JUDGMENT 1. 1. These two appeals arise out of the order passed by the Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation for District Jaipur and Tonk, dated January 20, 1986, in workman claim case No. 12/85. Kanaram v. Rajasthan State Electricity Board partly accepting the claim petition. The learned Commissioner gave an award in the amount of Rs. 32,340/-, along with a penalty of Rs. 16,170/- out of the total amount of Rs. 72,827.37 claimed. Kanaram preferred an appeal against disallowed part of claim, i. e. Rs. 40,487.37 and prayed for enhancement of the claim. while the appeal of the R. S. E. B. is for setting aside the claim awarded by the Commissioner as according to the R.S.E.B. claimant was not asked to climb the pole and risk his own life and thus accident did not arise out of and was not in the course of employment. 2. Brief facts giving rise to these appeals are that the claimant Kanaram was workman employed as Helper with R.S.E.B. since 1977 and was working under the control and supervision of Asstt. Engineer, R.S.E.B. Dudu, District Jaipur. On March 26, 1984, while he was discharging his duty on an electric pole he sustained sever injuries due to sudden passing of electric current in the line. He was immediately rushed to Jaipur and admitted to S.M.S. Hospital, Jaipur. He remained as indoor patient upto September 30, 1984. His both the hands had to be amputed and he became permanently disabled reducing his earning capacity by hundred per cent. A certificate to that effect was issued to him by Dr. S.C. Kasliwal, Professor and Head. S.M.S. Medical College & Hospital, Jaipur on February 18, 1985. Thereafter Kanaram preferred a claim for the amount of Rs. 72,827.37. This claim was contested by R.S.E.B. on various grounds. It was pleaded that an accident did not arise out of and in the course of employment, he was not asked to climb the pole and touch the live wires. He had worked contrary to the instructions ignoring all the safety measures and. therefore, was not entitled to any claim. His duty was only to do patrolling and it was not expected of him to climb the pole. It was also pleaded that from the date of the accident till June, 1985. the petitioner had been paid 50% salary as compensation. Besides this his expenses for treatment have also been paid. therefore, was not entitled to any claim. His duty was only to do patrolling and it was not expected of him to climb the pole. It was also pleaded that from the date of the accident till June, 1985. the petitioner had been paid 50% salary as compensation. Besides this his expenses for treatment have also been paid. It was further pleaded that at best his claim, according to the Schedule existing on the date of the accident, could be for Rs. 32,340/- out of which Rs. 4571.58 have since been paid, he was only entitled to Rs. 27,768.42. It was further pleaded that the amendment in the Schedule was brought subsequent to the date of the accident and. therefore, claim could not be paid according to the amended Schedule. Evidence was led on either side and thereafter by the impugned order the court awarded the claim according to the unamended Schedule for the amount as mentioned above. Aggrieved by the order of Workmen's Compensation Commissioner both the parties have preferred appeals. 3. It has been contended by Mr. Mohan Poonmiya representing the workman that the learned Commissioner has erred in not applying the amended Schedule in the present case particularly when the certificate of the Doctor certifying, 'that the workman has a case of bilateral amputtee of hands and according to workmen's compensation rules followed by E. S. I. Corporation, he is entitled to hundred per cent compensation" was issued subsequent to the amendment in the Schedule. It is submitted that under the Act the compensation could only be claimed in this case when the injuries were held to have resulted in permanent disablement. It was further submitted that there is distinction between the cases of instantaneous death and permanent disablement resulting in, during or after the course of treatment, in consequence of the injury caused earlier. It is further submitted that phrase resulted/ing from has to be given a liberal interpretation and further that the Schedule has to be given retrospective operation in the cases like the present one. It is further submitted that hundred per cent penalty should have also been imposed instead of fifty per cent awarded by the learned Commissioner. He has placed reliance on K. R. Chand Gandhi v. S. S Badole : FLR 1974 (29) 160. It is further submitted that hundred per cent penalty should have also been imposed instead of fifty per cent awarded by the learned Commissioner. He has placed reliance on K. R. Chand Gandhi v. S. S Badole : FLR 1974 (29) 160. Smt. Bimla v. Union of India : FLR 1980 (41) 297 , Bharat Singh v. New Delhi Tuberculosis Centre and Ors. FLR 1986 (69) 129 , Rustom & Hornsby (I) Ltd. v. T. B Kadam : FLR 1975 (31) 173 and State of Raj v. Smt. Dhapoo & Ors. : FLR 1981 (42) 70 Explaining the case of Smt. Bimla v. Union of India (supra) relied upon by the trial court, Shri Poonmiya contended that that was not a case of permanent disablement resulting from serious injuries received,by the workman prior to the Amending Act and further submitted that in the case of Bimla the emphasis was laid on the rights giving the cause of actions. He submitted that in the instant case cause of action accrued on account of the permanent disablement resulting from the injury sustained and, therefore, even the observations made in the aforesaid case favour the claimant. 4. Learned counsel appearing for the R. S. E. B. submitted that the respondent climbed on 11 KV pole and touched the live wires without being instructed to do so and without using the safety devices hence he risked his own life and his this conduct disentitles him to any compensation. It was further submitted that the workman has failed to show that the permanent disability was the direct result of the accident. It was submitted that the Doctor who amputed both the hands has not been examined to show that it was essential to do so and that it had a direct bearing with injuries caused during the course of employment. Imposition of the penalty has also been challenged on the ground that part payment towards compensation had been made by the Board. Learned counsel are controverted the arguments advanced on behalf of the workman regarding effect of amendment in the Schedule and submitted that retrospective operation cannot be given to the amendment to Schedule IV. Reliance was placed on Ram Lal v. Regional Manager, Food Corporation of India, Jaipur : RLW 1981 116 , Vijay Ram v. Janak Raj. : 1581 Lab. I. C. 143 and Madan Mohan Verma v. Mohan Lal : 1982 Lab. Reliance was placed on Ram Lal v. Regional Manager, Food Corporation of India, Jaipur : RLW 1981 116 , Vijay Ram v. Janak Raj. : 1581 Lab. I. C. 143 and Madan Mohan Verma v. Mohan Lal : 1982 Lab. I. C. 1729. 5. I have given my thoughtful consideration to the rival contentions and have perused the record. 6. I will first deal with the points raised by the learned counsel for the Board as to whether the injuries arose out of and during the course of employment and as to what was the nature of the injuries. This is a question of fact and I need only say that there is overwhelming evidence on record to substantiate that workman Kanaram sustained injuries while he was performing his duties on March 26, 1984. Assistant Engineer Shri D.C. Sogani under whom the workman, Kanaram, was working has of course, stated in his affidavit that Kanaram had climbed a pole without his permission and without having the safety devices with him. He however, could not stand the cross-examination when he had to admit that Kanaram was on duty on March 26, 1984 and that he got injured while he was performing his duties. He admitted that Kanaram had never disobeyed the orders of his superiors. Besides this he himself was not present when accident took place. Thus, it is borne out from the record that at the time of accident Kanaram was performing his duties. Kanaram has given all the details of the accident in his statement and stated that while he and Shedu Khan were working as helpers on Ugariabas-Bichun Feeder he had asked for a shut down because the feeder was not working since March 25, 1984, and Salig Ram had directed them to work on the pole. He, therefore, took a pin insulater and went to Ugariabas for taking a shut down along with Shedu Khan. He and Shedu Khan thereafter distributed the points and when he reached near Bichun village he found the pin insulater on 11 KV in a broken condition. He therefore, climbed the pole and tested the wires. There was no current flowing in these wires at that time. He therefore, removed the broken insulater and replaced it by new. But while he was changing the insulater suddenly he got an electric shock and became unconscious. He therefore, climbed the pole and tested the wires. There was no current flowing in these wires at that time. He therefore, removed the broken insulater and replaced it by new. But while he was changing the insulater suddenly he got an electric shock and became unconscious. He found himself in S.M.S. Hospital with both the hands burnt which were ultimately amputed by the Doctor. The Board filed an affidavit of Saligram to show that the workman worked contrary to his instructions, but from his detailed cross-examination it is borne out that he had said so in his affidavit to save his own skin since he was the person who was responsible for starting the flow of current in the wires suddenly. He admits that there was none except him at G.O. and that it was he who had flown the current on a signal from Mohanlal helper. This witness had the audacity to even deny the knowledge of the accident on that day. He has even the audacity to say that he dictated his own affidavit to which he could not stick in cross-examination. Thus, it is borne out from the record that the carelessness, if any, can be attributed to Saligram. Therefore, I am in agreement with the finding arrived at by the learned Commissioner that the accident arose out of and during the course of employment. 7. Coming to the next argument on behalf of the Board that it has not been proved that the amputation of both the hands was direct result of the injuries sustained by the workman during the course of his employment and further that the Doctor has also not been examined to prove the nature of disablement. One can only say that such is an argument of total despair. Such a defence on the part of employer in a public undertaking deserves to the deprecated. Such defences cannot be appreciated even if they are raised by private employers much less when it is raised by a public undertaking or a statutory body which an agency or instrumentality of the State it can only be bemoaned. I am unable to conceive even an idea for a moment that any human being much less an employee would voluntarily get his both the hands amputed in expectation of some future compensation. I am unable to conceive even an idea for a moment that any human being much less an employee would voluntarily get his both the hands amputed in expectation of some future compensation. Even in cases where the injury is declared to be serious and the Doctor advises the amputation of a part of body one would not agree to it and give consent easily unless he is convinced that no other alternative is left to save his life. It would be the saddest day in the life of a person when his/her both the hands or legs are amputed and when one would only see a dark life ahead of him, he would rather concieve the idea that it would have been better had he died rather than living such a life. I can only say that a defence raised by R S.E.B. has shocked my conscience. The argument advanced in this regard has no force. 8. Now remains the important question raised in the case by the workman regarding applicability of the amendment made in Schedule IV to the Workmen's Compensation Act and for appreciating the question raised as to whether the amended schedule can be applied to this case when the amended schedule was not in force on the day of the accident but it had come into force on the date the injury was declared to have resulted in permanent partial disablement, it will be essential to look into the scheme of the Act. S. 2 of the Act defines partial disablement and total disablement. The definition of total disablement has been amended by adding a proviso in 1962 by amending Act 64 of 1962. This definition reads as under : "Total disablement-Total disablement under the Act must be of such a character that the person concerned is unable to do any work and not only the work which he was doing at the time of the accident. The words -for all work which he was capable of performing at the time of the accident" cannot be read as "for the work which he was performing at the time of accident". A bare reading of the aforesaid amendment shows that the legislature have enlarged the scope of nature of injuries. The words -for all work which he was capable of performing at the time of the accident" cannot be read as "for the work which he was performing at the time of accident". A bare reading of the aforesaid amendment shows that the legislature have enlarged the scope of nature of injuries. Under the old proviso it was only confined to permanent loss of the sight of both the eyes while the test now is the determination of incapacity of the workman to perform all work which he was capable to do when he sustained injuries due to accident. Thus as soon as it is known that the workman has incapacity for work", then he shall fall within the definition of total disablement if the total percentage of both, amount, to one hundred per cent or more. Before considering the case or entertaining the claim it is essential for the court to take into account the nature of the injuries, nature of the work which the workman was capable of undertaking and so on. Thus, a claimant can only know this fact when the Doctor declares him to be such. S. 3 of the Act deals with the employer's liability for compensation and it only refers to an injury which is caused to the workman by an accident arising out of and in the course of employment. Certain exceptions have been carved out by the proviso but the words used by the legislation are injuries caused and 'arising out of' and in the course of employment'. Therefore, all the three words referred to above do not deal with the nature of injury or type of disablement or a disease suffered by the workman. The nature has to be governed in accordance with the provisions of S. 4 of the Act which deals with amount of compensation. Therefore, all the three words referred to above do not deal with the nature of injury or type of disablement or a disease suffered by the workman. The nature has to be governed in accordance with the provisions of S. 4 of the Act which deals with amount of compensation. S. 4 of the Act reads as under : "S. 4-Amount of compensation-(1) Subject to the provision of this Act, the amount of compensation shall be as follows, namely - (a) where death results from the injury and the deceased workman has been in receipt of monthly wages falling within limits shown in the first column of Schedule IV-the amount shown against such limits in the second column thereof; (b) where permanent total disablement results from the injury and the injured workman has been in receipt of monthly wages falling within limits shown in the first column of Schedule IV-the amount shown against such limits in the third column thereof; (c) where permanent partial disablement results from the injury - (i) in the case of an injury specified in (Part 11 of Schedule 1), such percentage of the compensation which would have been payable in the case of permanent total disablement as is specified therein as being the percentage of the loss of earning capacity caused by that injury, and (ii) in the case of an injury not specified in Schedule 1, such percentage of the compensation payable in the case of permanent total disablement as is proportionate to the loss of earning capacity permanently caused by the injury; Explanation - Where more injuries than one are caused by the same accident, the amount of compensation payable under this head shall be aggregated but not so in any case as to exceed the amount which would have been payable if permanent total disablement had resulted from the injuries. (d) where temporary disablement whether total or partial, results from the injury and the injured workman has been in receipt of monthly wages falling within limits shown in the first column of Schedule IV-a half-monthly payment of the sum shown against such limits in the fourth column thereof, payable on the sixteenth day - (i) from the date of the disablement, where such disablement lasts for a period of twenty-eight days or more, or (ii) after the expiry of waiting period of three days from the date of the disablement, where such disablement lasts for a period of less than twenty-eight days, and thereafter half-monthly during the disablement or during a period of five years, whichever period is shorter. Provided that- (a) there shall be deducted from any lump sum or half-monthly payments to which the workman is entitled the amount of any payment or allowance which the workman has received from the employer by way of compensation during the period of disablement prior to the receipt of such lump sum or of the first half-monthly payment, as the case may be; and (b) no half-monthly payment shall in any case exceed the amount, if any, by which half the amount of the monthly wages of the workman before the accident exceeds half the amount of such wages which he is earning after the accident". Explanation - Any payment or allowance which the workman has received from the employer towards his medical treatment shall not be deemed to be a payment or allowance received by him by way of compensation within the meaning of clause (a) of the proviso". In sub-S. (1) (a), (b), (c) or (d) wherever the different types of compensations have been mentioned the phrase used is results from the injury' whether it may be death or permanent total disablement or permanent partial disablement or temporary disablement. Thus, the amount of compensation has to be considered in relation to the type of claim resulting from the injury, i. e., the injury which has been sustained as referred to in Section 3 of the Act. Thus, the amount of compensation has to be considered in relation to the type of claim resulting from the injury, i. e., the injury which has been sustained as referred to in Section 3 of the Act. It may be that in cases where the injury may initially appear to be simple but subsequently found not only to be grievous but one which results in total incapacity to work, then the workman would only know when he has been so incapacitated and the nature of the claim would be determined as on the date he is declared to suffer the particular nature of disablement. S. 3 of the Act only fastens a liability on the employer for an injury caused to workman in an accident wising out of and in the course of his employment but the right of the employee to get the compensation flows from the ultimate result of the injury. i. e., the nature of that injury which has resulted in permanent total disablement or permanent partial disablement or temporary disablement. Therefore, the cause of action qua amount of compensation accrues to the employee for referring to the particular part of the Schedule only when he knows as to what claim he is entitled to. It is now well settled that a claim petition can be amended subsequently in case there is a subsequent change in the nature of claim though there is no specific provision about it. In Ahmad Abdul v. H. K. Sehgal : AIR 1965 Bombay 32 the applicant had originally claimed compensation on the basis of 60% partial disablement as per the medical certificate and it was in appeal that he wanted to amend the claim petition on the basis of total disability. It was held that no new cause of action is sought to be added and there can be no question of limitation as the appellant was misled by the medical certificate. Amendment sought in claim petition was allowed. 9. From the reading of the above case it can be inferred that cause of action for filing a claim not only arises from the accident but for quantifying the amount of compensation; it also arises on the day the nature of disablement is known. Amendment sought in claim petition was allowed. 9. From the reading of the above case it can be inferred that cause of action for filing a claim not only arises from the accident but for quantifying the amount of compensation; it also arises on the day the nature of disablement is known. In other words though not strictly speaking in legal terminology, but in common parlance it can be said that cause of action for filing the claim accrues from the injury suffered in the accident which arose out of or suffered in the course of employment on the date of accident but qua amount of compensation from the date when it is known to the claimant as to how much claim he is entitled to under the law. It may be possible that at times the claimant may not receive a proper advice or is misled by a wrong advice or by an erroneous medical certificate and circumstance, may also arise where a claimant may suffer a prolonged sickness and after a long interval it may be revealed that total permanent disablement was the result of the injury which required higher compensation at a higher rate. In all such cases in my opinion the claimant cannot be deprived of the higher claim to which he is otherwise entitled to. I am of the further opinion that even in the matters of claim where the Schedule has subsequently been amended claimant is entitled to the amount of compensation as mentioned in the amended Schedule. In Kastoorbai Ratanchand Gandhi v. S. S. Badole (supra) the court held that the question as to what compensation has to be given is essentially a question arising under Lex Fori it is for the court granting the compensation to determine as to what compensation has to be given. In that case claimant-appellant was widow of Ratan Chand who was in the employment of the respondent and died in an accident arising out of and in the course of employment. Respondent was liable to pay compensation of Rs. 7000/- on the basis of the salary of the deceased Ratan Chand at Rs. 125/- p. m. Claim was resisted on various grounds and the learned Civil Judge dismissed the claim but while dismissing the claim he also recorded a finding that in the event of appellant's succeeding the compensation payable was Rs. 7000/- on the basis of the salary of the deceased Ratan Chand at Rs. 125/- p. m. Claim was resisted on various grounds and the learned Civil Judge dismissed the claim but while dismissing the claim he also recorded a finding that in the event of appellant's succeeding the compensation payable was Rs. 3500/- on the basis of salary at the rate of Rs. 125/- p. m. Since during the pendency of the case the schedule was amended, an application was moved on behalf of the claimant in the appellate court that since Schedule IV has been substituted with effect from February 1, 1963, while the petition was pending, he should be permitted to amend the petition. This amendment was opposed on the ground that the death took place prior to February 1, 1963. when the amended Schedule came into force. The court while considering as to what compensation should be awarded by the court, came to the conclusion that the award of compensation is regulated by amended schedule IV and S. 4 of the Act and the respondent has no vested right in paying the lesser compensation under S. 3 or S. 4 of the Act under the old Schedule. The court further held as mentioned above that the question as to what compensation has to be given is essentially a question arising under Lex Fori. The court further held that it is for the court granting compensation to determine as to what compensation is to be given. No party can have a vested right when such a power is vested in the adjudicating authority. The court held that on the date when the application was made the court had the power to grant compensation under the amended schedule and, therefore. allowed the amendment and consequently the compensation was awarded according to the amended schedule. The facts of the aforesaid case are quite near to the facts of the present case and I am in complete agreement with the view taken in the aforesaid case. 10. In Bimla Devi v. Union of India (supra) this court however, held that the normal rule of construction of statutes is that they are considered as prospective in operation. The facts of the aforesaid case are quite near to the facts of the present case and I am in complete agreement with the view taken in the aforesaid case. 10. In Bimla Devi v. Union of India (supra) this court however, held that the normal rule of construction of statutes is that they are considered as prospective in operation. so far as they affect the substantive or vested rights of the parties unless there is anything express or implied contained therein to show a different intention ; although statutes affecting procedure are normally considered to be retrospective. It may he true that normally remedial legislation is construed as retrospective because its purpose is to prevent the mischief and advance a remedy. But the substitution of schedule IV by a new Schedule, by the provisions of the Amending Act No. 64 of 1962, cannot be termed as remedial legislation. The provisions of the amended Schedule were not intented to affect the rights or cause of action which had accrued prior to February 1, 1963. In this view of the matter, the provisions of the amended Schedule IV could not have been applied to cases pending on February 1, 1963". 11. In the case of Smt. Bimla widow of Bhoop Singh had preferred a claim from the Western Railway in whose service her husband was at the time of accident. His death took place as a result of accident arising out of and in the course of employment which took place on March 1, 1960. Her claim was awarded on February 28, 1963, and the amount of compensation had also been paid to her by instalments. It was after 3 years that she moved an application before the Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation stating that the Schedule for calculation has been amended before the award was given and, therefore she was entitled to payment for higher compensation. It was in these circumstances that the court held as above. 12. The facts of that case are totally different than the facts of the present case and also the case from Bombay High Court referred to above. It was in these circumstances that the court held as above. 12. The facts of that case are totally different than the facts of the present case and also the case from Bombay High Court referred to above. In the present case admittedly the claim was filed after the Doctor had opined that it was a case of total disablement and on the date the certificate was issued to the claimant the Schedule had been amended and he was then entitled to the amount mentioned in the Schedule. The legislature in S. 3 of the Act does not refer to the amount of compensation mentioned in part II of Schedule 1. S. 3 of the Act deals with the employer's liability for compensation and it is mentioned that the employer shall be liable to pay compensation in accordance with the provisions of this Chapter for personal injury caused to the workman by accident arising out of and in the course of employment. The words 'accident arising out of and in the course of employment' only refer to a right which the workman has and the liability of the employer in respect of compensation. The amount of compensation has to be determined in accordance with the provisions of S. 4 of the Act where the words used are results from the injury'. Thus the amount of compensation is to be determined on the resultant injury arising out of and in the course of employment. The legislature in its own wisdom has at no place used any sentence which could refer to an award of the compensation as was payable on the date the injury was caused. There is distinction between sustaining or causing an injury and the disablement resulting from the injury. It is not the least essential that immediately at the time of the accident an injury may result in death of the workman or the said injury may immediately result in total permanent disablement or temporary disablement or permanent partial disablement. But subsequently such a result may take place from that injury. Therefore, the amount of compensation will be considerably varied on the date when the injury is caused or sustained and the date on which its result is either death or total permanent disablement. But subsequently such a result may take place from that injury. Therefore, the amount of compensation will be considerably varied on the date when the injury is caused or sustained and the date on which its result is either death or total permanent disablement. Thus, there is always long distance to travel for a claimant between the various events, i. e., event of sustaining the injury resultant and ultimately the claim awarded and during coverage of this distance if the Schedule is amended he must get benefit of the amended Schedule because when the legislature amends the Schedule it does so keeping in view the rising of the price-index, increase in the cost of living and the other conditions prevalent and in my opinion, therefore, the purpose of the amendment would be frustrated in case the benefit is not extended to the workman as the time taken in covering the distance was not owing to his fault but was a natural consequence of the injuries he suffered. Workmen's Compensation Act is beneficial legislation and it marked the beginning of a realisation that the legislation has to achieve and fulfil the ideals of social security. It fastens the liability on the employer to pay compensation to a workman who is incapacitated by accident arising out of and in the course of employment or to his dependants in case he dies. In fact the compensation awarded under the Act are not on such a higher side to which the workman may be entitled in case he files suit for damages under Torts. In fact the legislature had been considerate enough towards the employers in fixing the amount by the Act. The same amount is not depending on the suffering caused to the workman or on the expenses incurred by him on his illness but are based on the difference between his wage earning capacity before and after the accident. In a welfare State committed to the ultimate object of doing social justice, liberal interpretation will have to be given to the beneficial legislation enacted for helping the needy and the poor. In a welfare State committed to the ultimate object of doing social justice, liberal interpretation will have to be given to the beneficial legislation enacted for helping the needy and the poor. The technicalities in law must not come as hurdle in getting the higher benefits by a workman who suffers himself or in case of his death his widow who has suffered a tremendous loss because of the death of her husband or the children who become orphan because of the death of the father or the mother and in such circumstances a narrow interpretation cannot be given to an amendment which has been brought for the benefit of the workman.I have, therefore, no hesitation in holding that the workman is entitled to claim compensation according to the amended schedule which had come into force on the date on which he received the certificate about permanent total disablement and filed the claim in not according to the Schedule which was in force on the date of accident. 13. Now remains the question of imposition of penalty. Learned counsel for the Board referred to Ramlal v. Regional Manager, Food Corporation of India : 1981 RLW 116 in which this court held as under : "S. 4 A has to be read along with Sections 3 and 4 of the Act. On reading of these provisions together it would be clear that the employer is required to deposit or to pay compensation within one month from the date when it falls due and the compensation falls due when the liability for payment arises, irrespective of the fact as to whether any order has been passed by the Commissioner for deposit or payment of the amount of compensation. S. 10 deals with notice and claim for compensation by the claimants. S. 10A deals with the power of Commissioner to require from the employers statements regarding fatal accidents. Sub-S. (2) of that section provides that if the employer is of opinion that he is liable to deposit compensation he shall make the deposit within thirty days of the service of the notice. S. 10B provides for sending report by the employer to the Commissioner giving the circumstances attending the death or serious bodily injury, within seven days, where, by any law, notice is required to be given to any authority, of any accident occurring on his premises. S. 10B provides for sending report by the employer to the Commissioner giving the circumstances attending the death or serious bodily injury, within seven days, where, by any law, notice is required to be given to any authority, of any accident occurring on his premises. It may be stated that payment under S. 10 A (2) does not in any way absolve the employer from liability to pay interest and penalty if so directed by the Commissioner under sub-s. (3) of S. 4A and on the basis of sub-s. (2) of S. 10A, it cannot be said that payment of compensation falls due only on expiry of thirty days of service of notice under S. 10A. Falling due of compensation is to be read in the light of arising of liability for payment of compensation. The workman becomes entitled to the compensation as soon as it fits due i. e., when the liability for payment of compensation is fixed on the employers. This shall, as laid down in S. 3 be on the date the injury is caused and not at any subsequent occasion. Any rule laid down by the English Courts may, if necessary, be applied by the courts in India only if there is no provision to the contrary in the enactment. When the Workmen's Compensation Act lays down that compensation shall be payable on the personal injury being caused the compensation has to be determined and paid forthwith and not that there be a mere declaration of the liability and the determination of the amount of compensation and the payment thereof, postponed for a future date". The facts of that case are distinguishable with the facts of the present case. In the instant case the Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation has assigned reasons for awarding the penalty. The Commissioner has awarded only 50 of the penalty and I do not find any justification for interfering with the discretion used by him. 14. As a result of the aforesaid discussion, I partly accept the appeal filed by workman. Kanaram and modify the order. It is borne out from the record that the last salary paid to the workman Kanaram was Rs. 682.00 and the relevant factor claimed to be applied by the workman was Rs. 14. As a result of the aforesaid discussion, I partly accept the appeal filed by workman. Kanaram and modify the order. It is borne out from the record that the last salary paid to the workman Kanaram was Rs. 682.00 and the relevant factor claimed to be applied by the workman was Rs. 213.57 paise meaning thereby the age on the last birth day, counted of the workman immediately preceding the date on which the compensation fell due was, 27 years. Thus calculating an amount equal to 50% of the monthly wages of injured workman multiplied by relevant factor comes to Rs. 72,827.37. Thus, the workman, Kanaram, is entitled to claim a sum of Rs. 72,827.37 on the basis of the Amending Act No. 22 of 1984. He shall also be entitled to interest on this amount @ Rs. 12% per annum from the date of making application till the date of realisation. He shall also be entitled to the proportionate increased amount of penalty as the amount of compensation is increased. The amount of penalty shall be calculated as 50% on the aforesaid amount of compensation. The claim for 100% penalty is rejected. The amount already paid to the workman shall be deducted from the amount awarded. The workman shall be entitled to a cost of Rs. 500/- as cost of litigation in this appeal. In view of the fact that I have partly accepted the appeal filed by Kanaram, the appeal filed by R. S. E. B. fails as natural consequence and is hereby dismissed.Appeal No. 145/1986, Partly Accepted, Appeal No. 189/1986 Dismissed. *******