ORDER 1. This Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution has been filed by Deepak Mitra for Mandamus directing the Allahabad Development Authority to take appropriate action to prevent the unauthorised constructions over the open courtyard shown in the sanctioned map by respondent 2 U.N. Tripathi or to make any construction against the Building Regulations over Plot No. I-B/2 Fatehpur Bicchwa Hashimpur Road, Allahabad. 2. The brief facts are that the father of the petitioner constructed house No. 1-A, Tagore Town, Hashimpur Road, Allahabad, in the year 1951. On his death, the petitioner along with other co-owners inherited the : above property. All around the building, there is a boundary wall and towards the southern side, the boundary wall runs from west to east, which is about 7 feet in height. Respondent 2, U.N. Tripathi purchased vacant land measuring 371.5 square yards, just adjacent to the southern boundary wall of the petitioner. He got a plan sanctioned by Allahabad Development Authority for making constructions of his residential house on the aforesaid plot, on 2-8-1986. Respondent 2, in his sanctioned plan, had shown a courtyard measuring 20 feet 26 feet 9 inches, i.e.,the open area, as required under Direction 19 issued under the U. P. Regulation of Building Operations) Act, 1958. As per Direction 19, the land of respondent 2 being more than 251 square yards, had to leave 20 feet set back at the rear. Regulation 19(iv) provides that on plots occupied by residential buildings only, not more than 40 per cent of the length of the rear yard may be occupied by one storey building of accessory use, such as kitchen, store, i. e., servants quarters and garage. As the 'petitioner found that respondent 2 was 9 making constructions against the sanctioned plan, he filed Suit No. 367 of 1986 on 13-8-1986 for restraining the defendant 2 from constructing the building along the southern boundary wall of the petitioner. It may be stated here that the petitioners grievance was that respondent 2 had raised a wall of 11 feet height, just adjacent to the northern wall of the petitioner and he intended to make further constructions on the same without leaving set back. On 13-8-1986, the Civil Judge granted an injunction restraining defendant 2 from making any constructions on the disputed land. On 13-8-1986, the Civil Judge granted an injunction restraining defendant 2 from making any constructions on the disputed land. The petitioner alleged that since respondent 2 despite service of injunction did not resist, he moved an application under O. 39, R.(2-A), CPC for disobedience. 3. Finding the attitude of respondent 2 to be that of defiance, the petitioner approached the Allahabad Development Authority and complained on 30-9-1986 that respondent 2 was constructing his building against the sanctioned plan. On 24-10-1986 the petitioner sent an application to the Allahabad Development Authority for taking action against respondent 2 for checking him from making unauthorised constructions. Although the petitioner was assured by the Allahabad Development Authority that suitable action would be taken against respondent 2, but finding that nothing was being done to prevent respondent 2 from making illegal or unauthorised constructions, the petitioner filed the present writ petition on 27-10-1986. 4. When the writ petition was presented on 27-10-1986, the Court directed it to be listed along with the name of Sri Ashok Mohiley, counsel for the Allahabad Development Authority. On the next date, that is, on 29-10-1986, the Court did not admit the writ petition, instead passed an order, which is as follows : "Shri Ashok Mohiley, appearing for the respondent Allahabad Development Authority, states that the Allahabad Development Authority is already enquiring into the complaint filed by the petitioner in regard to the building being constructed by Shri U. N. Tripathi, respondent 2. He further states that if the Allahabad Development Authority finds that the building is being constructed contrary' to the sanctioned plan it will take immediate steps to stop further constructions. He prays for, and is granted a weeks time for informing the Court of the action taken by the Allahabad Development Authority in this connection." 5. It was pointed out by the petitioners counsel that the Court had also orally directed Sri Ashok Mohiley to ask the Allahabad Development Authority to take appropriate steps to restrain U.N. Tripathi from making constructions against the sanctioned plan. The letter of Sri Ashok Mohiley is to be found in the file of the Allahabad Development Authority, which has been produced before us for deciding the controversy involved in the present writ. The letter of Sri Ashok Mohiley is to be found in the file of the Allahabad Development Authority, which has been produced before us for deciding the controversy involved in the present writ. The letter says; "The Court has further directed that the A.D.A. should, in the mean time, issue notice to respondent Sri Tripathi to stop constructions, if it comes to the conclusion that the constructions are against the sanctioned plan." 6. On the basis of the complaint, the Allahabad Development Authority prepared a notice dated 29-10-1986 under Sections 27/28 of the U.P. Urban Planning and Development Act, 1973. S. 27 confers power on the Development Authority for ordering demolition of building constructed against the approval or sanction. Section 28 authorises the authority to stop constructions made in contravention of the sanctioned plan. This notice was not served on respondent 2. 7. To contest the writ petition, two counter-affidavits have been filed; one by the Allahabad Development Authority and the other by respondent 2, U. N. Tripathi. The Allahabad Development Authority stated that the plot of respondent 2 was more than 251 square yards and, as such, 20 feet set back was required to be left at the rear, and further that constructions had to be made on 40 per cent area, and 60 per cent area had to be left open. It has been admitted in para. 14 of the counter-affidavit that respondent 2 has raised on the spot one wall measuring 10 feet in the rear. This was noticed by the Junior Engineer in his survey. This construction, according to respondent No. 1 itself, was unauthorised and illegal. Respondent 2, according to the Allahabad Development Authority, applied for compounding of deviation from the sanctioned plan and also for sanction of a new plan. The Allahabad Development Authority being of the opinion that violation of rear set back was compoundable, as such, the Vice-Chairman by his order dated 26-10-1986 gave his consent for compounding of the said constructions, and the revised map, which was filed by respondent 2, was also sanctioned. The counter-affidavit of U.N. Tripathi is also on the same lines as that of the Allahabad Development Authority. 8. After perusing the affidavits exchanged between the parties we find that the construction of the wall on the southern side measuring 10 feet in the rear has been admitted by both the respondents. The counter-affidavit of U.N. Tripathi is also on the same lines as that of the Allahabad Development Authority. 8. After perusing the affidavits exchanged between the parties we find that the construction of the wall on the southern side measuring 10 feet in the rear has been admitted by both the respondents. This construction was against the sanctioned plan. Respondent 2 was not restrained by the Allahabad Development Authority from making constructions against the sanctioned plan, instead it compounded the violation in the rear set back by charging compounding fee in the sum of Rs. 10,000/-. The new plan was also sanctioned. 9. Coming to the question about the power of the Allahabad Development Authority to waive with the requirement of providing rear set back, we may quote the relevant portion of Direction 19, which had been issued under the U.P. (Regulation of Building Operations) Act. It provides the manner in which a building plan has to be sanctioned, and for set back in the front, side, and rear of the building which has to be constructed on the land. Direction 19 is extracted below : Yard and set back limits - (1) Each structure hereafter erected shall be provided with the front, side and rear as under ; Size of plot Residential Front Rear Up to 250 sq. yards 10' 12' From 251 to 500 sq. yards 15' 20' Note 3 appended to Direction 19 is as follows:- "Note-3. In exceptional circumstances, the Prescribed Authority may, with the approval of the Controlling Authority relax the requirements of yards, as mentioned in the above table." 10. Undoubtedly, the Allahabad Development Authority had the power of relaxing the requirement of rear set back. The question, however, is that this power as laid down in Note 3 has to be exercised in exceptional circumstances. As to what are exceptional circumstances may be a question of fact, but while deciding that controversy, a Development Authority is expected to keep into account or consideration the object for : which the Act had been passed. The object of the U. P. Urban Planning and Development Act, 1973, was to provide for development according to plan and matters ancillary there lo. The set back is required to be left not for the convenience of the person who is constructing his house, but also for the benefit of others who are living in his neighbourhood. The object of the U. P. Urban Planning and Development Act, 1973, was to provide for development according to plan and matters ancillary there lo. The set back is required to be left not for the convenience of the person who is constructing his house, but also for the benefit of others who are living in his neighbourhood. Making of constructions without leaving a set back is bound to cause inconvenience to the person adjacent to whose house the new house is being constructed. This may cause hindrance in his right to receive air and light. It is with a view to provide for a healthier atmosphere that the provision for providing set backs has to be made. The Allahabad Development Authority cannot as of right in every case relax the requirement of having set back in the rear by just thinking that it has the power to do so, and, therefore, it may relax the same with impunity and without regard to curtailment of amenities which would be suffered by the person adjacent to whose house, the new' construction is being made. It is not our purpose to say that in no case the need of providing the set back can be waived or dispensed with, but what is needed by the Development Authority is to apply its mind to each particular case and to find out the location of the new construction as well as the situation of other houses built or to be constructed in the neighbourhood. It is highly objectionable and legally wrong on the part of the Development Authority to act arbitrarily and discriminately in these matters. It cannot relax the providing of set back in one case by taking into account imaginary grounds merely because it is in its wisdom to do so while in others not to relax as it is not thought advisable. 11. In the instant case, nothing could be pointed out by respondent in justification of the exercise of that power. Repeated argument was made that the Allahabad Development Authority since had the power to relax, it did so, and this Court had no power to interfere. 12. Almost all administrative powers are statutory. They owe their existence to, and the limitations on their use or determined by Act of Parliament or legislature. Repeated argument was made that the Allahabad Development Authority since had the power to relax, it did so, and this Court had no power to interfere. 12. Almost all administrative powers are statutory. They owe their existence to, and the limitations on their use or determined by Act of Parliament or legislature. A person or body can do only those things permitted by the Statute to be done, and cannot do things forbidden to be done. It is for the Courts to say whether the act is within the powers given to a body or Statute. The discretion conferred for relaxation, is a statutory discretion. It has to be exercised on sound grounds and for valid reasons. 13. We have perused the file of the present case, which had been produced by the counsel for respondent on our request. We are pained to find that the order was passed by the Allahabad Development Authority relaxing the requirement of leaving set back at the rear without application of mind. What worked in the mind of the Authority was that as respondent 2, U. N. Tripathi was prepared to pay the compounding fee, therefore, relaxation could be granted. It was forgotten that the power to relax being available only in exceptional cases. It should have been done only when the grounds for exercise of that power existed. The word "exceptional" means "rare, unusual". The making of the provision for providing set back at the rear would lose its purpose and object if the power is exercised as a routine by thinking that in any case where the Allahabad Development Authority desired it could relax the same. A public officer has a duty not to frustrate the policy and objects of the Statute under which he is acting. 14. Hon ble H.N. Seth, J. (as he then was) held in Jairam Lal Srivastava v. State of U.P., AIR 1982 All 290 , while interpreting the provisions of Sections 9, 10 and 12(2) of the U.P. (Regulation of Building Operations) Act, 1958, that composition of offence did not debar the authorities from taking proceedings for demolition of an authorised constructions. Two proceedings operate in different fields and are to take place independently of each other. The effect of composition of an offence merely is that the concerned person is absolved of his criminal liability. Two proceedings operate in different fields and are to take place independently of each other. The effect of composition of an offence merely is that the concerned person is absolved of his criminal liability. It did not have any effect on the proceedings under S. 10. In this case, it is not necessary to express our opinion on this controversy. Compounding fee can be charged for different purposes. In some cases, it may have the effect of not only exoneration from prosecution, but also in regularisation of constructions made, whereas in others the effect may not be the same. The proposition laid down in the above case need not be commented upon or followed as that is not the controversy before us. 15. Counsel for respondent No. 1 relied Cl. (7) of Bye-law No. 2 and Item 3 of Schedule I. These provisions are as under. "2. In granting or refusing to grant permission to compound an offence by or under the Act, the Development Authority (or any officer authorised by it in this behalf by general or special order) shall take into account the following factors : - (7) Whether the construction had been done on basement, semi-basement, ground, first or subsequent floors and its effects on the adjoining area? Schedule I (Bye Law No. 3) Composition Fee Type of unauthorised construction/development Amount of composition fee where the unauthorised construction/development has been undertaken or carried out : - (a) without the permission, approval or sanction, referred to in Section 14; (b) in contravention of any condition subject to which such permission, approval or sanction was granted. 3. Construction within the rear set-back Rs. 150 per square metre of the area covered on each floor plus the cost of land (present market value) with a minimum' fee of Rs. 1,000 to a maximum up to Rs. 10,000. 16. Bye-laws have been framed under S. 57 of the U.P. Urban Planning and Development Act, 1973, by the Allahabad Development Authority. Under this provision, the Allahabad Development Authority could compound the offence of making 10 feet wall on the south of the petitioners house, but this did not mean that mere compounding of the offence was sufficient in itself for the Allahabad Development Authority not to consider the requirements which were the condition precedent for exercising the power of relaxation and to sanction the map of respondent 2. 17. 17. In Hochtief Gammon v. State of Orissa, AIR 1975 SC 2226 , following the decision of the House of Lords in Pad field v. Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food ( 1968 AC 997 ), the Supreme Court held that no doubt whether the reasons given are bad and the authority had not taken into consideration the relevant matters or real grounds on which the order could have been passed, the Court can direct the authority to reconsider the matter in the light of such relevant matters. In the aforesaid decision, the Supreme Court deduced the following, principle from the decision of House of Lords in Pad field v. Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Foods: "The Executives have to reach their decisions by taking into account relevant considerations. They should not refuse to consider relevant matter nor should they take into account only irrelevant or extraneous consideration." 18. By taking into account the fact that the illegal construction had been since compounded, therefore, the new plan could be sanctioned, the Allahabad Development Authority acted erroneously. The relevant fact as to whether relaxation could be given was not considered. 19. It was submitted on behalf of the petitioner that when the High Court had ordered on 29-10-1986 that the Allahabad Development Authority should restrain respondent No. 2 from making constructions in violation of the sanctioned plan, respondent 1 should not have sanctioned the new plan, which in effect nullified the Court's direction. There appears to be force in this argument. Counsel for respondents 1 and 2 urged that since the compounding fee had been levied on 26-10-1986, therefore, the direction of the High Court given on 29-10-1986 did not come in the way of respondent to sanction the new plan. This appears to us to be an eyewash. The truth lies elsewhere. 26th Oct., 1986 was Sunday. On that date the compounding charges were levied, the payment of which was made subsequently. New Plan was delivered on 30-10-1986. But as we are directing the Allahabad Development Authority to reconsider the application for new plan by relaxing the need of providing the set back, we need say nothing more. 20. H.M. Seervai in his book "Constitutional Law of India", Second Edition, page 762, paras. 16-30 has considered the question of locus standi in the matter of seeking the judicial remedy by way of a Writ of Mandamus. 20. H.M. Seervai in his book "Constitutional Law of India", Second Edition, page 762, paras. 16-30 has considered the question of locus standi in the matter of seeking the judicial remedy by way of a Writ of Mandamus. He referred to R. v. Commr. of Police, Metropolis,Ex. P. Blackburn, (1968) 2 QB 118 and R. v. Metropolitan Police Commissioner, Ex. P. Blackburn, (1973) 1 QB 241, and stated that the Corporation, on which the statutory duty is imposed, could be compelled by means of a mandamus to perform the same. 21. We, therefore, direct the Allahabad Development Authority to consider the relaxation afresh. 22. Subject to above, the writ petition is allowed. No costs.