JUDGMENT Dr. R.R. Misra, J. - Opposite Party No. 3 landlord had moved an application under Section 21 of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) before the Prescribed Authority. This application was allowed. Aggrieved against the same, an appeal was preferred before the Second Additional District Judge, Rai Bareli, who has by the impugned order dated 29th July, 1987, dismissed the appeal of the petitioner. 2. Learned counsel for the petitioner - has made three submissions before me in support of this writ petition. The first submission made by him is that since the relation between the petitioner and his wife were not cordial, therefore, Explanation I to Section 21 (1) of the Act was not attracted. I have been taken through the impugned appellate order. Admittedly the tenant is residing in the accommodation in question along with his wife and a female child was also born to the wife on 15th April, 1983. On a consideration of the entire facts and circumstances of the case, the Appellate Authority has recorded a finding of fact that the relations between the petitioner and his wife were cordial. In this view of the matter, in my opinion the provisions of Explanation I to Section 21(1) of the Act are clearly attracted. In the case of Sri Ram Mohan Bajpai v. Vth Additional District Judge, Kanpur and others, 1980 ARC 279, the same view has also been taken. In paragraph 13 of the aforesaid, decision, the Court had observed as under :- "The plea taken by the petitioner was that as his relations with the mother were not cordial, he had separated himself and accordingly, could not occupy the house built by her. The two Courts did not find any substance in the plea of the petitioner and held that the same had been dishonestly advanced. The position, therefore, appears to be that the mother of the petitioner built her own house subsequent to the coming in force of U.P. Act No. III of 1972. That being so, the Explanation I to Section 21 (1) was clearly applicable. The position, therefore, appears to be that the mother of the petitioner built her own house subsequent to the coming in force of U.P. Act No. III of 1972. That being so, the Explanation I to Section 21 (1) was clearly applicable. As a result of the applicability of the said Explanation, the petitioner was debarred from challenging the bona fide need of the respondent No. 3 and from claiming a comparison of his own need with that of the said respondent." In this view of the matter, the first submission made by the Learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner fails. 3. The second submission made by the Learned Counsel for the petitioner is that the accommodation in question was not needed for residential purpose. The Lower Appellate Court has considered this matter and on a consideration of the materials on record has recorded a finding that the house in question was needed for residential purpose and that the need of the applicant was bona fide. 4. The third submission made by the Learned Counsel for the petitioner is that during the pendency of the appeal before the Lower Appellate Court a portion on the ground-floor of the house in question was vacated by one Dinesh Chandra Trivedi and the same was allotted by the landlord to Madhav Prasad. This also, according to the Learned Counsel, lends support to his submission that the accommodation in question was not bona fide needed by opposite-party No. 3 nor his own use. After hearing Learned Counsel for the petitioner I find that there is nothing on record to substantiate this submission. The judgment of the Lower Appellate Court does not make any mention with regard to this plea for has the petitioner filed any document in support of this plea. In the circumstances, in my opinion the petitioner has failed to substantiate this plea also. 5. In the result, the writ petition fails and is dismissed with costs because the opposite-party No. 3 has put in appearance through Sri B.K. Singh, Advocate, today at the time of the admission hearing.