JUDGMENT Ravi S. Dhavan, J. - The limited issue before this court arises from a letter written by the petitioner, originally sent during the pendency of the petition to the Chief Justice, in effect, intimating the court that he has unilaterally terminated the instructions of his counsel to act and plead. The case had been listed on the letter of the petitioner. These are matters of record. 2. In this letter to the Chief Justice the petitioner attempts to set the blame on counsel. This is not correct. The petition was filed on 7 December, 1985 on which date the State Counsel was granted one month's time to file a counter-affidavit and the case was directed to be listed immediately thereafter. Unfortunately, the matter was listed almost after 7 months since the petition was presented before the court. On 14th July, 1986, the Hon'ble Bench before whom the writ petition was pending admitted the writ petition and issued notice on the writ petition. The counter-affidavit was not forthcoming and on 21 August, 1986 on a report of the registry, the matter was before the court for orders. On two dates apparently the case was adjourned at the instance of the petitioner's counsel. This was on 22 August, 1986 and 25 August, 1916. On the latter date mentioned, the petitioner was writing to the Chief Justice that despite the fact that pleadings between the parties have been exchanged yet the matter is not being put up for hearing or for consideration of grant of an ad interim order. In his letter to the Chief Justice, the petitioner took re coarse to making incorrect statements. The order-sheet of the writ petition shows that the counter-affidavit is answer to the writ petition has yet to be received and is not on record to date. Thus, the fact that the matter cannot be heard is no fault of the petitioner's counsel whose instructions were terminated unilaterally. The petitioner is free to terminate his counsel's instructions but the reason he attributes to the counsel is not correct. 3. While the petitioner had in effect terminated his counsel's instructions, unilaterally, he sought another counsel. Petitioner's first counsel was Mr. G.C. Dwivedi, today Senior Advocate, Petitioner's subsequent counsel is Mr. A.N. Singh, Advocate. 4. The Court, though it appropriate that Mr. 3. While the petitioner had in effect terminated his counsel's instructions, unilaterally, he sought another counsel. Petitioner's first counsel was Mr. G.C. Dwivedi, today Senior Advocate, Petitioner's subsequent counsel is Mr. A.N. Singh, Advocate. 4. The Court, though it appropriate that Mr. G.C. Dwivedi, Advocate, as he then was, now Senior Advocate ought to known that the petitioner had written a letter to the Chief Justice and that his instructions have been unilaterally terminated without reference to him. Thus, this court directed the registry that a copy of the petitioner's letter dated 25th August, 1986, addressed to the Chief Justice, be delivered to Mr. G. C Dwivedi, should he desire to express anything to the court, he may have the opportunity to do so. 5. In pursuance of the orders passed by this court on 29 August, 1986 Mr. G.C. Dwivedi, Senior Advocate, was apprised of the feet that the petitioner had without reference to him written to the Chief Justice, in effect, intimating the Court that (a) instructions of counsel has been terminated and (b) he had engaged another counsel. 6. Mr. G. C. Dwivedi, now Senior Advocate personally appeared at the Bar as also petitioner's subsequent counsel Mr, A. N. Singh, Advocate. 7. To the subsequent counsel of the petitioner, this court observed that it was not proper for the petitioner to have written to the Chief Justice direct, unilaterally terminating the instructions of Mr. G. C. Dwivedi, without reference to the latter, as propriety demanded at the hands of the petitioner that his counsel ought to have been told that he was not to be retained henceforth. To the subsequent counsel now appearing for the petitioner the court also reminded him of the rules framed by the Bar Counsel of India, in a reference to the standards of professional conduct and etiquette which require that no counsel ought to enter appearance in any case in which a counsel already appears and if subsequent counsel does enter appearance then he must do so with the tacit consent of the previous counsel appearing. This is Rule 39 ; it is reproduced below:- "39. This is Rule 39 ; it is reproduced below:- "39. An Advocate shall not enter appearance in any case in which there is already a Vakalatnama or memo or appearance filed by an Advocate engaged for a party except with his consent; in case such consent is not produced he shall apply to the court stating reasons why the said consent could not be produced and he shall appear only after obtaining the permission of the court." 8. This court must express that learned counsel subsequently appearing for the petitioner, Mr. A.N. Singh, Advocate, fairly and candidly accepted that a mistake had occurred on his part and that he has not taken consent from Mr. G.C. Dwivedi, Senior Advocate, or from the court, before entering appearance in the writ petition as a subsequent counsel. Mr. A.N. Singh, Advocate has acknowledged that a mistake has happened at his instance in so far as he is concerned. Thus, the matter is being laid to rest and will not be called in controversy any more. 9. As far as the unilateral termination of counsel's instructions in a reference to Mr G.C. Dwivedi, Advocate, is concerned this court has reservations on the petitioner's propriety. Firstly, as mentioned above, what he contended in his letter to the Chief Justice was incorrect. Secondly, counsel's instructions ought not to have been terminated behind his back and the grace of the legal profession needs to be protected so that in future clients do not embarass counsel at the bar of this court. While every client is at liberty to unilaterally terminate his counsel's instructions, it cannot go unnoticed. Should a client ever terminate counsel's instructions unilaterally without reasonable cause, then it implies that under the principles of Order III, Rule 4 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 counsel becomes entitled to full fees settled with clients. A client may engage as many counsel as he may desire, but to each counsel whose instructions is unilaterally terminated, without cause, the client would become obliged to pay full fees settled. This proposition has been settled by several High Courts. 1. AIR 1930 Pat 403 (DB); 2. AIR 1931 Pat 137(DB); 3. AIR 1934 Cal 58 (DB) ; 4. AIR 1952 All 643 ; 5. AIR 1974 Kar 88 ; 6. AIR 1974 Raj 137. 10. This proposition has been settled by several High Courts. 1. AIR 1930 Pat 403 (DB); 2. AIR 1931 Pat 137(DB); 3. AIR 1934 Cal 58 (DB) ; 4. AIR 1952 All 643 ; 5. AIR 1974 Kar 88 ; 6. AIR 1974 Raj 137. 10. The petitioner may be in straitened circumstances, as his grievance in the petition is that he is without employment and he may under a mistaken impression that the change in counsel may set pace the proceedings before this court. The petitioner ought to have verified from the record of the court that proceedings had not been held up because of his counsel, but simply because the respondents would not file a counter-affidavit. Thus, he ought to have shown a little more grace to his counsel. Mr. G. C. Dwivedi, today Senior Advocate, and should not have made any allegations upon unverified facts when he wrote to the Chief Justice. 11. Mr. G.C. Dwivedi, Advocate, has accepted his unilateral termination of instructions and in fact requested the court that in accordance with the petitioner's desire as expressed in the letter to the Chief Justice, aforesaid, to be released from the obligation to act on behalf of the petitioner. The petitioner's letter to the Chief Justice, is in effect an application under Order III, Rule 4, of the Code, seeking unilateral discharge of counsel and will be treated as such. Mr. G. C. Dwivedi submitted before the court that it was his duty to seek leave front the court and. thus, he has sought it. This is also the principle under Order III, Rule 4 of the Code aforesaid, that no counsel may withdraw from a case except by leave of court where the case is pending. The court has granted him leave in the circumstances, to withdraw from the case consequent upon the petitioner's desire. 12. In a reference to the petitioner, in the manner in which he has unilaterally terminated counsel's instructions, this court is taking a lenient view for no other reason except that he is unemployed. While the petitioner has been granted the latitude to change counsel, an act exclusive to his discretion, this court feels that counsel who plead ought not to be embarrassed. In the manner in which the petitioner has unilaterally terminated the counsel's instructions and to mitigate the embarrassment which has been suffered by Mr. While the petitioner has been granted the latitude to change counsel, an act exclusive to his discretion, this court feels that counsel who plead ought not to be embarrassed. In the manner in which the petitioner has unilaterally terminated the counsel's instructions and to mitigate the embarrassment which has been suffered by Mr. G. C. Dwivedi, Advocate, this court directs the petitioner to make a deposit of Rs. 10/- (Rs. ten only) before the Secretary, Bar Counsel of U.P. A photostat copy of the receipt so issued by the Secretary. Bar Council of U.P. will be set on record of this writ petition by the learned Counsel now appearing on behalf of the petitioner. Petitioner must do this by 30 November, 1987. When the receipt has been brought on record of this writ petition, the matter may be listed before an appropriate court so that the case proceeds in the normal course. 13. A copy of this order will be issued free of charge to Mr. G. C. Dwivedi, Senior Advocate, now, by the Registrar, High Court.