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1987 DIGILAW 840 (ALL)

Jeet Singh v. District Judge Dehradun

1987-08-26

A.P.MISRA

body1987
JUDGMENT A.P. Misra, J. - Heard Counsel for the parties at length. The petitioner by means of the present writ petition sought for quashing the orders dated 28-5-86 and 2-9-85 passed by respondent No. 1 and 2 (Annexure 10 and 9 to the writ petition). 2. The petitioner is a tenant in a partition of House No. 67, Luniya, Dehradun and has been in possession thereon. Respondent No. 3 is the landlord of the building in dispute. Respondent No. 3 filed an application under Section 21 (1) (a) of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 for release of the building in dispute on the ground that it is bona fide required by him and in case it is not released, he will a suffer a great hardship. The petitioner contested the said application. It was alleged that the landlord sold his another house only few days before the filing of the present application and his need even otherwise is not bona fide. The Prescribed Authority, respondent No. 2 allowed the application on 20th August, 1980 but on appeal the case was remanded back for decision afresh. After remand, respondent No. 2 again allowed the said application on 2nd September, 1985. Thereafter, an appeal filed and the same was also dismissed by the Appellate Authority on 28th May, 1986. Both these two orders after remand passed by the Prescribed Authority as well as the Appellate Authority are subject-matter of challenge in the present writ petition. The petitioner has challenged these orders on number of grounds. One of the challenges to these orders is that in comparing the hardships between the landlord and tenant, the authorities below committed an error in recording the finding that the petitioner's married daughter has an alternative accommodation available where the petitioner could shift, cannot be sustained since the married daughter is not a member of the family. The second ground of attack in that apart from this before recording a finding on comparative need and hardship between the landlord and tenant under Section 21 of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 it is necessary to record a finding on bona fide need. The second ground of attack in that apart from this before recording a finding on comparative need and hardship between the landlord and tenant under Section 21 of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 it is necessary to record a finding on bona fide need. It was argued that no finding on bona fide need recorded in the present case and thus both orders cannot be sustained, In the present case if this finding of bona fide he has not been recorded by both the courts below, then the order cannot be sustained and it would not be necessary for this Court to go into first at this stage. 3. It was vehemently argued that actually in the case finding has been recorded by the Prescribed Authority. Reliance has been placed by the learned Counsel for respondent No. 3 on the portion of the finding of Prescribed Authority that the landlord has only two rooms and great hardship would be caused to the landlord in case his release application is not allowed. It is on these findings the arguments were addressed that this is a finding of bona fide need of the landlord. The said argument cannot be sustained. The aforesaid findings would not be sufficient. The language used in Section 21 of the aforesaid Act it regarding the bona fide need. The bona fide need may be for the part or whole of the accommodation in possession of the tenant. Thus, after regarding hardship of the landlord qua the tenant further finding of the extent of bona fide need of the landlord qua the accommodation available with the tenant has to be recorded, I find in the present case the Prescribed Authority completely failed to record this finding. Mere recording the finding that great hardship would be caused to the landlord without recording the finding of bona fide need would be against the very ingredient of the aforesaid section. 4. Section 21 has two significant parts, one recording of finding of bona fide need of the landlord and then by the last proviso the question of hardship, while comparing the need of the landlord qua the tenant. However, apart from recording the finding of hardship it is necessary to record a finding of bona fide need of the landlord. 4. Section 21 has two significant parts, one recording of finding of bona fide need of the landlord and then by the last proviso the question of hardship, while comparing the need of the landlord qua the tenant. However, apart from recording the finding of hardship it is necessary to record a finding of bona fide need of the landlord. For recording this finding it is not sufficient only to record a finding that the partition in possession of landlord is not sufficient or great hardship is being caused on account of pausity of the accommodation. It may be in a given case the accommodation in possession of tenant may be very large and bona fide need of landlord could be satisfied by releasing only part of the accommodation. Thus word 'bona fide need' has to be understood with the need of landlord. It would not be automatically viz., if there is great hardship to the landlord, then whole accommodation with the tenant be released. It is on the fact of each case the authority has to come to the conclusion whether part or the whole is required for the bona fide need of the landlord. 5. It is relevant here to refer Rule 16 (1) (d) which is quoted below ;- "Where the tenant's need could be adequately met by leaving with him a part of the building under tenancy and the landlord's needs would served by releasing the other part, the Prescribed Authority shall release only the later part". Under the aforesaid Rule it is provided that where the tenant's need is adequately met by leaving with him a part of the building under tenancy and the landlord's needs would be served by releasing other part, the Prescribed Authority shall release only the latter part of the building. Therefore,before the release order is passed, consideration of bona fide need, is the aspect which is to be necessarily gone into before the finding is arrived at. It cannot be doubted in the present case that the Prescribed Authority has not recorded any such finding. The Appellate Authority recording a finding that the Prescribed Authority rightly recorded a finding on bona fide deed. Appellate Authority had not independently recorded any such finding of the bona fide need. Thus I find that both the Prescribed Authority have not recorded specific finding of bona fide need. 6. The Appellate Authority recording a finding that the Prescribed Authority rightly recorded a finding on bona fide deed. Appellate Authority had not independently recorded any such finding of the bona fide need. Thus I find that both the Prescribed Authority have not recorded specific finding of bona fide need. 6. Learned Counsel for the respondents relied on the case of Ziaul Haq v. Addl. District and others, 1983 (2) ARC p. 38. In this case learned Counsel relied on the following portion of the judgment: "I am aware that normally the question as to whether the extent of the accommodation which would be sufficient to meet the need of the landlord is to be decided by the fact finding authorities and not by this Court in a writ petition. However, this is not an absolute rule and the proposition of law cannot be disputed that if the necessary material is already on the record and if the circumstances of a particular case require to do so, this Court is not precluded from considering the said question. This authority mainly lays down that it is open for this Court while exercising powers under Article 226 of the constitution to decide this question if the facts and circumstances of a particular case require to do so. This case is not the proposition of law that without recording a finding of bona fide need, a finding on release of the accommodation could not be made. This case has no application to the facts of the present case learned Counsel for the respondents then relied on the case of Ram Bharosey v. District Judge, Bareilly and others, the UP RCC 1985 p. 654 : 1985 (2) ARC 520. It was held in this case that the petitioner had three rooms, two on the first floor and one on the ground floor. This much accommodation seeing the number of family members of the landlord and the petitioner, was incapable of being bifurcated or demarcated. Realising that such an argument could not succeed, the tenant petitioner did not raise it before the authorities below. Only for the purpose of getting the judgments of the two authorities set aside, this point was argued which, in my opinion, in the circumstances, has no substance. 7. Realising that such an argument could not succeed, the tenant petitioner did not raise it before the authorities below. Only for the purpose of getting the judgments of the two authorities set aside, this point was argued which, in my opinion, in the circumstances, has no substance. 7. This is not again the proposition of law or an authority under Section 21 that the release could be granted without recording a finding of bona fide need. This was a question regarding bifurcation of tenancy. 8. The decisions of the aforesaid two cases on their facts and circumstances could not be relied on by the respondents. In the present case no finding of bona fide need was recorded by the authorities. 9. Since the matter has taken long time, it would not be appropriate to send the case back to the Prescribed Authority. The case is remanded to the Appellate Authority with the direction to consider the question of bona fide need of the landlord again in the light of the observations made above after leaving the counsel for the parties. As the matter is pending since long, the Appellate Authority shall as far as possible decide this case within three months from the date of the certified copy of this judgment is produced before it. 10. In the result, the writ petition is allowed and the orders dated 28-5-1986 passed by respondent No. 1 (Annexure 10 of the writ petition) is hereby quashed and the case is remanded to the Appellate Court for deciding afresh on the basis of the observations made above. Costs on parties.