JUDGMENT D.S. Bajpai, J. 1. First Civil Appeal No. 46 of 197 under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure has been filed assailing the judgment and decree dated 16th March, 1977 passed by the Civil Judge, Lakhimpur Kheri decreeing the plaintiffrespondent's suit for Rs. 29,965.80 paisa against the defendantappellant, the Union of India. The fact giving rise to this appeal are that the plaintiff which owned the U.P. Roadways, plied buses in the State of Uttar Pradesh and amongst others it was plying buses from Lakhimpur to Gola Gokarannath. There is a railway level crossing near Gola Gokarannath on the road and there is a railways gate no. 136 maintained by the Railway with gateman thereon. On 1961960 at about 1110 A.M. Bus No. U.P.M. 4040 of the plaintiff carrying passengers was in the process of crossing the railway track when it is alleged that the gateman, Moolchand, came forward and abruptly began to close the gate from the other side. The driver of the Bus saw the 51 Up Passenger Train approaching the level crossing without any whistle and tried to reverse the Bus so as to clear it out of the railway track but while he was reversing the Bus it collided with the gate on the back side of the gate and could not clear the gate and the engine of the railway train collided with the Bus and the Bus overturned resulting in injury to seven passengers and serious damage to the Bus. It was alleged that the damage caused and the accident took place on account of the negligence of the employees of the railways and that the plaintiff had suffered damages to the extent of Rs. 29,965.80 paisa which amount was calculated by deducting the sum of Rs. 6,900 for which the Bus was auctioned, from the book value of the Bus i.e. Rs. 36,865.80 paisa. The plaintiff also claimed interest on damages suffered to the extent of Rs. 37,800 at the rate of 12% per annum. 29,965.80 paisa which amount was calculated by deducting the sum of Rs. 6,900 for which the Bus was auctioned, from the book value of the Bus i.e. Rs. 36,865.80 paisa. The plaintiff also claimed interest on damages suffered to the extent of Rs. 37,800 at the rate of 12% per annum. It was further averred in the plaint that one Jagjit Singh who was a passenger travelling in the Bus filed a suit No. 17 of 196 against the railways and that a decree had been passed against the railways on 4th March, 1963 which had become final inasmuch as the railways never went in appeal against the said judgment and decree of the trial court and as such the judgment and decree passed in the said suit was resjudicata. The defendants filed their writ en statement. They contended that there was contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff but at the same time admitted that the railway crossing gate was maintained by them and the accident took place and the Bus was damaged. It was further stated that the gateman, Mool Chand, who was on duty was not feeling well and on coming to the site he tried to close the gate when the accident took place. It was further pleaded that the Bus could have been stopped and that the driver of the Bus could have very well seen that the train was coming. It was further pleaded that the amounts of damages were inflated and that the damages were too remote. Notice under Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure was also challenged inasmuch as no notice was served by the newly added plaintiffs as also on the defendants 4 and 5. On the pleadings of the parties the following issues were framed: 1. Whether this court has no jurisdiction to try this suit as pleaded in the W. S.? 2. Whether the accident in dispute occurred due to the negligence of either of the defendants 1, 2, 4, 5 or the servants of the defendant no. 1 ? 3. Whether the notice served on the defendant no. 1 and 2 was valid ? 4. What damages were caused to the plaintiff? 5. 2. Whether the accident in dispute occurred due to the negligence of either of the defendants 1, 2, 4, 5 or the servants of the defendant no. 1 ? 3. Whether the notice served on the defendant no. 1 and 2 was valid ? 4. What damages were caused to the plaintiff? 5. Whether the judgment and decree passed by this court in Regular Civil Suit No. 17 of 1961 operates as res judicata between the parties, if not, what is the effect of this decree? 6. Whether the occurrence took place due to negligence of the servant of the plaintiffs? If so its effect? 7. Whether the plaintiffs or any of their servant is guilty of contributory negligence. If so its effect? 8. To what relief, if any, is the plaintiff entitled? If so, which of them? 9. Whether the suit is barred by limitation 10. Whether the suit is bad for want of notice under Section 80 CPC by the plaintiff ? 2. I have heard learned counsel for the Union of India, Sri S.K. Vidyarthi at some length as also learned counsel for the respondent, Sri S.K Kalia, and I have also gone through the record of the case. The learned counsel for the Union of India has firstly contended that the judgment and decree passed by the trial court in the earlier suit no. 17 of 1961 was not res judicata between the parties in view of the fact that the plaintiff had failed to bring on record the pleadings of the parties in that case and the copy, of the judgment of the said suit, on record as Ext2, did not go to establish mat the matter directly and substantially in issue in the present suit was also in issue in the earlier suit. The court below examined the judgment and held that the claim of the plaintiff Jagjit Singh therein was in respect of the same accident which took place at the same time, on the same date and at the same railway level crossing with the same train and it had been held by the court that the employees of the defendant no. 1, the Union of India, were negligent and the accident took place due to their negligence and misconduct. The court also he'd that since no appeal had been riled the judgment became final. 1, the Union of India, were negligent and the accident took place due to their negligence and misconduct. The court also he'd that since no appeal had been riled the judgment became final. The matter in issue was between the same codefendants. In the instant suit the State of U.P. is the plaintiff and the Union of India and its employees as defendants on the other side. In the earlier suit the question was also raised about contributory negligence of the Bus driver which belonged to the U.P. State but no finding against the State of U.P. was recorded and thus it cannot be said that the claim is not between the same parties or between the parties not deriving their title from the parties of the earlier suit, more so when liability of the accident was considered in the prior suit. It was also found that the employees of the defendant no. 1 were responsible for the accident and negligence and that the employees of the plaintiff were not in any way responsible for the accident. There remains nothing more to bring the case within the ambit of rule of res judicata as enshrined in Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 3. The learned counsel for the appellant cited a decision of their Lordships of the Privy Council in the case Radha Kishun v. Khurshed Hossein and others ( AIR 1920 PC 81 ). The facts of the case in hand are entirely different with the case before their Lordships of the Privy Council since in view of the observations made by the Court: Consequently to sustain the plea of res judicata it is incumbent on the Sahus in the circumstances of this case to show that they sought in the former suit to displace Bakhtaur Mull's prior title and postpone it to their own. For this it would have been necessary for the Sahus as plaintiffs in the former suit to allege a distinct case in their plaint in derogation of Bakhtaur Mull's priority. nothing more was required herein since the facts, issues and circumstances were wholly similar in the earlier suit. The Supreme Court in the case of Isher Singh Vs. For this it would have been necessary for the Sahus as plaintiffs in the former suit to allege a distinct case in their plaint in derogation of Bakhtaur Mull's priority. nothing more was required herein since the facts, issues and circumstances were wholly similar in the earlier suit. The Supreme Court in the case of Isher Singh Vs. Sarwan Singh and others ( AIR 1965 SC 948 ) held : The question whether a matter was directly and substantially in issue in the former suit has to be decided (a) on the pleadings in the former suit, (b) the issues struck therein, and (c) the decision in the suit. Further, it depends upon whether a decision on such an issue will materially affect the decision of the suit. This necessarily leads to the conclusion that material to determine as to whether the matter was directly and substantially in issue in the former suit oil not was present which I find is present in the judgment of the earlier suit and1 this case as such does not in any way help the appellant. This Court in the case of Mt. Batul Begam v. B. Gem Chandar Mukherji (AIR 1960 Allahabad 519) held that plea of res judicata cannot be taken for the first time in a second appeal specially when go substantial material was on record and that the material must be pressed before the court. This proposition of law cannot be disputed but looking to the facts of the case in hand it will be found that there was full material before the court contained in the judgment of the earlier suit which had become final. 4. The learned counsel further referred to the decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Gulam Abbas and others v. State of U.P. and others ( AIR 1981 SC 2198 ) in which it has been held that the scope of Section 11 of the CPC is not exhaustive and lays down only general doctrine of res judicata with a view to give finality to litigation. Their Lordships observed: It is well settled that Sec. 11 of the CPC is not exhaustive of the general doctrine of res judicata and though the rule of res judicata as enacted in Section 11 has some technical aspects the general doctrine is founded on consideration of high public policy to achieve two objectives, namely, that there must be a finality to litigation and that individuals should not be harassed twice over with the same kind of litigation. Technical aspects of Sec. 11 of CPC, as for instance, pecuniary or subjectwise competence of the earlier forum to adjudicate the subjectmatter or grant relief's sought in the subsequent litigation would be immaterial when the general doctrine of res judicata is to be invoked. It will thus appear that the decision of the former suit no.I7 of 1961 was final and binding on the parties in the present suit and a finding to that effect recorded fey the court below is not only well founded but no other view could be taken in the matter. The finding is accordingly confirmed and the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is rejected. 5. It was secondly contended that the accident having taken place on 19th June, 1960 it was the duty of the plaintiffrespondent to minimise the quantum of damages in the accident but they having failed to do so were not entitled to recover the sum of Rs. 29,965.80 paisa as damages. This has beers urged on the ground that had the plaintiff auctioned the bus damaged in the accident earlier then it would have fetched more price than the price for which it was auctioned i.e. Rs. 6,900. It may be pointed out here that no specific pleading had been taken so as to raise this issue in the written statement. The plaintiff has produced evidence to the effect that the Book value of the Bus was Rs. 36,865.80 paisa and after allowing depreciation it was sold according to rules, by auction and it fetched only Rs. 6,900 in September, 1967 and as such they made a claim of Rs. 29,965.80 paisa. There is no material on record to indicate as to how and in what way the liability could be minimised and damages reduced. It was a question of fact and had to be established by evidence on record and by specific pleading on the point. 6,900 in September, 1967 and as such they made a claim of Rs. 29,965.80 paisa. There is no material on record to indicate as to how and in what way the liability could be minimised and damages reduced. It was a question of fact and had to be established by evidence on record and by specific pleading on the point. The contention is equally devoid of farce and is unworthy of consideration. 6. The third submission of the teamed counsel for the appellant that survives for consideration on which he tried to lay stress was that the appellant was not responsible for the criminal acts of its employees. It was held in the earlier suit that the accident took place due to the negligence of the gateman maiming the railway level crossing since he had failed to close it & it was held that since the failure of the gateman was in the discharge of his duties as a servant of the railways the appellant was responsible for the negligence of its employees be it the gateman or the driver, of the train or anyone else concerned and connected with the accident and working for the appellant. In instant suit issue no. 2 related to the cause of accident which took place on account of negligence of defendant 1, 2, 4 and 5, the servants of the defendant no. 1 as also issue no. 6 related to the negligence on the part of the servants of the plaintiff and issue no. 7 pertained to the contributory negligence of the plaintiff. The Court returned a finding on issue no. 1 that the accident took place on account of the negligence of the servants of the defendant no. 1 on the basis of the finding recorded in the previous suit. On issue nos. 6 and 7 a finding was returned that since these issues have been decided in the earlier suit and the decision having become final the accident tookplace solely on account of the negligence and misconduct of the employees of the defendant no. 1 and not on account of the employees of the U.P. State. On issue nos. 6 and 7 a finding was returned that since these issues have been decided in the earlier suit and the decision having become final the accident tookplace solely on account of the negligence and misconduct of the employees of the defendant no. 1 and not on account of the employees of the U.P. State. In as far as the plea raised before me for the first time that the accident took place on account of criminal acts of the employees of the appellant I find that the appellant did not raise any such point and there was no pleading to this effect in its written statement much less any material on the record to substantiate it. It is wellsettled that no matter unless specifically pleaded can be considered, even if there is any evidence in that respect, by the courts but as skated hereinabove I find that neither there is any pleading nor is there any material to consider and go into this question. Moreover there is a positive funding against the appellant regarding negligence and misconduct of its servants for which the appellant has been held liable and responsible. This contention is devoid of force and Is rejected. 7. Lastly, it was contended that the notice under Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure was defective in as much as no notice was served by the U.P. State Road Transport Corporation, the successor in interest, on defendants 3, 4 and 5. This contention has been repelled by the court below and rightly so on a finding recorded that the U.P. State Road Transport Corporation being a statutory corporation which took over the functions of the U.P. Roadways from the State of U.P. during the pendency of the suit no fresh notice was required to be given by it, and as such the court below rightly held that the plaintiff no. 2 having stepped into the shoes of the plaintiff no. 1 there was no need to serve fresh notice on the appellant from the side of the plaintiff no. 2 in terms of the provisions of the General Clauses Act. No other point has been urged. The appeal as such is liable to fail. 8. 2 having stepped into the shoes of the plaintiff no. 1 there was no need to serve fresh notice on the appellant from the side of the plaintiff no. 2 in terms of the provisions of the General Clauses Act. No other point has been urged. The appeal as such is liable to fail. 8. First Civil Appeal No. 52 of 1977 is a cross objection filed in First Appeal No. 46 of 1977 against that part of the judgment and decree of the lower court by which the court held on issue no. 8 that the plaintiff was not liable to a decree for Rs. 38,700 on account of interest. The learned counsel for the appellant in the appeal, Sri S.K. Kalia, submitted that the finding of the court below to the effect that interest could be divided in three periods one, for the period before the institution of the suit, second, pendente lite interest and third, on amount after the decree till the recovery and that the interest of the plaintiff fell in first head is erroneous since the plaintiff in the suit claimed in the relief clause for award of interest, on payment of additional court fee, pendente lite and till the realisation of the decretal amount at 12 per cent per annum. Learned counsel for the Union of India could not support this finding of the court below and fairly conceded that there was no provision in the Interest Act or otherwise to bar award a decree for interest. I accordingly set aside this finding and direct that the first appeal no. 52 of 1977 would stand decreed for recovery of Rs. 38,700 as claimed by the plaintiff and future interest till realisation at the rate of 12 per cent per annum, on payment of additional court fee. 9. In the result first civil appeal no. 46 of 1977 is dismissed with costs and the first civil appeal no. 52 of 1977 stands allowed in terms stated hereinabove and the judgment and decree of the court below are modified to this extent that the suit of the plaintiffrespondent stands decreed in toto with costs throughout for the recovery and damages and interest as claimed. (Order accordingly)