JUDGMENT K. P. Singh, J. - By means of this writ petition the petitioner has prayed for quashing the judgment and order dated 27-1-1984 passed by the Assistant Director of Consolidation, Jaunpur, whereby a review or restoration application filed by the opposite party no. 2, Deo Nandan, in the present writ petition has been allowed. 2. The claims of the parties were decided by the revisional court through its order dated 3rd July, 1970. Thereafter the petitioner moved an application on 16-7-1981 for setting aside the order dated 3-7-1970 on the ground that the petitioner was not heard and the order in revision was obtained after practising fraud upon him as well as the court. It appears that the application filed by the petitioner was allowed by the Assistant Director of Consolidation through his order dated 29-5-1982. The orders passed by the appellate authority as well as the revisional court were set aside and the order passed by the Consolidation officer was confirmed. Against the order dated 29-5-1982 it appears that the opposite party no. 2 Deo Nandan applied for its setting aside through an application dated 17-4-1983 which has been allowed by the revisional court through its order dated 27-1-1984 contained in Annexure IX attached with the writ petition. Now aggrieved by the order of the revisional court dated 27-1-1984 the petitioner has approached this court under Article 226 of the Constitution. 3. The learned counsel for the petitioner has contended before me that the impugned order is bad in law because it has not decided any material controversy raised by the parties. It has also not decided the question of limitation involved in the case. It has also been emphasised that the impugned order is without jurisdiction because no review application lay under the provisions of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act. 4. The learned counsel for the contesting opposite party Deo Nandan has emphasised that the impugned order has done substantial justice between the parties, therefore, it should not be interfered with. He has also emphasised that the delay in filing the application has been explained and the revisional court has condoned the delay after imposing a cost of Rs. 25/-. 4. The learned counsel for the contesting opposite party Deo Nandan has emphasised that the impugned order has done substantial justice between the parties, therefore, it should not be interfered with. He has also emphasised that the delay in filing the application has been explained and the revisional court has condoned the delay after imposing a cost of Rs. 25/-. It has also been emphasised that the petitioner had obtained the order dated 29-5-1982 by setting up an imposter and he himself had played fraud upon the Court, therefore, no interference should be made with the impugned order at his instance. It has also been brought to my notice that the order dated 29-5-1982 in favour of the petitioner also did not consider the question of limitation or latches on the part of the petitioner in moving the Court for setting aside the order dated 3-7-19.0 after a lapse of 11 years. 5. In rejoinder the learned counsel for the petitioner has emphasised that the order dated 3-7-1970 was passed behind the back of the petitioner and fraud had been committed upon the petitioner as well as the court. Therefore, the revisional court was fully justified in setting aside the order dated 3-7-1970. He has placed reliance over the decisions reported in AIR 1968 Supreme Court 956 Ningwa v. Bairappa Sirappa and others, AIR 1982 Allahabad 622 Bhagwati Prasad and another v. Ram Rup Tiwari and others, AIR 1950 Ajmer 6; Anandi Prasad and another v. Jhamman Lal and another, AIR 1921 Bombay 20 Sannubai Babu Rao Gaekwad v. Shivail Rao Krishna Rao Gaekwad, AIR 1951 Rajasthan 47 ; Mag raj and others v. Har Narayan and others and has emphasised that when fraud was committed by the opposite party Deo Nandan in obtaining the order dated 3-7-1970, the revisional court was fully justified in passing the order dated 29-5-1982. Even if the question of limitation was not specifically decided in the order dated 29-5-1982 it did not suffer from any error of law and the impugned order passed by the revisional court on 27-1-1984 being without jurisdiction should be quashed. 6. I have considered the contentions raised on behalf of the parties and I have gone through the rulings cited by the learned counsel for petitioner. 6. I have considered the contentions raised on behalf of the parties and I have gone through the rulings cited by the learned counsel for petitioner. In my opinion it is not a fit case where interference should be made with the impugned judgment at the instance of the petitioner. The order dated 29-5-1982 appears to have been obtained behind the back of the contesting opposite party Deo Nandan. By the impugned judgment dated 27-1-1984 the application moved by the petitioner Jhuri would be heard and decided again. Therefore, the petitioner would not be prejudiced in any manner. The order dated 29-5-1982 suffers from patent error of law insofar as it did not consider the question of latches or delay on the part of the petitioner in moving the court for setting aside the order dated 3-7-1970 after a lapse of 11 years. It is true that for the exercise of inherent powers there is no period of limitation provided as has been indicated in the various rulings cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner but when a party moves a court after a lapse of 11 years, it is the duty of the court to indicate that it was a fit case for exercise of inherent jurisdiction after such a delay. Since the order dated 29-5-1982 did not disclose any valid reason on the question of delay, I think that the aforesaid order dated 29-5-1982 has been rightly set aside by the impugned order dated 27-1-1984. 7. For the sake of argument even if it is accepted that the impugned order dated 27-1-1984 is illegal and without jurisdiction but by quashing the aforesaid order equally bad order dated 29-5-1982 would come into existence. Therefore, I think that it is not a fit case where interference should be made with the impugned judgment of the opposite party no. 1 dated 27-1-1984. The ends of justice demand that the revisional court should be directed to examine the claims of the parties strictly in accordance with law after giving reasonable opportunity to the patties concerned to press their claims. 8. In the result, the writ petition fails and is accordingly dismissed but it is expected that the revisional court shall decide the claims of the parties after giving them reasonable opportunity. Parties are directed to bear their own costs.