ORDER 1. This writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution challenges bye-law 15 of the notification made under Cl. (b) described in List of S. 298(2) of the U.P. Municipalities Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act). Clause (b) of the aforesaid provision provides : - "(b) Permitting, prohibiting or regulating the use occupation of any or all public streets or places by itinerant vendors or by any person for the sale of articles or for the exercise of any calling or for the set ting up of any booth or stall and providing for the levy of fees for such use and occupation." By-law 15 in so far as it is relevant for our purposes is extracted below : - VERNUACULAR MATTER OMITTED 2. Claiming himself to be the operator of stage carriage on the Bulandshahr, Anupshar, Debai, Ramghat, Shikarpur, Balore, Narora route, the present petition was filed by Om Prakash on the ground that bye-law aforesaid was beyond the power of the Municipal Board, therefore, it was invalid. The bye-law provides imposition of Tehbazari in various sub-clauses of clause (2) of the Act. Sub-clause (15) deals with the imposition of fee on passenger buses and trucks @Rs. 10/- per trip. It was contended by the petitioners counsel that Tehbazari can be charged for use of land belonging to the Municipal Board, but as the petitioners enters in Municipal Board only for dropping and picking up passengers, no fees is chargeable under clause (b) of E of List aforesaid. In this connection, it was urged that public at large has a right to use the public streets for passing or repassing without permission of the Municipal Board, hence the Municipal Board could not frame any bye-law imposing fee on the entry of the vehicles to its jurisdiction. 3. Section 298(1) of the Act provides that Board by a special resolution may and where required by the State Government shall, make bye-laws applicable to the whole or any part of the municipality consistent with this Act and with any rule, for the purpose of promoting or maintaining health, safety and convenience of the inhabitant of the municipality and for the purpose of municipal administration under this Act. Sub-section (2) empowers the board to make bye-law described in List I. E of List 1 deals with streets. Sub-section (2) empowers the board to make bye-law described in List I. E of List 1 deals with streets. 3-A. Section 220 of the Act lays down the requirement of obtaining permission despite any right Or privilege (previously) acquired, accrued or enjoyed. Such kind of user and occupation would be within S. 293 of the Act and for allowing such user and occupation, fees can also be charged by a Board. The enjoyment of right and privileges which are restricted are like using the street for sale of articles or for setting up booths or stalls. This restriction does not hamper the right of using a public street for passing or repassing. 4. In C.A. Singh v. State of U. P., 1970 All LJ 249 Hon. Satish Chandra, J. (as he then was) laid down "It is clear that the right of passing and repassing through motor vehicle is public right which vests in the public under the general law of the land and it is not a right which inheres for the public because the Municipal Board allows it." 5. In Sahir Ahmad v. State of U. P., AIR 1954 SC 728 , the Supreme Court held : - The right of the public to use motor vehicle on the public road cannot in any sense be regarded as a right created by the Motor Vehicles Act. The right exists anterior to any legislation on the subject as an incident of public rights over a highway. The State controls and regulates for the purpose of ensuring safety, peace, health and good morals of the public." 6. It is thus clear that the right of passing or repassing is not a right, which is acquired by the public under the provisions of the Municipalities Act. Section 220 of the Act does not apply to such a user, hence no permission is needed. Consequently, the Board cannot charge any fee. 7. After having considered Sections 220 and 298(2) of the List of the Act, we are of the opinion that the Municipal Board has no power to frame bye-law imposing fee on the point of entry under Section 298(2) E(b) of the Act. 8. Consequently, the Board cannot charge any fee. 7. After having considered Sections 220 and 298(2) of the List of the Act, we are of the opinion that the Municipal Board has no power to frame bye-law imposing fee on the point of entry under Section 298(2) E(b) of the Act. 8. In Jagdish Chandra v. State of U. P., 1975 All LJ 571 this Court was called upon to consider the validity of the bye-law under which the vehicles had to be parked only at the parking place compulsorily provided by the Board. 9. Bye-law in that case had been framed under H(b) of List of S. 298(2) of the Act, which deals with regulation of traffic in the public street. In that connection, the learned Judge held : - "The Board cannot charge a fee for permitting vehicles to be parked at a place other than a bus stand." In agreement with Jagdish Chandras decision (supra), he was of the view that bye-laws imposing fees for entry of plying of motor vehicles did not deal with subject-matter mentioned in clause (b) of List I, H and could not be sustained. 10. In the two cases referred to above, notifications had been issued under S. 298(2) List H(b), whereas in the instant case, the bye-law was made under S. 298(2) List I, E(b). There is a difference in between the two provisions. However, under clause (b) of List E, as well no fees could be charged for entry on stage carriages for setting down and picking up passengers. Section 265 of the Act also views the stay of a vehicle for the period longer than necessary for picking up or setting down passengers as not amounting to obstruction. 11. In our case, the counter-affidavit justifies the bye-law 15 stating that the buses used to stay at nights in the municipal (limits?). Such a stay was for a period longer than need for setting down and picking. In this respect, relevant portion to paragraph 15(d) is being quoted below : - "Debai is a permanent bus stop and every bus which passes through this road transacts the business at Debai by dropping passengers and taking passengers. They also stay at night in Debai and hence this respondent is entitled to get Tehbazari fee from such operators who transact such business on the public road and its parties within its limits." 12. They also stay at night in Debai and hence this respondent is entitled to get Tehbazari fee from such operators who transact such business on the public road and its parties within its limits." 12. In Municipal Council, Bhopal v. Sinphi Sahiti Multi-purpose Co-operative Society Ltd., AIR 1973 SC 2420 it was held that a Municipal Board could not compel the persons plying the motor buses for hire to park buses at place specified by it but it was further said : - "However if a Municipality provides fora bus stand without compelling everybody to use it, a fee can be charged on bus operators using it voluntarily." 13. Anyone who parks the bus on the land belonging to the Board, it can charge for ' its use like any other owner. In our case, the Board says that a regular bus stand has been provided, but assuming that not to be so, since disputed, the charge can be still made for the use and occupation of land belonging to the Board. The Supreme Court has held in Municipal Council, Bhopal v. Sindhi Sahiti Multipurpose Co-operative Society Ltd. (supra) : "Nobody has a fundamental right to use a land belonging to another without that persons permission or paying for it if necessary. While the Municipal Council has no power to compel persons plying motor buses for hire to use only the Municipal bus stand for the purpose of taking up and setting down passengers, there can be no objection its providing a bus stand for anybody who chooses to use it voluntarily and to such person being required to pay for such use. In that sense propositions 2 and 3 put forward by Mr. Chagla are unexceptionable. If for this permission the formality of the issue of a permit is followed and a fee is charged it cannot be said to be objectionable. In that case the charges may be such as may be agreed upon between the parties, i.e. if the Municipality charges a certain rate only people who are prepared to pay at that rate would resort to that place." Bye-law No. 15 impugned, in this case docs not purport to do so. Cl. (b) of E of List can be invoked for levying fees only when use and occupation are for purposes stated therein. The word such used in Cl. Cl. (b) of E of List can be invoked for levying fees only when use and occupation are for purposes stated therein. The word such used in Cl. (b) of List E indicates that the use should be identical with, being the same as what has been mentioned earlier. Use of land for parking of vehicles is not covered by it. 14. We wish to clarify at this place that the Board has a right to charge for the use of its land by arriving at agreements or otherwise from bus operators, but on the basis of the bye-law 15 impugned in this case. 15. In the result, the writ petition succeeds and is allowed. Bye-law 15 of the notification made under clause (b) described in List of Section 298(2) of the Act to the extent quoted above is held to be invalid. There shall be no order as to costs.