JUDGMENT K.C. Agarwal, J. - This petition has been presented by the two firms which are registered with the Project Director, District Rural Development Authority, Ghaziabad for supply of Buggis to the farmers under a Scheme for development of weaker section of the rural areas, which is known as "Integrated Rural Development Programme." In this programme, it is envisaged that animal driven vehicle should be supplied to the villagers for transportation purpose. 2. On 107-1981, the Joint Secretary of the Government of India, New Delhi, issued a letter to the Secretaries in charge of the Integrated Rural Development Programme of all the States, and Union Territory that the supply of such vehicles may betaken from : (i) U.P. Agro Industries Corporation, (ii) Panchayat Raj Udyog, and (iii) Small Scale Industries Units which are duly registered in the District Industrial Offices. 3. The petitioners were registered as Small Scale in pastries with the Director of Industries and Deputy Director of Industries, Ghaziabad. They manufactured Buggis (Animal driven carts) and supply the same to the Project Director, District Rural Development Authority, Ghaziabad. They were registered with the Project Director also for supply purpose. 4. The petitioners filed a circular dated 9-4-1987 issued by the Project Director that Buggis would be purchased from Panchayat Raj Udyog. The circular is as under : " vkbZ0vkj0Mh0 ds ykHkkfFkZ;ksa dks iapk;r m|ksx ls gh cqXxh dh vkiwfrZ dh tkos rFkk iapk;r m|ksx dh DokfyVh lqfuf'pr dh tk;saA " 5. Challenging this circular, the present writ petition has been filed by the petitioners and it was urged that the order of the District Magistrate on the basis of which circular was issued for purchasing Buggis from the Panchayat Udyog was discriminatory and violative of Article 43 of the Constitution. It was suggested in the argument that the impugned order of the District Magistrate would create monopoly in favour of Panchayat Udyog. The petitioners argument further was that the beneficiaries of I.R.D. would be denied the Buggis according to their choice. 6. In support of his argument, the petitioners cited the decision of the Supreme Court in Ramana v. International Airport Authority of India, AIR 1979 SC 1628 . The petitioners argument further was that the beneficiaries of I.R.D. would be denied the Buggis according to their choice. 6. In support of his argument, the petitioners cited the decision of the Supreme Court in Ramana v. International Airport Authority of India, AIR 1979 SC 1628 . The counsel relying on the aforesaid decision referred to the following observations : " the Government is not like a private individual who can pick and choose the person with whom it will deal, but the Government is still a Government when it enters into contract or when it is administering largess and it cannot, without adequate reason, exclude any person from dealing with it or take away largess arbitrarily." 7. The learned counsel also brought to our notice that Writ No. 13948 of 1985 Vikas Buggi Udyog v. State of U. P. admitted on 4-12-1985involves the same points as arise in the present case and, as such, the petitioner is entitled to admission. In that connection, the counsel referred the two decisions of the Supreme Court, one of which is Bir Bajrang Kumar v. State of Bihar, AIR 1987 SC 1345 and Sushil Chandra Pandey v. Factory Manager, New Victoria Mills, 1982 UP LBEC 211(1). In a mutt shell, his submission was that if one writ petition has been admitted by a High Court, all other petitions are entitled to be admitted as of right. 8. Admittedly, Panchayat Udyog is a Cooperative Society and, as such, cannot be kept at par with the petitioner. Article 43 of the Constitution lays emphasis on Cottage Industries on an individual or cooperative basis in rural areas. The petitioners, therefore, could not claim itself to be classed along with the Co-operative Society. A Co-operative Society sub serves a larger number of persons." " It is not run for the same purpose as a private concern. Both the petitioners appear to be the proprietors of their firms. They are running the business for individual gain. That is not the object of Panchayat Udyog. 9. It is also correct that the Government can (cannot) enter into contract with any one looking arbitrary or without reason. But as appears to us that the order passed by the District Magistrate for purchase of bullock-carts is not arbitrary, we cannot quash the same on the said basis. Choosing a Cooperative Society for supply of carts was not an act of arbitrariness. But as appears to us that the order passed by the District Magistrate for purchase of bullock-carts is not arbitrary, we cannot quash the same on the said basis. Choosing a Cooperative Society for supply of carts was not an act of arbitrariness. 10. In Empire Industries Ltd. v. Union of India, AIR 1986 SC 662 , an interesting argument was raised. The argument was, could different Courts pass different interim orders. Dealing with that controversy, the Supreme Court observed : "It is a matter of common knowledge that the interim orders passed by particular Courts on certain considerations are not precedents for other cases which may be on similar facts. An argument is being....It is submitted at the Bar that such variance creates discrimination. This is an unfortunate approach. Every Bench hearing a matter on the facts and circumstances of each case should have the right to grant interim orders on such terms as it considers fit and proper and if it had granted interim order at one stage, it should have the right to vary or alter such interim orders." 11. In the above case, the view of the Supreme Court was that passing of an interim order is not precedent in other cases even on similar facts. The reason obvious is that at the time when interim order is given nothing is decided which could be called to be a precedent. In Eknath Shankarrao v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1977 SC 1177 , paragraph 25, the view of the Supreme Court appears to be that the admission of appeal is not a precedent. 12. When a Court admits a case, it does not decide any controversy. For finding out as to what has been decided in a particular case, the Court is required to ascertain the principle laid down by the previous decisions. 13. It was remarked in P.A. Shah v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1986 SC 468 that the scope and authority of a precedent should never be expanded unnecessarily beyond the needs of a given situation. 14. In Rakesh Kumar v. Public Service Commission, 1982 All WC 724: (1983 Lab IC 190), a similar argument was advanced on the basis of the decision given in Sushil Chandra Pandey v. Factory Manager ( 1982 UPLBEC 211 (1)) (supra). 14. In Rakesh Kumar v. Public Service Commission, 1982 All WC 724: (1983 Lab IC 190), a similar argument was advanced on the basis of the decision given in Sushil Chandra Pandey v. Factory Manager ( 1982 UPLBEC 211 (1)) (supra). The Division Bench observed : "Coming to Sushil Chandra Pandey's case, we find that the said case is distinguishable and does not support the petitioners counsel. As the appeal before the Supreme Court went from a decision of this Court, we had the advantage of looking into the relevant records. It appears that two employees Sushil Chandra and Bheem working in the same factory, i.e., New Victoria Mills, Kanpur, were dismissed oh the same charge of adopting fraudulent means in cheating the Company. Two references made for adjudication to the Labour Courts were decided against the workmen. Writ Petition No. 295 of 1980 was filed by Sushil Chandra Pandey against the award given in his case, while writ petition No. 2286 of 1979 was filed by Bheem. Sushil Chandra Pandeys writ was admitted, whereas that of Bheem was summarily dismissed when the matter was taken by Bheem to the Supreme Court, the Supreme Court thought proper that the two matters being connected with each other should have been admitted and decided together. This case is not an authority for the proposition advanced before us. This decision turned on its peculiar facts and cannot be treated as law laying down that whenever one petition has been admitted, all other subsequent writ petitions filed on the points raised in the first writ petition must necessarily be admitted as of course." 15. In Rakesh Kumars case, (1983 Lab IC 190) argument of admission of a previous writ petition sought to be relied upon was repelled. However, to us it appears that when the second writ petition is being dismissed, it would be in the interest of justice that reasons for not admitting the writ petition are recorded. In a recent decision, the Supreme Court also has emphasised that reasons should be given by a Court dismissing the writ petition so that the grounds are known for the same. Bir Bajrang Kumars case ( AIR 1987 SC 1345 ) does not lay down that subsequent writ petition cannot be rejected by giving reasons for doing so. 16. For what we have said above, we dismiss the writ petition summarily.