ORDER Anshuman Singh, J. - This contempt petition has been filed for punishing the Secretary, Home Department, U.P. Shashan, Lucknow, Sri Daya Shanker Bhatnagar, Director General of Police, Lucknow, Sri Durgesh Pd. Sinha, Senior Superintendent of Police, Allahabad and Sri Virendra Kumar, Superintendent of Police (Karmik) Police Headquarter, Allahabad for disobeying the order of this Court dated 27-2-1985 and the order passed by the U.P. Public Service Tribunal, Lucknow, (hereinafter referred to as the Tribunal) dated 22-11-1983. 2. The facts giving rise to this petition briefly stated are that the petitioner entered the U.P. Police Service on Mar. 27, 1963. In the year 1973 he was posted as Court Moharrir in the court of Sri Brahma Deo, Extra- Magistrate, Ist Class, Allahabad. Sometime in May 1973 an agitation was launched by the Police Karmachari Parishad, Uttar Pradesh, in which allegations were made against the petitioner that he was inciting the staff of police station Canington to go on strike and consequently a criminal case under S. 7 of the U.P. Criminal Laws Amendment Act read with S. 3 of the Police Incitement of Disaffection Act and under S. 43, D.I.R. was registered against him. He was tried under the aforesaid sections and was ultimately acquitted by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Allahabad on 14-9-1976. It appears that before the petitioner was prosecuted in the trial his services were terminated by an order dated 31-5-1973 of the Senior Supdt. of Police, Allahabad. The petitioner feeling aggrieved against the said order of termination preferred a writ petition in this Court which abated because of coming into force of the Uttar Pradesh Public Services (Tribunals) Act, 1976 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and he was directed to seek his remedy before the Tribunal. The Tribunal gave its award on 22-11-1983 and allowed the claim of the petitioner and quashed the order of termination dated 31-5-1973 and directed the authorities to reinstate him in service with effect from 1-6-1973 with full back wages and salary. The State of U.P. feeling aggrieved against the award of the Tribunal challenged the same by way of a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution in this Court. The said petition was dismissed on 27-2-1985. The State of U.P. feeling aggrieved against the award of the Tribunal challenged the same by way of a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution in this Court. The said petition was dismissed on 27-2-1985. It has been alleged that after the dismissal o f the writ petition the petitioner made several representations to the respondents requesting them to comply with the order of this Court and the award given by the Tribunal but to no avail. Hence the present petition for punishing the respondents under S. 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act. 3. When the case came up for admission the Standing Counsel was directed to seek instructions only but he chose to file a counter-affidavit duly sworn by Durgesh Prasad Sinha, Senior Superintendent of Police, Allahabad, respondent 3. A rejoinder affidavit has also been filed. 4. I have heard Sri R.K. Saxena, learned counsel for the petitioner, and Mr. N.L. Ganguli, learned Standing Counsel. The pivotal question that arises in the instant case is whether the respondents have disobeyed the award dated 22-11-1983 given by the Tribunal and the order passed by this Court dated 27-2- 85. 5. Before deciding the question whether there has been any disobedience on the part of the respondents or not. I would like to refer to certain provisions of the Act. Section 5(6) and (7) provides : "(6) A declaration made by the Tribunal shall be binding on the claimant and his employer as well as on any other public servant who has in respect of any claim affecting his interest adversely, been given an opportunity of making a representation against it, and shall have the same effect as a declaration made by a court of law. (7) Where the Tribunal makes any other order in favour of the claimant and against his employer or any other public servant, and such order remains uncomplied with for a period of 3 months, the Tribunal may, on his application, issue a certificate for recovery of the amount awarded or, as the case may be, for other relief granted by it, and any person in whose favour such certificate is issued may apply to the principal civil court of original jurisdiction in Uttar Pradesh within the local limits of whose jurisdiction he has, for the time being, been serving or last served such employer, for execution of the order of the Tribunal, and such court shall thereupon execute the certificate or cause the same to be executed in the same manner and by the same procedure as if it were a decree for like relief made by itself in a suit". A perusal of to aforesaid provisions leaves no room for doubt that an order made by the Tribunal has the same effect as a declaration made by a court of law. They further lay down that in case any order is made in favour of an employee by the Tribunal and the same remains uncomplied with for a period of three months, the employee may approach the Tribunal for issue of a certificate for recovery of the amount awarded or for other relief granted by it and the said certificate shall be executed by a civil court of competent jurisdiction in the same manner as if it were a decree passed in a suit. No such steps have been taken by the petitioner in the present case to get the order of the Tribunal executed as provided under the Act till today. Keeping in view the said provisions I am of the view that where the employees in whose favour the orders or awards are given by the Tribunal the proper remedy for such employees is to get the awards executed as provided and not to approach this Court in contempt jurisdiction and the courts should also not entertain such contempt petitions. I have no hesitation in saying that the petitioner was ill advised to have filed the contempt petition and this petition deserves to be thrown out on this ground alone. 6. I have no hesitation in saying that the petitioner was ill advised to have filed the contempt petition and this petition deserves to be thrown out on this ground alone. 6. Contempt proceedings cannot be a substitute for execution proceeding and moreover the contempt proceedings should not be allowed to be used as a lever by the litigants for bringing pressure on the State functionaries in getting the decree or orders executed without taking recourse to remedies available under the Act itself. I am substantiated in my view by a decision of a Division Bench of the Delhi High Court in Gan Chand Bali v. L.P. Singh, 1968 Delhi LT 135 wherein it has been observed :- "Proceedings for contempt of court must not be treated as a substitute for execution proceedings enforcing the decrees and orders made in favour of the decree-holders." A similar view has also been expressed by a Full Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Prakash Chand v. S.S. Grawal, 1975 Cri LJ 679. 7. The other order which is alleged to have been not obeyed by the respondents is order dated 27-2-1985 passed by this court which actually while dismissing the writ petition filed by the State of U.P. did not issue any specific direction to the respondents but merely endorsed the findings recorded by the Tribunal. The mere fact that the writ petition was dismissed by this court could not debar the petitioner from getting the order/award of the Tribunal executed by a competent civil court. 8. Learned Standing Counsel submitted that since the State of U.P. had preferred a special leave petition in the Supreme Court of India against the judgment dated 27-2-1985 passed by this Court and the award of the Tribunal dated 22-11-1983 and the respondents had been pursuing the legal remedy available to them, the award given in favour of the petitioner was not complied with and the respondents cannot be held guilty of disobeying the same. However, since I am taking the view that the petitioner should have got the decree executed before coming to this Court the said argument appears to be redundant. 9. However, since I am taking the view that the petitioner should have got the decree executed before coming to this Court the said argument appears to be redundant. 9. Another limb of argument of counsel for the petitioner is that even though the petitioner did not get the decree executed by the civil court but since the respondents had knowledge about the same and once they failed in the High Court they should have complied with the award and in not doing do they have disobeyed the order of this Court as well as that of the Tribunal. Though the case has not been admitted but I feel that this Court at the time of admission of the contempt petition itself should apply care and caution and the matter should be scrutinised threadbare before issuance of a notice. 10. The words "civil contempt" have been defined in S. 2(b) of the Contempt of Courts Act to mean "wilful disobedience to any judgment, decree, direction, order, writ or other process of a court or wilful breach of undertaking given to a court". According to Webster's Dictionary 'wilful' means "said or done deliberately or intentionally." Keeping in view the said definition it appears that the respondents have not disobeyed any order deliberately or intentionally. To elaborate further the scope of these proceedings I would like to refer to a Division Bench decision of the Calcutta High Court in Mira Bose v. Santosh Kumar Bose, 1973 Cri LJ 790 in which it has been held that contempt of court is not an ordinary proceeding and the question involved is a serious one. Oswald in his "Contempt of' Court" (3rd Edn. 1910) observed : "This jurisdiction must, however, be exercised with care and the disobedience must be wilful". 11. Relying on the observation of Mr. Justice Kay in the case of Gay v. Hancock, (1887) 56 LT 726 that, "this court should exercise a very great care in putting into force its power and sending persons to prison" the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court in Mira Bose (1973 Cri LJ 790) (supra) observed: "It is quite true that the halo of solemnity surrounding the courts of justice since the dawn of civilisation should not be allowed to be disturbed by a blatant interference with its orders defiling thereby the sacred temples where justice is dispensed with by high priests, the Judges". In the case of P.C. Sen, Chief Minister of West Bengal, reported in (1966) 70 Cal WN 579 : AIR 1966 Cal 411 also Mr. Justice Binayak Nath Banerjee observed at page 592 (of Cal WN) : (at p. 417 of AIR) : "The power of committal for contempt must be wielded with the greatest of care and caution should be exercised with the greatest of reluctance and the greatest of anxiety and only with the object of seeing that the dignity and authority of the court be not impaired" In view of the observations referred to in the preceding paras I am of the opinion that issuance of notice for contempt should not be a matter of rule but should be an exception But where the court is of opinion that the officers or the State functionaries have intentionally and deliberately disobeyed the orders of this court or of the subordinate courts it should not hesitate in punishing such officers. 12. Lastly learned counsel for the petitioner urged that since respondent 3 has filed a false affidavit, notice for perjury should be issued against him. No doubt in the counter affidavit it was mentioned that special leave petition has been admitted but the said fact appears to have crept in due to inadvertence. The facts which are not disputed are that the State of U.P. had filed a special leave petition in the Supreme Court of India along with an application for staying the operation of the order passed by this Court and the award of the Tribunal, that the present petitioner had also filed a counter affidavit and that a rejoinder affidavit thereto was filed by the State Government. In view of the said admitted fact I am not prepared to believe that the fact that the special leave petition has been admitted in the Supreme Court of India was mentioned in the counter affidavit knowingly or with the knowledge of respondent 3. For the reasons stated above l am of definite view that respondent No. 3 has not committed any perjury and no action is warranted on the facts of the case. 13. For the reasons stated above l am of definite view that respondent No. 3 has not committed any perjury and no action is warranted on the facts of the case. 13. Applying the test referred to in the preceding paragraphs and after scrutinising the facts of the case I am of definite view that there has been no deliberate or intentional disobedience on the part of the respondents and the petition deserves to be rejected at admission stage.. The petition is accordingly rejected 14. However, I am confident that since the is between the petitioner and the respondents has been finally adjudicated upon by the highest Court i. e. the Supreme Court of India and the matter has been set at rest, the respondents will ensure that the petitioner, who is an ordinary employee and has been out of service since 1973, shall be reinstated without any further delay.