JUDGMENT P. D. Desai, C. J.—This judgment will be read alongwith the interim orders passed on September 21, 1987 and November 16, 1987. 2. The Vice-Chancellor of the respondent-University has filed Civil Misc. Petition No. 13l3 of 1987 and in para 2 thereof the following averments are found to have been made: "That keeping in view the orders of this Honble High Court dated November 16, 1987, I have decided to place the whole issue regarding the grant of short leave and half day casual leave to the teachers of the University before the Executive Council in its next meeting which is likely to be held by the end of this month. I will decide the issue involved in my letter No. 4-4/ 87-HPU (VC)-1080, dated August 4, 1987 soon after the matter is decided by the Executive Council.” 3. In view of the observations made in the interim orders above-mentioned, the Court can appreciate the decision of the Vice-Chancellor to place before the Executive Council the policy issue with respect to the grant of half day casual leave and short leave so that, if found fit and proper, a statutory provision can be enacted or precise norms/guidelines can be framed in that regard and made a specific condition of service for the teaching and non-teaching staff in future. However, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Court is unable to appreciate the necessity, desirability or propriety of postponing the decision on the issue relating to the retrospective revocation of the half day casual leave granted to the petitioner on fifteen different occasions prior to July 30, 1987, till the Executive Council meets and decides the policy matter. The Vice-Chancellor is admittedly the leave sanctioning authority. He having already exercised the power to grant half day casual leave and having subsequently revoked the same vide letter dated August 4, 1987, Annexure P-I, it was for him to review the matter in light of the Courts observations. The matter was necessarily to be decided as per the extant rules. The Vice-Chancellor is admittedly the leave sanctioning authority. He having already exercised the power to grant half day casual leave and having subsequently revoked the same vide letter dated August 4, 1987, Annexure P-I, it was for him to review the matter in light of the Courts observations. The matter was necessarily to be decided as per the extant rules. The Executive Councils decision, if any, taken in accordance with law and in light of the observations of this Court, will govern and regulate future cases and not those decried till that date, Under the circumstances, the Court is left with no option but to examine the legal validity of the decision conveyed to the petitioner vide Annexure P-I. 4. It may be observed at the outset that leave once sanctioned cannot be cancelled or varied retrospectively to the disadvantage or detriment of an employee without affording an opportunity of being heard to him. Any such action bearing upon the conditions of his service taken without compliance with the principles of natural justice must be regarded as unjust, unfair, arbitrary and irrational and as violative of the fundamental rights guaranteed by Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. It is not in dispute that the decision recorded in para 2 of the letter dated August 4, 1987, Annexure P-I, addressed by the Vice-Chancellor to the petitioner canceling with retrospective effect the half day casual leave granted to the petitioner on fifteen different occasions prior to July 30, 1987 and treating the same as full day casual leave is arrived at without prior notice and hearing. Under the circumstances, the decision deserves to be treated as null and void. 5. Shri Bhawani Singh urged that the Vice-Chancellor is ready and willing to afford a post-decisional hearing to the petitioner and that once that is done the vice attaching to the said order on the ground of the violation of the rules of natural justice will be cured. The submission cannot be accepted. The audi alterant partem rule, which is one of the basic features of the rules of natural justice, is firmly entrenched in our administrative jurisprudence. This rule of fair play cannot be permitted to be jettisoned save in very exceptional circumstances where compulsive necessity so demands. The submission cannot be accepted. The audi alterant partem rule, which is one of the basic features of the rules of natural justice, is firmly entrenched in our administrative jurisprudence. This rule of fair play cannot be permitted to be jettisoned save in very exceptional circumstances where compulsive necessity so demands. The Court should and would be extremely reluctant to reach the conclusion that the duty of affording even a minimal hearing, shorn of all its formal trappings and dilatory features, at the pre decisional stage, is excluded, unless, viewed pragmatically, it would paralyse the administrative process or frustrate the need for utmost promptitude. The expediency of post-decisional hearing, which has been recognised as applicable in very rare and exceptional cases (see : Mohinder Singh Gill v. Election Commissioner of India, (1978) 1 SCC 405; Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248 and Swadeshi Cotton Mills v. Union of India, (1981) 1 SCC 664), is attracted only in those few cases where owing to the compulsion of the fact-situation or the necessity of taking speedy action, no pre-decisional hearing is given but the action is followed soon by a full post-decisional hearing to the person affected. It is not a substitute for prior hearing nor a convenient answer to the plea of breach of rules of natural justice in „ ordinary cases. 6. In K. L Shephard v. Union of India, (1987) 4 Supreme Court Cases 431,;the matter has been examined in depth once again. A scheme was drawn under section 45 of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 in respect of three private banks which provided for their amalgamation with Punjab National Bank, Canara Bank and State Bank of India. Pursuant to the scheme, services of certain employees of those three private banks were not taken over by the respective transferee banks. Some of the excluded employees filed writ petitions in the High Court which were partly allowed by a learned Single Judge but dismissed by the Division Bench, Appeals were carried against the said decision to the Supreme Court. Some of the excluded employees had filed writ petitions directly in the Supreme Court also. All these cases were heard and decided together. Some of the excluded employees had filed writ petitions directly in the Supreme Court also. All these cases were heard and decided together. The excluded employees contended, inter alia, that no opportunity of being heard was afforded to them before their exclusion was ordered under the scheme and that, therefore, the authorities concerned could not be regarded to have acted fairly. The challenge was sought to be met on the ground, inter alia, that the entire operation was to be conducted within a brief time-limit and that by necessary implication it must follow that prior hearing, which would involve a time-consuming process, was ruled out. It was held that the Reserve Bank of India, which monitored the amalgamation, was required to act fairly on the facts and in the circumstances of the case since the action deprived the excluded employees of their livelihood and brought adverse civil consequences. The situation necessitated a participatory inquiry in view of the fact that the decision to exclude certain employees from service under the transferee banks was grounded upon a set of facts, the correctness whereof was under challenge, and the decision could not have been taken on the ipse dixit of the officers of the Reserve Bank without verification of facts, It may be that in view of the fixed time-frame a detailed inquiry involving communication of allegations, show-cause, opportunity to lead evidence in support of the allegations and in defence of the stand of the employees was not possible. Keeping the scheme in view perhaps a simpler inquiry, for instance, communication of the allegations and even receiving an explanation and, in cases where the allegations were serious or there was a total denial though there was firm basis for the allegations, a single personal hearing could have been afforded. On the facts and in the circumstances of the case, there was no justification to hold that rules of natural justice were ousted by necessary implication on account of the time-frame. The time limited by statute, in fact, provided scope for an opportunity to be extended to the intended excluded employees before the scheme was finalised so that a hearing commensurate to the situation could be afforded before a section of the employees was thrown out of employment. The time limited by statute, in fact, provided scope for an opportunity to be extended to the intended excluded employees before the scheme was finalised so that a hearing commensurate to the situation could be afforded before a section of the employees was thrown out of employment. It was further held that there was no valid basis to think of a post-decisional hearing since there was no justification to throw out the excluded employees and then give them an opportunity of representation when the requirement was that they should have the opportunity of prior hearing as a condition precedent to action. A post-decisional hearing would not meet the ends of justice since it was common experience that once a decision had been taken there was a tendency to uphold it and a representation may not really yield any fruitful purpose. On the basis of this reasoning and in light of the findings aforesaid, the appeals and the writ petitions were allowed and the transferee banks were directed to take over the excluded employees on the same terms and conditions of employment under the respective banking companies prior to amalgamation Those employees were also held entitled to the benefit of continuity of service for all purposes including salary and perks. Liberty was, however, reserved to the transferee banks to take such action as they considered proper against those employees in accordance with law in case any deliquency was involved on the part of such employees. 7. In the present case, there was no time frame, there were no exceptional circumstances or compulsive necessity or the need for utmost promptitude and there was no reason whatever not to afford a hearing before the decision to substitute one kind of leave by another was taken with retrospective effect. The doctrine of post-decisional hearing is not attracted in the fact situation present in this case. The submission, therefore, deserves rejection. 8. Apart from the fatal infirmity aforesaid arising out of the breach of rules of natural justice, the impugned decision is not sustainable even otherwise. The doctrine of post-decisional hearing is not attracted in the fact situation present in this case. The submission, therefore, deserves rejection. 8. Apart from the fatal infirmity aforesaid arising out of the breach of rules of natural justice, the impugned decision is not sustainable even otherwise. In the course of the interim order dated September 21, 1987, the Court has observed that the First Ordinances of the Himachal Pradesh University, 1973 make no distinction in the matter of the applicability of the rule governing the grant of casual leave to the academic and non-academic staff of the respondent-University and that the rule applies to "all employees of the University" which would include the teachers as well as the non-academic staff of the University. No rule or decision taken by the competent authority confining the concession or privilege of the grant of half day casual leave to the non-teaching staff only was shown to the Court at that time. However, in the supplementary affidavit dated October 12, 1987, filed by the Registrar of the respondent-University, an attempt has been made to establish that such concession or privilage is available only to the non-teaching staff whose working hours are from 10 A. M. to 5 P. M. There is no substance in the plea accordingly set-up. In the first place, it is an admitted position that the grant of half day casual leave is governed only by the administrative instructions issued in this behalf from time to time. Reference has been made in this connection to the instructions issued by the Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, in its memorandum dated August 4, 1965 which have been applied/adopted also by the State Government vide Chapter-I of Compilation of Instructions issued by the Department of Personnel (Appoint-ment-11). The relevant instructions, which have been quoted in the supplementary affidavit, fall in two parts : first, they empower the competent authority to debit half days casual leave to the casual leave account of a Government servant under circumstances and subject to the conditions therein mentioned in order to ensure punctual attendance and to curb the tendency of late attendance and, secondly, they confer upon a Government servant the privilege or concession (if not right) to apply for a half day casual leave, the grant whereof is to be regulated in accordance with the provision made therein. Be it stated that they make no distinction between different classes or categdries of government servants; they are not applicable only to those whose working hours are from 10 A. M. to 5 P. M. (see para 4 of the instructions), In the next place, it is also admitted that the Executive Council of the University in its meeting held on April 26, 1974, had decided vide Item No. 17 that where specific provision for any matter does not exist in the Statutes and the Ordinances, the Government Rules, Regulations and Procedure be followed mutatis mutandis. Under the circumstances, the aforesaid instructions issued by Government of India and State Government become applicable proprio vigore to the employees of the respondent-University irrespective of the nature and functions of the duties performed by them and their hours of duty. In the last place, the Office Order dated January 2, 1987, Annexure R-I/6, issued by the Registrar of the respondent-University, which has been relied upon in support of the plea that half day casual leave is not available to the teaching staff, has no relevance for two reasons. First, the Registrar has no power, authority or jurisdiction to issue instructions which purport to run counter to or curtail the scope of the relevant instructions governing the subject issued by the Government of India/State Government in view of the decision aforementioned of the Executive Council under which those instructions become applicable to the employees of the University mutatis mutandis irrespective of whether they belong to the teaching or non-teaching staff and, secondly, the Office Order refers only to the debiting of casual leave for a half or one-third day, as the case may be, to ensure punctuality and to curb the tendency of late attendance and read literally they do not confer the right, privilege or concession of claiming half day casual leave even upon the administrative staff. Against the aforesaid background, the conclusion is inevitable that the grant of half day casual leave to the employees of the University is a matter governed by the instructions issued by Government of India/State Government which are made applicable by virtue of the decision of the Executive Council to all categories of employees and that, therefore, till a specific provision is made by the competent authority in an appropriate manner restricting the grant of half day casual leave only to the non-teaching staff of the University, there is no justification for the denial thereof to the teaching staff. Even on merits, therefore, the impugned decision is unsustainable and deserves to be regarded as having no effect in the eye of law. 9. Rule is, therefore, made absolute in terms aforesaid with no order as to costs. 21-9-1987. Present: Petitioner in person. Shri Bhawani Singh, Advocate, for respondents. Leave is a condition of service. It has to be regulated by conditions which are duly prescribed by the competent authority and made known by due publication to the persons who are intended to be governed by them. It makes no difference that the person concerned is an academic. It is a misnomer to believe that the question with respect to the regulation of leave of an academic assumes and academic character or pertains to the academic field, simply because it may have bearing, direct or indirect, proximate or remote, upon the teaching work assigned to him. The said factor may be taken into account while prescribing conditions of service regulating the grant of leave but its relevance does not transcend so as to convert a service matter, pure and simple, into a matter pertaining to the academic field. It also does not empower the competent authority to deal with a teacher in an arbitrary manner on the basis of any undefined or assumed criteria. The Courts attention was invited to Chapter XXXVI, of the First Ordinances of the Himachal Pradesh University, 1973, entitled "Leave Rules for Employees of the University" and, more particularly, to Rules 36.1 and 36.9 contained in the Part-A of the said Chapter, those rules read as follows: "36. 1. (a) These rules shall apply to all employees of the University. (b) The power of interpreting, changing, adding to and relaxing these rules is vested in the Executive Council. * * * * 36.9. 1. (a) These rules shall apply to all employees of the University. (b) The power of interpreting, changing, adding to and relaxing these rules is vested in the Executive Council. * * * * 36.9. Casual Leave.—(a) Casual leave may be granted to an employee for short a period ; but shall not exceed 15 days in a calendar year. This leave cannot be combined with any other kind of leave, but can be combined with holidays, provided that the total period of absence including holidays at any time does not exceed 10 days. (b) Casual leave will ordinarily be applied for and sanction obtained before it is availed of.In case of urgency, however, this requirement may be waived. Note.—Holidays falling within the period of casual leave shall not be counted as casual leave. (c) Casual leave shall not be treated as absence from duty and the pay and allowances of an employee shall not be intermitted. (d) Casual leave shall be granted by the Vice-Chancellor or by the Officer authorised in this behalf. (e) No employee shall leave the station during holidays or during casual leave without prior permission. (f) If an employee overstays his casual leave for any reason whatsoever, for example, a breakdown on the road due to flood or landslips, the entire period of absence will be debited to his ordinary leave account, and not only the period by which he has overstayed his casual leave." On a bare reading of these two rules, it is apparent that no distinction is made in the matter of the applicability of the rule governing the grant of casual leave to the academic and non-academic staff of the respondent-University. The rule applies to "all employees of the University", which would include the teachers as well as the non-academic staff of the University. No separate provision is made in Part B of the said Chapter, which prescribes the additional leave rules applicable to the teachers, with respect to the grant of a casual leave to an academic. Rule 36.9 does not speak of the grant of half days casual leave. It is not in dispute, however, that half days casual leave is admissible to the non-teaching staff of the University. Rule 36.9 does not speak of the grant of half days casual leave. It is not in dispute, however, that half days casual leave is admissible to the non-teaching staff of the University. The Court is not shown any rule nor any decision taken by the competent authority confining the benefit of the grant of half days casual leave to the non-teaching staff only. In the absence of any specific decision authorising such restrictive or selective application of the said benefit and in view of the fact that the petitioner was granted half days casual leave on as many as fifteen occasions in the current calendar year, it would not be unreasonable to assume that all the employees of the respondent-University are entitled to avail of the said benefit, especially when casual leave is governed by a rule which finds place in Part A which applies to all the employees and no different provision in that regard is made in Part-B. Before we decide the present case, on the said basis, however, it is expedient in the interest of justice to afford an opportunity to be respondent-University to place on record the decision, if any, taken by the competent authority restricting the benefit of the grant of half days casual leave to the non-teaching staff only and, if any such decision has been taken, to state and clarify whether such decision was duly publicised and, if so, in what manner. The material to be placed on record by way of an affidavit, the text of the relevant decision, if any, being annexed to such affidavit, which will be filed on or before October 12, 1987. Adjourned to October 14, 1987. Order accordingly.