Research › Browse › Judgment

Allahabad High Court · body

1987 DIGILAW 882 (ALL)

S. P. Pandey v. U. P. State Sugar Corporation Ltd

1987-09-07

B.L.YADAV, S.K.DHAON

body1987
JUDGMENT S.K. Dhaon, J. - In this and in the companion writ petition No. 2471 of 1987 separate but similar orders are being impugned. The controversies involved in the two petitions are also the same. Hence the two petitions can be conveniently disposed of by a common judgment. 2. The petitioner was appointed as an Assistant Engineer in the Punjab Sugar Mills Company Limited (hereinafter referred to as the erstwhile Mill) on 3rd February, 1976. On 28th November, 1982, he was appointed as a Senior Engineer and on 14th April, 1984, he was appointed as a Deputy Chief Engineer. 3. The petitioner in writ petition No. 12471 of 1987 was on 3rd/5th September 1982, appointed as Manufacturing Chemist in the erstwhile Mill. On 8th September, 1983 he was appointed as Senior Manufacturing Chemist and, on 14th April, 1984 he was appointed as a Deputy Chief Chemist. 4. With effect from 28th October, 1984, the erstwhile Mill vested in the U.P. State Sugar Corporation Limited (hereinafter referred to as the Corporation). On 22nd January, 1986 the Deputy Managing Director of the Corporation passed an order re-designating the petitioner as the Senior Engineer. On 22nd January, 1986, the same officer of the Corporation passed an order re-designating the petitioner in Writ Petition No. 12471 of 1987 as the Senior Manufacturing Chemist. The two orders passed by the Deputy Managing Director of the Corporation are being impugned in the present writ petition. 5. It will be seen that between 28th October, 1984 and 22nd January, 1986, the petitioner continued to be designated as Deputy Chief Engineer in the Corporation. Likewise, the petitioner in writ petition No. 12471 of 1987 continued to be designated in the corporation as Deputy Chief Chemist between 28th October, 1984 and 22nd January 1986. In the case of both the petitioners, the General Manager of the Corporation on 3rd March, 1987, sent a communication to the Managing Director of the Corporation that the orders passed by the Deputy Managing Director re-designating the two petitioners may be recalled and they may be allowed to be designated respectively as the Deputy Chief Engineer and Deputy Chief Chemist. 6. Section 16(1) of the U.P. Sugar Undertaking (Acquisition) Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) alongwith the proviso thereto is relevant and is extracted: 16. 6. Section 16(1) of the U.P. Sugar Undertaking (Acquisition) Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) alongwith the proviso thereto is relevant and is extracted: 16. Transfer of employees:- (1) Save as otherwise provided in this section, every person (other than a director of a company in whom the ownership, management or control of the scheduled undertaking was vested immediately before the appointed day, or of a subsidiary company of such company, or a relative, as defined in Section 6 of the Companies Act, 1956 (Act I of 1956) of such director or of a proprietor or partner or lessee of the undertaking) who was employed exclusively in connection with the scheduled undertaking immediately before the appointed day shall, on and from that day, become an employee of the corporation and shall hold his office or service therein by the same tenure, at the same remuneration, and upon the same terms and conditions, and with the same rights and privileges as to pension, gratuity and other matters as be would have held the same on who appointed day if the undertaking had not been transferred to and vested in the corporation, and shall continue to do so until his employment in the corporation is terminated or until his remuneration or other terms and conditions of service are revised or altered by the Corporation under or in pursuance of any law or in accordance with any provision which for the time being governs his service: Provided that no appointment made or promotion, increment in salary, pension allowance or any other benefit granted to any person after the thirty first day of March, 1983 and before the appointed day which in the opinion of the Corporation would not ordinarily have been admissible under the terms and conditions of service in force prior to the thirty-first day of March, 1983, shall have effect or be payable or claimable from the Corporation or from any provident, pension or other fund or from any authority administering the fund unless the State Government has, by general or special order, confirmed the appointment, promotion or increment or has directed the continued grant of the pension, allowance or Other benefit, as the case may be. 7. 7. A bare perusal of the enacting part of Section 16(1) will indicate that the Legislature intended that employees of the erstwhile Mill would automatically become the employees of the Corporation from the date of the vesting of the erstwhile Mill in the Corporation. Further, the service conditions and the tenor of the employees of the erstwhile Mill will continue to be the same as hitherto before. In other words, it was made clear that the service conditions of the employees of the erstwhile Mill will continue to be the same until the employment in the Corporation is terminated or until the remuneration or other conditions of service are revised or altered by the Corporation under or in pursuance of any law or in accordance with the any provision which for the time being governs their service. In the counter-Affidavit filed on behalf of the Corporation, the specific case taken up is that no action has been taken by the Corporation under the enacting part of Section 16(1). The impugned orders are sought to be protected by the provisions contained in the proviso to Section 16(1). 8. A bare perusal of the impugned orders will immediately indicate that apart from stating therein that the petitioners have been re-designated as Senior Engineer and Senior Manufacturing Chemist respectively, there is not even a whisper to indicate that the Deputy Managing Director of the Corporation had adverted his mind to the provisions contained in the proviso to Section 16(1). No reason whatsoever has been given in the impugned orders to indicate as to why the two orders re-designating the petitioners have been passed. The conclusion, therefore, is irresistible that the Deputy Managing Director passed the impugned orders without any application of mind. This shortcoming in the two orders is enough to vitiate them. 9. In the counter-affidavit sworn and verified not by the Deputy Managing Director, but by an Assistant Personnel Officer, an attempt has been made to justify the impugned orders on the ground that the conditions necessary for attracting the provisions of the proviso were in existence. This, in our opinion, is an exercise in futility. In such matters, the state of the mind of an officer passing the order has to be seen. The Deputy Managing Director was not acting subjectively while purporting to act under the proviso to Section 16(1). This, in our opinion, is an exercise in futility. In such matters, the state of the mind of an officer passing the order has to be seen. The Deputy Managing Director was not acting subjectively while purporting to act under the proviso to Section 16(1). He was required to review the cases of the petitioners objectively. The proviso to Section 16(1) qualifies or dilutes the rights secured to the employees of the erstwhile Mill. It is, therefore, carving out an exception to the normal rule as laid down in Section 16(1). The onus or burden of bringing the cases of the petitioners within the category of exceptional cases lay throughout upon the corporation and the Deputy Managing Director in the impugned orders failed to discharge that onus or burden. 10. The corporation is an instrumentality of the State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution. The Deputy Managing Director was discharging a statutory duty when he purported to re-designate the two petitioners, under the provisions as contained in the proviso to Section 16(1). The dictum of the Supreme Court in Mohindar Singh v. The Chief Election Commissioner, A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 851 that when a statutory functionary makes an order passed on certain grounds, its validity must be judged by the reasons so mentioned and cannot be supplemented by fresh reasons in the shape of affidavit or otherwise applies to the facts of the present case. 11. Though these petitions have not been formally admitted, yet affidavits have been exchanged between the parties and we are proceeding to dispose of the same finally with the consent of the learned counsel for the parties. 12. These petitions succeed. They are allowed. The orders dated 22nd January, 1986 passed in them are quashed. The petitioners are entitled to their costs.