B. K. BEHERA, J. ( 1 ) THE appellant stands convicted under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code (for short, the Code) for having committed the murder of his brother Mcdi Majhi (to be described hereinafter as the deceased) during the night of March 7, 1981, at Sudeipadar in the district of Koraput and sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life. The order of conviction has been based mainly on the evidence of P. Ws. 1, 3 and 4 regarding the extra judicial confessions made by the appellant before them, the recovery of an axe (M 0. I), the weapon of attack, carried by the appellant during the night of occurrence when he went, work up P. W. 1 and informed him that he had killed his brother, which, on chemical test, contained blood and the recovery of his wearing cloth (M. 0. II) from his person, which, on chemical and serological test, was found to contain human blood, coupled with the evidence of the doctor (P. W. 2) who had conducted the autopsy. ( 2 ) APPEARING on behalf of the appellant, Mr. K. C. Mohanty has contended that the evidence relating to the extra judicial confession is not clear and acceptable and the other circumstances would not establish the charge against the appellant. ( 3 ) IT admits of no doubt from the evidence of P. W. 2 that the deceased had died a homicidal death. ( 4 ) THE witnesses to the extrajudical confessions are no other persons than the brothers (P. Ws 1 and 4) and uncle (P. W. 3) of the appellant and the deceased who have testified that the appellant had admitted before them that he had killed the deceased. They were the persons in whom the appellant could repose confidence. It appears that having killed his brother, the appellant had confessed his guilt owing to remorse and penitence. There is no reason to discard the evidence of P. Ws. 1, 3 and 4. ( 5 ) AS has been laid down by the Supreme Court in State of U. P. v. M. K. Anthony1, an order of conviction can legally be founded on an extra-judicial confession of an accused if the evidence in this regard is reliable, trustworthy and beyond reproach. ( 6 ) AS a rule of practice and prudence, some corroboration is sought of a retracted extra-judicial confession. ( 6 ) AS a rule of practice and prudence, some corroboration is sought of a retracted extra-judicial confession. In the instant case, apart from the extra judicial confessions made by the appellant, M. O. I, which was the weapon of attack, had been seized on being produced by P. W. 1 in the course of investigation and it is in evidence that the appellant had carried M. O. I when he went to the house of P. W. 1 and narrated the occurrence to him. It is in evidence that M. O. I belonged to the appellant and was being used by him. Besides, the wearing cloth (M. O. II) seized from the person of the appellant contained human blood. In addition, there is the evidence of the doctor (P. W. 2), which would lend assurance to the other evidence on which the conclusion of guilt has been rested. The retracted extrajudicial confession made by the appellant bas found material corroboration. ( 7 ) FOR the foregoing reasons, we are at one with the learned trial Judge who has accepted the case of the prosecution that the appellant had killed the deceased by means of MO. I. ( 8 ) MR. Mohanty has contended that if the case against the appellant is accepted, the offence would be one of culpable homicide not amounting to murder coming within the purview of section 304 Part I of the Code as whatever had been done by the appellant bad been done under the impulse of grave and sudden provocation offered by the deceased. ( 9 ) IT is in evidence that deceased was a rowdy person and people were afraid of him. On the day of occurrence, in the afternoon, the deceased came in a state of drunkenness and hurled abuses at the appellant and had been threatening to kill him. Such abuses and threat continued during the night before the occurrence. The appellant belongs to an aboriginal tribe. Persons belonging to such tribes are highly inflammable by nature, as bas been submitted at the Bar. The appellant had taken a plea right from the first statement made by him before P. W. 1 that because of such acts and conduct on the part of the deceased, he had killed the latter. The appellant belongs to an aboriginal tribe. Persons belonging to such tribes are highly inflammable by nature, as bas been submitted at the Bar. The appellant had taken a plea right from the first statement made by him before P. W. 1 that because of such acts and conduct on the part of the deceased, he had killed the latter. The learned trial Judge bas also noticed in the judgment while imposing the sentence that the deceased had been giving threats to kill the accused and had invited trouble and that the spirit of self-preservation had induced the appellant to commit the crime. In the absence of any evidence indicating that at the time the act was committed by the appellant, there was any threat to his life or that he had any apprehension that grievous hurt would be the consequence if he did not intervene, the appellant could not be protected by the right of private defence of his person. However, as would clearly appear from the materials placed before the trial court, tile deceased had hurled abuses at the appellant and had been verbally threatening to assault and kill him. This had evidently infuriated the appellant and he had killed his brother being deprived of his power of self-control by the grave and sudden provocation offered by the deceased. The learned Additional Government Advocate has fairly submitted that on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, it would be reasonable and proper to convict the appellant under section 304 Part I of the Code as his act would come under the first exception to section 300 of the Code. ( 10 ) IN the result, the appeal is allowed in part. The order of conviction passed against the appellant under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code and the sentence passed against him are set aside and in lieu thereof, the appellant is convicted under section 304 Part I of the Indian Penal Code is sentenced thereunder to undergo imprisonment for the period already undergone by him which would meet the ends of justice. The appellant be set at liberty forthwith. Appeal partly allowed.