Onkar Nath v. Prescribed Authority (Munsif), Mirzapur
1987-09-01
ANSHUMAN SINGH
body1987
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT Anshuman Singh, J. - Before this writ petition was admitted, the petitioner was directed to serve the respondents personally who have been served. Counter and Rejoinder affidavits have been exchanged between the parties. As provided in the second proviso to Rule 2 of Chapter XII of the Rules of Court and also with the consent of the parties, it is desirable that the writ petition should be disposed of finally at the admission stage itself. 2. The facts giving rise to the instant writ petition are that the petitioner, who is the landlord of the accommodation in dispute filed an application under Section 21 (1) (a) of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) against respondent No. 2 Jagdish Son of Gulab Chandra. The said application was allowed by the Prescribed Authority by order dated October 26, 1984. It has been averred in the writ petition that since respondent No. 2 did not vacate the premises in dispute after passing of the release order by the Prescribed Authority, the landlord moved an application under Section 23 of the Act before the Prescribed Authority for police help in order to get the order passed under Section 21 of the Act executed and the respondent evicted. Smt. Meet a Devi, respondent No. 3, filed an application before the Prescribed Authority resisting the claim of the landlord under Section 23 inter alia on the ground that she has been living in the accommodation in dispute as a tenant with the consent of the landlord She further alleged that as she was not a party to the proceedings under Section 21 of the Act the order was not binding on her and she was not liable to be evicted in proceedings under Section 23 of the Act. The landlord denied the fact [of tenancy and alleged that she was inducted in the accommodation in dispute at the instance of respondent No. 2 against whom an order of release under Section 21 was obtained by the landlord. The Prescribed Authority after hearing the parties by Order dated July 8, 1986 rejected the application of Smt. Meera Devi, respondent No. 3, for impleadment and also rejected the application filed by the petitioner landlord for police help under Section 23 of the Act.
The Prescribed Authority after hearing the parties by Order dated July 8, 1986 rejected the application of Smt. Meera Devi, respondent No. 3, for impleadment and also rejected the application filed by the petitioner landlord for police help under Section 23 of the Act. The petitioner feeling aggrieved against the aforesaid order has come to this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 3. It appears that after the impugned order dated July 8, 1987 was passed by the Prescribed Authority an application for allotment as envisaged in Rule 10 of the Rules framed under the Act was filed by Smt. Meera Devi before the Rent Control and Eviction;Officer who by order dated July 13, 1987 allotted the accommodation in dispute in her favour. The petitioner has also challenged the subsequent order of allotment passed by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer in the instant writ petition. An amendment application in the present writ petition has also been filed. 4. I have heard Sri S.C. Tripathi, learned Counsel for the Petitioner, and A.S. Srivastava, learned Counsel for the respondent. Mr. Tripathi convassed before me that since the order under Section 21 (1) (a) of the Act became final and was not challenged by respondent No. 3 Smt. Meera Devi she could not have resisted the proceedings under Section 23 of the Act and in the alternative he argued that even if Smt. Meera Devi was in possession of the accommodation in dispute she was also liable to be evicted in proceedings under Section 23 of the Act inasmuch as a reading of the aforesaid provision makes if very clear that while executing an order under Section 23 of the Act after passing the order under Section 21 (1) (a) of the Act whoever may have been in possession is liable to be ejected. The said proposition of law can not be disputed by the counsel for the respondent as well. Mr. A.S. Srivastava, learned Counsel for the respondent, urged that Smt. Meera Devi was not a party to the proceedings under Section 21 of the Act and she was inducted as a tenant by the landlord petitioner himself and as such the order under Section 21 was not binding on her.
Mr. A.S. Srivastava, learned Counsel for the respondent, urged that Smt. Meera Devi was not a party to the proceedings under Section 21 of the Act and she was inducted as a tenant by the landlord petitioner himself and as such the order under Section 21 was not binding on her. The said contention is wholly fallacious The order of release under Section 21 of the Act was passed on October 26, 1984 which was not challenged by respondent No. 3 and even according to the finding of the Prescribed Authority Smt. Meera Devi is alleged to have come in possession of the premises in dispute on March 1, 1985 and not prior to that. In view of the said fact she could never be deemed to be in possession at the time of passing of the release order under Section 21 and as such the question of impleadment in those proceedings was wholly uncalled for and in my opinion, the Prescribed Authority rightly rejected the application under Section 23. 5. Counsel for the respondent has contended that since subsequently an order of allotment has been passed in favour of respondent No. 3 and the said order is reviseable under Section 18 of the Act, this Court should not interfere in the present writ petition. Mr. S.C. Tripathi, learned Counsel for the petitioner has informed me that he has already preferred a revision under Section 18 of the Act before the Revisional Court against the order dated July 13, 1987, i.e., the order of allotment. Since the petitioner has already availed the statutory alternative remedy against the impugned order of allotment he cannot be allowed to pursue the writ remedy simultaneously in this Court. In view of the said fact I am of the opinion that the petitioner should pursue his remedy before the Revisional Court. 6. Mr. S.C. Tripathi, learned Counsel for the petitioner has invited my attention to a decision of this Court in Smt. Shanti Devi v. Vth Additional District Judge, Bulandshahr and others, 1987 (2) ACR 130, and on the strength of that case he contended that once on order under Section 21 (1) (a) of the Act has been passed the accommodation could not be allotted. Since I am directing the parties to approach the Revisional Court.
Since I am directing the parties to approach the Revisional Court. I do not want to express any opinion whatsoever but I hope that the Revisional Court while disposing of the revision filed by the petitioner will look into that decision. It has further been contended on behalf of the petitioner that since the accommodation in question had not fallen vacant it could not be allotted by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer. He also contended that in view of the finding recorded by the Prescribed Authority in its order dated July 8, 1987 that respondent No. 3 has been held to be unauthorised occupant, the allotment order was bad on this ground alone. However, I am keeping this matter open to the Revisional Court to record its own finding keeping in view the provisions on the said subject. 7. A.S. Srivastava, contended that the possession of respondent No. 3 was not unauthorised as she was inducted with the consent of the landlord but I do not want to express any opinion on the said fact and it will be open to the Revisional Court to consider the said contention also. 8. In view of the fact that the petitioner has already availed the alternative remedy against the impugned order the petition has become infructuous which is accordingly dismissed as infructuous. The Revisional Court is directed to dispose of the revision filed by the petitioner under Section 18 of the Act within thirty days from the date of production of a certified copy of this order keeping in view the observations made above. 9. Let a copy of this order be supplied to the learned Counsel for the parties within a week on payment of usual charges.