ORDER Gulab C. Gupta, J. 1. This revision, filed under Section 397/401 read with Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, is directed against the order dated 30-4-1984, passed by the Judicial Magistrate, Class I, Mandla in Criminal Case No. 148 of 1981 (Narendra Kumar v. Alok Mitra and Ors.). 2. On a complaint dated 20-12-1979 filed by the non-applicant No. 1, the applicants have been put on trial for offence under Section 500, Indian Penal Code. After filing of the complaint, the learned Magistrate examined the complainant and found a prima facie case existing against the appllicants and therefore issued process for their appearance, on the same date. Later on, when the applicants appeared before the learned Magistrate, particulars of offence were explained to them on 3-5-1980. The matter had been brought to this Court twice before (Criminal Revision No. 550 of 80 and Criminal Revision No. 83 of 81) for decision whether the judicial Magistrate had territorial jurisdiction to try the offence and Whether the procedure followed by him was proper. As a result of the aforesaid, the evidence of complainant in the case has not yet started. On 27-4-1983 the applicants, through their Advocate moved an application under Section 245(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure praying for their discharge, as charges against them, were groundless. This application has been dismissed by the impugned order dated 30-4-1984 which is the subject matter of this application. By the impugned order the learned Judicial Magistrate has held that since particulars of offence were explained to the applicants only because the Court found the prima facie case existing against them and nothing new has been brought on record since then, the application did not lie. 3. The facts of the case relevant for purposes of this application, are that on the night intervening 27th and 28th May, 1976 at village Pondi, District Mandla two persons were murdered and ornaments worth about Rs. 15,000/-robbed. The incident came to be popularly known as Jabda Tod Kand. Non-applicant No. 1 Narendra Kumar and 3 others were tried for this death and robbery before the Addl. Sessions Judge, Mandla in Sessions Trial No. 26 of 1978. They were however, acquitted by the judgment dated 23-9-1978 on a finding of "not guilty". Applicants Nos. 1 and 2 are the editor and printer of Hindi monthly magazine "Satyakatha" published from Allahabad. Sessions Judge, Mandla in Sessions Trial No. 26 of 1978. They were however, acquitted by the judgment dated 23-9-1978 on a finding of "not guilty". Applicants Nos. 1 and 2 are the editor and printer of Hindi monthly magazine "Satyakatha" published from Allahabad. Applicant No. 3 is the contributor to the said magazine. It appears that a story in connection with the aforesaid murder and robbery, came to be published in February, 1979 issue of "Satyakatha". The said story was written by non-applicant No. 3. Since a copy of the magazine exists on the record, this Court had the advantage of going through the same. The story appears at page 82 onwards and is based on facts of the trial held in the Court of learned Additional Sessions Judge. It is, however, not a verbatim re-production of the Court proceedings though it is substantially based on facts brought out on record of the trial. Indeed, it would appear that the applicant No. 3, the author had refrained from saying any thing about Court's proceedings presumably because of legal provisions about their publication. The article, however, deals with pre-trial stage of the case in detail and states circumstances under which non-applicant No. 1 Narendra Kumar and Baisakhu were arrested. The article also deals with the talk which the applicant Dr. Kailash Narad had with the Investigating Officer and the Medical Officer. At the end of the article it is mentioned that Investigating Officer Jail Singh, after completing the investigation, had filed a charge-sheet in the Court from where the matter was sent to the Session for trial. The article further mentions that the District and Sessions Judge, Mandla, after completing the Sessions Trial, held that the police had not been able to prove the charge of murder and robbery against non-applicants Narendra Kumar and Baisakhu and therefore both of them were held not guilty and acquitted. They were ordered to be released from jail forthwith. At the end of the article, it is stated that the police had failed to find out the real Jabda Tod. Probably the said cruel accused person had left Madhya Pradesh. From the complaint filed by the non-applicant No. 1, it appears that some portions of this article, marked in red, were treated to be defamatory and sufficient to prosecute the applicants for offence under Section 500, Indian Penal Code. Probably the said cruel accused person had left Madhya Pradesh. From the complaint filed by the non-applicant No. 1, it appears that some portions of this article, marked in red, were treated to be defamatory and sufficient to prosecute the applicants for offence under Section 500, Indian Penal Code. It is the case of the non-applicant No. 1 that the article was not published properly and contains distorted version of the incident, intended to bring the applicant into disrepute. The complainant Narendra Kumar was examined by the learned Magistrate when he stated that the manner in which the article had been published creates an impression that it was the applicant who was the real culprit and the judgment of the Court was wrong. He was, therefore, of the opinion that it was intended to intentionally defame him. That is how the non-applicant claimed prosecution and conviction of the applicants for the offence aforesaid. 4. Section 245 of the Code is the modified version of Section 253 of 1898 Code. Sub-section (2) of this section is, however, the same as old Section 253(2), and permits discharge of an accused person even before any evidence against him is taken provided the learned Magistrate, for reasons to be recorded, considers the charge to be groundless. In Abhey Dass v. Gurdial Singh AIR 1971 SC 834 , it was held that where the accused was liable to be found guilty if the allegations against him are found to be true, it cannot be said that the charge is groundless. In S.K. Kashyap v. State of Rajasthan AIR 1970 SC 1120, the Supreme Court held that word 'charge' in this provision has no reference to the framing of the charge and is only used in the sense of an accusation or allegation fo an offence. The distinction between Sub-section (1) and Sub-section (2) of the provision was brought out by the Supreme Court in Cricket Association v. State of West Bengal AIR 1971 SC 1925 , and it was held that although Sub-section requires the Magistrate to take all the evidence referred in Section 244 before discharging the accused, Sub-section (2) empowers the Magistrate to discharge the accused at any previous stage of the case if he finds that the charge against the accused is a groundless one. This decision would, therefore indicate that the Magistrate taking cogizance of the matter is entitled to discharge the accused even before any evidence has been taken in support of the charge provided he finds that the charge is groundless. Since this power can be exercised only after the congnizance of the offence has been taken either by registering the complaint or by issuing process against accused persons neither the order taking cognizance nor the order issuing process is sufficient to decline exercise of this power. Indeed, it would appear that at the stage of taking cognizance or issuing process the learned Magistrate has before him only the version of the complainant but at the stage of Section 245, he has the accused present before him and therefore aware of his defence as well. The accused may raise specific plea while denying the charge or by filing application in this behalf. Exercise of powers under Sub-section (2) cannot be declined only because no new material had been brought on record after the particulars of the allegations are explained. If an accused person denies the charge and submits that no prima facie case has been made out against him, it will not be proper answer to his plea that no new material has been placed for consideration of the Court after framing of the charge. In spite of it, no hard and fast rule can be laid down as to when a Magistrate will be justified in holding a charge to be groundless. The conclusion will always depend on facts and circumstances of each case. It is, however, clear that in every case the Magistrate has to arrive at his conclusion judicially, it appears settled that the Magistrate has the power to discharge an accused under this provision if the story related by the complainant himself is of such a nature that it does not disclose a criminal offence. In Gopesh Chandra v. Nirmal Kumar AIR 1950 Cal. 57, the Court upheld discharge of an accused claiming protection of Exception 4 of Section 499, Indian Penal Code. Clearly, therefore, if the complaint does not disclose a prima facie case against the accused, the Magistrate would be justified in proceedings under this provision and pass an order of discharge. In Gopesh Chandra v. Nirmal Kumar AIR 1950 Cal. 57, the Court upheld discharge of an accused claiming protection of Exception 4 of Section 499, Indian Penal Code. Clearly, therefore, if the complaint does not disclose a prima facie case against the accused, the Magistrate would be justified in proceedings under this provision and pass an order of discharge. Under the circumstances, the learned Judicial Magistrate was not right in refusing to examine the submission of applicants only because he had earlier explained particulars of the offence to them. Explaining particulars to the applicants did not act as estoppel against them nor did it take away the jurisdiction of the Court under this provision. In this view of the matter, this Court is not in a position to sustain the impugned order. 5. There is no dispute between the parties that a revision lies against the impugned order. So serious has been the commitment of this Court to the case of justice even a suo motu revision without being moved by any party was considered proper Cricket Association v. State of West Bengal AIR 1971 SC 1925 and Delhi Municipality v. Girdharilal Sapuru, AIR 1981 SC 1169 . The submission of the learned counsel for the applicants, however, is that this Court while exercising its revisional powers would not be justified in quashing the proceedings and discharging the accused persons. Reliance has been placed on the Supreme Court decision in J.P. Sharma v. Vinod Kumar Jain AIR 1986 SC 833 . The decision, however, does not limit or define the jurisdictional contents of revisional powers of this Court, but deals with those circumstances under which the High Court may quash proceedings pending before a sub-ordinate criminal Court. According to the Supreme Court, the question at this stage is not whether there was any truth in the allegations made but the question is whether on the basis of the allegations a cognizable offence has been alleged to have been committed. The fact subsequently found out to prove the truth or otherwise on the allegation is not a ground on the basis of which the complaint can be quashed. The fact subsequently found out to prove the truth or otherwise on the allegation is not a ground on the basis of which the complaint can be quashed. The test, according to the Supreme Court was that taking the allegations and the complaint as these were, without adding or substracting any thing, if no offence is made out then only the High Court would be justifed in quashing the proceedings and not otherwise. The revisional powers of the Court are, however, limited to calling for the record of the inferior criminal Court and examining the correctness, legality or propriety or any finding, sentence, or order and regularity of any proceedings. These words are of wide amplitude and even permit this Court to correct any error of fact or law and even examine if two reasonable views regarding incident were possible. This power would, therefore, include, power to quash proceedings where no offence appears to have been committed on the face of the proceedings or where the grave injustice would be done by the continuation of the proceedings. K. Narayanaswami v. P.N. Viswanathan and Bangshilal v. Towtmal. Under the circumstances, this Court does not feel in any way handicapped in granting relief to the applicant in case a proper case for grant of relief has been made out. 6. From the particulars of offence explained to the applicants, it is clear that they have been put on trial for offence of defamation described in Section 499, Indian Penal Code and punishable under Section 500, Indian Penal Code thereof. A bare reading of these provisions would indicate that (1) publishing any imputation, (2) by words either spoken or intended to be read, and (3) with the intention of harming or with the knowledge or having reason to believe that it will harm the reputation of the person about whom it is made, are the essential ingredients of the offence. There are at least 10 Exceptions to such an imputation. Fourth Exception to Section 499, Indian Penal Code provides immunity from the offence for publishing a substantially true report of the proceedings of the Court of justice, or the result of any such proceedings. The word "substantial" used in this Exception would indicate that verbatim re-production of judicial proceedings is not required and it would be enough if the publication taken as a whole, is substantially true account of those proceedings. The word "substantial" used in this Exception would indicate that verbatim re-production of judicial proceedings is not required and it would be enough if the publication taken as a whole, is substantially true account of those proceedings. The 5th Exception provides immunity to an imputation expressed in good faith regarding the merits of any case decided by a Court of justice or to the conduct of any person as a party, witness or agent in any such case. The 9th Exception provides immunity against imputation made in good faith for the protection of the interests of the person making it or of any person or for the public good. Under the circumstances, before these applicants can be prosecuted for offence under Section 499, Indian Penal Code, not only basic requirments of aforesaid, should be prima facie satisfied but also the imputation should not be covered by any of the Exceptions. Added, with the aforesaid is the freedom of press enjoyed by the applicants. Limits of this freedom, in the context of Criminal Law of Defamation have however been laid down in Sewakram v. R.K. Karanjia AIR 1981 SC 1514 . According to the Supreme Court journalists do not enjoy any special privilege and have no greater freedom than others to make allegations and imputations sufficient to ruin the reputation of a citizen, under the circumstances, though no special privilege would be granted to the press, the law of defamation would not be applied with any more vigour than it would otherwise be applied. It may be examined if these essential ingredients are found prima facie existing in the instant case. 6A. A perusal of the complaint filed in the Court indicates that the defamatory publication is said to be the story appearing in February, 1979 issue of Satyakatha at page 84 thereof. Para 4 of the complaint enumerates passages which are said to be defamatory. In para 5 thereof it is alleged that all facts stated in the story are not only false and baseles but have been found to be false by the Court. It is also alleged that a reading of the said material bring out the intention of the applicants which is that irrespective of the decision of the Court, it is the complainant who has committed the murder. It is also alleged that a reading of the said material bring out the intention of the applicants which is that irrespective of the decision of the Court, it is the complainant who has committed the murder. A reading of the entire story as published would show that some part of the same have been lifted and mentioned in para 4 of the complaint out of context. This, however, is not the correct reading of the publication. The publication as circulated was not underlined in red as has been done when it was filed in the trial Court and therefore no one would notice underlined portions unless he reads it as a whole. In this view of the matter, the effect of whole of the story will have to be ascertained in order to consider if any offence under Section 499, Indian Penal Code has been prima facie made out. This Court had the advantage of reading the whole story and is of the opinion that it is neither intended nor likely to defame the complainant. Most of the underlined portions alleged to be defamatory are the statement given by Baisakhu, the co-accused, to the Investigating Officer, Jai Singh. It is not the complainant's case that Baisakhu s statement as aforesad was not recorded. Clearly, therefore, the aforesaid statement does not amount to an imputation by the applicants. It is, however, true that the learned Sessions Judge did not admit this statement as evidence because of the law of evidence. Publication of this Statement would however be covered by 4th and 5th Exceptions to Section 499, Indian Penal Code and would not amount to defamation. The other part of the alleged defamatory matarial is about the talk between the complainant and the Investigating Officer, Jai Singh. It is not the case of the complainant that no such talk had taken place or that it was the figment of the imagination of the applicants. It may be that these statements were not admissible in law and therefore could not be used for convicting and sentencing the complainant. But the fact remains that they formed part of the record presented by the Police for consideration of the Sessions Court. What has not been appreciated is that the author had clearly written that the matter has been decided by the trial Court which found the complainants "not guilty'' and directed their release. But the fact remains that they formed part of the record presented by the Police for consideration of the Sessions Court. What has not been appreciated is that the author had clearly written that the matter has been decided by the trial Court which found the complainants "not guilty'' and directed their release. Underlined portions have to be read in the context of the statement that complainant was found not guilty of those allegations. It would thus be clear that the marked portions are only narrations of events which had taken place and do not amount to imputation made by the applicants intending to harm or knowing or having reason to believe that they will harm the reputation of the complainant. Since these facts had already been presented to the Court by the Police and had been subjected to public trial, harm, if any, had already been done to the complainant. Publishing the statement that the Court had found the complainant not guilty and acquitted him would amount to restoring the loss, if any. That is the impression that this Court has gathered by reading the publication as a whole. Then the intention of the applicants in publishing the story is not to cause any prestige loss to the non-applicant complainant but to make the book saleable. It is true that the applicant could have achieved this object by writing the story differently and avoiding publication of marked portions. This by itself, is not sufficient to attract Section 499, Indian Penal Code and put the applicants for trial under Section 500, Indian Penal Code thereof. In the opinion of this Court, the offending portions being part of the record of the Sessions Trial and police diary are substantially correct, re-production thereof and do not amount to offence of defamation. In this view of the matter, it would be the abuse of the process of the Court to require the applicants to face trial. Interest of justice would lie in quashing these proceedings and save their harassment, as even without any thing more and accepting allegations as they are, the applicants would not be punished for the offence alleged. 7. It was, however, submitted that quashing proceedings at this stage would be unjustified as the applicants have not come to this Court at the first available opportunity. 7. It was, however, submitted that quashing proceedings at this stage would be unjustified as the applicants have not come to this Court at the first available opportunity. It has been noticed earlier that the present proceedings started because of the order refusing to discharge the applicants under section 245(2), Criminal Procedure Code. It had also been noticed that the said power is available to the Court after explaining particulars of offence. Under the circumstances, the delay in approaching this Court, if any, would not be detrimental of the exercise of power. The fact that no evidence has been recorded so far would be sufficient inducement to save harassment of the applicants and embarrassment of the complainant and his witnesses. 8. In view of the discussion aforesaid, the revision succeeds and is allowed. The impuged order is hereby setaside. The applicants are discharged as the charge against them are found to be groundless. Bail bonds/surety bounds, if any, furnished by them would stand cancelled.