JUDGMENT 1. - Everything being the same and common in these three habeas corpus writ petitions-the date of detention orders, the Authority passing the detention orders, the grounds of detention, the date of approval of the orders of detention by the State Government, the date of reaching the approval sent by the State Government to the Central Government - they were heard together and are disposed of by a single judgment. 2. The petitioners are residents of village Mandla P.S. Guda Endla district Pali. Two of them. namely, Bhanwar Singh and Jabbarsingh are the real brothers being the sons of Jaisingh. The petitioner Girdhari is the servant of Jaisingh. One Baghsingh is the real maternal grand-father of the petitioners Rhanwarsingh and Jabbarsingh. Baghsingh filed a complaint against Nathuram Bishnoi - the Station House Officer, Police Station, Guda Endla in the Court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Pali on April 30, 1981 for extorting a sum of Rs. 8C00/- from him and beating him. The Chief Judicial Magistrate took cognizance of the offences under sections 384 and 323, I. P. C. and issued process against Nathuram Bishnoi to procure his appearance in the Court. This invited wrath and displeasure of Nathuram Bishnoi. As many as nineteen criminal cases were registered by him at Police Station. Guda Endla against the petitioners for offences under sections 147 148, 447, 379 etc. of the Penal Code though the offences were alleged to have been committed long back. The petitioners were arrested in some criminal cases and were in judicial custody on January 16, 1987. The Sessions Judge Pali passed an order for releasing them on bail on January, 12, 1967. However, before they could furnish the bail bonds, the District Magistrate, Pali passed an order under section 3 (2) of the National Security Act (for short 'the NSA' or 'the Act') against the petitioners for detaining them. The petitioners made representations and on the recommendation of the Advisory Board, they were ordered to be released forthwith on March 6. 1987. But they were not released and the District Magistrate, Pali again passed the detention order EX. 5 on March 6, 1987 under section 3 (2) of the Act. The representations were made by the petitioners, but their representations were rejected throughout. 1987. But they were not released and the District Magistrate, Pali again passed the detention order EX. 5 on March 6, 1987 under section 3 (2) of the Act. The representations were made by the petitioners, but their representations were rejected throughout. The grounds of detentions communicated to them by Annexure-6 are almost the same which were communicated to them with the earlier detention order EX. 1. 3. The detention is challenged on the following grounds (1) the grounds of detention communicated to the petitioners have no nexus or co-relation with the maintenance of public order. The grounds relate to the commission of the crime against an individual person. They do not furnish any material to show that the activities of the detenu were. in any way, prejudicial to the public order; (2) the detention order is malafide and motivated. As many as nineteen criminal cases were registered on a single day though the offences were alleged to have been committed long before on different dates. Malice is, thus, writ large, and easily visible; and (3) the detention orders of the District Magistrate Pali were approved under section 3 (4) of the Act by the mate Government on March 13, 1987. The State Government, however, failed to report the fact to the Central Government together with the grounds on which the orders were passed, within seven days from March 13, D87. The communication of the approval was received by the Central Government on March 24, 1987. This contravenes the mandatory provisions of section 3 (5) of the Act. 4. In the returns filed by the respondents, the allegations relating to malafide etc. were categorically refuted. it w.rs stated that the activities of the petitioners created not only a problem of law and order but also of public order. As regards the non-compliance of the provisions of section 3 (5) of the Act, the stand taken was that the report was sent to the Central Government by the State Government on March 13, 1987 by a registered post. The order of detention was approved on this very date of March 13, 1987. It was. no doubt, received by the Central Government on March 24, 1987. Section 3 (5) of the Act does not lay down that the report should be received by the Central Government within seven days of the date of approval. 5. We have heard Mr. The order of detention was approved on this very date of March 13, 1987. It was. no doubt, received by the Central Government on March 24, 1987. Section 3 (5) of the Act does not lay down that the report should be received by the Central Government within seven days of the date of approval. 5. We have heard Mr. M.C. Bhandari and Mr. L. S. Udawat, learned counsel for the detenues and the learned Additional Advocate General, Mr. J.P. Josbi. 6. During arguments, the learned counsel for the detenues concentrated their contentions mainly on ground Number 31, namely, the non-compliance of the provisions of section 3 (5) of the Act. It was argued by them that the orders of detention passed by the District Magistrate, Pali on March 6, 1987, were approved under section 3 (5) of the NSA, by the State Government on March 13, 1987. Under Section 3 (5) of the NSA this approval should have been reported to the Central Government within seven days. The order of approval dated March 13, 1987 was received by the Central Government on March 24, 1987. Since the approval was not communicated within seven days, the detention of the detenues becomes invalid on the expiry of seven days from March 13, 1987. Reliance in support of the contention was placed on Sher Mohammed v. State of West Bengal (A I.R 1975 S.C. 2049) , Vinayak Ramchandra and others v. D. Ramchandran etc. (1985 Cr.L.J. 1257 - decided by a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court) and Gurucharan Singh v. Superintendent Central Jail, Bareilli and others (1986 Allahabad Law Journal 1172 , decided by a Division Bench). On the basis of these authorities, it was argued that the approval made by the State Government under section 3 (5) of the NSA must be received by the Central Government within seven days of the order of approval. In the instant case, the order of approval was passed by the State Government on March 13, 1987 and it was received by the Central Government on March 24, 1917, that is to say, beyond seven days from March 13, 1987. The prolonged detention of the detenues after March 13, 1987 thus becomes invalid. 7. In the instant case, the order of approval was passed by the State Government on March 13, 1987 and it was received by the Central Government on March 24, 1917, that is to say, beyond seven days from March 13, 1987. The prolonged detention of the detenues after March 13, 1987 thus becomes invalid. 7. It was on the other hand, submitted by the learned Additional Advocate General that what is required under section 1(5) of the N,S.A. is that the State Government should report the fact of the approval of the detention order to the Central Government within seven days. It is not, at all, necessary under the said provision that the order of approval should be received by the Central Government within seven days. Reliance in support of the contention was placed on Yogendra Singh v. State of Bihar (1985 Cr. L.J. 889) . It was also argued by the learned Additional Advocate General that the use of word 'communication' in Sher Mohammed's case (supra) was made in a casual manner. Their lordships of the Supreme Court never intended to mean that the word 'report' used in section 3(5) of the NSA means 'communication'. The matter before the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Sher Mohammed case was entirely different. We have taken the respective submissions into consideration. 8. It would be useful to first read sub-section (5) of section 3 of the NSA, which reads as under : "3(5)-When any order is made or approved by the State Government under this section, the State Government shall, within seven days, report the fact to the Central Government together with the grounds on which the order has been made and such other particulars as in the opinion of the State Government, have a baring on the necessity for the order." 9. The word 'report', which occurs in sub-section (5) also occurs in sub-section (4) of the same section. The word 'report' has been used in both these sub-sections, because the matter is to be reported by a subordinate to the superior, under sub-section (4) by the District Magistrate to the State Govern merit and under sub-section (15) by the State Government to the Central Government. The use of any other word like 'communicate' would be entirely misfit. The word 'report' has been used in both these sub-sections, because the matter is to be reported by a subordinate to the superior, under sub-section (4) by the District Magistrate to the State Govern merit and under sub-section (15) by the State Government to the Central Government. The use of any other word like 'communicate' would be entirely misfit. Therefore, we are to see whether the word 'report' mentioned in sub-section (5) simply requires that a report is to be despatched or whether it implies that the report must be received by the Central Government within the specified time of seven days. 10. In Yogendra Singh's case (supra), the learned Judge of the Patna High Court took the view that what is required under section 3(5) is that the State Government should make a report to the Central Government within seven days. It does not require that the report of the State Government should be received by the Central Government within seven days. They further held that the obligation imposed upon the State Government under stc ion 3(5) is that the State Government should send a report and it is not that the report should reach within a period of seven days to the Central Government. It may be mentioned at once that the Sher Mohammed's case (supra) was not brought to the notice of the learned Judges of the Patna High Court. 11. In Sher Mohammed's case (supra), the provisions of section 3(4) of the MISA (Act No. XXVI of 1971) are examined The provisions of section 3(4) of the MISA are identical and pari materia with those of section 3(5) of the NSA. The word used in section 3(4) of the MISA is 'report'. In para 3 of the judgment, their lordships observed i "A fair reading of section" indicates that the State Government may directly issue an order of detention or, if it is done by a lesser authority, approve of such detention order as provided in the statute. The word used in section 3(4) of the MISA is 'report'. In para 3 of the judgment, their lordships observed i "A fair reading of section" indicates that the State Government may directly issue an order of detention or, if it is done by a lesser authority, approve of such detention order as provided in the statute. Sub-section (4) of section 3, which we have extracted, obligates the State Government to communicate, within seven days of the order of detention it makes or it approves, that fact to the Central Government, together with the grounds on which the order has been made and other relevant particulars, Even assuming that the order is made by the District Magistrate and is approved by the State Government, the communication has to be made to the Central Government within the time specified. This procedural mandate is inviolable except on peril of the order being voided." 12. Their lordships took the view that she word 'report' is synonymous with the word `communicate'. The use of word 'communication' in para 3 was discussed at length by the learned Judges of Bombay and Allahabad High Court in the cases quoted above. 13. In Vinayak's case (supra), the learned Judges of the Bombay High Court. relying upon Sher Mohammed's case, observes : "Section 3(5) casts a duty on the State Government to report the fact to the Central Government within seven days together with the grounds on which order has been made and such other particulars, as in the opinion of the State Government, have bearing on the necessity of the order. Therefore, unless the report sent by the State Government under section 3i5) of the Act is received by the Central Government, it cannot be said that the fact of detention together with tic grounds on which the order has been made is communicated or reported to the Central Government within the meaning of section 3 (5) of the Act." 14. It may he pointed out that the contention of the Central and the State Government that mere sending of a report is enough under section 3(5) of the Act and it is not necessary that the report should also be received by the Central Government within the period of seven days, was repelled and rejected. 15. It may he pointed out that the contention of the Central and the State Government that mere sending of a report is enough under section 3(5) of the Act and it is not necessary that the report should also be received by the Central Government within the period of seven days, was repelled and rejected. 15. In Gurucharan Singh's case (supra), the learned Judges of the Allahabad High Court, in view of the law laid down in Sher Mohammed's case, held: "Therefore, it is quite obvious that unless the fact of the detention is communicated to the Central Government within seven days it cannot be said that the mandate of Section 3(5) is complied with." 16. It was contended by the learned Additional Advocate General that the word "communication" was inadvertantly used in para 8 of the judgment in Sher Mohamed's case. Only a casual reference was made to the word "communication" and it should not, therefore, be inferred that their lordships of the Supreme Court took the word "communication" as synonymous for the word "report" used in section 3(5) of the Act. We are unable to agree with him. Para 3 of the judgment, which we have reproduced above, cleatty ,hows that the word "communication" was not unmeaninglully used by their lordships. The word "communication" was used to lay emphasis that the report under section '(5) of the NSA should be received by the Central Government within seven days. In our opinion, the State Government cannot be relieved of its duty merely by despatching the report under section .'(5) of the ct. If the mere despatchirg of the report is taken as sufficient under section 7(5) of the Act, at times, it may cause a serious harm to the detenu. If the report is lost in transit, the Central Government may not conic to know of it. In order to avoid such contingeneirs, it is necessary that the report under section 3(5) should reach the Central Government within seven day. 17. In the instant case, the order of tie District Magistrate was approved by the State Government on Match 13, 1987. It was stated during arguments by the learned Additional Advocate General that the said approval was despatched under section 3(5) of the Act and was received by the Central Government on March 24, 1987. 17. In the instant case, the order of tie District Magistrate was approved by the State Government on Match 13, 1987. It was stated during arguments by the learned Additional Advocate General that the said approval was despatched under section 3(5) of the Act and was received by the Central Government on March 24, 1987. The approval was, thus, received by the Central Government after the expiry of seven days from March 13. 1987. The Act does not lay down the method as to how the approval under section 3(5) of the Act should be reported to the Central Government. It depends on the State Government to adopt any method to send the report, but it must ensure that it reaches the Central Government within seven days. The report can be despatched through special messenger, by telegram or telex or any other method, taking the time factor into consideration. The State Government, in the instant cases, was expected that since the approval was made on March 13, 1987, the report to the Central Government should be sent by such means that it reaches there within the prescribed period of seven days. Tl.e duty of the State Government does not come to an end under section 3(5) of the Act by merely despatching the report. When the approval was despatched on some date after Match 13, 1987, the State Government must have adopted a quick method to ensure that the report teaches the Central Government within seven dabs of the approval.18-19. It was also contended by the learned Additional Advocate General that even the late receipt of the report by the Central Government causes no prejudice to the detenues because the Act does not lay down the period within which the Central Government is to consider the natter under section .4 of the Act The contention has no substance in view of the law laid down in the State of Punjab v. Jagdev Singh (A.I.R. 1984 S.C. 444) . Their lordships observed: "Preventive detention is a necessary evil, but essentially a-t evil. Therefore, deprivation of personal liberty, if at all, have to be on the strict terms of the Constitution. Nothing less. Their lordships observed: "Preventive detention is a necessary evil, but essentially a-t evil. Therefore, deprivation of personal liberty, if at all, have to be on the strict terms of the Constitution. Nothing less. preventive detention is considered so treacherous and such an anathema to civilised thought and democratic policy that the safeguards against undue exercise of the power to detain without trial, have been built into the Constitution itself ana incorporated as fundamental rights. There are two sentinels, one at either end. The Legislature is required to make the law circumscribing the limits within which persons may be preventively detained and providing for the safeguards prescribed by the Constitution; and the Courts are required to examine, when demanded, whether there has been any excessive detention, that is, whether the limits set out by the Constitution and Legislature have been transgressed. It has always been the view of the Supreme Court that the detention of individuals without trials for any length of time, however short, is wholly inconsistent with the basic ideas of our Government and the gravity of the evil of community resulting from anti-social activities can never furnish an adequate reason for invaliding the personal liberty of citizen except in accordance with the procedure established by law. It is well-settled that the law of preventive detention is a hard law and, therefore it should be strictly construed."1 ), We may state that under the preventive detention law, the personal liberty of the citizen is curtailed down. When the liberty is curtailed down under the preventive detention, it is imperative that a faithful compliance should be trace of the law of preventive detention The citizen, who has been detained under the law of preventive detention, has a right to contend that the provisions of the law have been breached and as such his detention illegal. In the instant cases, there is a clear breach of the mandate contained in section 3(5) of the Act. The prolonged detention of the detenues is, therefore, invalid. The petitions should be allowed and the detenues should be freed. 20. We need not touch the merits of the grounds of detention served on the detenues as we are allowing the petitions on the non-compliance of the mandate contained in section 3(5) of the NSA.21. The prolonged detention of the detenues is, therefore, invalid. The petitions should be allowed and the detenues should be freed. 20. We need not touch the merits of the grounds of detention served on the detenues as we are allowing the petitions on the non-compliance of the mandate contained in section 3(5) of the NSA.21. In the result, the petitions are allowed and the respondents are directed to forthwith release the detenues Bhanwarsingh, Girdhari and Jabbar singh,if not wanted in any other case.Petition allowed. *******