R. K. SHUKLA, J. ( 1 ) NAEEM Khan has filed this petition under article 226 of the Constitution of India against the detention order dated 30-9-1986, passed under Section 304 of the National Security Act (hereinafter, called the Act) in the exercise of powers given to the District Magistrate, Allahahad under Section 3 (3) of the Act. ( 2 ) THE aforesaid detention order dated 30-9-1986 was served on the petitioner in jail on 1- 10-1986 along with grounds of detention, which read as under. . . (Verunacular Matter Ommited ). . ( 3 ) APPROVAL of the aforesaid detention order dated 30/9/1986 was done by the State Government on 9/10/1986. The grounds of the detention of the petitioner were placed by the UP. Government before the Advisory Board. UP. on 14/10/1986. The representation of the petitioner was not received by the Government till then. Therefore, comments and the representation we-re sent to the Advisory Board on 4/11/1986. The representation was examined by the Government and it was ultimately rejected by the Government on 10-11-1986. The fact of rejection of the representation was conveyed to the petitioner through the district authorities on 12-11-1986. The aforesaid order of detention dated 30-9-1986 was confirmed for twelve months on 30-11-1986 by the State Govt. and the same was communicated to the petitioner through district authorities. ( 4 ) THE first point urged by Sri R. K. Jam, learned counsel for the petitioner is that there is inordinate delay in sending the representation dated 21/23-10-1986 to the State Government. In support of his contention he relied on two Supreme Courts decisions namely, (i) Harish Pahwa v. State of UP. and others and (U) Raisuddin alias Babu Tamchi v. State of UP. and another and one unreported decision of this Court in H. C. Saleem v. State of UP. and others, decided on 8-1-1987. After careful scrutiny of the materials on the record as well as the original record of the State in this case, we find no force in this argument. It is clear from the counter affidavit filed by Sri R. P. Misra, Assistant Jailor, Central Jail, Naini, Ahmababad that the petitioner gave his representation dated 21-10-1986 by signing it on 23-10-1986 to the jail authority after the DAK had been sent on 23-10-1986. Consequently on 24-10-1986 one copy of the representation was sent to Home Secretary, UP. It is clear from the counter affidavit filed by Sri R. P. Misra, Assistant Jailor, Central Jail, Naini, Ahmababad that the petitioner gave his representation dated 21-10-1986 by signing it on 23-10-1986 to the jail authority after the DAK had been sent on 23-10-1986. Consequently on 24-10-1986 one copy of the representation was sent to Home Secretary, UP. Government by special messenger and a copy of this representation was also sent to the Advisory Board, Lucknow on 24-10-1986. Both these copies were delivered to the persons concerned at Lucknow on 25-10-1986. A copy of the representation had also been sent to the District Magistrate with a request that it may be sent to His Excellency the Governor of U. P. No representation was ever made or given for the President of India and the Prime Minister. Sri Prabhat Chandra Chaturvedi, District Magistrate, Allahahad in paragraph 10 of his counter affidavit has stated that the petitioner did make a representation dated 23-10-1986 bearing the typed date of 21-10-1986 in jail, which was received by him on 24- 10-1981) and the same was sent to the Senior Superintendent of Police, Allahahad for his comments on 28-10-1986. It is also mentioned in the said counter affidavit that 25-10-1986 was Saturday and 26-10-1986 was Sunday; the representation of the petitioner was addressed to the Home Secretary, UP Government, Lucknow and its copies were addressed to Superintendent, Central Jail, Naini and His Excellency the Governor of U. P. , Lucknow. After obtaining the report of the S. S. P. , Allahahad dated 31-10-1986 along with the comments of the police station concerned thereon the District Magistrate forwarded the representation to the Government of U. P. on 31-10-1986, which was received by the Government of U. P. on the same day. It is clear from the perusal of the record of the State Government before us that the representation of the petitioner along-with the covering letter of Superintendent, Central Jail, Naini was received by the Government of U. P. on 25-10-1986 and a crash radiogram from Home Department, U. P. Government, Lucknow was sent to the District Magistrate, Allahahad on 27-10-1986 and a spare copy of the radiogram was sent to the District Magistrate by hand through Sri Vishnu Sahai. It is clear from the affidavit of Sri Vishnu Sahai, Upper Division Assistant in Confidential Section (6), U. P. Secretariat, Lucknow that the comments dated 31-10-1986 along with the representation of the petitioner dated 23-10-1986 was received by the Government on 3-11-1986. On 4-11-1986 the comments and the representation were sent to the Advisory Board and on the same date a detailed note was put up to the Joint Secretary, Home, who examined the representation on 5-11-1986. Social Secretary examined the representation on 6-11-1986, the Home Secretary examined the same on 7-11- 1986 and the representation was ultimately rejected by the Government on 10-11-1986. The fact of rejection of the representation was conveyed to the petitioner through District authorities on 12-11-1986. In this view of the matter, we are fully satisfied that there is no inordinate delay in sending the representation of the petitioner to the State Government and decisions thereon. It is, therefore, quite clear that there was no delay on the part of the State Government in dealing with the representation of the petitioner. The question is whether the unexplained delay of two days by the District Magistrate in not sending the representation for comments to the S. S. P. , Allahahad till 28-10-1986 renders the continued detention of the petitioner invalid. It has been clearly held by the Supreme Court in the case of Sat Pal v. State of Punjab and others that delay of two months and fifteen days on the part of the State Government in not forwarding the representation of the petitioner in that case was not sufficient to invalidate the order of detention. The Supreme Court has further held in that case as under: The contention that the unexplained delay on the part of the State Government is sufficient to invalidate the order of detention can hardly be accepted. The Court must look at the substance of the matter and not act on mere technicality. Therefore, following the aforesaid ratio of Sat Pals case (supra) we find no merit in the argument that there is any inordinate delay in sending the representation of the petitioner to the State Government, which can render the detention of the petitioner invalid. ( 5 ) THE second point urged by Mr. Therefore, following the aforesaid ratio of Sat Pals case (supra) we find no merit in the argument that there is any inordinate delay in sending the representation of the petitioner to the State Government, which can render the detention of the petitioner invalid. ( 5 ) THE second point urged by Mr. Jam is that there is contravention of Section 3 (5) of the Act in reporting the fact of approval by the State Government to the Central Government together with the grounds within seven days. The relevant facts in this connection are given in Paragraphs 17 and 18 of the petition, which have been controverted in Paragraph 4 of the counter affidavit of Sri Vishnu Sahai that the complete order and all other papers and reports etc. along with the fact of the order having been approved by the State Government was reported to the Central Government on 9-10-1986. After perusal of the record of the State Government as well as the counter affidavit of Sri V. K. Sethi, Desk Officer, Ministry of Home Affairs, Government, of India, New Delhi, filed on behalf of the Central Government, we are fully satisfied that the report as envisaged under Section 3 (5) of the Act about the detention of the petitioner was made by the Government of U. P. to the Central Government in the Ministry of Home Affairs vide post copy of their wireless message dated 9-10-1986. It has been further stated by Mr. Sethi that the said report was received by the state Government in the Ministry of Home Affairs on 14th October, 1986. Thus the approval order was passed by the State Government on 9-10-1986 and report was received by the Central Government by 14-10-1986 well within a week as required by Section 3 (5) of the Act. It was immediately attended to by the Central Government and it was decided on 17-10-1986 by the Central Government that there was no necessity to interfere with the order of the detention approved by the Government of D. P. Sri Sethi has clearly stated in Paragraph 3 of his counter affidavit that the said report was received along with the order of detention, grounds of detention and other supporting materials by the Central Government in the Ministry of Home Affairs within time. Thu we find no merit in this argument also and reject it. Thu we find no merit in this argument also and reject it. ( 6 ) THE third point urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the petitioner is an illiterate person and the detention order and the grounds of detention were neither read over nor explained to the petitioner on 1-10-1986 at the time of service of the detention order. Thus there is violation of Section 8 of the Act. In this connection allegations have been made in Paragraphs 11 and 12 of the petition, which have been controverted by the District Magistrate, Allahahad in Paragraph 10 of his counter affidavit, wherein he has not admitted that the petitioner is an illiterate person. Moreover, the District Magistrate in his letter dated 30-9-1986 addressed to the S. S. P. , Allahahad has clearly asserted that in case the petitioner may not be able to read the grounds and materials in support thereof, he should be read over and explained the order and grounds etc. , in support whereof his signature on the second copy of the entire materials be obtained. The report dated 1-10-1986 received by the District Magistrate after service and execution of the order of detention along with its materials indicates that the petitioner was read over the entire materials thereafter he had put his signature on the duplicate copy thereof. We have seen the relevant report on the record of the Government as we are fully satisfied that the materials were read over and explained to the petitioner and there is no force in this argument. Consequently it is also rejected. ( 7 ) THE 4th point urged by Sri Jam, learned counsel for the petitioner is that by not placing the representation of the petitioner before the Advisory Board within three weeks the State Government has violated the mandatory provisions of Section 10 of the Act, which makes the detention illegal. In support of this contention he relied on Fahim Ahmad v. Superintendent, Naini Central Jail, Naini and others. The facts relating to this point have been given in Paragraphs 19, 20 and 21 of the petition, which have been controverted by Sri Vishnu Sahai, U. D. A. , Confidential Section (6), UP. Secretariat, Lucknow in Paragraph 2 of his counter affidavit; whereby it is clear that the representation of the petitioner dated 23/10/1986 was received by the Government on 3-11-1986. Secretariat, Lucknow in Paragraph 2 of his counter affidavit; whereby it is clear that the representation of the petitioner dated 23/10/1986 was received by the Government on 3-11-1986. Thus the representation was not there with the Government. It could be sent to the Advisory Board, if it were received in time. The requirement of Section 10 of the Act is that the appropriate Government shall within three weeks from the date of detention of the person under the order, place before the Advisory Board constituted by it under Section 9, the grounds on which the order has been made and the representation, if any made by the person affected by the order. In the instant case it is clear from the perusal of the Government record supplied by the learned Government Advocate that the detention order, grounds of detention order and other materials were sent to the Advisory Board vide Governments letter No. 111/2/63/86-C. X-6 dated October 14, 1986. Since the grounds on which the detention order was passed have been sent to the Advisory Board within three weeks and representation of the petitioner was not received by the Government till that date, therefore, there is no contravention of Section 10 of the Act as urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner. Consequently this argument is also rejected. ( 8 ) THE fifth point urged by Sri Jam is that the Advisory Board did not submit its report within seven weeks to the State Government from the date of detention as contemplated under Section 11 (1) of the Act. The allegations regarding this are made in Paragraph 22 of the petition, which have been emphatically controverted by Sri Vishnu Sahai in Paragraph 5 of his counter affidavit that the Advisory Board after hearing the case of the petitioner on 12-11-1986 submitted its report on 17/11/1986, which was received by the State Government on the same date. The detention order was passed and served on the petitioner in jail on 30/9/1986. Thus, the report of the Advisory Board was received by the State Government within seven weeks from the date of detention of the petitioner. Therefore, this ground has also no force and deserves rejection. The detention order was passed and served on the petitioner in jail on 30/9/1986. Thus, the report of the Advisory Board was received by the State Government within seven weeks from the date of detention of the petitioner. Therefore, this ground has also no force and deserves rejection. ( 9 ) THE sixth point urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the petitioner was not produced before the Advisory Board and the Advisory Board did not specify in separate part that there is sufficient cause for detention of the petitioner as contemplated under Section 11 (1) and (2) of the Act. This fact has been controverted by Sri Vishnu Sahai in Paragraphs 5 and 6 of his counter affidavit as well as in Paragraph 15 of the counter affidavit of the District Magistrate. Mr. Vishnu Sahai has clearly stated in Paragraph 6 of his counter affidavit that the petitioner was specifically produced before the Advisory Board. Sri P. C. Chaturvedi, District Magistrate has stated in Paragraph 15 of his counter affidavit that after the petitioner had been produced before the Advisory Board he was brought back to Allahahad and the deponent was informed that the petitioner did appear before the Advisory Board and the Advisory Board heard the petitioner. The petitioner has not impleaded the Advisory Board as a party in this case. On a perusal of the record, we find that the opinion of the Advisory Board in respect of the petitioners detention under National Security Act was sent to the Government with a covering letter of Sri Mohan Singh, Registrar of the Advisory Board. In part II of the report it is clearly mentioned that on the facts and circumstances placed before the Board, it was of the opinion that there was sufficient cause for detention of the petitioner under Section 3 (2) of the Act. After careful scrutiny of the materials on the record as well as the record of the State, we are fully satisfied that there is no force in this point also. Consequently we reject it. ( 10 ) IN the end the learned counsel for the petitioner vehemently urged that the incidents mentioned in the grounds of detention do not make out a case of disturbance of public order, the District Magistrate passed the detention order without applying his mind. Therefore, the detention of the petitioner is not justified. Consequently we reject it. ( 10 ) IN the end the learned counsel for the petitioner vehemently urged that the incidents mentioned in the grounds of detention do not make out a case of disturbance of public order, the District Magistrate passed the detention order without applying his mind. Therefore, the detention of the petitioner is not justified. In support of his contention be has relied on Ashok Kumar v. Delhi Administration, State of U P. v. Han Shankar Tiwari, Sheshdhar Misra v. Superintendent, Central Jail. Naini (F. BJ8, Mrs. sering Dolkar v. Administrator, Union Territory of Delhi and others. The distinction between the concept of public order and law and order has been clearly drawn by a series of decisions of the Supreme Court well as High Courts. The true distinction between the areas of public order and law and order lies not in the nature or quality of the act but in the degree and extent of its reach upon society. The distinction between the two concepts of law and order and public order is a fine one but this does not mean that there could be no overlapping acts similar in nature but committing in different context and circumstances might cause different reactions. In one case it might affect specific individual only and, therefore, touch the problem of law and order while in another it might affect public order. The act by itself therefore, is not the determinant of its own gravity. It is the potentiality M the act to disturb the even tempo of life of the community which makes it prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. The test to determine whether an act affects law and order or public order is. Does it lead to disturbance of the current of the life of the community so as to amount to a disturbance of the public order or does it affect merely an individual leaving the tranquility of the society undisturbed. The public order is what the French called order publique and is something more than ordinary maintenance of law and order. ( 11 ) IN the light of what has been observed above, there is no doubt that each one of the incidents mentioned in the aforesaid grounds of detention was prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. The public order is what the French called order publique and is something more than ordinary maintenance of law and order. ( 11 ) IN the light of what has been observed above, there is no doubt that each one of the incidents mentioned in the aforesaid grounds of detention was prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. It is clear from ground No. 1 that on 12/9/1986 the petitioner after collecting his 15-20 friends in Roshan Bagh Park, Khuldabad, Allahabad was talking to them in such a manner which were provocative to communal feelings. He was saying that during communal riot police and P. A. C. committed excesses on the Muslims, therefore, they did not celebrate the MOHARRAM festival; so you people cooperate in not allowing Hindus to celebrate their DADHIKANDO festival. We have to face police and P. A. C. and to accept the challenges of the administration. This incident was reported to police at about 9. 25 p. m. at serial No. 36 and was investigated by SI. Gajraj Singh. The second incident relates to 18-9-1986 when an information was received that the petitioner, alongwith his 2-3 friends, was moving in largely attended DADHIKANDO fair having illegal bombs, with the intention of committing serious crime. The police tried to arrest the petitioner near Lallu crossing at about 6. 45 p. m. on the same day; then thepetitioner threw bomb on the police with intention to kill them. The bomb exploded on the road and caused terrible sound. He also raised communal slogans there and generally abusing the Hindus encouraged their killings. Due to these desperate acts of the petitioner at public place the atmosphere was fully changed with fear and terror. People started running away due to fear and shops were being closed. The movement of the traffic on the road was paralyzed and public order was disturbed. The petitioner was arrested on the spot and on his personal search three living illegal bombs were recovered from his possession. A case was registered and the petitioner was sent to Naini Jail. There was possibility of the petitioner being released on bail, therefore, this detention order was passed by the District Magistrate. The above act of the petitioner and his associates created fear and terror in the minds of the people of the locality and thus disturbed the public order. A case was registered and the petitioner was sent to Naini Jail. There was possibility of the petitioner being released on bail, therefore, this detention order was passed by the District Magistrate. The above act of the petitioner and his associates created fear and terror in the minds of the people of the locality and thus disturbed the public order. ( 12 ) EACH one of the above two incidents affected public order and not merely law and order. During the period of riot in the city the aforesaid act of the petitioner had the potentiality to disturb the even tempo of life of the community, which was prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. Therefore, the test for disturbing the public order is, clearly fulfilled on the facts and circumstances of this case. The acts in question in the very nature of things would adversely affect the even tempo of life of the community and cause a general disturbance of public tranquillity. Under these circumstances we are fully satisfied that both the incidents had potentiality to disturb the public order and they have actually done it also. Therefore, the order of detention of the petitioner dated 30-9-1986, is fully justified and needs no interference by this Court. ( 13 ) IN view of the above facts and circumstances of this case, all the aforesaid cases cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner are distinguishable on facts and it is not necessary to discuss them in detail. It will suffice to say that in the case of Han Shankar Tiwari (supra) in Paragraph 8 of the report the Supreme Court has observed that when communal tension is high an indiscreet act of no significance is likely to disturb or dislocate the even tempo of life of the community. An order of detention made in such a situation has to take note of the potentiality of the act objected to. No hard and fast rule can really be evolved to deal with such problems of human society. Every possible situation cannot be brought under water tight classification and a set of tests to deal with them cannot be laid down. In Ashok Kumars case (supra) in Paragraph 13 of the report it has been clearly held by the Supreme Court that the act by itself, is not determinant of its gravity. Every possible situation cannot be brought under water tight classification and a set of tests to deal with them cannot be laid down. In Ashok Kumars case (supra) in Paragraph 13 of the report it has been clearly held by the Supreme Court that the act by itself, is not determinant of its gravity. It is the potentiality of the act to disturb the even tempo of life of the community, which makes it prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. That has been clearly fulfilled in the instant case. ( 14 ) THOSE who are responsible for the national security or for the maintenance of public order must be the sole judges of what national security or public order requires. It is their subjective satisfaction, which is not justiciable. There is no formula by which one case can be distinguished from another. It is, therefore, necessary, as observed by the Supreme Court in Ajai Disits case10 to examine the facts in each case to determine, not the sufficiency of the grounds nor the truth of the grounds, but nature of the grounds alleged and see whether these are relevant or not for considering whether the detention of the petitioner is necessary for maintenance of public order. ( 15 ) IN view of the nature of the allegation mentioned in the grounds quoted above in Hindi, we are of the opinion that they are of such nature, which certainly have the potentiality for apprehension that the even tempo of life of the community would be endangered. Therefore, the detention of the petitioner under Section 3 (2) of the Act is fully justified and needs no interference by the High Court in the exercise of its power under Article 226 of the Constitution. In the aforesaid view of the matter, this Habeas Corpus Writ Petition fails and is dismissed. Appeal dismissed