) Whether petitioner was in the employment of Hiralal V. N. Intermediate College, Chhibramau, district Farrukhabad on 6-2-1985 or any time prior thereto or any time after thereto as teacher? (b) Whether on the date of scrutiny of nomination papers and on the date of election the petitioner was disqualified for being chosen as a member of the U.P. Legislative Assembly? If so, its effect? 5. (a) Whether the petitioner has resigned/ sought voluntary retirement from the office of the teacher of aforesaid Hira Lal V. N. Intermediate College on 4-2-1985? (b) Whether the petitioner has played fraud and fabricated false documents regarding his alleged resignation/voluntary retirement? If so, its effect. (c) Whether the resignation/ voluntary retirement was accepted by the competent authority? If so, when? 6. To what relief, if any, is the petitioner entitled?" 5. On March 10, 1987 when the matter came up for hearing, Sri A. Kumar, appearing for the respondent, stated that issue No. 1 stood decided by the order passed by V. P. Mathur, J. on Feb. 3, 1986 (being paper Nos. 13/1 to 13/8). 6. One of the prayers which Sri K. N. Tripathi, appearing for the election petitioner, made on March 10, 1987 was that issue Nos. 2 and 3, which did not require any evidence to be led by the parties, be heard and decided as preliminary issues. Sri A. Kumar, raised objection to this course being followed and after hearing counsel, I directed, through a detailed order recorded on the order-sheet, that issue Nos. 2 and 3, which did not require any evidence to be led by the parties, be heard and decided as preliminary issues. Sri A. Kumar, raised objection to this course being followed and after hearing counsel, I directed, through a detailed order recorded on the order-sheet, that issue Nos. 2 and 3 be heard and disposed of in the first instance. The counsel for the parties then addressed me on these issues at some length on various dates. Orders in respect of these issues were reserved on April 16, 1987. 7. S. 100(1)(c) of the act says that : "(1) Subject to the provisions of sub-sec. (2) if the High Court is of opinion - (a) ......................... (b) ......................... (c) that any nomination has been improperly rejected; or (d) ......................... the High Court shall declare the election of the returned candidate to be void. (2) ......................." Scrutiny of nominations is provided for in S. 36 of which sub-sec. (2)(a) says that the Returning Officer may reject any nomination, amongst others, on the ground that on the date fixed for the scrutiny of nomination, the candidate either is not qualified or is disqualified for being chosen to fill the seat under Article 191 of the Constitution. A look at Article 191 reveals that a person shall be disqualified for being chosen as, and for being, a member of the Legislative Assembly of a State (a) if he holds any office of profit under the Government of India or the Government of any State specified in the First Schedule other than an office declared by the Legislature of the State by law not to disqualify its holder. 8. The case of the petitioner is that as a Lecturer in Hira Lal V. N. Intermediate College, Chhibramau, he was not holding any office of profit under the Government of the State of Uttar Pradesh which is one of the States, specified in the First Schedule of the Constitution, nor was he holding any office of profit under the Government of India. The Returning Officer was in error in rejecting the nomination paper on the ground that he was holding an office of profit under the Government of the State of Uttar Pradesh. The Returning Officer was in error in rejecting the nomination paper on the ground that he was holding an office of profit under the Government of the State of Uttar Pradesh. Reliance on behalf of the election petitioner was placed upon the decision of B. D. Agarwala, J. in Sarnam Singh v. Smt Pushpa Devi, 1986 All LJ 507 in which a similar plea had been raised and the decision rendered was that a teacher serving in a Higher Secondary School in Uttar Pradesh could not be said to hold an office of profit under the Government of Uttar Pradesh so as to be said to be disqualified for being a Member of the U.P. Legislative Assembly. A reference to this decision shall be made later. But, first the submissions made on behalf of the respondent by Sri A. Kumar : 9. Sri Kumar says that the words used in Article 191(1)(a) of the Constitution are of wide import and would embrace within their ambit an office of profit not only under the State but also under an instrumentality or agency of the State. He further says that an institution like the one in which petitioner Tripathi was serving and which was, admittedly, governed by various statutory provisions was an agency or instrumentality of the State. A person serving in such an institution was also to be held disqualified from becoming a Member of the State Legislative Assembly. The Returning Officer was, according to the submission, justified in rejecting the nomination of petitioner Tripathi on this ground. The parties are not at issue on the question that the office of a Lecturer in an aided institution is not only an office but an office of profit. They are at issue on the question whether this office of profit is"under the Government of a State". Counsel have, therefore, confined their arguments to this aspect alone. 10. In the decision in Sarnam Singh's case (1986 All LJ 507), which has been followed by O.P. Verma, J. in Election Petn. No. 19 of 1985 Suraj Singh Shakya v. Virendra (decided on Jan. 12, 1987) and Election Petn. No. 20 of 1985 Dhruva Kumar v. Pravin Kumar decided on Feb. 10. In the decision in Sarnam Singh's case (1986 All LJ 507), which has been followed by O.P. Verma, J. in Election Petn. No. 19 of 1985 Suraj Singh Shakya v. Virendra (decided on Jan. 12, 1987) and Election Petn. No. 20 of 1985 Dhruva Kumar v. Pravin Kumar decided on Feb. 18, 1987, B. D. Agarwal, J. has dealt, at length, with the provisions of the U.P. Intermediate Education Act, 1921 and the Regulations framed thereunder; the U.P. High School and Intermediate Colleges (Payment of Salary to teachers and other employees) Act, 1971; the U.P. Secondary Education Services Commissions and Selection Boards Act, 1982, the U.P. Higher Education Service Commission Act, 1980; the U.P. High School and Intermediate Colleges (Reserve Pool Teachers) Ordinance, 1978; the U.P. Basic Education Act, 1972; the Rules of the U.P. School and Colleges teachers Gratuity Fund and the Rules of Contributory Provident Fund, Insurance, Pension Scheme, (triple benefit scheme); U.P. Education Code; relevant provisions of the Constitution and a number of decisions of the Supreme Court. In his decision, the learned Judge has culled out some basic tests and enumerated the essential premise which have bearing on the question as to when does an office become an office of profit under the State within the meaning of Article 191(1)(a) of the Constitution. He has found, and in my opinion, rightly, that for holding an office of profit under the Government one need not be in the service of the Government and there need be no relationship of master and servant between them. The payment of remuneration not from the public revenue is a neutral factor. The power to appoint, direct and remove, to regulate and discipline may he good indicia but are not decisive. The various factors which have been stressed by the Supreme Court as determinative of the holding of an "office' under Government, need not be conjointly present. The substance and not the form is material. In the words of the learned Judge (in para 19 of the report) : "The governing criteria has thus been held to be the degree of control the Government has over the concerned authority, the extent of control is the measure. The composition of the authority is relevant; the degree of dependence on Government, for its functional aspect and its financial needs ought be looked into as also whether the body is discharging important governmental function. The composition of the authority is relevant; the degree of dependence on Government, for its functional aspect and its financial needs ought be looked into as also whether the body is discharging important governmental function. This would depend considerably on the facts and circumstances of each case. The person concerned need not be placed directly under the State Government it may sometimes be that the form is of a body corporate independent' of the Government but in substance it may be just the alter ego of the Government itself. The submissions of Sri Mishra that the concept of instrumentality is relevant for purposes of the enforcement of the Fundamental Rights or giving effect to the Directive Principles of State Policy and for the exercise of the writ jurisdiction, but not in relation to Article 191(1)(a) or 102(1)(a) for that matter, may not be acceded to. It is true that these Articles do not refer in terms to local or other authority as is done in Article 58(2) or 66(4) but, if the control of the authority is in form alone and not deep or pervasive, and the extent or measure of Government control is preponderating it would amount virtually as of the State Government itself. In Agartala Municipality AIR 1985 SC 211 also there is recognition given to the fact that the term office of profit under the Government' used in clause in Article 191(1)(a) is an expression of wider import than a post held under the Government which is dealt with in part XIV of the Constitution. "The measure of control by the Government over a local authority should be judged in order to eliminate the possibility of a conflict between duty and interest and to maintain the purity of the elected bodies." Also, those in para 23 of the report, where he says, that : "Education is indisputably basic to the realisation of the goals set out in the preamble to the Constitution. One of the cherished objects is to secure to all its citizens the liberty of thought, expression, belief, faith and worship. Nothing provokes and stimulates thought and expression in people more than education. That the welfare State as ours postulates that the State must try its best to make effective provisions to secure education for its citizens depending on its capacity and the constraints of development hardly admits of two opinions. Nothing provokes and stimulates thought and expression in people more than education. That the welfare State as ours postulates that the State must try its best to make effective provisions to secure education for its citizens depending on its capacity and the constraints of development hardly admits of two opinions. Article 41 of the Directive Principles of State Policy envisage this plainly; promotion of educational and economic interest of the Scheduled castes, Scheduled tribes and other weaker sections is a special responsibility entrusted to the State (Art. 46). In Re : Kerala Education Bill, AIR 1958 SC 956 , Article 45 enjoins upon the State to endeavour to provide within a specified period for free and compulsory education for all children until they complete the age of fourteen years. I am not impressed by the argument of Sri Mishra that confined as Article 45 is to the imparting of basic education this in any manner erodes against the mandate contained in Articles 41 and 45. To the extent basic education is concerned the provision is special, but the rest are nonetheless fundamental in the governance of the country creating obligations or duties binding on the State." 11. The learned Judge, however, noticed the caution which the Supreme Court gave in Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi AIR 1981 SC 487 by saying that while giving a wide meaning to the expression 'other authorities' in Article 12 of the Constitution, it must be realised that it should not be stretched so far as to bring in every autonomous body which has some nexus with the Government within the sweep of the expression. The learned Judge felt that the range of governmental activity was undoubtedly broad and varied but merely because an activity may be such as may legitimately be carried on by government, it did not mean that a Corporation which is otherwise a private entity, would be instrumentality or agency of Government by reason of carrying on of such activity. 12. The learned Judge felt that the range of governmental activity was undoubtedly broad and varied but merely because an activity may be such as may legitimately be carried on by government, it did not mean that a Corporation which is otherwise a private entity, would be instrumentality or agency of Government by reason of carrying on of such activity. 12. The conclusion which the learned Judge has recorded (in para 56), after a detailed consideration of various statutory provisions placed before him, was that : "...........control of the State Government though expanding vis-a-vis the Committee of Management constituted under the Scheme of Administration framed in accordance with the provisions of the Intermediate Education Act or the Commission created under the U.P. Act 5 of 1982 is not such as might give rise to any conflict between the personal interest of a person placed in the position of .......a teacher in a Higher Secondary School and his duties as a member of the Legislature and in this manner defeat the central object underlying the statutory disqualification....... " The test, with reference to which the aforesaid conclusion was arrived at, was the one laid down by the Supreme Court in Ashok Kumar Bhattacharyya v. Ajay Biswas AIR 1985 SC 211 where the issue was whether an Accountant Incharge of the Agartala Municipality held an office of profit within the meaning of Article 102(1)(a) of the Constitution. On the finding that though the Government exercised certain amount of control and supervision, the Supreme Court held that the Accountant Incharge was not an employee of the Government nor was he required to perform governmental functions for the Government. The test which the Supreme Court laid down was that : "The measure of control by the Government over a local Authority should be judged in order to eliminate the possibility of a conflict between duty and interest and to maintain the purity of elected bodies." 13. The learned Judge took pains, in the elaborate judgment delivered by him in Sarnam Singh's case (1986 All LJ 507), to deal with the various facets of the plea that a teacher in an aided institution of the nature in which the election petitioner was in employment as a Lecturer, held an office of profit under the Government. He negatived the plea. He negatived the plea. Sri Ashok Khare, who had appeared before him on behalf of the election petitioner, had placed the case on his behalf with-great ability and industry. Virtually the same submissions were made before me by Sri A. Kumar, appearing for the first respondent in this election petition, with a view to persuade me to hold that the decision of brother B. D. Agarwal, J. needed reconsideration, inasmuch as, a teacher did hold an office of profit under the State Government because the Institution in which he was serving was an instrumentality or agency of the State Government performing governmental functions. 14. Having heard Sri A. Kumar at great length and having given due consideration to the submissions made by a competent counsel like him, I find it difficult to take a view different from the one expressed by B. D. Agarwal, J. in Sarnam Singh's case (1986 All LJ 507). I entirely concur with the learned Judge in the reasons recorded by him in the judgment and the conclusion arrived at by him. I may add that the provisions of the Uttar Pradesh Educational Institutions (Prevention of Dissipation of Assets) Act, 1974 (U.P. Act 3 of 1975) to which also my attention was drawn by Sri A. Kumar and which had not been placed before B. D. Agarwal, J. do not alter the position of the Institution. As rightly pointed out by Sri K. N. Tripathi, appearing for the election petitioner, the provisions of this Act, which has a limited object to avoid dissipation of assets of an Institution, leave wide choice with the Management Committee for action by it. The provisions of the Act undoubtedly impose restrictions upon the powers of the Management Committee but there is no provision in it enabling the Director of Education to compel the Management Committee to transfer any property if the Management Committee does not want to do so. In totality, therefore, the provisions do not convert the Management Committee into an instrumentality of the State. Most of the cases relied upon by Sri A. Kumar, according to Sri Tripathi, are those which were concerned with the question whether a particular body was "State" within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution. Sri Tripathi is plainly right in his submission. 15. Most of the cases relied upon by Sri A. Kumar, according to Sri Tripathi, are those which were concerned with the question whether a particular body was "State" within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution. Sri Tripathi is plainly right in his submission. 15. In a recent decision in the case of Deepak Kumar Biswas v. Director of Public Instruction, AIR 1987 SC 1422 the question of the legal status of an employee in a privately managed college was considered by the Supreme Court. After dealing with several of its earlier decisions, the Supreme Court took the view that even though the College in question "may be governed by the statutes of the University and the Education Code framed by the Government of Meghalaya and even though the college may be receiving financial aid from the Government it would not be a statutory body because it has not been created by any statute and its existence is not dependent upon any statutory provision." 16. This decision indicates the distinction which has to be made in the case of an institution like the one in which the election petitioner was employed and the one which was under consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Bihari Lal Dobray v. Roshan Lal Dobray, AIR 1984 SC 385 upon which considerable reliance was placed by Sri A. Kumar. B. D. Agarwal, J. has dealt with this case in paras 51 to 53 of the judgment in Sarnam Singh's case (1986 All Li 5)7). He has rightly noticed what the Supreme Court said about the Board o f Basic Education in this case in para 53 when he extracts in para 21 of his decision the observation to the effect that "the Board for all practical purposes is a department of the Government and its autonomy is negligible." In other words, the Supreme Court, having regard to the various provisions of the U.P. Basic Education Act, 1972, judged in the light of the Statement of Objects and Reasons attached to the Bill which later became an Act, came to the conclusion that the Board was for all practical purposes, a Department of the Government. 17. 17. The main thrust of the submission of Sri A. Kumar was that having regard to the recent trend of judicial thinking by the Supreme Court, the line of distinction between a body which could be treated to be an instrumentality or agency of the Government and the Government itself had become very thin. Consequently, this court should give an extended meaning to the words "under the government" used in Article 191(1)(a) of the Constitution by including employment even under those bodies which could he treated to be performing governmental functions and thus being, in a sense, the instrumentality or agency of the government. This submission overlooks that howsoever thin may be the dividing line between a body which is a part of the Government or its instrumentality or agency properly understood and a private body hedged in by multifarious control by the government, the line has yet not been obliterated. may be, some day, the Supreme Court may itself choose to do so but so long as the caution given by it in the case of Ajai Hasia, AIR 1981 SC 487 continues to exist, it is difficult to hold that merely because an activity which may be such as may legitimately be carried on by the Government, the Corporation, which is otherwise a private entity, will become an instrumentality or agency of the Government by reason of carrying on such activity. After all, while judging whether an employee of any authority under the control of the Government would become holder of office of profit under the Government, it cannot be ignored that "the measure and nature of control exercised by the Government over the employee must be judged.... so as to avoid any possible conflict between personal interest and duties." Disqualification under Article 191(1)(a) of the Constitution must necessarily be related to this possibility of a conflict between personal interest of an employee and the duties as a Legislator. 18. To quote the words of the Supreme Court in Biharilal Dobray, AIR 1984 SC -385 : "the object of enacting Article 191(t)(a) is plain. A person who is elected to a Legislature should be free to carry on his duties fearlessly without being subjected to any kind of governmental pressure. 18. To quote the words of the Supreme Court in Biharilal Dobray, AIR 1984 SC -385 : "the object of enacting Article 191(t)(a) is plain. A person who is elected to a Legislature should be free to carry on his duties fearlessly without being subjected to any kind of governmental pressure. If such a person is holding an office which brings him remuneration and the Government has a voice in his continuance in that office, there is every likelihood of such person succumbing to the wishes of the Government. Article 191(l)(a) is intended to eliminate the possibility of a conflict between duty and interest and to maintain the purity of the Legislatures." 19. The fact that the election petitioner was a teacher in an institution which was, in several respects, under the control of the State Government, cannot necessarily lead to the conclusion that the continuance of the election petitioner as a teacher in the Institution of the kind where he was appointed depended upon the sweet will of the Government in spite of the various restrictions under which the Institution had to function. Sri Kumar could not point out any such provision in the entire body of regulatory measures dealt with by him during his submissions which could lead to the conclusion that the State Government could require the institution employing the petitioner to terminate his services at its will or that it could issue any such direction which may compel the Institution to bring about an end to the employment of the election petitioner as a teacher whenever the Government so choose. Nor could Sri Kumar suggest the kind of conflict contemplated by the object of Article 191(1)(a) of the Constitution between the duties of a teacher as a Legislator and the inhibition felt by him in performing it fearlessly on account of his employment as a teacher in the Institution. 20. The Supreme Court has given a clear indication in Bihari Lal Dobray's case (1984 All LJ 203) about the extent of control' of the Government which may lead to the conclusion that the employment under a body would amount to employment of a person under the Government. 20. The Supreme Court has given a clear indication in Bihari Lal Dobray's case (1984 All LJ 203) about the extent of control' of the Government which may lead to the conclusion that the employment under a body would amount to employment of a person under the Government. That indication is to be found in the observation contained in para 21 of the report where the Supreme Court says that "sometimes the form may be that of a ody corporate independent of the Government but in substance it may be just the alter ego of the Government itself." For purposes of Article 191(1)(a) of the Constitution, the office of profit should be held under the Government or under an alter ego of the Government. Holding of an office of profit under a body which falls short of being an alter ego of the Government may not disqualify a person from being chosen as and from being a Member of the Legislative Assembly under cl. (a) of Article 191(1) of the Constitution. 21. In Manmohan Singh Jaitla v. Commr. Union Territory Chandigarh AIR 1985 SC 36 the question was whether an aided school which was receiving more than 95% of its expenses and was subject to regulations made by the Education Department was an authority within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution and thus amenable to writ jurisdiction of the High Court or not.Likewise in Central Inland Water Transport Corpn. Ltd. v. Barojo Nath Ganguly, AIR 1986 SC 1571 what was said by the Supreme Court was that "for the purposes of Article 12 of the Constitution one must necessarily see through the corporate veil to ascertain whether behind that veil is the face of an instrumentality or agency of the State." In Tejinder Singh v. M/s Bharat Petroleum Corpn. Ltd., AIR 1987. SC 51 the Supreme Court referred to its earlier judgment in Som Prakash Rekhi v. Union of India AIR 1981 SC 212 for its view that M/s Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. was "State" within the meaning of Article 12'of the Constitution, and that there was no dispute before it that the petitioner was entitled to invoke the protection of Article 14 of the Constitution. Similarly in O.P. Bhandari v. Indian Tourism Development Corpn. Similarly in O.P. Bhandari v. Indian Tourism Development Corpn. Ltd. AIR 1987 SC 111 there was no dispute about the I.T.D.C. being 'State' within the parameters of Article 12 of the Constitution as being an instrumentality of the State as per the law enunciated by the Supreme Court in Central Inland Water Transport Corpn. Ltd. AIR 1986 SC 1571 . These decisions do not lend support to the plea which Sri Kumar has made before this Court. 22. Part X V oft he Constitution deals with elections. Article 326 contemplates the elections to the House of the People and to the Legislative Assemblies of States to be on the basis of adult suffrage. This Article also says that every person who is a citizen of India and who,is not less than twenty-one years of age on such date as may be fixed in that behalf by or under any law made by the appropriate Legislature and is not otherwise disqualified under the Constitution or any law made by the appropriate Legislature on the ground of non-residence, unsoundness of mind, crime or corrupt or illegal practice, shall be entitled to be registered as a voter at any such election. Sri K. N. Tripathi urged that keeping in view the object underlying Article 326, the restrictive provisions of Article 191 should receive a narrow construction. According to him, Article 191 should be held to disqualify only those persons who are not under the employment of the Government, as are so intimately connected with the employment under the Government that they are almost under the employment of the Government itself. In other words, according to him, the body under which they serve is such which is almost entirely under the control of the Government in the matter of appointment, dismissal etc., day-to-day functioning, payment of salary, acquisition of property and the like. The argument further is that the control, for purposes of Article 191, should be upon the employee who seeks election to the Legislature so that it might lead to a possible conflict between duties as a Legislator and his personal interest as an employee. This line of reasoning seem to get support from the observations of the Supreme Court in Biharilal Dobray, AIR 1984 SC 385 : 119~S-I All LJ 203) but it is really not necessary to pursue it further. 23. This line of reasoning seem to get support from the observations of the Supreme Court in Biharilal Dobray, AIR 1984 SC 385 : 119~S-I All LJ 203) but it is really not necessary to pursue it further. 23. The effort of Sri Kumar to persuade me to take a view different from that taken by brother B. D. Agarwal, J. in Sarnam Singh's case (1986 All LJ 507) having failed, the inevitable consequence is to hold that the nomination paper of the election petitioner was improperly rejected by the Returning Officer on the ground that he held an office of profit under Article 191(l)(a) of the Constitution of India. The second issue is, therefore, answered in the affirmative in favour of the election petitioner while the third issue is answered in the negative, again in favour of the election petitioner. 24. I n view of the decision recorded in respect of issues Nos. 2 and 3, it is not necessary to require the parties to lead evidence in respect of Issues Nos. 4 and 5 or to record any decision about them. 25. Issue No. 6 will have to be answered in favour of the election petitioner by holding that the nomination paper of Ram Prakash Tripathi (election petitioner) having been improperly rejected by the Returning Officer, the election of the first respondent Santosh alias Santosh Chaturvedi to the U.P. Legislative Assembly from 310 Chhibramau Assembly constituency in district Farrukhabad is void. 26. In the result, the petition is allowed. The election of the respondent to the U.P. Legislative Assembly from 310 Chhibramau Assembly constituency is declared void. 27. The petitioner is entitled to costs which is assessed at Rs. 500/-.