ORDER: The short but interesting point involved in the present writ petition is whether mere conviction in a criminal case, whatever be its nature, will cost a public servant his livelihood. 2. The petitioner, a double Graduate and a General Education Teacher for the Pre-Vocational Training Centre while preparing for his M. A. Examination gets eccentric and is arrested by the Police for shouting in a public thoroughfare. He is charged under s. 290 of the Indian Penal Code for having committed public nuisance and is convicted and sentenced by a Magistrate to pay a fine of Rs. 5/- and in default to suffer simple imprisonment for a day. 3. This small incident occurring on December 7, 1967, which ordinarily would have gone unnoticed, result in petitioner’s suspension by the Director of Public Instruction, West Bengal, by his order dated June 24, 1968, which continues. 4. The very same authority then directs the petitioner by his order dated February 17, 1969, to appear before a Medical Board for a report regarding his medical fitness and on such examination he is found fit clinically. 5. But the matter hangs simply on the ground of his conviction in he case under s. 290 IPC as if he had no other alternative. 6. All his entreaties before the concerned authority having failed to evoke any sympathy the petitioner seeks redress in this Court by filing a writ petition in the year 1979. It drags on. 7. He had shouted his way to dismissal in eccentricity and then cried his voice hoarse in normalcy to get back to service. And now after long twenty years from the date of that fateful shouting, the court is being called upon to answer whether a mere conviction in a criminal case should cost a public servant his source of livelihood which ordinarily is neither destroyed by fire nor lost by drowning. 8. The State respondents having failed to respond, service of notice notwithstanding, the matter was heard ex-parte. However, this day Mr. Sumit Panja, the learned Advocate appeared for the State respondents but only to say that he no instructions from his clients in spite of all endeavours. 9. 8. The State respondents having failed to respond, service of notice notwithstanding, the matter was heard ex-parte. However, this day Mr. Sumit Panja, the learned Advocate appeared for the State respondents but only to say that he no instructions from his clients in spite of all endeavours. 9. The order of dismissal of the petitioner, it may be mentioned at the outset, was not preceded by any departmental enquiry under Rule 10 of West Bengal Service (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1971 And this was quite in keeping with Rule 11, which excludes application of Rule 10 in a case where a person is dismissed or removed or reduced in rank on the ground of conduct which had led to his conviction on a criminal charge. 10. Significantly, the Rules, namely, the West Bengal Services (Classification, control and Appeal) Rules, 1971, are silent as regards to the various acts and omissions that may lead to the imposition of penalties as provided by Rule 8. 11. Rule 11, however, implies that a person can be dismissed or removed or reduced in rank on the ground of conduct which has led to his conviction on a criminal charge. But this Rule has to be read with Rule 8 which provides that the penalties as specified therein may be imposed for “good and sufficient” reasons. 12. Thus, for imposing punishment the punishing authority should not act blind-fold Being a quasi-judicial authority it should exercise its discretion properly and before inflicting any punishment, which may have far-reaching consequences, it should be fully satisfied that the punishment so imposed is justified, considering particularly the nature of the alleged misconduct. No punishment should be imposed which may appear to be grossly disproportionate to the misconduct alleged and proved. 13. The Supreme Court in Divisional Personnel Officer v. T. R. Chellapan, AIR 1975 SC 2216 while considering the implication of the word ‘consider’ in Rule 14(1) of the Railway Servants (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1968, observed that: “The word ‘consider’ in the last para of Rule 14(1) merely connotes that there should be active application of the mind by the disciplinary authority after considering the entire circumstances of the case in order to decide the nature and extent of the penalty to be imposed on the delinquent employee on his conviction on a criminal charge. The provision confers power on the disciplinary authority to decide whether in eh facts and circumstances of a particular case what penalty, if at all, should be imposed on eh delinquent employee” 14. The words used in Rule 8 of the West Bengal Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1971, in my view, are much stronger than the word ‘consider’ as interpreted by the Supreme Court. The words “for good and sufficient reasons” as used in Rule 8 require the disciplinary authority to be very much circumspect in the matter of awarding punishment and the order of punishment for any particular misconduct should clearly indicate that there was active application of the mind in the matter. In other words, the order must show on the face of it that the disciplinary authority duly considered whether in the facts and circumstances of the particular case the penalty imposed id justified. 15. In Uma Charan v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1981 SC 1951 the Supreme Court observed that : “Reasons are the links between the materials on which certain conclusions are based and the actual conclusion. They disclose how the mind is applied to the subject matter for a decision whether it is purely administrative or quasi-judicial. They should reveal a rational nexus between the facts considered and the conclusions reached. Only in this way can opinions or decisions recorded be shown to be manifestly just and reasonable” 16. So far conviction on a criminal charge is concerned, the observations of the Supreme Court in Chellapan’s case (supra) clearly indicate that mere conviction an a criminal charge would not dispense with the requirement of an application of mind by the disciplinary authority And further, that depending on the circumstances of any particular case, no punishment at all may be inflicted on such conviction. 17. In the instant case, the impugned order of dismissal dated January 15, 1978, is conspicuous by absence of any reason an total non-application of the mind. 18. It is really unfortunate that an authority like the Director of Public instruction without least application of his mind decided to deprive a person of his livelihood simply because of his conviction in a petty case not involving moral turpitude, without bothering even for a moment to consider whether the punishment so imposed was grossly disproportionate to the misconduct. 19. It is really unfortunate that an authority like the Director of Public instruction without least application of his mind decided to deprive a person of his livelihood simply because of his conviction in a petty case not involving moral turpitude, without bothering even for a moment to consider whether the punishment so imposed was grossly disproportionate to the misconduct. 19. He completely overlooked the fact that before inflicting the punishment he was required to assign good and sufficient reasons which is a precondition under Rule 8 as already referred to earlier. He should have realised that he was under no compulsion to order dismissal in every case of conviction on a criminal charge. 20. The result of this non application of mind has been simply disastrous. For having committed a petty offence and that too unwittingly, a young teacher was put under suspension in 1968, dismissed in 1978 and still now he is paying the penalty for the indiscreet act of his superior. 21. In the circumstances above, the writ petition succeeds and the Rule in made absolute. 22. The impugned order of dismissal (Annexure ‘H’) is hereby set aside. Since the nature of the misconduct does not justify any punishment whatsoever, the petitioner is released of the charge. 23. The respondents are directed by the issue of a writ in the nature of Mandamus to reinstate the petitioner in service within six weeks from the date of the communication of this order and to pay him 50% of the wages starting from the date of suspension till the date of reinstatement within a period of sixty days thereafter. There will be no order for costs. 24. Let a copy of this order be communicate to the respondents No. 1, 2 and 3 at the cost of the petitioner. 25. The petitioner is directed to deposit postal costs for such service by registered post with Acknowledgment Due within a week from this date. Rule made absolute ; impugned order set aside.