JUDGMENT Binodanand Singh, J.- Both these appeals have been taken up and heard together since they arise out of a common judgment. 2. Both the appellants, i.e., appellant Obaid Akhtar of Cr. Appeal No. 195 of 1984 and appellant Md. Anamul Haque of Cr. Anea1 No. 271 of 1984 have been convicted for the offence punishable under section 302/34 of the Indian Penal Code and each of them have been sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for life by judgment and order dated 25.1.1984 passed by Shri Awadh Kishore Prasad Sinha, 2nd Additional Sessions Judge, Sitamarhi, in Sessions Trial No. 156/82 / 42/82. Further these two appellants have also been convicted under section 394 of the Indian Penal Code and the same sentence has been awarded under this count as well Both the sentences, have, however, been ordered to run concurrently. 3. The relevant facts leading to these two appeals are that on 7.8.1980 while Sitaram Singh (P. W. 6), who is the informant of this case. the then Dafadar of Bit no 2 belonging to village Morsand, P.S. Runisaidpur in the District of Sitamarhi, was going to his house from Saidpur and when he reached near the High School, he heard a rumour that one dead body was lying in the maize field. He went inside the said maize field along with Jagarnath Singh (P.W.5), the Mukhiya of Morsand Gram Panchayat, at about 6 P.M. and there they found a highly decomposed dead body, i.e. only the skelton was found lying in the said maize field. The dead body was naked and near the dead body there were Hawai Chapal, flying-shrit, Pant, etc., besides broken teeth and the hairs of the deceased. Thereafter, Sitaram Singh, (P.W.6) went to Runisaidpur Police Station along with the aforesaid Mukhiya, Jagarnath Singh (P.W.5) and got a report written by Jagarnath Singh (P.W.5) regarding the aforesaid facts and submitted the same before the Officer-in-charge of Runisaidpur Police Station at 7 P.M. on the same date, which has been marked as Ext. 1, on the basis of which the Officer-in-charge of Runisaidpur Police Station drew up a formal First Information Report (Ext.6) under sections 302 and 201 of the Indian Penal Code, being Runisaidpur P.S. Case no.2(8)80, against unknown. Thus the aforesaid case came to be instituted. 4. 1, on the basis of which the Officer-in-charge of Runisaidpur Police Station drew up a formal First Information Report (Ext.6) under sections 302 and 201 of the Indian Penal Code, being Runisaidpur P.S. Case no.2(8)80, against unknown. Thus the aforesaid case came to be instituted. 4. The prosecution case as disclosed from the evidence of prosecution witnesses in brief, is that a few days prior to the recovery of the dead body, Md. Ayub (P.W.1) had sent his son Gulam Rabbani/deceased) to Hafizur Rahman, his brother-in-law, at Muzafferpur, who was residing at Muzaffarpur, to bring Rs.405/-from the said Hafizur Rahman, Gulam Rabbani, the deceased, had boarded the bus at Parihar, where P.W.1 Md. Ayub, the father of the Gulam Rabbni, had a shop for repairing the motor tyres those days. Appellant Obaid Akhtar who was known to Md. Ayub P.W.1) from before, also boarded the same bus at Parihar. Appellant Obaid Akhtar was a resident of village Kaba, which was situated towards Muzaffarpur, P.W.1-Md. Ayub told appellant Obaid Akhtar that his son Gulam Rabbni was going to Muzaffarpur to his Fufu (father's sister) and he should get him reached there. When his son did not come back even after 5 to 6 days, he (P.W.1) went to his sister at Muzaffarpur and enquired from his sister Khoraisa Khatoon (P.W.13) about his son Gulam Rabbani (deceased) and asked her that Gulam Rabbani his son bad come to her, but he had not returned till then. It is said that P. W.13-Khorais a Khatoon replied that his son was accompanied with another man and both of them had stayed at her place for two days and his son returned along with him. P. W .13 Khoraisa Khatoon was married with Hafizar Rahman. His sister further told that she had given Rs.405/- to Gulam Rabbani as also some clothes and had returned his son alongwith the man with whom he had come. She further told that the man who had accompanied Gulam Rabbai, had told her that he had been asked by Md. Ayub (P.W.1) that his son will take money from his Fufu and there after he should get him reached back to his (P.W.1) house. P.W.1 Md. Ayub thereafter began to search appellant Obaid Akhtar and his son, but neither his son nor appellant Obaid Akhtar could be found. Ayub (P.W.1) that his son will take money from his Fufu and there after he should get him reached back to his (P.W.1) house. P.W.1 Md. Ayub thereafter began to search appellant Obaid Akhtar and his son, but neither his son nor appellant Obaid Akhtar could be found. It is also stated that appellant Obaid Akhtar's father was the Gurubhui of P.W. 1 Md. Ayub. Thereafter it appears that P.W.1 Md. Ayub came back to his house and after arranging some money he sent Jainnul Abeddin (P.W.11) to search his son and also his younger brother Abdul Quayum (P.W.2) for the said purpose. P.Ws.2 and 11 went to Muzaffarpur on 10.8.1980 in search of Gulam Rabbani. There they met Khoraisa Khatoon (P.W.13) and enquired from her about Gulam Rabbani they were told by Khoraisa Khatoon (P.W.13) that she had given Rs.405/- to Gulam Rabbani and had returned him back with appellant Obaid Akhtar. Thereafter, these two persons i.e.P. Ws. 2 and 11 searched Gulam Rabbani and Obaid Akhtar here and there at Muzaffarpur, but none of them were found. They again returned to the place of Khoraisa Khatoon (P.W.13) and found appellant Obaid Akhtar there. P.W.2 Abdul Quayum said appellant Obaid Akhtar that his family members at the house were weeping since Gulam Rabbani bad not returned, hence he asked appellant Obaid Akhtar toacc0mp.my them to their house. Thereafter, P. Ws. 2 and 11 proceeded for Sursand alongwith appellant Obaid Akhtar and when they reached Sursaad, P.Ws. 2 and 11 began to make queries from appellant Obaid Akhtar and it is alleged that appellant Obaid Akhtar stated before them that after bringing Gulam Rabbani to Sitamarhi he had gal him boarder on a bus for Sursand. Thereafter, P.W.1 Md. Ayub further told appellant Obaid Akhtar that his son was simple by nature and requested him to tell the truth as to where his son was. Then appellant Obaid Akhtar disclosed before them that be and appellant Md. Anamul Haque (appellant in Cr. Thereafter, P.W.1 Md. Ayub further told appellant Obaid Akhtar that his son was simple by nature and requested him to tell the truth as to where his son was. Then appellant Obaid Akhtar disclosed before them that be and appellant Md. Anamul Haque (appellant in Cr. Appeal no.271/84) both had got Gulam Rabbani unboarded from the bus at Saidpur and told Gulam Rabbani that they had relations there, so they will go to their relations and than they will reach Gulam Rabbani to his house Thereafter, they took Gulam Rabbani to a maize field where Gulam Rabbani was done to death by throttling and Rs.405/- was taken away from his possession, i.e. from the possession of Gulam Rabbani after killing him and both of them, i.e. these two appellants distributed the money amongst themselves At that time the other witnesses, namely, P.Ws. 2, 3, 4, and 11 were also the e, besides others. Several persons began to assemble these, then P. W. 1 Md. Ayub took appellant Obaid Akhtar to Sursand Police Station and handed him over to the Police. Unfortunately, the evidence of the Investigating Officer is not available to us as he has not been examined hence we are deprived of the findings of the Investigating Officer. 5. 1t further appears that when the report (Ext.1) was submitted at Runisaidpur by PW. 6-Sitaram Singh, Defadar, on 7.8.1980 and the case was instituted, Sachidanand Singh (P. W. 9) who was then posted as the Assistant, Sub-Inspector of Police at Runisaidpur Police Station, went to the aforesaid maize field where the dead body was lying along with K. N. Ojha (not examined). There they found a highly decomposed dead body lying in the maize field. As it was night, he could not hold inquest on the dead body in that night and hence in the next morning, i.e. on 8.8.1980 he held inquest over the dead body under the order of K.N. Ojha, who was then posted as the Sub-Inspector of Police at the police Station and prepared inquest report (Ext. 2). He also prepared a seizure list, as directed by K. N. Ojha, S. I.; of the articles which were found near the dead body in presence of witnesses. The seizure list has' been marked as Ext.3. 2). He also prepared a seizure list, as directed by K. N. Ojha, S. I.; of the articles which were found near the dead body in presence of witnesses. The seizure list has' been marked as Ext.3. The materials found near the dead bedy were a pair of Hawai Chapal of yellow colour, white trousers (Paijama), having buttons, striped underwear, which was torn, and full flying-shirt, having red flowery prints thereon, besides some teeth and hairs of head. The seizure list was prepared in presence of witnesses Sitaram Rai and Ramnath Sah, the dead body chalan was also prepared which has been marked as Ext. 4. 6. It also appears that in course of police Investigation the dead body was sent to Sri Krishna Medical College Hospital Muzaffarpur, for postmortem examination where the postmortem examination over the dead body was held by the doctor on 9.8.1980. The doctor who held the postmortem examination has not been examined in this case, but the postmortem report has been brought in evidence by the prosecution without any objection by the defence under section 294 Cr. P. C. and the same has been marked as Ext. 8. According to the postmortem report the dead body was of an unknown male child who was brought from Morsand Tola within Runisaidpur Police Station by constable no. 247 Ram Pravesh Singh and Dafadar Sitaram Singh (P. W. 6). It appears from the postmortem report (Ext 8) that the dead body was a skeleton of a male child, which was denuded of the muscles, blood vessels and other structures except a few portion of muscles attached to left hand and right leg. No visceras were found in the chest; abdomen, pelvis, except a portion of penis was found. No injuries were found either on muscles attached to left hand and right leg or on the skeleton. The two incisors on the right Upper portion were found missing. According to the doctor it was not possible for him to say about the cause of death. 7. It further appears that after four to five days of handing over of accused appellant Obaid Akhtar to Police. P. W. 1 Md. Ayub went to Runisaidpur Police Station and he identified the flying-shirt, chappal, underwear, Paijama (trousers) as belonging to his son Gulam Rabbani (deceased). 8. As stated earlier appellant Obaid Akhtar was produced at Sursand Police Station by P.W. 1 Md. P. W. 1 Md. Ayub went to Runisaidpur Police Station and he identified the flying-shirt, chappal, underwear, Paijama (trousers) as belonging to his son Gulam Rabbani (deceased). 8. As stated earlier appellant Obaid Akhtar was produced at Sursand Police Station by P.W. 1 Md. Ayub and others and was handed over to the police. The police arrested him, Thereafter appellants Anamul Haque (appellant of Cr. Appeal no. 271/84) was also arrested by the police and both of them were forwarded to the court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Sitamarhi, and were produced before him on 14.8.1980. A requisition was also sent along with the forwarding report of these two appellants by the police officer to record their statements under section 164 Cr. P. C. The learned Chief Judicial Magistrate by order dated 14.8.1980 directed the appellants to be produced before Shri Nand Kishore Singh, Sub-divisional Judicial Magistrate, for their statement under section 164 Cr. P. C. being recorded. From the same order dated 14.8.1980, it appears that both the accused persons were ready to confess their guilt before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, hence the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate remanded both the appellants to Jail till 28.8.1980 with a direction to the Jail Superintendent to keep these two appellants in segregation It was also directed that if possible both the accused persons be kept in segregation in separate rooms, till their statements under section 164 Cr. P. C. were recorded by a Magistrate. From the record it appears that after the receipt of the record from the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, on 16.8.1980 both the appellants were produced in the Court of Sri Nand Kishore Narayan Singh (P. W. 12). Sub-divisional Judicial Magistrate, Sitamarhi, for recording their statements under section 164 Cr. P. C. After observing all the legal formalities P. W. 12 Nand Kishore Narain Singh the Sub-divisional Judicial Magistrate recorded the confessional statements of both the appellants one by one and the aforesaid confessional statements have been marked as Exts. 5 and 5/1. Ext. 5 is the confessional statement of appellant Obaid Akhtar, whereas Ext. 5/1 is the confessional statement of appellant Anamul Haque. Thereafter the learned Sub-divisional Judicial Magistrate (P.W. 12) returned back the records of the case to the Court of learned Chief Judicial Magistrate and the accused-appellants were sent back to the Jail. 9. 5 and 5/1. Ext. 5 is the confessional statement of appellant Obaid Akhtar, whereas Ext. 5/1 is the confessional statement of appellant Anamul Haque. Thereafter the learned Sub-divisional Judicial Magistrate (P.W. 12) returned back the records of the case to the Court of learned Chief Judicial Magistrate and the accused-appellants were sent back to the Jail. 9. After completing investigation the police submitted charge-sheet against both the appellants and after cognizance and commitment the accused-appellants were put on trial. In course of trial in all 14 witnesses were produced on behalf of the prosecution out of whom P.W. 7 Ramashray Paswan and P. W. 10 Ram Pravesh Singh have been tendered and the rest of the witnesses have been examined. The accused persons, i.e. these two appellants were also examined under section 313 Cr. P. C. 10. The case of the defence appears to be the total denial of the prosecutions allegations and their participation in the commission of crime in question. Besides they also denied to have made any confessional statement before any Magistrate. The learned trial court at the conclusion of the trial rejected the defence plea and accepted the prosecution evidence including the two judicial confessions-one made by appellant Obaid Akhtar (Ext. 5) and the other made by appellant Anumal Haque (Ext. 5/1) as voluntary and true and held that they had killed Gulam Rabbani by throttling in a maize field at Saidpur in furtherance of their common intention and had robbed him of Rs. 405/- which was with him and thus the prosecution succeeded in bringing home the charges to accused persons, i. e. these two appellants beyond all shadow of reasonable doubt. On the basis of the aforesaid findings the learned trial court passed the orders of conviction and sentence as stated above. 11. Appellant Obaid Akhtar in Cr. Appeal no. 175/84 bas been represented through a counsel, but no body was appearing on behalf of appellant Md. Anumal Haque in Cr. Appeal no. 271/84. On the basis of the aforesaid findings the learned trial court passed the orders of conviction and sentence as stated above. 11. Appellant Obaid Akhtar in Cr. Appeal no. 175/84 bas been represented through a counsel, but no body was appearing on behalf of appellant Md. Anumal Haque in Cr. Appeal no. 271/84. It appears that initially both the appellants had filed a joint memo of appeal, but later on it was detected that the learned advocate filing the memo of appeal, had not filed Vakalatnama on behalf of appellant Anumal Haque and thus he was not authorised by appellant Anumal Haque to file an appeal on his behalf, which was consequently not entertained by this Court since the said memo of appeal, so far as appellant Anumal Haque, was without any power of appellant Anumal Haque. He, however, filed an appeal from Jail, being Cr. Appeal no. 271/84 At the time of hearing of the appeals, Mrs. Anjana Prakash Advocate offered to appear on his behalf amicus curie and the permission was granted by order dated 10.5.1984. 12. The respective counsels appearing for these two appellants have challenged the judgment of the trial court and orders of conviction and the sentence passed by it mainly on the ground that the findings and the conclusions of the learned trial court are not based on proper appreciation of the evidence; and that the learned trial court was not justified in passing the orders of conviction and sentence mainly on the confessional statements of the appellants individually as well as on the confessional statement of the co-accused. No doubt the prosecution evidence against these two appellants are not quite similar and the cases of both the appellants stand somewhat on different footing, but the common materials against them are their respective judicial confessions because, as already stated above both of them made judicial confessions which have been marked as Exts. 5 & 5/1, respectively. 13. The learned counsel appearing in both the appeals have attacked the aforesaid two judicial confessions i.e., the judicial confession recorded on the statement of appellant Obaid Akhtar alias Obaid Akhtar Hashmi as well as appellant Anamul Haque, first on the ground that the confessional statements of both the appellants should Dot be acted upon since they are not voluntary and true. The learned counsel appearing for appellant Anamul Haque has contended that the findings of the learned trial court convicting this appellant are mainly based on the two judicial confessions, which are not legal and justified. Besides, she has also argued that the two judicial confessions should not have been acted upon since they are not voluntary and true. 14. So far as the learned counsel appearing for appellant Obaid Akhtar is concerned, his first submission has been that these two appellants had not made any judicial confession at all and alternatively it has been contended that even if it be accepted that they made confession before the learned Magistrate, their confessional statements are Dot voluntary and true. At the very outset it can be stated that in this case there is no lye witness regarding the commission of alleged crime. The prosecution case is based on circumstantial evidence as well as the confessional statements of these two appellants and the extra judicial confession of appellant Obaid Akhtar. 15. I propose to take up the first submission of the learned counsel appearing for appellant Obaid Akhtar that the accused persons, i. e. these two appellants had not at all made any confessional statement. This submission or this stand of the learned counsel appearing for this appellant may be repelled at once on the simple ground that it is difficult to disbelieve the evidence of P. W. 12 Nand Kishore Narain Singh, Sub-divisional Judicial Magistrate, Sitamarhi West, who recorded their confessional statements. He has been examined in court and in court he has stated that he recorded their confessional statements as directed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate. This fact also finds support from the record of the case, i. e, the orders passed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate. Both the appellants were produced in the court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Sitamarhi on 14.9.1980 and it appears from the order dated 14.8.1980 passed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate that both the appellants were ready to make confession before him, but by way of precaution, it appears that the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate remanded them to the judicial custody, i.e. to the jail in view of the fact that they had come from the police custody. The learned Chief Judicial Magistrate was who enough to take suitable measure by way of giving direction in his order dated l4.8.1980 directing the jail authority to keep these two appellants in segregation possibly in two separate rooms. No doubt these two appellants have denied to have made any confessional statement before Magistrate in their statement under section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure Thus this was a part of their defence, but it appears that the defence took no step to substantiate this stand taken by the two accused persons i. e. these two appellants. P. W. 12 Shri Nand Kishore Narain Singh, who recorded the confessional statements of these two appellants, has stated in his evidence that he had recorded the confessional statements of these two appellants after observing all the legal formalities. This witness has been cross-examined. It has nowhere been suggested or put to this witness by the defence counsel in cross examination that he had not recorded the confessional statements of these two appellants and he was telling lie in the court. It was open to the defence to get the signature of appellant Obaid Akhtar and the thumb impression of appellant Anamul Haque examined by the handwriting expert as well as finger print expert in order to show that the confessional statements did not bear their signature and thumb impression respectively. 16. In view of the aforesaid facts and the materials available on the record, the above submission of the learned counsel appearing for appellant Obaid Akhtar h without substance and the same is accordingly rejected and it has to be held that Ext. 5 & 5/1 are the confessional statements of appellants Obaid Akhtar and Anamul Haque, respectively, recorded by P.W. 12 Sri Nand Kishore Narain Singh, the Sub-divisional Judicial Magistrate. 17. At this very stage it may be pointed out that on behalf of appellant Anamul Haque, at the time of he: ring, it has not been argued that he did not make any confessional statement, but from the statement of appellant Anamul Haque as well recorded under section 313 Cr. P. C. it appear that he stated before the trial court that he did not make any confession. That is why the question, whether appellant Anamul Haque had also made the confession before the Su b- divisional Judicial Magistrate (P. W. 12) or not has been considered. 18. P. C. it appear that he stated before the trial court that he did not make any confession. That is why the question, whether appellant Anamul Haque had also made the confession before the Su b- divisional Judicial Magistrate (P. W. 12) or not has been considered. 18. A common argument has been advanced on behalf of both the appellants regarding the value which is to be attached to the aforesaid two confessional statements allegedly made by two appellants. First of all, it has been argued that the confessional statements of these two appellants recorded by the Sub-divisional Judicial Magistrate (P. W. 12) are not voluntary. In this connection two points have been raised (i) the accused persons, i.e., these two appellants were not given sufficient time for reflection, i.e. to think over as to whether they should make confession or not, after giving warning and being cautioned by the Magistrate regarding the confession. In the present case from the evidence as well as from the two confessional statements it would appear that when these two appellants were produced before the Sub-divisional Judicial Magistrate (P.W.12), after giving due caution and warning they were kept in segregation in the court for one hour in order to give them time for reflection. It has been argued in this connection that the time of one hour given for reflection, after warning and caution, was not sufficient enough for the accused persons to think over the matter and to decide as to whether they should make confession before a Magistrate or not and, therefore, on this ground alone the confessional statement of both the accused persons should be discarded I am unable to accept this contention in view of the fact that from the several decisions of the Supreme Court it would appear that there is no bard and fast rule laying down the time which should be given for reflection to an accused making confession. That differs from case to case depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case. As for example in a case in which an accused who makes confession is brought before a court after prolonged police remand, sufficient time for reflection will be necessary in order to remove the influence and fear of the police from the mind' of the accused as he had been produced in the court for statement from the police custody. As for example in a case in which an accused who makes confession is brought before a court after prolonged police remand, sufficient time for reflection will be necessary in order to remove the influence and fear of the police from the mind' of the accused as he had been produced in the court for statement from the police custody. But in the instant case the position is somewhat different. Appellant Obaid Akhtar was apprehended and handed over to the police on 12.8.1980, whereas appellant Anamul Haque appears to have been arrested on 13.8.80 and both the appellants were forwarded to the court of Chief Judicial Magistrate on 14.8.1980, i.e. very promptly, and from the conduct of the police it does not appear that they were interested in keeping the accused persons in their custody for a long time in order to extract confessional statement from them to help the prosecution. Besides, from the aforesaid circumstances, it appears that the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate in his wisdom did the proper thing by sending the two accused persons to jail, although both the accused persons were ready to make confession on 14.8.1980 itself. This appears to have been done by the Chief Judicial Magistrate in order to remove the police influence, which might be working in the mind of these two appellants. The two accused persons. i.e. the appellants were brought before the Sub-divisional Judicial Magistrate (P.W. 12), who recorded their confessional statements, from jail custody. So it can not be said that they were under the police influence at that time when they had made their confessional, statements. In this regard it was argued on behalf of the appellants that although in the order-sheet of the Chief Judicial Magistrate it is mentioned that the accused persons were directed to be sent to Sitamarhi jail and the Jail Superintendent was directed to keep them in segregation but there is nothing on the record to indicate that the aforesaid order of the Chief Judicial Magistrate were carried out. I am unable to agree with the aforesaid contention of the learned counsel in view of the fact that in ordinary course, it will be presumed that if an order is passed by the Court, it will be deemed that order must have been carried out, unless it is shown otherwise by the other side. I am unable to agree with the aforesaid contention of the learned counsel in view of the fact that in ordinary course, it will be presumed that if an order is passed by the Court, it will be deemed that order must have been carried out, unless it is shown otherwise by the other side. On the other hand, there is material in the instant case to establish that these two appellants were actually kept in Sitamarhi Jail as ordered by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, in segregation. In their confessional statements (Exts. 5 & 5/1), the learned Sub-divisional Judicial Magistrate (P.M. 12), who recorded the aforesaid confessional statements, has specifically recorded that before recording the confessional statement he ascertained that the accused persons were kept in Sitamarbi Jail in segregation for more than 24 hours. There is no reason to disbelieve the writings of P.W. 12, the Sub-divisional Judicial Magistrate, on the confessional statements itself. So in view of the fact that there is ample evidence to estabhish that both the appellants were kept in Judicial custody for more than 24 hours in segregation and from there they were brought before the learned Sub-divisional Judicial Magistrate (P.W. 12) who recorded the confessional statements of these two appellants. I am of the view that the time of one hour for reflection, after giving caution and warning by the learned Magistrate, is sufficient. 18(a). It has next been argued that the confessional statement of one accused should not be taken into consideration against the co-accused since they are self exculpatory. This submission is also not acceptable. It has also been argued by the learned counsel appearing for both the appellants that the accused persons, i e., these two appellants were not questioned properly by the learned Sub-divisional Judicial Magistrate (P.W. 12), who recorded the confessional statement of the two accused persons. But from the two confessional statements (Exts. 5 & 5/1) it appears that the learned Sub-divisional Judicial Magistrate, who recorded the confession has put certain questions in order to ascertain, whether the accused had understood the warning and whether the confession was voluntary and the same was not caused by any inducement, threat or promise, as barred under section 24 of the Indian Evidence Act. 5 & 5/1) it appears that the learned Sub-divisional Judicial Magistrate, who recorded the confession has put certain questions in order to ascertain, whether the accused had understood the warning and whether the confession was voluntary and the same was not caused by any inducement, threat or promise, as barred under section 24 of the Indian Evidence Act. In this connection it was also contended that the learned Magistrate should have put a question that why they were making confessional statements, and if this question has not been put, the confessional statements made by the accused persons cannot be said to be voluntary and in support of the aforesaid submission they have relied on the case of Devendra Prasad Tiwari Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh (AIR 1918 Supreme Court 1544), in which it has been observed that, the Judicial Magistrate who recorded the confessional statement of the appellant did not question him as to why he was making the confession in order to ascertain as to whether it was voluntary or not. The above observation appears to have been made the Supreme Court in a quite different circumstances. In that very case it has been observed by the Supreme Court that before a confessional statement made under section 164 Cr. P.C. can be acted upon, it must be shown to be voluntary and free from police influence and that the confessional statement made by the appellant in the aforesaid case was rejected on the ground that the confessional statement suffered from serious infirmities in that (1) there was no contemporaneous record to show that the appellant was actually kept in jail as ordered by Judicial Magistrate; (2) the Judicial Magistrate, who recorded the confessional statement of the appellant did not question him as to why he was making the confession and (3) there was also nothing in the statement of the said Magistrate to show that he told the appellant that he would not be remanded to the police lock up even if he did not confess his guilt. The facts and circumstances of the case in hand are quite different. In the present case, the learned Sub-divisional Judicial Magistrate (P.W. 12) while recording the confessional statements (Exts. The facts and circumstances of the case in hand are quite different. In the present case, the learned Sub-divisional Judicial Magistrate (P.W. 12) while recording the confessional statements (Exts. 5 & 5/1) has ascertained from the accused-appellants themselves that they had been kept in Sitamarhi Jail and have been brought from there and from the lower court records it appears that they were again remanded back to jail and were not allowed to be given on police remand. So in these circumstances I think that the observations made by the Supreme Court in the case referred to above are not applicable in the case in hand and only because the learned Magistrate did not put a question to the accused persons as to why they were making confession cannot be held to be fatal in this case while taking into consideration their confession statements. 19. For ascertaining the voluntary character of the confessional statements it is necessary to consider the subjective satisfaction of the Sub-divisional Judicial Magistrate (P.W. 12) regarding the confession. The learned Sub-divisional Judicial Magistrate (P.W. 12) has given the certificate on two confessional statements (Exts. 5 and 5/1) that he had explained to the respective accused persons that they were not bound to make confession and that if they did so and, make any confession the same may be used as evidence against them and he believed that this confession was voluntarily made. Thus, from the records it appears that the learned Magistrate, after being fully satisfied that the accused persons were making confession voluntarily without any inducement, threat or promise proceeding from any source including the police, recorded their confessional statements (Ext 5 & 5/1). 20. I have gone through the confessional statements (Exts. 5 & 5/1) of both the accused persons, i.e, these two appellants. 20. I have gone through the confessional statements (Exts. 5 & 5/1) of both the accused persons, i.e, these two appellants. In order to appreciate the aforesaid submissions and consider this important question it appears necessary to quote their confessional statements which are as follows :- Confessional statement of appellant Obaid Akhtar : iz’u %& rqe tkurs gks fd eSa ,d iqfyl vf/kdkjh ugha cfYd ,d U;kf;d naMkf/kdkjh gw¡ \ mRrj %& th gk¡ esa tkurk gw¡ fd vki iqfyl ugha gSaA vki eftLVªsV gSaA iz’u %& D;k rqe tkurs gks fd rqe laLohd`fr (confession) djus ds fy, ck/; ugha gks \ mRrj %& th gk¡ \ iz’u %& D;k rqe ;g Hkh tkurs gks fd ;g laLohd`fr rqEgkjs fo:) lk{; gksxk rFkk blds vk/kkj ij rqEgsa naM Hkh fey ldrk \ mRrj %& th gk¡A tkurk gw¡A iz’u %& vki xqyke jckuh dh dfFkr gR;k ds laca/k esa D;k tkurs gks \ mRrj %& fnukad 2&8&80 dks xqyke jckuh ds lkFk ¼iVk gqvk½ ;gk¡ ls ¼pqM+h egYyk ls½ dh lqjlUM vius ?kj tkuk FkkA xqyke jokuh dks QqQh us eq>s xqyke jokuh dks lqjlUM igq¡pkus dks dgk FkkA xqyke jokuh ds ikl 405@& :i;k FkkA eqtQjiqj cl LVSUM ij vukeqy ls eq>s HksaV gqbZA og Hkh lkFk gks x;kA ge yksx lhrke<+h okys cl ij p<+s rFkk :uhlsniqj esa mrj x;sA vukeqy us dgk fd fjLrsnkj ls HksaV dj ge yksx lhrke<+h pysaxsA ge yksx edbZ ds [ksr dh rjQ ls pysA vukeqy us xqyke jokuh dks edbZ ds [ksr esa xnZu phi fn;kA mlus eq>s Nqjh fnyykrs gq;s dgk fd xqyke jokuh dk iSj idM+ks ugha rks eSa rqEgsa Nqjh ekj nw¡xkA eSaus Mj ds ekjs xqyke jokuh dk Vkax idM+ fy;kA xqyke jokuh ds eq¡g ij vukeqy us nks ykr ekjk ftlls xqyke jokuh dk nkar VwV x;kA xqyke jokuh ds iStkek ds uhps dPNk FkkA mldh Mksjh dks ysdj vukeqy us xqyke jokuh ds xjnu esa yisV dj dl fn;k ftlls xqyke jokuh ej x;kA mlds ckn eSa rFkk vukeqy eqtQjiqj pys x;sA vukeqy us eq>s 100 :Œ fn;k rFkk 305@& :i;k dks mlus vius ikl j[k fy;kA mDr 405@& :i;k vukeqy xqyke jokuh dk ekjdj ys fy;k FkkA eqtQjiqj ls eSa dkok ?kj pyk x;kA Confessional Statement of appellant Anamul Haque : iz’u %& D;k rqe tkurs gks fd eSa ,d iqfyl vf/kdkjh ugha cfYd ,d U;kf;d naMkf/kdkjh gw¡ \ mRrj %& th gk¡] eSa tkurk gw¡ fd vki iqfyl ugha gSaA vki eftLVªsV gSaA iz’u %& D;k rqe tkurs gks fd rqe laLohd`fr (Confession) djus ds fy, ck/; ugha gks \ mRrj %& th gk¡A iz’u %& D;k rqe ;g Hkh tkurs gks fd ;g laLohd`fr rqEgkjs fo:) lk{; gksxk blds vk/kkj ij rqe vijk/kh Hkh ?kksf”kr fd;s tk ldrs gks rFkk rqEgs naM Hkh fey ldrk gS \ mRrj %& th gk¡A eSa tkurk gw¡A iz’u %& ftl ?kVuk ds laca/k esa iqfyl rqEgsa idM+h gS] mlds ckjs esa rqEgsa D;k dguk gS ]\ mRrj %& fnukad 2&8&1980 dks fnu esa mcsn v[rj ls esjh eqykdkr eqtQjiqj jsyos LVs’ku ds utnhd gqbZA mlds lkFk ,d yM+dk Fkk ftldk uke eSa ugha tkurkA mcsn us eq>ls dgk fd og lhrke<+h bl yM+ds dks igq¡pkus tk jgk gSA blds ikl :i;k gSA bldks ekj dj :i;k ys fy;k tk;sA ge rhuksa vkneh cl LVSaM ij vk;s rFkk lhrke<+h dk cl idM+sA :uhlSniqj esa ge rhuksa vkneh mrj x;sA mcsn cksyk fd dqjksrk ?kqe ysrs gSa rks lhrke<+h pysaxsA ge rhuksa tc edbZ ds utnhd igq¡ps rks mosn ml yM+ds dk uV~Vh idM+ fy;kA og eq>s ml yM+ds dk iSj idM+us dks dgkA yM+dk dks iVd dj ftlesa eSa iSj idM+k Fkk] mosn mldk uV~Vh pki fn;kA mlus ml yM+ds dk nkar ykr ls ekjdj rksM+ fn;kA mosn ml yM+ds ds QkMk esa ls 405@& :i;k fudky fy;kA ge nksuksa eqtQjiqj ykSV vk;s rFkk mDr jde esa ls vk/kk&vk/kk ck¡V fy;kA 21. The next point which has been raised to discard the confessional statements of the two accused persons, i.e., these two appellants by the learned counsel appearing for them, is that according to them the confessional statements of both has appellants, namely, Exts. 5 and 5/1 are self exculpatory, hence the confessional statements made by one accused cannot be used against a co-accused. 22 Section 30 of the Indian Evidence Act lays down that, when more persons than one are being tried jointly for the same offence, and a confession made by one of such persons affecting himself and some other of such persons, is proved, the court may take into consideration such confession. So in order to find out whether the two confessional statements made by the respective appellants affects himself or not, i.e., the same affects the maker or not. If the sames affects the maker it cannot be held to be self exculpatory rather it has to held to be self inculpatory. Both the appellants have stated in their statements (Exts- 5 & 5/1) that they got down from the bus at Runisaidpur near a maize field. According to appellant Obaid Akhtar, appellant Anamul Haque said him that they would go to Sitamarhi after meeting his relations. Thereafter, they started going on through the maize field when appellant Anlmul Heque throttled the neck of Gulam Rabbani (deceased) and appellant Anamul Haque sowing a dagger told him to catch hold of the legs of Gulam Rabbani otherwise he would be stabbed. Thereafter, out of fear he caught hold of the legs of Gulam Rabbani. He also said that appellant Anamul Haque gave him Rs. 100/- and Rs. 305/- was kept by him. The amount of Rs. 405/- was taken from the possession of Gulam Rabbani by appellant Anamul Haque after killing him, whereas appellant Anamul Haque says regarding the main occurrence that there was money with that boy, namely, Gulam Rabbani (deceased) which should be taken after killing him. All the three persons, name1y, both the appel1ants and the deceased started by a bus for Sitamar hi and got down at Runissidpur. According to him, appellant Obaid Akhtar told him that after visiting relations they would go to Sitamarhi. All the three persons, name1y, both the appel1ants and the deceased started by a bus for Sitamar hi and got down at Runissidpur. According to him, appellant Obaid Akhtar told him that after visiting relations they would go to Sitamarhi. Thereafter they reached in the maize field when appellant caught hold of the neck of that boy and asked this appellant, namely, Anamul Hdque to catch the legs of the deceased Gulam Rabbani. Appellant Obaid Akhtar threw the deceased on the ground and be caught bold of his legs and appellant Anamul Haque throttled the deceased. This appellant, namely, Anamul Haque bas further stated in his confessional statement that appellant Obaid Akhtar had taken away Rs.405/- from the waist of the deceased Gulam Rabbani and returned back to Muzaffarpur, where they distributed the money half and half. Therefore, from the above statements of both the accused, i.e., these two appellants as contained in their two confessional statements (Ext. 5 & 5/1), it would be apparent that both the appellants took part in killing the deceased as well as in distributing the money amongst them. The only difference is that one says that another person throttled the neck. But the facts remain that both the accused persons admit that at the time of killing Gulam Rubbani, either of them had caught hold of the legs of the deceased and thus both of them had taken part in the killing of the boy. Besides that it was stated on behalf of the appellants that there is some discrepancy with respect to the account, but the position is the same that money taken from the possession of deceased Gulam Rabbani was distributed and taken by both of them. This it cannot be said that the statements which they have made do not affect them and therefore the two confessional statements cannot be said to be self exculpatory and clearly they are self inculpatory confessions and therefore according to section 30 of the Indian Evidence Act they can be taken into consideration as against the maker as well as against the co-accused. 23. The next question which has been canvassed on behalf of the appellants is that both the appellants have retracted from their confession and therefore these confessional statements should not be taken into consideration while considering the guilt or innocence of the accused persons. 23. The next question which has been canvassed on behalf of the appellants is that both the appellants have retracted from their confession and therefore these confessional statements should not be taken into consideration while considering the guilt or innocence of the accused persons. Besides it has also been argued that except the confessional statements there are no other reliable material on the record to warrant the conviction of the accused persons i.e., these two appellants. 24. Now it has to be found out from the confessional statement of respective accused persons as to what extent they have implicated themselves in their confessions as well as the co-accused. A reference has already been made to the two confessional statements and they have been already quoted in extenso earlier. Both the accused persons, namely, these two appellants have implicated themselves by stating that both of them took part in the commission of murder of Gulam Rabbani. No doubt there is some difference in their statement with respect to the actual throttling of Gulam Rabbani by a particular accused which bas already been pointed out. But from the two confessional statemenes it is clear that both of them took part in the commission of murder of Gulam Rabbani. In both the confessional statements it is admitted that both of them took part in robbing Gulam Rabbani of Rs.405/-. So far a question of retracted confession is concerned, in my view if the accused sticks to his confession at the trial it will amount to pleading guilty and under section 229 of the Code of Criminal Procedure the trial judgment may convict him on such plea. So in my view it will be only the retracted confession which will come for consideration before the Court during the trial. Confession has no where been defined in the Evidence Act, but sections 24 to 30 of the Indian Evidence Act deals with confession which falls under the heading 'Admissions'. It is needless to point out that the confession is nothing but the admission of his guilt by the accused making the confession. There is nothing about retracted confession. The Indian Evidence Act nowhere provides that a retracted confession cannot be taken into consideration against the co-accused or the confessing accused. It is needless to point out that the confession is nothing but the admission of his guilt by the accused making the confession. There is nothing about retracted confession. The Indian Evidence Act nowhere provides that a retracted confession cannot be taken into consideration against the co-accused or the confessing accused. The requirements of section 30 of the Indian Evidence Act are that there should be more persons than one being tried jointly for the same offence, and a confession made by one of such persons affecting himself and some other of such persons is proved, the Court may take into consideration such confession as against such other persons as well as against the maker. So section 30 of the Indian Evidence Act does not put any bar to the use of a retracted confession against the maker as well as against the co-accused. But by several decisions of the Supreme Court it has been settled that the credibility of retracted confession depends upon the circumstances of each particular case. If the Court believes that a confession made by a prisoner although subsequently withdrawn contains a true account of that prisoner's crime, the court can take into consideration such confession against the maker as also against the co-accused but in case of co-accused the Court as a rule of prudence should seek any other materials besides retracted confession of the co-accused and that is why it has been held that against the co-accused retracted confession is a very weak type of material. It is, therefore quite legal that retracted confession can be taken into consideration against the maker as well as against the co-accused as provided under section 30 of the Indian Evidence Act. 25. Now the next question arises for consideration before considering the submissions of the learned counsel appearing for the appellants is that only the confessional statements arc the material against the appellants on the record or the same having been held to be voluntary are true or not. In order to find out the truthfulness or the falsity of the two confessions it is necessary to seek independent corroboration of the two confessional statements. 26. In order to find out the truthfulness or the falsity of the two confessions it is necessary to seek independent corroboration of the two confessional statements. 26. From the consideration of the two confessional statements it would appear that practically on all material points, their statements are common, i.e., both the accused persons have admitted that they boarded a bus along with Gulam Rabbani, got down from the same at Runisaidpur and went inside the maize field along with deceased Gulam Rabbani where Gulam Rabbani was killed by both of them. No doubt the parts that they have played in killing Gulam Rabbani have differently been stated by both the appellants. But the fact remains that both of them took part in the commission of the crime of murder of Gulam Rabbani, bes des robbing of Rs. 405/-. Now coming to the point for consideration whether there is any independent corroboration of the two confessional statements or not, I find that both the accused persons have stated in their confessional statements that kicks were given on the mouth of Gulam Rabbani. Of course one attributes this act to annther, but the fact remains that according to both the confessions Gulam Rabbani was kicked on his mouth. Both the accused persons have stated in their confessional statements that as a result of kicks some teeth of Gulam Rabbani were broken and it would appear from the evidence of Sachidanand Singh (P.W. 9), A.S.I, who held the inquest on the dead body of Gulam Rabbani in the maize field, the inquest report (Ext. 2) prepared by him and the seizure list (Ext. 3) that same broken teeth were found near the dead body. There is some discrepancy regarding the number or the broken teeth which were found near the dead body of Gulam Rabbani, since from the evidence of P.W. 9, the police officer, who seized the, articles found near the dead body and the seizure list, it would appear that number of broken teeth was six where as from the postmortem report it appears that the doctor, who held the postmortem examination on the dead body of Gulam Rabbani, found two incisors of right upper portion missing. So from the evidence of the Police Officer (Ext. 9), inquest report (Ext. 2), seizure list (Ext. 3) and the postmortem report (Ext. 8) it is established that teeth of Gulam Rabbani were "broken. So from the evidence of the Police Officer (Ext. 9), inquest report (Ext. 2), seizure list (Ext. 3) and the postmortem report (Ext. 8) it is established that teeth of Gulam Rabbani were "broken. In my view this is sufficient and quite independent corroboration of the two confessional statements of both the accused persons. No doubt the two confessional statements were recorded after the recovery of the dead body and the teeth, but in my view that will not affect the value of corroboration since both the acts are quite independent from each other. The discovery of the dead body as well as the broken teeth was made by the Police Officer of Runisaidpur and it appears from the evidence of the Police Officer (P.W 9) that he had directly sent the dead body for postmortem examination through the constable and Dafadar to Muzaffarpur. The accused was handed over to the Police at Sursand Police Station and from there he was forwarded to the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, where both the accused persons were ready to make confession on 14.8.1980 and actually their confessional statements was recorded on 16.8.1980. Thus in this circumstance, it cannot be said that the Police Officer of Sursand had the knowledge of broken teeth having been found near the dead body. Thus in my view there is sufficient and independent corroboration of the confessional statements on the very material points. 27. While considering the question which has been raised by the respective counsel appearing On behalf of the appellants, whether there are materials on the record besides the confessional statements of each of the appellants or not to warrant their conviction, it is necessary to consider the cases of both the appellants individually. First the case of appellant Anamul Haque in Cr. Appeal 271/84 is taken up for consideration. So far as this appellant is concerned the material against him on the record is his own confession which has already been discussed above, in which he has admitted his participation in the commission of the crime. Apart from this there is confession of co-accused, i.e., the confession of appellant Obaid Akhtar (Ext. 5), which can also be taken into consideration against him. Appellant Obaid Akhtar also speaks about the participation of this appellant, i.e., appellant Anamul Haque in the commission of crime, i.e., the murder of Gulam Rabbani as well as robbing of him. Apart from this there is confession of co-accused, i.e., the confession of appellant Obaid Akhtar (Ext. 5), which can also be taken into consideration against him. Appellant Obaid Akhtar also speaks about the participation of this appellant, i.e., appellant Anamul Haque in the commission of crime, i.e., the murder of Gulam Rabbani as well as robbing of him. Thus it cannot be said that the only material against this appellants his own confessional statement. As stated above the two confessional statements have been corroborated by the independent finding of the Police Officer (P.W.9), namely, the finding of broken teeth of Gulam Rabbani (deceased). It is also significant to point out in this connection that this appellant has not been able to bring on the record any kind of enmity between him and appellant Obaid Akhtar so that appellant Obaid Akhtar may falsely implicate him in the confessional statement or against any body, including the Police. Thus there does not appear any reason as to why this appellant will be falsely implicated in this case. If the prosecution would have been interested in falsely implicating this appellant other evidence also could have been concocted by the prosecution. But it appears that the prosecution has came out with a very clean hand. In these circumstances, I am unable to take a different view from the view taken by the learned trial Court that appellant is also guilty for the offence punishable under section 302, read with section 34, of the Indian Penal Code and section 394 of the Indian Penal Code. 28. So far as appellant Obaid Akhtar in Cr. Appeal No. 195/84 is concerned, there is strong circumstantial evidence agaimt him, besides the two confessional statements (Exts. 5 & 5/1). I need not repeat anything about the two confessional statements since it has been said much about the same. So far as the other circumstantial evidence against this appellant is concerned, it appears that when this appellant was caught by P. Ws. 2 and 11 at Muzaffarpur, he made extra judicial confession before them as well. Thereafter, according to the prosecution evidence this appellant was brought to Sitamarhi where he admitted before P.Ws. 1, 2, 3, 4 and 11 that he alongwith another committed the murder of Gulam Rabbani and robbed him of Rs. 405/-. 2 and 11 at Muzaffarpur, he made extra judicial confession before them as well. Thereafter, according to the prosecution evidence this appellant was brought to Sitamarhi where he admitted before P.Ws. 1, 2, 3, 4 and 11 that he alongwith another committed the murder of Gulam Rabbani and robbed him of Rs. 405/-. P. w. 3 Kishori Lal Shrivastava and P.W.4 Ram Nath Sah are quite independent persons and it has not been brought on the record against them anything to show that they were in any way related with the father of the deceased, i.e, P.W.1 Md. Ayub. So far a5 this extra judicial confession of appellant Obaid Akhtar is concerned there does not appear any reason for P.Ws. 1, 2, 3, 4 and 11 to tell a lie in this regard because the defence could not be able to bring any material on the record to show that there was any enmity between P.W.1, namely, Md. Ayub, father of the deceased, and this appellant. On the other hand. P.W.1 Md. Ayub has stated in his evidence that appellant Obaid Akhtar was the son of Guru Bhai of P.W. J. Thus in such circumstances it would be expected that P.W.1 Md. Ayub and his family members would have some soft corner for this appellant but for his act which he did they could not help him. P.W. 1 Md. Ayub has stated what, has already been narrated while depicting the prosecution case and as such I need not repeat. It has been contended by the learned counsel appearing for this appellant that the extra judicial confession made by this appellant should not be taken into consideration since it is hit by section 24 of the Indian Evidence Act, as the same was made, if any, as alleged by the prosecution, by this appellant as a result of threat by P. Ws. First there is nothing on the record to indicate that any threat was given to this appellant by any body. Only P.W.1 Md. Ayub has stated that he had said that the truth should be disclosed before him. From the evidence of the witnesses relevant for this purpose it does not appear that the extra judicial confession made by this appellant was the result of any inducement, threat or promise and hence this extra judicial confession should be treated as irrelevant in the trial of the accused. From the evidence of the witnesses relevant for this purpose it does not appear that the extra judicial confession made by this appellant was the result of any inducement, threat or promise and hence this extra judicial confession should be treated as irrelevant in the trial of the accused. As stated above, there is nothing to indicate any kind of inducement, threat or promise by any of the witnesses. Besides that according to section 24 of the Indian Evidence Act such inducement, threat or promise must proceed from a person in authority and sufficient in the opinion of the Court to give the accused person grounds which would appear to him reasonable for supposing that by making it he would gain any advantage or avoid any evil of a temporal nature in reference to the proceeding against him. By no strech of imagination the witnesses aforesaid can be said to be a person in authority of the kind as contemplated in section 24 of the Indian Evidence Act. Therefore, I can safely hold that the alleged extra judicial confession as stated by the witnesses referred to above, may be taken into consideration against that appellant. Another circumstance against this appellant is that according to the statement of P.W. 1 Md. Ayub he got his son boarded on a bus at Parihar and accused Obaid Akhtar, namely, this appellant was also going by the same bus. He has further stated that he asked appellant Obaid Akhtar to reach his son Gulam Rabbani to his Phuphi at Muzaffarpur. Another strong circumstantial evidence against this appellant is the statement of P. W. 13 Khoraisha Khatoon, the sister of P.W.1 Md. Ayub. i.e., the Phuphi of the deceased. She has stated in her evidence that Gulam Rabbani had gone to her house in Mohalla Islampur, Muzaffarpur Town along with a boy named Obaid Akhtar, i.e., this appellant. Gulam Rabbani had gone to her to take. Rs.405/-. They had reached at her house on Thursday and they stayed on Thursday and Friday. On Saturday she handed over Rs. 405/- to her nephew, namely, Gulam Rabbani, which was tied in his waist. She also gave Rs. 5/- to Gulam Rabbani for fare etc. Her nephew, i.e., the deceased Gulam Rabbani started alongwith appellant Obaid Akhtar at about 8 A.M. for Parihar. On Saturday she handed over Rs. 405/- to her nephew, namely, Gulam Rabbani, which was tied in his waist. She also gave Rs. 5/- to Gulam Rabbani for fare etc. Her nephew, i.e., the deceased Gulam Rabbani started alongwith appellant Obaid Akhtar at about 8 A.M. for Parihar. She has also stated that she had shown appellant Obaid Akhtar as well the money which she had tied in the waist of the deceased and bad asked him to reach Gulam Rabbani to his house safely. At that time appellant Obaid Akhtar had left his brief-case at her house. On the same day, i.e., on Saturday itself at about 1 P. M. in the day, appellant Obaid Akhtar came back to her house and she asked from Obaid Akhtar as to how could he (appellant Obaid, Akhtar) return so early; whereupon he told her that he got Gulam Rabbani boarded on a bus at Sitamarhi for Parihar. Thereafter, he went away with his brief-case. So from the evidence of this lady (P.W.13) it is quite clear, that it was this appellant who was seen last with the deceased and this appellant had accompanied the deceased on way to Parihar. The statement of this witness cannot be doubted on any ground, since nothing has been brought on the record by the defence to show as to why she will make a false statement implicating falsely this appellant. Besides as stated above, she has also stated about the extra judicial confession having been made by this appellant before her. So there are strong circumstantial evidence against this appellant besides his own confession and the confe5sion of the co-accused namely, appellant Anamul Haque. 29. Thus from the above discussions of the evidence and the materials on the record it would appear that there is nothing on the record to interfere with the findings and the conclusions of the learned trial court. The learned trial court was quite justified in holding that both the appellants were guilty under section 302/34 of the Indian Penal Code since from the materials on the record it is established that both of them knowingly and intentionally committed the murder of Gulam Rabbani. The learned trial court was quite justified in holding that both the appellants were guilty under section 302/34 of the Indian Penal Code since from the materials on the record it is established that both of them knowingly and intentionally committed the murder of Gulam Rabbani. In such circumstances, the orders of conviction passed by the learned trial court convicting both the appellants under section 394 of the Indian Penal Code also appears to be justified in view of the materials on the record establishing that Gulam Rabbani was robbed of Rs. 405/- by these two appellants. 30. So far the question of sentence is concerned, I am of the view that in the circumstances of this case it will not be justified to take a lenient view on this point, as the minimum sentence as provided under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code has been awarded by the trial court although it is a case of gruesome murder of a young boy. 31. Thus I do not find any me it in these two appeals which are accordingly dismissed and the statement and orders of conviction and sentence passed by the learned trial court are hereby up held. Phani Bhushan Prasad, J.-I agree.