JUDGMENT A. P. Misra, J. - The petitioner seeks a writ of certiorari for quashing the judgment and order dated 29-11-1979, passed by the U.P. Public Services Tribunal, II, Lucknow (here - in-After referred as the Tribunal) by virtue of which the Tribunal rejected two claim petitions of the petitioner, viz. Claim No. 505/ 11/1976 and Claim No. 656/11/1976. By virtue of Claim No. 605/11/1976 and claim No. 656/11/1976. By virtue of claim No. 605/11/1976 the petitioner sought for quashing the show-cause notice dated 19th May, 1976, with a direction to respondents to treat the petitioner as confirmed Principal of the college and not to interfere in the discharge of his duties as confirmed Principal of the college. Alongwith the said claim petition an application for stay was also filed on 1st June, 1976 restraining the respondents from taking any proceeding in pursuance to charge-sheet dated 19th May, 1976, and also to refrain from interfering with the right of the petitioner in discharging his duties, as the Principal. The tribunal granted the interim order. However, since the Chairman of the Nagar Mahapalika terminated the services of the petitioner on 5th June, 1976, the petitioner filed a second Claim Petition No. 656/11/1976 seeking the relief of setting aside of the said termination order and also for a direction to treat the petitioner as confirmed Principal and not to interfere with his duties as Principal. 2. The brief facts of the case are that the petitioner was duly selected committee and was appointed as a Principal in Mahatma Gandhi Palika Inter College, Ujhani, district Budaun, on the 18th December, 1974, on probation for a period of one year. According to the petitioner, the Acting Chairman, who was officiating as the Chairman, confirmed the petitioner, on 19th September, 1975. This fact of his confirmation has been disputed by the respondents. On 10th December, 1975, the probationary period of the petitioner was extended for a further period of one year. However, on 20th May, 1976, a charge-sheet dated 19th May, 1976, containing serious charges against the petitioner, were served on the petitioner. After the receipt of the said charge-sheet the petitioner by means of his letter dated 27th May, 1976, requested for certain papers to be furnished to enable him to file a reply. According to the petitioner neither any documents nor any reply to the said letter was given to him. After the receipt of the said charge-sheet the petitioner by means of his letter dated 27th May, 1976, requested for certain papers to be furnished to enable him to file a reply. According to the petitioner neither any documents nor any reply to the said letter was given to him. The charges contained in the charge-sheet were regarding serious misconduct of the petitioner in respect of his personal behaviour and regarding the money of the institution. As per the said show-cause notice a reply was to be filed by the petitioner by the 4th June, 1976, but since the petitioner obtained a stay order from the Tribunal he did not file the said reply. From the termination order passed against the petitioner on the 5th June, 1976, it clear that the said order was passed since no reply was filed by the petitioner and the termination order had been passed expressly stating the various misconduct of the petitioner. The Officer terminating the services of the petitioner after recording a finding on perusal of the documentary evidence on each of the charges as against the petitioner finally passed an order that since the petitioner had been appointed on a probation for twelve months on 18th December, 1974, which was further extended from 12th December, to a further period of twelve months and during this period of probation it was found that his continuance, as Principal" is not in the interest of the Board, institution and the students of the college. Some day it may lead to Mahabharata in the college and also feel that the college money is not safe in your hands. "Therefore, this services of the petitioner were the terminated with immediate effect. It is this order which was subject-matter of challenge in the latter Claim petition. 3. The first main argument of the petitioner, was that in the last paragraph of the termination order, it was mentioned as a simple termination order, but in fact, his termination was by way of punishment without giving any opportunity and, therefore, the order is illegal and is liable to be quashed. Learned Counsel for the petitioner also mentioned that he is confirmed on the post of Principal. However, he finally confined his argument to the first point and not to the other. Learned Counsel for the petitioner also mentioned that he is confirmed on the post of Principal. However, he finally confined his argument to the first point and not to the other. The stand taken by the respondents in the counter-Affidavit was that the petitioner was only a probationer and his services were terminated because of his unsuitability during the period of probation in accordance with the U.P. Municipalities Act and the rules framed thereunder. The petitioner was only served with a show-cause notice who his services be not terminated during the probation of his service. In the counter-Affidavit, telegram of the petitioner communicating the stay order by the Tribunal is admitted to have been received on the 4th June, 1976, but was contended that there was no confirmation of the identity of the person sending the telegram and, therefore, there was no presumption about the allegations mentioned in the telegram. The registered letter was, however received in the office only on 6th June, 1976, when before that i.e., on 5th June, 1976, services of the petitioner were terminated by means of Annexure 3-A to the writ petition. According to averments of the respondents made in the counter-Affidavit the termination order does not cast any stigma on the petitioner, nor his services were terminated because of his alleged involvement in R. S. S., which is mentioned in the letter of termination. 4. At the outset, learned Counsel for the respondents raised a ground that since the petitioner did not raise the ground in the form they have been raised in the writ petition that the termination of the services were by way of punishment, the same should not be permitted to be raised now before this Court. It was also urged that when the Tribunal recorded a finding that the petitioner had a remedy to appeal to the State Government against his termination order, which he did not file and since the Tribunal does not sit and examine as an appellate authority, therefore, the petitioner is not entitled to any relief. For this, he has also made reliance on the second provision to Section 4 of the U.P. Public Services (Tribunals) Act, 1976, (U.P. Act No. 13 of 1980) (hereinafter referred to as the Act). For this, he has also made reliance on the second provision to Section 4 of the U.P. Public Services (Tribunals) Act, 1976, (U.P. Act No. 13 of 1980) (hereinafter referred to as the Act). For ready reference the said proviso is quoted as below : "Provided further that no reference shall ordinarily be entertained by the Tribunal until the claimant has exhausted his departmental remedies under the rules applicable to him." 5. After perusing the Claim Petition I find that a specific ground was raised by the petitioner before the Tribunal that the services of the petitioner were terminated on the basis of charges against him and he was not given any opportunity to meet the same. Reading the whole tenor of the Claim Petition with preceding circumstances coupled with the fact that the termination order specifically in it the various charges contained in the charge-sheet dated 19th May, 1976, it cannot be urged that the petitioner has not made any foundation in his claim petition, or raised any such ground which dis entitles him to raise it before this Court. No doubt, before the Tribunal the petitioner further mainly relied, that he is a confirmed Principal, no question of his probationary period being further extended arose and the President of the Municipal Board is not appointing authority and no charge-sheet could have been issued to him. In view of the aforesaid facts the contention of the respondents that the petitioner should not be permitted to raise the said question could not be accepted. Even apart from this, the question whether the petitioner's services had been terminated by way of punishment or a simple termination, nothing more is required to be gone into except reading the termination order itself and then interpreting that the said termination order amounted to punishment or not. It will be a pure question of law based on the interpretation of the termination order, especially when preceding circumstances are not in dispute. Respondents reliance even on second proviso of Section 4 of the Act is not sustainable. The second proviso merely says "no reference shall ordinarily be entertained by the Tribunal until the claimant has exhausted his departmental remedies." In the present case, the Tribunal, though referred to this in the Claim Petition but it went on to decide the case on merits. The second proviso merely says "no reference shall ordinarily be entertained by the Tribunal until the claimant has exhausted his departmental remedies." In the present case, the Tribunal, though referred to this in the Claim Petition but it went on to decide the case on merits. Then, in such a case now after a lapse of more than a decade it would be futile to drag the petitioner to first exhaust his departmental remedies. In fact, this writ petition was filed in the year 1979 and is pending in this Court for the last about eight years. Rule of alternative remedy is not absolute. It has to be exercised on the facts and circumstances of each case. On the facts of the present case I am, therefore, of opinion that the respondents contention is devoid of any merit. 6. The Tribunal has mainly relied on the rule dealing the termination of services of the probationers. The petitioner relied on Rule 9 of the U.P. Municipal Boards Servants (Enquiry, Punishment and Termination of Service) Rules, 1960 (hereinafter referred to as i960 Rules) while the Tribunal relied on the rules issued by the State Government by virtue of a notification No. 4718 - F/XI-a-797 - 60 dated June 14, 1961. The aforesaid Rule 9 is as follows : "9. Where it is proposed to terminate the employment of a probationer whether during or it the end of the period of probation, or of a temporary servant for any specific fault or on account of his unsuitability for the service, it shall not be necessary to observe the detailed procedure laid down in Rule 5. In such cases, the probationer or temporary servant concerned shall be apprised of the grounds of such proposal, given an opportunity of showing cause against the action age proposed to be taken against him, and his explanation in this behalf, if any, shall be duly considered before orders are passed by the competent authority." The rule relied upon by the Tribunal is also quoted hereunder : "Government of Uttar Pradesh Municipal Department June 14, 1961. No. 4718 - F/XI-a-797 - 60 - In exercise of the powers conferred by clause (b) of Sub-section (2) of Section 296 of the U.P. Municipalities Act, 1916 (U.P. Act No. 11 of 1916), the Governor of Uttar Pradesh is pleased to make, after previous publication in notification No. 3742 - F/XI-a-797 - 60, dated November 16, 1960, as required by Sub-section (1) of Section 300 of the said Act, the following rules regulating the conditions of services of persons who are appointed to posts under Municipal Boards and in respect of whom no specific rules governing matters of probation and confirmation otherwise exist." RULES "1. (1) Except as otherwise specifically provided in any other rule applicable to him, every officer or servant of a Board, on appointment to a post under the Board in or against a substantive vacancy, otherwise than in a temporary or officiating capacity, shall be placed on probation for a period of one year. (2) The appointing authority may, for sufficient reasons, extend the said period of probation in individual cases for a further period not exceeding one year. Every such order of extension shall specify the exact date upto which the extension is granted. (3) If it appears at any time during the period of probation or extended period of probation as the case may be that a probationer to whom Sub-rule (1) applies has not made sufficient use of his opportunities or has otherwise failed to give satisfaction, his services may, if he is directly recruited, be terminated or if is appointed by promotion, he may be reverted to his substantive post. (4) A person whose services have been terminated during or at the end of the period of probation under Sub-rule (3) shall not be entitled to any compensation. 2. A probationer to whom Sub-rule (1) of Rule 1 applies shall be confirmed in his appointment at the end of his period of probation or extended period of probation, as the case may be, if his work, conduct and integrity are reported to be satisfactory and the appointing authority is satisfied that he is otherwise fit in all respects to be confirmed." By order S B. L. Kakkar Sachiv". 7. However, nothing will turn on these two different sets of rules. Since serious disputes were raised as to their applicability the same will be dealt with herein below. 7. However, nothing will turn on these two different sets of rules. Since serious disputes were raised as to their applicability the same will be dealt with herein below. The aforesaid Rule 9 is in respect of all the Boards" servants while the rule quoted by the Tribunal specifically mentions the notification that these rules relates to the conditions of service of persons who were appointed to posts under a Municipal Board and in respect of whom no specific rules governing the matter probation and confirmation otherwise exist. 8. It is urged on behalf of the respondents that since the petitioner is holding a post in the educational establishment of the Board, therefore, 1960 rules could not be applicable and since no specific rule regarding the educational establishment has been made the rules quoted by the Tribunal would be applicable. The respondent's contention is devoid of any merit. Looking at the schedule of 1960 rules at serial No. 2 it is specifically mentioned that Rules 4 to 9 of 1960 rules in relation to educational establishment of Municipal Boards it shall be applicable with such modifications and supplementary provisions as are contained in U.P. Municipal Boards Educational Establishment Service Rules, 1954 (hereinafter referred to as 1954 rules). Thus, when there is specific rule in relation to the educational establishment already there the question of applicability of the rule, quoted by the Tribunal, would not arise. It is significant here to refer to 1954 rules. Rule 37 of this rule deals with the appointment on probation. In effect, the said rule is almost in the same line as that of 1960 Rules. 9. The question, which requires consideration, in the present writ petition, is whether the termination of service of the probationer by exercising the powers under rules during the period of probation could be examined by the court to test whether the termination of the services of the petitioner was a simple termination or by way of punishment. Learned Counsel for the petitioner urged in the present case that there could not be any doubt as even without examining the preceding circumstances, the very termination order spells out the misconduct and civil consequences as against the petitioner thus putting a stigma on him and that is liable to be quashed as no opportunity was granted to the petitioner to meet with those charges. He further urged that the principal is well-settled as even in those cases where the language of the termination order is worded to look as if it is a simple termination the court can always examining the attenuating circumstances to test whether the termination is a simple termination or by way of punishment. On the other hand, as aforesaid, it was vehemently urged by the respondents that the order is merely a simple termination and since he was merely a probationer, the termination of the services during the period of probation cannot be constituted as terminating the services by way of punishment. 10. Learned Counsel for the petitioner relied on the case of V. K. Singh v. Union of India and others, 1984 UPLBEC 399. It was held : "It is settled law that in order to judge the real nature of an order of termination surrounding and attendant circumstances are relevant... " 11. It was a case where an I. A. S. probationer was discharged from the - Indian Administrative Service during the period of probation. Initially, an enquiry was conducted as against him and the Central Government thought that on account of the report of the misconduct of the petitioner a warning should be issued to him and his conduct be kept in watch for future. Before this order could be communicated, on account of another letter from Sri Appu the matter was reconsidered and an order of simple discharge was passed in terms of Rule 12 of the Indian Administrative (Probation) Rules, 1954. However, it was held that where specific allegations of misconduct, inefficiency or corruption is made an order of discharge, though innocent on its take, shall amount to punishment so as to attract Article 311 (2) of the Constitution. The case of the petitioner is identical to the present ease as even in this case charges of mis - Conduct, inefficiency and corruption was made against the petitioner. Later, it was urged, in his case even the terminations order is not innocent as it openly deals with the aforesaid conduct of the petitioner. Thus, it casts a stigma on his character. 12. Next, reliance was placed in the case Indra Pal Gupta v. The Managing Committee, Model Inter College, Thora, AIR 1984 SC p. 1110. Later, it was urged, in his case even the terminations order is not innocent as it openly deals with the aforesaid conduct of the petitioner. Thus, it casts a stigma on his character. 12. Next, reliance was placed in the case Indra Pal Gupta v. The Managing Committee, Model Inter College, Thora, AIR 1984 SC p. 1110. This was a case of a Principal of an Intermediate College, who was on probation and his services were terminated during the extended period of his probation. The managing committee by means of resulting to the reports of the Manager stated that the facts contained in the report were "serious" and "not in the interest of the institution". However, since he was on probation his services were terminated without making any inquiry as laid down under regulations framed under Section 16 - C of the U.P. Intermediate Education Act. It was held that the letter and the resolution bore a mark of disgrace and infamy and the Principal concerned was visited with evil consequences. It was further held that such a termination could not be said to be an innocuous one. In this case, though Article 311 of the Constitution was no applicable its principles were applied in the case of a probationer. 13. Now with the changing socio economic conditions of the Country the exercise of powers by various authorities either by the State, statutory authorities, etc. the principals of Article 311 of the Constitution has been imputed even in the domain where a person is not holding a civil post in the restricted sense as laid down under Article 311 of the Constitution. The aforesaid case of Indra Pal Gupta (supra) was a case under Intermediate Education Act and even in this case the Supreme Court applied the principle of Article 311 of the Constitution in the case of the termination of services of the Principal whose services were terminated before the expiry of the period of probation. 14. Learned Counsel for the respondents urged that this case would not be applicable since the services of the Principal in the aforesaid Indra Pal Singh's case was governed under Section 16-G of the Education Act as the said provision has been suspended in the case of the Municipal Board Educational establishment. He strongly relied on Section 16-H of of the aforesaid Act. He strongly relied on Section 16-H of of the aforesaid Act. In Sub-section (2) of Section 16-H of the Education Act it is provided : "(2) In the case of recognised institution maintained by a local body, the State Government may declare that all or any of the provisions referred to in Sub-section (1) shall not apply or shall apply subject to such alternations, modifications or additions as it may make " 15. Sub-section (vi) of Section 16-H provides that the provisions of Section 16-G shall not apply to the recognised institutions maintained by the State Government or the Central Government. The argument was that in exercise of the powers under Section 16 - H (2) the State Government by means of Notification No. U. O. A - 1/558/XV, dated 21st February, 1984 excluded the provisions of Section 16-G to the recognised institutions maintained by local bodies. Admittedly, the petitioner is working in the institution recognised and maintained by a local body. It was further urged that the aforesaid notification was superseded by means of another Notification No. Ma - 2450/XV-7-8(4) - 75, dated 13th June, 1979 whereby Section 16-G of the Education Act was again made applicable. According to his contention Section 16-G of the Education Act was not applicable to the institution with effect from 21st February, l64 to 13th June, 1979 and since the impugned action as against the petitioner took place during this period, thus the opportunity to be given to the petitioner has been taken away by the exclusion of Section 16-G. Under the Intermediate Education Act Section 16-G is the main provision which deals with the services of the teacher, Principal or other employees. He further urged that because of exclusion of Section 16-G even principles of natural justice has been taken away and a person cannot be deprived of a right of being heard in view of the right having been taken away. Reliance was placed by the learned Counsel for the respondents in the case Union of India v. J. N. Sinha, AIR 1971 SC p. 40. He urged in view of the aforesaid authority even if expressly right to be heard has been taken away if it could be construed by implication then also a person has no right to be heard. 16. He urged in view of the aforesaid authority even if expressly right to be heard has been taken away if it could be construed by implication then also a person has no right to be heard. 16. The principle as laid down in the aforesaid case was that "rules of natural justice are not embodied rules nor can they be elevated to the provisions of fundamental rights. Their aim if to secure justice or to prevent miscarriage of justice But if a statutory provision either specifically or by necessary implication excludes the application of any rules of natural justice then courts ignore the mandate of the legislature or the statutory authority ...." 17. In the present case, rules of natural justice having been taken away specifically or by implication could arise only when there is no subsisting rule, which gave them opportunity. The relevant provision of Section 16 provides that no Principal, Head Master or teacher may be discharged or removed or dismissed from service or reduced in rank or subjected to any diminution in emoluments except with the approval in writing of the Inspector. This provision requires a prior approval before discharging, removing or dismissing one from the service Thus, by mere deletion of Section 16-G to the institution run by the local bodies could not mean the exclusion of the fair opportunity to the Principal, teachers or other employees if their services are to be removed. The principles of natural justice is based on fairness, founded on good reasons and is attendant before exercising the powers and the same could not be lightly interpreted as to have been excluded by mere exclusion of Section 16-G. Eleven if Section 16-G would not have been on the statute book, it could not have been urged that employees such as Principal or teachers could be dismissed from service without giving any opportunity. Thus, contention of the respondents that the case of Indra Pal (supra) would not apply cannot be accepted. The principle of Article 311 of the Constitution, which was made applicable to the case of the Principal of the Intermediate colleges under the Education Act Section 16-G would be equally applicable to the Principal, teachers of the educational institution run by the local bodies and thus their services could not be terminated by way of removal without giving any opportunity. 18. 18. It is relevant to mention here that even in the absence of Section 16-G the services of the educational institutions are governed by 1960 rules to the extent as is modified by 1954 rules. Rule 5 of the aforesaid 1960 rules and Rule 45 of the 1954 rules specifically provides that an order of dismissal, removal or reductions in rank - shall be passed on a person who is member of the educational establishment of a board or a hold the post on that establishment unless he is informed in writing of the grounds on which it is proposed to take action and has been afforded adequate opportunity to defend. Thus, it would be seen that the granting of opportunity is still retained specifically in spite of exclusion of Section 16-G. In view of this, the argument raised by the learned Counsel for the respondents cannot be sustained. 19. Coining back to the main argument for the petitioner that the termination of his services amounted to punishment he has merely placed the termination order (Annexure III-A to the petition), which itself reveals that the termination of his services has been made on account of misconduct, negligence, inefficiency and other disqualifications. The principle from the case of Purshottam Lal Dhingra's (supra) case till today is very clear that if the termination or discharge of services have been made on account of misconduct, which puts an indelible stigma on the employee the a such termination or discharge would amount to removal from service. 20. Learned Counsel for the respondents vehemently urged that even if any inquiry had t a held in respect of his misconduct and other inefficiency, but his services has only been terminated in terms of contract of rules, it would not amount to removal from service. He urged that the petitioner was only appointed as a probationer and since the probation was still continuing therefore his termination was a simple termination. He further urged that even if the charge-sheet has been served on him still it is not open to the authorities not to terminate the services by way of punishment. 21. He urged that the petitioner was only appointed as a probationer and since the probation was still continuing therefore his termination was a simple termination. He further urged that even if the charge-sheet has been served on him still it is not open to the authorities not to terminate the services by way of punishment. 21. Reliance has been placed by the learned counsel for the respondents in the case reported in the State of Orissa and another v. Earn Narayan Das, AIR 1961 SC 177 In this case it was held that mere termination of employment does not carry with it any evil consequence and an order discharging the probationer following upon an inquiry to ascertain whether he was fit to be confirmed would not amount to dismissal from service. In this case, the employee, a Sub-Inspector, was on probation in Orissa Police Force and in view of the adverse report notice was served on him to show why he should not be discharged from service for gross neglect of duties and unsatisfactory work. In the notice specific instances of neglect of duty and two instances of misconduct were set out and an explanation was offered by the Sub-Inspector stating that authorities have already taken an action against him in respect of instances of neglect of duty and, therefore, no further action should be taken as it would amount lo double punishment. He denied the charge of misconduct. After consideration of the explanation he was discharged from his service. This order was challenged on the ground that the said order had been passed without giving any reasonable opportunity. The Supreme Court held that the said Sub-Inspector under the terms of his employment could be discharged under rule 55 - b of the Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, and mere termination of employment does not carry with it "any evil consequence". It was also held that no stigma was there affecting his future career. The Sub-Inspector was discharged for unsatisfactory work and not misconduct. This case does not support the respondents. The Supreme Court in that case further held that even the inquiry which was conducted against the respondents was for ascertaining whether he was fit to be confirmed. It was also held that no stigma was there affecting his future career. The Sub-Inspector was discharged for unsatisfactory work and not misconduct. This case does not support the respondents. The Supreme Court in that case further held that even the inquiry which was conducted against the respondents was for ascertaining whether he was fit to be confirmed. Even in this case the Supreme Court clearly held : "An order discharging a public servant, even if a probation, in an inquiry of charge of misconduct, negligence, inefficiency or other disqualification may appropriately be regarded as one by way of punishment, an order discharging a probationer following upon an inquiry to ascertain whether he was fit to be confirmed, is not of that nature." 22. The next case relied upon a was the State of Punjab and another v. Sukh Daj Bahadur, AIR. 1968 SC 1089. In this case, the employee was a Personal Assistant to the Deputy Commissioner, Amritsar, and under rule 22 of Punjab Civil Services (Executive Branch) Rules, 1930. He was to remain on probation for 18 months. His probationary period expired and the same was not extended. The petitioner claimed that he was confirmed. Then, later on he received a charge-sheet seeking his reply and to produce and defence if he desires. The petitioner replied that he wanted an opportunity of being heard in person. However, subsequently by an order he was reverted to his substantive post of Superintendent under the Chief Secretary, Delhi Administration. The question raised in this case was whether such reversion order was by way of punishment. The Supreme Court held in this case that since inquiry did not proceed any further after serving on him the charge-sheet it could not be said that the reversion placed any stigma as he was only reverted to his substantive post and therefore Article 311 of the Constitution is not attracted. In this case, the order of reversion may be stated as follows : "The Governor of Punjab is pleased to revert Sri Sukh Baj Bahadur, Extra Assistant Commissioner., to the post of Superintendent under the Chief Secretary, Delhi Administration, with immediate effect." In this case also, even the principle laid down was the same as in the case of Purshottam Lal Dhingra (supra) and subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court. In this case, it was held that the circumstances preceding or attending and order of termination of service have to be examined in each case, the give behind it being immaterial. If the order visits the public servant with any evil consequence or casts an aspersion against his character or integrity, it must be considered to be one by way of punishment, no matter whether be was a mere probationer or a temporary servant. 23. Reliance was also placed in the case of Shamsher Singh v. Slate of Punjab and another, AIR 1974 SC p. 2192 in which it was held as follows :- "In the absence of any rules governing a probationer in this respect the authority may come to the conclusion that on account of inadequacy for the job or for any temperament or other object not involving moral turpitude the probationer is unsuitable for the job and hence must be discharged. No punishment is involved in this." This proposition as laid down in the Supreme Court is not in doubt. If the services of a probationer is terminated on the ground of his unsuitability to the job discharge would always be valid - It is always open to the authorities in case of probationer either to discharge him on the ground of his unsuitability or unsatisfactory work or on the ground of misconduct. If the termination of the service is on the earlier ground it would be simple termination while if it is founded on the later misconduct it would amount to removal from service even though the language may show a simple termination. It is significant even in the aforesaid passage the words "not involving moral turpitude" are specifically mentioned. Thus, where the termination of service involves the moral turpitude and is specifically mentioned then it cannot be said that the termination is not by way of punishment. It is significant even in this authority the Supreme Court held :- "No abstract proposition can be laid down that where the services of a probationer are terminated it can never amount to a punishment.. .... The authority may in some cases be of the view that the conduct of the probationer may result in dismissal or removal on an inquiry. .... The authority may in some cases be of the view that the conduct of the probationer may result in dismissal or removal on an inquiry. But in this case the authority may not hold an inquiry and may simply discharge the probationer with a view to give him a chance to make good in other walks of life without a stigma at the time of termination of probationer. If, on the ether hand, the probationer is placed with an inquiry on charges of misconduct inefficiency or corruption and if his services are terminated without following the provisions of Article 311 (2) he can claim protection." So even this case does not help the respondents. 24. The consensus of the various decisions cited by the learned counsel for the parties and so other decisions of the Supreme Court is very clear and the same has been very clearly reproduced in the case of Sukh Raj Bahadur (supra) in paragraph 16 of the judgment. For a ready reference the same is quoted below i "(1) The services of a temporary servant or a probationer can be terminated under the rules of his employment and such termination without anything more would not attract the operation of Article 311 of the Constitution. (2) The circumstances preceding or attendant on the 'order of termination of service have to be examined in such case, the motive, behind it being immaterial. (3) If the order visits the public servant with any evil consequences or casts an aspersion against his character or integrity, it must be considered to be one by way of punishment, no matter whether he was a mere probationer or a temporary servant. (4) An order of termination of service in unexceptional form preceded by an enquiry launched by the superior authority only to ascertain whether the public servant should be retained in service, does not attract the operation of Article 311 of the Constitution. (5) If there be a full scale departmental enquiry envisaged by Article 311 i.e. an Enquiry Officer is appointed, a charge-sheet submitted, explanation called for and considered, any order of termination of service made thereafter will attract the operation of the said article." 25. (5) If there be a full scale departmental enquiry envisaged by Article 311 i.e. an Enquiry Officer is appointed, a charge-sheet submitted, explanation called for and considered, any order of termination of service made thereafter will attract the operation of the said article." 25. The main contention of the learned counsel for the respondent that even if an inquiry has been conducted against the petitioner that itself would not be conclusive that the termination of the service was be way of removal. In some of the authorities it has been laid down that if charge-sheet was served on him and no inquiry proceeded further and if the authorities in order to satisfy the suitability of the employee has discharged his services by way of simple termination it would not amount to removal from service. The authorities are very clear. If the authorities are holding an inquiry mainly for testing his suitability or whether he is to be confirmed as probationer or not, then it does not lead to any evil consequences derogatory to the employee, but if such an inquiry is held on the ground of misconduct, inefficiency etc. which places stigma on him then it is a clear case of removal from service and not a simple discharge. This question mostly has arisen when an order of termination or reversion was by any simple order without attaching any misconduct or inefficiency. The questions were raised repeatedly in the past. In has been held that the courts must look to the attendant circumstances to come to the conclusion whether the said termination was in effect on account of misconduct or not and mere use of language in the impugned order should not be decisive, The courts repeatedly held this in order to find whether under the guise of simple termination it is actually by way of removal. For this the court can lift the veil in order to ascertain the preceding circumstances and other factors to come to the conclusion. However, where the termination order itself spells out the misconduct of an employee none of the authority can come to the rescue for upholding such an order. 26. In the present case, the termination order itself refers to each charges served on him earlier and the authority drew its own inference after examining the documents on record relating to those documents. 26. In the present case, the termination order itself refers to each charges served on him earlier and the authority drew its own inference after examining the documents on record relating to those documents. The termination order not only referred each of the charges and the conclusion of the authority but also refers about the complaints, about the link of the petitioner with the views of R. S. S. worker and also the secret report of the S. D. M Thus, the very termination order is very expressly founded on the misconduct, negligence and inefficiency of petitioner. In view of this, if the services have been terminated without giving any opportunity it cannot be sustained. 27. Learned counsel for the respondents vehemently urged that in any case even if opportunity was to be given to him, in the instant case actually opportunity was given after he has failed to reply within the period on which he was granted time then it cannot be said that no opportunity was given. In this case, on the 19th May, a charge-sheet against the petitioner was framed which was received by him on 20th May, 1976. As per the charges framed against him in show cause notice he was to reply which was to be filed by him by the 4th June, 1976, However, before that date he first made an application for certain copies, and later on obtained stay order from the Tribunal on the 1st June, 1970. Thus, before the date of his filing the explanation of the stay order there was no question of his filing any explanations. The finding of the Tribunal that the petitioner did not avail of his opportunity of filling a reply and thus the termination of his employment in the absence of reply within time were perfectly justified cannot be sustained when the Tribunal itself granted stay order on 1-6-1976 staying the proceedings in pursuance to the charge-sheet dated 19th May, 1976 with further direction that the petitioner,s rights to discharge his duties as Principal of the college should not be interfered. 28. Apart from this, opportunity does not mean only a lip service. It should on the facts and circumstances be such as to enable the employee to put up a proper defence as against the charges levelled. 28. Apart from this, opportunity does not mean only a lip service. It should on the facts and circumstances be such as to enable the employee to put up a proper defence as against the charges levelled. In the present case, after receiving the said charge-sheet on 20th May, 1976, the petitioner sent a letter dated 27th May, 1976, requesting for furnishing some papers The said letter was also received by the authorities. After that unless there were other adverse circumstances on the record, normally they should have either replied for giving those documents or with such other directions which they deem tit on the facts and circumstance of that case. It was known to the authorities that the petitioner desired some papers, on fairness the authorities should have either provided those documents if it was permissible under the rules or asked him to inspect the same, instead of passing the termination order on the very first day immediately after the expiry of the date for filing the explanation. This letter shows the anxiety and the hurry of the authorities to dispense with the services and this does not fit with the facts of giving fair opportunity to the petitioner. Thus, on the acts of this case also it cannot be said that the authorities granted any opportunity to the petitioner. Thus, the contention of the respondents, in the alternative, that full opportunity was granted to him, cannot be accepted. 29. It is significant to mention here that apart from not giving opportunity to the petitioner there is violation of rule 46 of the 1954 Rules, under which after completing inquiry when the punishing authority arrived at the conclusion in regard to penalty to be imposed it must supply with the copy of the proceedings prepared under rule 45 (1) with a show cause after giving a reasonable time why the proposed penalty should not be imposed on him. Rule 46 is as follows : "46. Rule 46 is as follows : "46. After the enquiry icon template in rule 45 (1) against a member of the service has been completed, and after the punishing authority has arrived at provisional conclusion in regard to the penalty to be imposed, the person charged shall, if the penalty proposed is dismissal, removal or reduction, be supplied with a copy of the proceedings prepared under rule 45 (1) excluding the recommendations, if any in regard to punishment, made by the officer conducting the enquiry and asked to show cause, by a particular date, which affords him reasonable time, why the proposed penalty should not be imposed on him : Provided that, if for sufficient reasons that punishing authority disagrees with any part or whole of the proceedings prepared under rule 45 (1), the point or points of such disagreement together with a brief statement of the grounds thereof, shall also be communicated to the person charged alongwith a copy of the proceedings." 30. In the present case no such opportunity before imposing the penalty has been given to the petitioner. It has not been shown to me by the learned counsel for the respondent that the aforesaid' 1954 Rules or 1960 Rules have been superseded or any such rule has been modified. In view of this event the alternative argument for the respondents that an opportunity was given to the petitioner cannot be sustained. 31. Normally, in a case where a wrath of certiorari is sought for, the Courts exercising powers under Article 226 of the Constitution quash the order and remand the case back to the said authority for passing appropriate orders in the light of the observations made. However, on the facts of this case specially where already more than twelve years has elapsed since the impugned action, with the pressure of work and chance of disposal by the Tribunal afresh might take a long time and the very delay may defeat the justice I am of the opinion not only to quash the order passed by the Tribunal, but also to quash the termination order, which was impugned before the Tribunal. 32. 32. The High Courts under the Constitution have been empowered to issue the prerogative writs as understood in England, but the powers of the Courts have been widened by the use of expression "in the nature of" and use of the words "any directions, orders or writs." While the courts exercising its power under it cannot only issue prerogative writs, as in England, but could mould the relief to meet the peculiar requirement of this Country. The guiding principle for the issuance of the writ under Article 226 of the Constitution in all cases in promotion of justice and prevention of injustice. In fact, on the facts of each case the Courts could exercise powers under it even though writ of the particular kind, which the petitioner asked for, may not be available to him. In other words, there could be no doubt that the powers which was exercised by the Tribunal could in appropriate cases directly exercised by this Court. In the present case, as aforesaid, I feel that instead of sending back the case to the Tribunal specially where the termination order on the face of it is per se illegal, the same is being quashed. 33. In view of the aforesaid, the order dated 5th June, 1976, terminating the services of the petitioner as well as the judgment and order dated 29-11-1979 passed by the Tribunal are hereby quashed. 34. In the result, this writ petition is allowed with costs.