R. K. SHUKIA, J. ( 1 ) VIRENDRA, appellant has preferred this appeal against the judgment and order dated 30-9-77 passed by Sessions Judge, Farrukhabad whereby the learned Sessions Judge has convicted the appellant under section 302 IPC and sentenced him to imprisonment for life. ( 2 ) THE facts of the prosecution case are that the complainant Mewa Ram (P. W 1), his brother Ram Prakash (deceased) as well as Virendra, appellant belonged to the same village Nagla Latifpura, hamlet of village Sikandarpur, p. 5 Shamshabad, District Farrukhabad The houses of the deceased and the appellant are adjacent. Apart from the houses of the complainant and the deceased there are houses of one Munshi, Lal Sahai and other persons. It is alleged that Virendra, appellant used to visit the house of Munshi surreptitiously for illicit purposes through the roof of the house of Ram Prakash, deceased, who did not like that conduct and consequently had forbidden the appellant from doing so. It is said that on 16-4-76 Ram Prakash Was sleeping on his cot on the roof of his house, Virendra appellant again scaled over the roof of Ram Prakash at about 3 a. m. to go to the house of Munshi to which Ram Prakash again protested. The row between Ram Prakash and the appellant drew attention of Mewa Ram (P. W. 1), Ram Singh (P. W. 2), Soney Lal (P. W. 5) and other persons sleeping on their adjoining roof. It was moonlit night and there were torches of the witnesses and neighbours. In these light they saw that Virendra, appellant took out pistol from his Phenta (folds of his dhoti) and fired at Ram Prakash with it. Wounded Ram Prakash fell down from the roof into his court-yard and died due to the aforesaid gunshot injuries. On being challenged by the witnesses the appellant reloaded his pistol, jumped into his courty-yard, fired a shot in the air and ran out of his house towards south. Thereafter Mewa Ram got a report Ext. Ka-1 scribed by one Lal Ram and lodged it at 4. 15 a. m. on the same day i. e. 16-5-76 at Police Station Shamshabad situate at a distance of 4 miles from the place of occurrence. Thereafter Mewa Ram got a report Ext. Ka-1 scribed by one Lal Ram and lodged it at 4. 15 a. m. on the same day i. e. 16-5-76 at Police Station Shamshabad situate at a distance of 4 miles from the place of occurrence. The case was registered against the appellant under section 302 I. P. C. The matter was entrusted to S. I. Radhey Shy am (P. W. 6) for investigation. He reached the place of occurrence at about 6 a. m. He prepared inquest report and sent the dead body for post-mortem through constable Beni Prasad and Chowkidar Rameshwar Prasad. He found the shell of rifle cartridge Ext. 3 on the roof of the house of Ram Prakash, which he sealed in a packet and prepared its recovery memo (Ext. Ka-11) in the presence of the witnesses. He prepared a site plan (Ext. Ka-13 ). ( 3 ) DR. R. P. Gupta (P. W. 3) conducted the post-mortem examination of the dead body of Ram Prakash on 17-5-76 at 1. 30 p. m. and found the following ante-mortem injury: One gun-shot wound of entry 1 x 1 abdominal cavity deep, on the right side of the abdomen 3 of the above the unbilicus at 10 clock position. Blackening and charring present. Direction from right to left and from front to back. He also found one rifle bullet inside the abdomen. In the opinion of the Doctor the death was caused due to aforesaid injury which could have caused on 16-5-76 at about 3 a. m. ( 4 ) AFTER completing the investigation, charge-sheet was submitted against the appellant on 20-5-76 and the matter was committed to Sessions for trial. ( 5 ) THE prosecution examined 6 witnesses in support of its case, out of whom Mewa Ram (P. W. 1), Ram Singh (P. W. 2) and Soney Lal (P. W. 5) are the witnesses of the occurrence. Rest of the witnesses are the aforesaid Doctor. Investigating Officer and Police constable who are formal witnesses. ( 6 ) THE appellant pleaded not guilty and stated that he has been falsely implicated due to enmity. He admitted that roofs of his house and the house of Ram Prakash, deceased are adjoining to each other, but the roof of Munshi is at some distance and is not adjacent to the roof of Ram Prakash. ( 6 ) THE appellant pleaded not guilty and stated that he has been falsely implicated due to enmity. He admitted that roofs of his house and the house of Ram Prakash, deceased are adjoining to each other, but the roof of Munshi is at some distance and is not adjacent to the roof of Ram Prakash. He also denied that he used to visit the house of Munshi surreptitiously or had been objected to by Ram Prakash and added that at the time of occurrence, he was not at the spot and had gone to The han the village of his Phoopha, Hira Lal. He has also stated that Ram Prakash wanted to spread out tobacco leaves on his roof to which he did not permit and for that reason Mewa Ram (P. W. 1) was inimical to him. He also stated that it was rum outed in the village that Ram Prakashs first wifes brother was seen committing murder of Ram Prakash. No witness had been produced in support of defence. ( 7 ) AFTER discussing the entire evidence, the learned Sessions Judge has convicted the appellant under section 302 I. P. C. and sentenced him to life imprisonment. ( 8 ) THE aforesaid prosecution story has been fully supported by three eye-witnesses, namely, Mewa Ram (P. W. 1), Ram Singh (P. W. 2) and Soney Lal (P. W. 5 ). Mewa Ram (P. W. 1) is the brother of the deceased. He was sleeping on the eastern roof. He woke up on the protest of the deceased and saw the occurrence in the light of the moon and torches. He and Ram Singh (P. W. 3) had torches with them. He along with other witnesses chased the assailant who jumped into his court-yard and fired his pistol due to which the witnesses could not chase him. It has been clearly stated by Mewa Ram (P. W. 1) that about 10-12 roofs almost join each other and in the locality of which 4-5 persons were sleeping including Ram Singh (P. W. 2) and Soney Lal (P. W. 5) who rushed to the place of occurrence and flashed their torches in addition to the prevailing light. In this light he saw the appellant firing with his pistol on Ram Prakash. In this light he saw the appellant firing with his pistol on Ram Prakash. The aforesaid statement of Mewa Ram finds full corroboration from the statements of two witnesses, namely, Ram Singh (P. W. 2) and Soney Lal (P. W. 5 ). Ram Singh (P. W. 2) was sleeping on the roof of his cousin Jodhan Singh, which is quite close to the roof of Ram Prakash. Soney Lal (P. W. 5) was sleeping on his roof. Due to exchange of words (Kaha Sunil) between the appellant and the deceased both of them woke up and saw the occurrence in the light of the moon and the torches. They had torches in their hands. They have also stated that on prior occasions, appellant passed through the roof of the deceased which was objected to by the deceased, it was not liked by the appellant and he threatened the deceased with dire consequences if he caused hindrance in his going to the roof of Munshis house. The presence of the aforesaid three eye-witnesses at the time of occurrence cannot be doubted. There was sufficient light for them to recognise the assailant. Nothing substantial has been brought in their cross-examination, which can create any reasonable doubt regarding the truthfulness of the prosecution case. Minor discrepancies and variations in their statements are always found in the statements of most honest witnesses, which indicate that they are not tutored. ( 9 ) THE statements of the aforesaid three eye-witnesses find corroboration from medical evidence. There is only one bullet injury. The wound had blackening and charring around it. It clearly indicates that Ram Prakash must have been shot at from a close distance. There would have been no blackening and charring if Ram Prakash was sleeping in the court-yard and to weapon was fired from the roof itself. It cannot be said with certainty whether Ram Prakash fell down by shock or losing balance. The height between roof and the court-yard is only 5 or 6 feet, therefore chances of getting any major injuries due to fall are very meagre. The post mortem examination took place on 17-5-76 at 1-30 p. m. and minor bruises and abrasions if any must have disappeared by then. ( 10 ) THE rifle shell was found by, the Investigating Officer on the roof. Ram Prakash fell down in his court-yard after getting the injury. The post mortem examination took place on 17-5-76 at 1-30 p. m. and minor bruises and abrasions if any must have disappeared by then. ( 10 ) THE rifle shell was found by, the Investigating Officer on the roof. Ram Prakash fell down in his court-yard after getting the injury. It takes some time to coze the blood but before that Ram Prakash fell in the courtyard where blood had been found. In these circumstances the absence of blood stains on the roof is not improbable. ( 11 ) LEARNED counsel for the appellant has also urged that since the crops had been harvested and cattles were being tethered outside, therefore, in the normal course of things the witnesses should have been out to keep a watch over these things. Mewa Ram (P. W. 1) has clearly stated that crops and cattles were kept in front of the door of their houses and their presence on the roof could certainly enable them better to keep watch upon those things. ( 12 ) WE find no force in the argument that a rifle bullet cannot be fired from a country made pistol. It is incorrect to say that bullet cannot be fired effectively from country made pistol. The pistol was not recovered, therefore, it cannot be said, what type of weapon was used. New technique of preparing country made pistol has so much advanced that it cannot be said that bullet cannot be fired from it even from shorter distance. ( 13 ) AFTER careful scrutiny of the evidence on record, we are fully satisfied that the prosecution has proved its case against the appellant beyond reasonable doubt and defence version has no force. ( 14 ) IN the end Sri P. C. Chaturvedi, counsel for the appellant urged that at the time of the occurrence the appellant was below 16 years, therefore, he is entitled to get the benefit of the U. P. Children Act and he cannot be sent to jail. In support of his contention he relied on Ghanshyam v State of U. P. and Gopinath Ghosh v. State of West Bengal. In support of his contention he relied on Ghanshyam v State of U. P. and Gopinath Ghosh v. State of West Bengal. ( 15 ) ON the other hand Sri Sushil Kumar, learned Government Advocate urged that the D. P. Children Act came in force in that district on 1-7-76 and the occurrence took place before that on 16-5-1976, in that case, the appellant is not entitled to get any benefit of that act. ( 16 ) THE limited question is whether the appellant was a child within the meaning of section 2 (h) of U. P. Children Act. Section 2 (4) of the U. P. Children Act defines child to mean a person under the age of 16 years. Admittedly Virendra, appellant has given his age about ( 17 ) YEARS before the trial court, which has not been disputed by anybody nor the Sessions Judge has made any note in negative about the correctness of age given by the appellant. There is no doubt that at the fag end of his Judgment, the learned Sessions Judge has held there is no clear evidence about the age of the accused and I hold that he may be merely 17 years of age. This observation of the learned Sessions Judge takes us nowhere. Undisputedly the statement of the appellant regarding 17 years of his age was recorded before the learned Sessions Judge on 27-9-77. Thus after mathematical calculation, the age of the appellant comes to about 15 years and 8 months on 16-5-76 at the time of occurrence which brings him under the definition of child under section 2 (4) of U. P. Children Act Section 27 of the Act provides that notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any law no court shall sentence a child to death or transportation or imprisonment for any term or commit him to prison in default of payment of fine. There is proviso to the section that if the child is found to be unruly in behaviors or depraved; that he is not fit to be sent to an approved school and/or the other provisions under which the case can be legally dealt with are suitable, such a child, if shown to be 12 years of age may be committed to prison. Section 29 (1) provides that when a child is found to have committed an offence punishable with imprisonment for life and the court having been satisfied on enquiry that it would be expedient to so deal with the child, may order him to be sent to an approved school for such period of stay when the child will attain the age of 18 years or for a shorter period the reason for such period to be recorded in writing. ( 18 ) THE effect and validity of retrospective legislation had been considered by the Federal Court of India and the Supreme Court on a number of occasions. A number of cases could be cited, some on retrospective validation of taxing provisions by removing defects, others on removal on the basis of or grounds of decisions given by courts making their judgments ineffective, others affecting the jurisdiction of courts in cases pending, either in the original court or in courts of appeal so as to render proceedings anfractuous; and still others curing legally defective appointments or elections. It is not necessary to discuss these cases individually as the principles laid down by them are well recognised. The rule against the retrospective effect of statutes is not rigid or flexible rule but it is one to be applied always in the light of the language of the statute and the subject matter with which the statute is dealing. While considering whether the main Act as well as its amendment are prospective or retrospective in effect it should be kept in view: 1. What was the object of the Act ? The establishment of the machinery for, achieving the object ? As a matter of principle an Act is not without sufficient reason taken to be retrospective but there is no presumption that an Act is not intended to interefere with existing right. Most Acts infact, do interfere with existing rights. In the instant case in view of the underlying intendment and beneficial provisions of the U. P. Children Act read with cause (f) of Article 39 of the Constitution which provides that the State shall direct its policy towards securing that children are given opportunities and facilities to develop in a healthy manner and in conditions of freedom and dignity and that childhood and youth are protected against exploitation and against moral and material abandonment. We consider it proper not to allow objection raised by the learned Government Advocate before us. ( 19 ) SECTION 27 of the U. P. Children. Act dearly provides that notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any law no court shall sentence a child to death or to transportation or imprisonment for any term or commit him to prison in default of payment of fine. This legislation has been made in furtherance of the object of Article 39 (f) of the Constitution of India in compliance of Directive Principle of State Policy enshrined under Chapter IV of our Constitution for promotion and welfare of the children. In view of the above discussions and imperative provisions under section 27 of the Act we find no force in the argument of the learned Government Advocate that petitioner is not entitled to get benefit of Section 27 of the Act because the appellant was not below 16 years at the time of sentencing him by the court. In Ghanshyam case (supra) Supreme Court has clearly held that undisputedly the appellant being under the age of 16 years on the date of offence was a child and the case would be governed by the U. P. Children Act. Thus the decisive date is the date of offence and not the date of sentence. ( 20 ) IN this case jurisdiction of the Sessions Court to try the appellant for the offence of murder has never been questioned before us. The learned Government Advocate has fairly conceded that there are no juvenile courts established in the district concerned. Moreover the offence committed by the appellant is governed by Indian Penal Code, which has to be investigated, enquired into, tried or otherwise dealt with according to the provisions contained in Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. Therefore in the circumstances of the present case we find no flaw regarding the jurisdiction of the Sessions Judge. ( 21 ) IN view of the above discussions, we have no doubt that the prosecution has proved its case beyond reasonable doubt against the petitioner and case of the defence has no force. Therefore the conviction of the appellant is maintained. ( 21 ) IN view of the above discussions, we have no doubt that the prosecution has proved its case beyond reasonable doubt against the petitioner and case of the defence has no force. Therefore the conviction of the appellant is maintained. Since the appellant was about 15 years 8 months old at the time of the offence therefore according to the provisions of section 27 of the U. P. Children Act no court shall sentence a child to imprisonment for life or to any term of imprisonment. Section 2 of the Act provides, insofar as it is material, that if a child is found to have committed an offence punishable with imprisonment the court may order him to be sent to an approved school for such period of stay as will not exceed the attainment by the child of the age of 18 years. In the normal course, we would have directed that the appellant Virendra should be sent to an approved school but in view of the fact that he is now about 26 years of age we cannot do so. Therefore following the ratio in Jaiendra v State of U. P. a we uphold the conviction of the appellant and quash the sentence for life imprisonment imposed upon him. ( 22 ) IN view of the aforesaid reasons, although the conviction of Virendra appellant has to be upheld but we quash the sentence for life imprisonment imposed upon him by the trial court and direct that he shall be released forthwith. He is already on bail. He need not surrender. His bail bonds are cancelled and sureties discharged. .