JUDGMENT S.C. Mathur, J. - This is tenant's petition directed against the order of eviction passed in proceedings under Section 21 (1) (a) of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972). The dispute in the petition pertains to shop No. 14 situate in mohalla Raja Bazar, Sitapur. 2. The shop in dispute adjoins shop No. 15. Both the shop were previously owned by Raja Pratap Bhanu Prakash Singh who transferred the same to Pragati Corporation. While shop No. 14 was in the tenancy of petitioner Shiv Raj Agarwal Shop No. 15 was in the tenancy of Opposite Party No. 3 Zahiruddin. Opposite Party No. 3 purchased both the shops from Pragati Corporation through sale deed dated 27th June, 1980. Thus, in respect of shop No. 15 his status from being tenant was converted into one of ownership while in respect of shop No. 14 he became landlord of the petitioner Shivral Agarwal. After purchasing the shops Opposite Party No. 3 sent notice to the tenant on 4th March, 1985 intimating him about the purchase. He also informed the tenant that he intended to demolish the wall separating the two shops so as to convert the two shops into one shop as he wanted to expand his business by starting retail business in cloth. Thereafter the application under Section 21(1) (a) was moved on 10th September, 1985. 3. In the aforesaid application after stating about the purchase of the shop by him and of his intention to use it in the manner herein before stated, Opposite Party No. 3 asserted that his brother Islamuddin would also be associated in the expanded business. He averred that he had no other shop in the city. In order to point out that the tenant will not suffer any hardship he indicated the alternative accommodations available to him and the other business being carried on by the tenant. In particular it was pointed out that the tenant had in his possession shop No. 4-A, Lohar Bagh, Sitapur which was inaugurated on 7th April, 1985. It was asserted that the tenant keeps the shop in question closed and carries on business jointly with his sons with whom he forms joint Hindu Family. 4. In the aforesaid application three persons had been arrayed as Opposite parties. It was asserted that the tenant keeps the shop in question closed and carries on business jointly with his sons with whom he forms joint Hindu Family. 4. In the aforesaid application three persons had been arrayed as Opposite parties. Opposite party No. 1 was Shiv Raj Naresh Kumar through Shivraj Agrawal and Opposite Party No. 2 was Shivraj Agarwal himself. Opposite Party No. 3 was Naresh Kumar son of Shivraj Agarwal. 5. The application was contested by the opposite Parties arrayed therein. It was asserted that Shivraj Agrawal alone was the tenant of the shop in question who was carrying on business under the name and style of Shivraj Narresh Kumar and Naresh Kumar had nothing to do either with the business carried on in the shop or with the tenancy rights of the shop. The need set up by Opposite party No. 3 was also challenged. It was stated that there was no need for expanding the business and that Islamuddin could not be said to be a member of the landlord's family and therefore release could not be sought on the ground that he was required to be settled in business. It was also pleaded that Islamuddin was a minor aged about 13-14 year and there was no question of his being set up in business. The tenant-petitioner pleaded that the landlord opposite-party was a rich person had several properties in his possession. It was stated that he owned a house at Kanpur and had a shop at 8, Raja Bazar, Sitapur where he was carrying on flourishing tailoring business. It was pleaded that the landlord and his father were engaged in farming also and they owned tractor. Two moppeds were also alleged to be owned by the landlord opposite party. The shop at 4-A, Loharbagh was alleged to be not in the tenancy of the petitioner but in the tenancy of his son Sushil Kumar who was stated to be doing business and residing separately from the petitioner-tenant. It was stated that the petitioner had to settle two his sons Shyam Sunder and Prahlad and he searched accommodations for them but could not get any and therefore they had also been accommodated in the present business in the disputed shop. It was stated that the petitioner had to settle two his sons Shyam Sunder and Prahlad and he searched accommodations for them but could not get any and therefore they had also been accommodated in the present business in the disputed shop. It was pointed out that business in the shop in dispute has been carried on for the last twenty six years and there was considerable goodwill attached to it. 6. In support of their respective pleas the parties filed their respective affidavits. The Prescribed Authority held that Naresh Kumar was not a tenant of the accommodation in question and that petitioner Sheoraj Agarwal alone was the tenant of the said shop. He however negatived the landlord's case of bona fide requirement. According to him Islamuddin was not a member of the family of the landlord and therefore release of the disputed shop could not be claimed for setting him up in business. Regarding the shop at 4-A, Loharbagh it was held that the same was not in the tenancy of the petitioner-tenant but in the tenancy of his son Sushil Kumar. After recording these findings and comparing the hardships the Prescribed Authority came to the conclusion that the petitioner-tenant would be put to greater hardship if he was evicted from the accommodation in question than the landlord-opposite party would suffer in case his application was rejected. With these findings the application of the landlord under Section 21 was rejected. 7. Against the above order of the Prescribed Authority, the landlord preferred appeal under Section 22 of the Act before the District Judge, Sitapur who allowed the same and setting aside the order of the Prescribed Authority directed the eviction of the petitioner. The learned Addl. District Judge, however, confirmed the Prescribed Authority's finding that Opposite Party No. 4 Naresh Kumar was not a tenant of the shop in question and that Sheoraj Agarwal petitioner No. 2 was also the tenant of the disputed shop. Aggrieved by the judgment and order of the learned Vth Addl. District Judge, Sitapur the tenant has approached this court under Article 226 of the Constitution. 8. While up-holding the landlord's claim of bona fide requirement, the learned Additional District Judge has pointed out that it was the case of the landlord that the shop in question was required only for getting up Islamuddin in business. District Judge, Sitapur the tenant has approached this court under Article 226 of the Constitution. 8. While up-holding the landlord's claim of bona fide requirement, the learned Additional District Judge has pointed out that it was the case of the landlord that the shop in question was required only for getting up Islamuddin in business. It has been stated that the case of the landlord was that he wanted, to expand his own business and for that purpose he wanted to demolish the intervening wall and thereafter apart from the tailoring business which he was already carrying on he wanted to start business in sale of cloth also. It was of course asserted that he wanted to engage his brother also in the business. The learned District Judge has rightly pointed out that mere engagement of the brother in the expanded business did not amount to the shop in question being required for the purpose of the brother who could not be said to be member of the family of Opposite Party No. 3. I have perused the application under Section 21 (1) (a) and I do not find any error in the finding recorded by the learned District Judge. 9. After recording the above finding the learned District Judge has referred to certain decision of this Court and of the Supreme Court for holding that the expansion of business is also covered by the bona fide requirement referred to in clause (a) of sub-section (;) of Section 21. The authorities relied upon by him are. (i) 1978 ARC 236 Brij Nandan Saran v. The Addl. District Judge. (2) AIR 1979 SC 272 , Mst. Bega Begum and others v. Abdul Ahmad Khan, and (3) 1979 (UP) RCC 132 Jayant Kumar v. Prescribed Authority. 10. The authorities do support the conclusions arrived at by the learned Additional District Judge. Accordingly I do not find any manifest error in the line of reasoning adopted by the learned District Judge in holding that the shop in question was bona fide required by the landlord-opposite party for expansion of his business in which he wanted to involve his unemployed younger brother Islamuddin. 11. Accordingly I do not find any manifest error in the line of reasoning adopted by the learned District Judge in holding that the shop in question was bona fide required by the landlord-opposite party for expansion of his business in which he wanted to involve his unemployed younger brother Islamuddin. 11. The learned counsel for the petitioners however submitted that the dominant intention of the landlord was to secure employment for his brother Islamuddin and therefore it could not be said that it was landlord's own bona fide requirement within the meaning of clause (a) of sub-section (1) of Section 21 so as to entitle him to an order of eviction against the petitioners. It was also submitted by the learned Counsel that the finding of bona fide requirement is thus against the pleading of the opposite party-landlord Having gone through the application under Section 21. I am unable to agree with the submission of the learned Counsel. 12. It was not submitted that the judgment of the learned District Judge was not one of affirmance but was of variation and therefore the learned District Judge should have discussed evidence in detail before recording finding of bona fide need in favour of the opposite party. It is true that the judgment of the learned District Judge is not of affirmance but is of variation but it cannot be said that the learned District has recorded the finding without considering the evidence on record. In paragraph 13 of his judgment to the learned District Judge has observed :- "The applicant has stated in his affidavit that he informed the Opposite Party No. 2 with his intention when he purchased the disputed shop and shop No. 15 in the year 1980 and the Opposite Party No. 2 had promised him that whenever required by the applicant, he will vacate the disputed shop." This shows awareness of the learned District Judge about the evidence on record. It was not necessary for him to refer to each and every affidavit filed on behalf of the parties. The learned District Judge may not have pointed out in so many words where the Prescribed Authority went wrong but he has given his own reasons for recording finding in favour of the landlord. This in my opinion is sufficient to up-set, an order of authority below. 13. The learned District Judge may not have pointed out in so many words where the Prescribed Authority went wrong but he has given his own reasons for recording finding in favour of the landlord. This in my opinion is sufficient to up-set, an order of authority below. 13. While comparing the hardships of the parties, the learned District Judge has up-set the finding of the Prescribed Authority that the shop in Loharbagh was not in the tenancy of the petitioner-tenant but was in the tenancy of his son Sushil Kumar and has recorded the finding that the said shop is in the tenancy of the tenant-petitioner. The learned District Judge has given detailed reasons for recording this finding. He has pointed out that the landlord had obtained extract from the assessment list which indicated that the shop was owned by Virendra Kumar Jain and the name of the tenant therein entered was 'Sheoraj'. This extract was filed before the Prescribed Authority on 23rd August, 1986. Thereafter the petitioner tenant took steps to get his name deleted and the name of Sushil Kumar substituted This change was done on 30th August, 1986 in pursuance of the report of the Tax Superintendent dated 29th August, 1986. Since this change was effected during the pendency of the proceedings the Prescribed Authority came to the conclusion that it was a mala fide action on behalf of the petitioner-tenant and that the manoeuvring indulged in by him showed that the shop was actually in the tenancy of the petitioner-tenant and not in the tenancy of his son Sushil Kumar. The finding is a reasoned one and the reason does not suffer from any apparent error. The said finding cannot therefore be challenged in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution. 14. The learned Counsel for the petitioners however submitted that the correction of entry in the relevant records of the Nagarpalika could not be challenged in the present proceedings and therefore it was not open to the learned District Judge to doubt the genuineness of the correction. It may not be possible to cancel the said entry in the proceedings giving rise to the present petition but it cannot be said that the motive behind the change in the entry also cannot be examined in the said proceedings. It may not be possible to cancel the said entry in the proceedings giving rise to the present petition but it cannot be said that the motive behind the change in the entry also cannot be examined in the said proceedings. Accordingly I am of the opinion that it was permissible for the learned District Judge to go into the bona fide of the correction of the entire obtained by the petitioner-tenant. 15. While discussing the correction made in the Nagarpalika entry the learned District Judge had observed that the petitioner-tenant did not care to get the affidavit of Virendra Kumar Jain filed, The petitioners have tried to meet this observation of the learned District Judge by getting his affidavit filed in this Court as Annexure 7. The filing of this affidavit does not Improve matters for the petitioners. It is apparent from the judgment of the learned Additional District Judge that Virendra Kumar Jain was siding with the petitioners. The mala fides of the correction are apparent from the fact that the change was obtained only after the landlord-opposite party had obtained certified copy from the record of the Nagarpalika on 22nd August, 1986 and filed the same before the Prescribed Authority on 23rd August, 1986. Before the attempt had been made by the petitioner-tenant to obtain correction of the so called error in the Nagarpalika records. 16. The learned District Judge has further pointed out that the petitioner and his sons are living jointly and are having business jointly. In this manner apart from the business in shop at Loharbagh the petitioner and his sons have a joint business at Bahraich also. About this business there was no dispute that in the year 1980 it was partnership. The case of the petitioner was that the business was started in partnership in the year 1980 but in the year 1984 another partnership deed was executed and the petitioner-tenant ceased to be a partner in the business. The learned District Judge has come to the conclusion that the exclusion of the petitioner-tenant from this partnership was also not bona fide and that the petitioner-tenant was excluded only to save the shop in dispute from slipping out of his hands. The learned District Judge has come to the conclusion that the exclusion of the petitioner-tenant from this partnership was also not bona fide and that the petitioner-tenant was excluded only to save the shop in dispute from slipping out of his hands. The finding of the learned District Judge is based on material on record and cannot be said to be arbitrary so as to call for interference under Article 226 of the Constitution. The argument of the learned Counsel for the petitioner that the finding is based on surmises cannot he accepted. As already pointed out the sale-deed was registered on 26th June, 1980 and in the year 1980 itself the partnership business in which the petitioner-tenant also had a share was started in Bahraich. There is no evidence on record to explain the exclusion of the petitioner-tenant from the said partnership in the year 1984. 17. Before the learned District Judge it was strenuously pressed on behalf of the petitioner-tenant that he was separate from his sons and therefore his sons' business could not be considered while considering the petitioner's need in respect of the shop in dispute. The learned District Judge has declined to accept the petitioner's contention pointing out that recently the petitioner-tenant purchased a house at Vijai Lakshmi Nagar in which he was living with his sons jointly. In order to show that he was not joint with his sons the petitioner tenant filed municipal bills and receipts which indicated that the petitioner-tenant was paying house tax and water tax of one portion of the house and house tax and water tax of the other portion was being paid by his son Naresh Kumar. The learned District Judge has observed that mere payment of tax or portion of the house did not grove that partition had taken place between the petitioner-tenant and his sons. In my opinion the finding is neither arbitrary nor based on conjectures. The inference has been drawn by the learned District Judge from the material on record. 18. From the material on record it is established that while the petitioners are financially well off and they own immovable properties and have business in Sitapur and Bahraich the opposite party Zahiruddin is a small landlord having only two adjoining shops in his ownership. The inference has been drawn by the learned District Judge from the material on record. 18. From the material on record it is established that while the petitioners are financially well off and they own immovable properties and have business in Sitapur and Bahraich the opposite party Zahiruddin is a small landlord having only two adjoining shops in his ownership. At present he is doing only tailoring business in one of the shop and he proposes to expand his business by starting business in sale of cloth. The comparison of hardship done by the learned District Judge is based on sound principles and does not suffer from any manifest error. Altogether the judgment of the learned District Judge is sound in law and on facts. 19. In view of the above petition lacks merits and is hereby dismissed with costs to contesting opposite party No. 3. Interim order, if any, shall stand discharged. The shop in question shall be vacated by the petitioner within two months from today.