A suit was filed, inter alia, against the petitioner in the Court of learned Assistant District Judge, Dibrugarh, claiming a sum of Rs. 28,483.00 jointly and severally against 6 persons who were impleaded as defendants in the case. An issue relating to territorial jurisdiction of the court was framed in the suit and the same was taken up as a preliminary issue. By the impugned order, the learned trial court has decided the issue in favour of the plaintiff. Defendant No. 6 has assailed the same in this application under section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code. 2. As it is defendant No. 6 alone who has come up to this Court, it would be enough if averments made in the plaint relating particularly to him are taken note of. The case of the plaintiff is that he entered into contract with defendant No. 1 on 5.9.1974 to supply two tonnes of Titanium Dioxide to despatch the same by road to Ledo via Tinsukia. For this purpose, the plaintiff contacted defendant No. 4 who is a carrier, Defendant No. 5 being its Manager. The plaintiff met this defendant on 5,9.74 itself when he was told that due to heavy floods, direct road communication to Assam was suspended temporarily and therefore all consignments would be stored at Madras godown for a few days till road communication to Assam would be resumed. While the plaintiff was at Trivandrum, where he had gone to enter into the contract, he met defendant No. 6 in the hotel where he was putting up and developed some acquaintance with him as he was also a Hindi speaking gentlemen. On 9,9.74, the plaintiff requested this defendant to be kind to take care of plaintiff's consignments which would be stored at Madras for a few days in the godown of defendant No. 4 and to see that the same are stored well and are despatched to Assam. The request was friendly. Subsequently, the plaintiff knew that the consign­ments were sent only upto Madras, and not to Ledo. At Madras, defendant No. 6 took delivery of the consignments for onward despatch to Assam but the same was not done. The request was friendly. Subsequently, the plaintiff knew that the consign­ments were sent only upto Madras, and not to Ledo. At Madras, defendant No. 6 took delivery of the consignments for onward despatch to Assam but the same was not done. The plaintiff, therefore entered into correspondence with defendant No. 6 who concocted a" fairy tale" that he had been authorised by the former to take delivery of the consignments to hand-over the same to some other parties in liquida­tion of the loan taken by the plaintiff. Several attempts were made to recover the price of the goods, but all went in vain following which the present suit was filed. 3. Relying on the above averments relating to the petitioner, it is contended by Shri Barua that the court at Dibrugarh had no jurisdiction to try the case inasmuch as it is section 19 of the Civil Procedure Code which would del ermine the question of territorial jurisdiction relating to the case of the plaintiff against the petitioner, and the Court at Dibrugarh is not one which is contemplated by section 19 which reads :- "19. Suits for compensation for wrongs to person or movables- Where a suit is for compensation for wrong done to the person or to movable property, if the wrong was done within the local limits of the jurisdiction of one Court and the defendant resides, or carries on business, or personally works for gain, within the local limits of the jurisdiction of another Court, the suit may be instituted at the option of the plaintiff in either of the said Courts." Shri Barua contends that as the present is a suit for compensation for wrong done to some movable property the suit could have been filed only where the wrong was done and or where the petitioner resides or carries on business, or personally work for gain. As the petitioner does not reside, or carry on business, or work for gain within the local limits of the Court of Assistant District Judge at Dibrugarh, the question to be determined is whether it could be said that the wrong was done within the local limits of the aforesaid court. 4. As the petitioner does not reside, or carry on business, or work for gain within the local limits of the Court of Assistant District Judge at Dibrugarh, the question to be determined is whether it could be said that the wrong was done within the local limits of the aforesaid court. 4. To satisfy me about the applicability of section 19, Shri Barua has urged that in so far as defendant No, 6 is concerned, it is not the case of the plaintiff that he had entered into any contract with him inasmuch as from the averments made in the plaint it is quite clear that this defendant had made only a request to look after the consignments of the plaintiff during the short period these were, to be stored at Madras. He, therefore, urges that the liability of defendant No. 6, if at all, was not contractual but tortuous, and so it was a case of some wrong done to the consignments of plaintiffs. This is not challenged by Shri Yadav. It has therefore to be seen whether to realise the compensation for the wrong done to the consignments, the Court of Assistant District Judge, within whose jurisdiction the plaintiff resides, can be said to be a competent Court. 5. To support his stand Shri Barua has referred to Sreepathi Hosiery Mills v. Chitra Knitting Company, AIR 1977 Madras 258, wherein it has been stated that section 19 is a specific section dealing with a suit for compensation for wrong done to a person or movable property. Reference has also been made to Gokaldas v. Baldev Das, AIR 1961 Mysore 188, wherein it has also been stated that it is section 19 which would govern the question of territorial jurisdiction in a case of the present nature. This position is not disputed by Shri Yadav. 6. Because of the aforesaid stand taken by the learned counsel of both the sides, it is not necessary to decide whether section 20 of the Code would apply in those cases only which are not governed by other cognate provisions of the Code dealing with the "Place of Suing". This position is not disputed by Shri Yadav. 6. Because of the aforesaid stand taken by the learned counsel of both the sides, it is not necessary to decide whether section 20 of the Code would apply in those cases only which are not governed by other cognate provisions of the Code dealing with the "Place of Suing". To put it differently, it is not necessary for the present case to determine whether section 19 can really be regarded in the nature of an exception to section 20, or whether section 19 is really a limitation on the provisions contained in section 20. 7. The real question to decide in the instant case, in the context of stand taken by both the learned counsel, is whether the Dibrugarh Court is one of the forums envisaged by section 19. Shri Yadav has urged that the phrase "wrong done" is indicative of completed action and is wide enough to take in the results as the basis for the purpose of restitution. Compensation for wrong done can be realised only on the proof of actual suffering of loss by the plaintiff and so if the loss is suffered at a place where the plaintiff resides, the Court within whose jurisdiction the plaintiff resides would also have jurisdiction to entertain a suit covered by section 19.- To support this contention, Shri Yadav has referred to State versus Sarovadaya Industries, AIR 1975 Bombay 17, wherein it has been stated as below in para 13 :- "In a suit for compensation "wrong done" or "complained of" is the cause of action by which Code understands and contemplates all the bundles of necessary facts capable of proof of sustaining the relief claimed. Compensation clearly posits an injury resulting in loss and damage. Mere injury or wrong without anything more would not suffice to sustain the claim for compensation. It is clear that the phrase "wrong done" is not used in any narrow sense but has to, be understood in all its amplitude so as to afford forum and necessary relief. That clearly takes in both cause and effect. Injury or actual wrong may occur at place A but its effect may be felt at places other than 'A' and may effect places 'B' or 'C'. That clearly takes in both cause and effect. Injury or actual wrong may occur at place A but its effect may be felt at places other than 'A' and may effect places 'B' or 'C'. Act or actions taking place at a given place may still give rise to results affecting persons or property at places quite different and at all these places and for all those effects, cause would arise seeking compensation. Without resultant loss or its proof restitutive justice may not afford any relief nor there could be any remedy in vacuum. Thus the phraseology used by section 19 about "the wrong done" would clearly take in not only the initial action complained of but its resultant effect." 8. I would respectfully agree with the aforesaid view inasmuch as suit for compensation for wrong done would not lie unless the plaintiff has suffered loss or damage. As the loss in the present case had occured within the jurisdiction of the Court at Dibrugarh because the plaintiff resides at Ledo. I am of the view that the court at Dibrugarh had territorial jurisdiction to try the suit against the petitioner. Having come to this conclusion, it is not necessary to examine the question as to whether territorial jurisdiction of the Dibrugarh court would have been saved on the ground that it had r jurisdiction over other defendants, and if the petitioner would not. Thave been impleaded as a party, the suit would have suffered from the infirmity of non-joinder of necessary parties. 9. In the result, I uphold the jurisdiction of the Court at Dibrugarh and dismiss this revision. Sd/ Judge