JUDGMENT V.K. Khanna, J. - The petitioner in this writ petition has been holding the post of Branch Manager of a bench of Allahabad Regional Rural Bank in Village Lendiari Tehsil Meja District Allahabad. The Chairman of the Bank on 18-5-1987 passed an order by which it was communicated to the petitioner that a departmental enquiry will be held regarding his acts of misconduct and that he has been suspended from the Bank's services with immediate effect i.e. with effect from 18-5-1987. It is this order of the Chairman of the Bank, respondent No. 2 which has been challenged in this writ petition on the ground that the Chairman of the Bank) is not authorised to suspend the petitioner in view of the provision s of the Regional Rural Banks Act, 1976 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). 2. At the very outset it may be mentioned that at the admission stage contesting respondents I and 2 put in appearance and they are represented by an advocate of this Court, Counter and rejoinder affidavits have been exchanged between the parties. The writ petition is thus being decided finally in accordance with the Rules of the Court. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner in this writ petition has raised only one argument. It has been urged that in 'view of the amended provisions of Section 30 of the Act the regulations framed could only become effective if there had been compliance of the requirements of Section 30 (2) of the Act as has been inserted by the Central Act No. 1 of 1984. The precise argument is that the regulations framed have not been laid before the Parliament as contemplated under Section 30(2) of the Act. 4. Learned counsel for the respondents has however urged that the regulations giving power to the Chairman to pass an order of suspension have been framed in the year 1980 and the Central Act No. 1 of 1984 has come into force from 15-2-1984. Prior to the coming into force of the Central Act No. 1 of 1984 there was no such provision as has been inserted in Section 3C (2) of the Act requiring laying of the regulations before the Parliament. According to the learned counsel the provisions of Section 30 (2) of the Act are prospective in nature and the regulations already framed need not be laid before the Parliament. 5. According to the learned counsel the provisions of Section 30 (2) of the Act are prospective in nature and the regulations already framed need not be laid before the Parliament. 5. The amendment in Section 30 of the Act as observed above was made by the Central Act No, 1 of 1984 Section 30(2) of the Act inserted by means of the amending Act by no stretch of imagination gives an idea that the provisions are retrospective. On the other hand the language of Section 30(2) is indicative of the fact that after framing of the regulations it will be forwarded to the Central Government by the Board of Directors as soon as it is possible. The intention, therefore, is that the Board of Directors after framing of the regulations shall immediately communicate about the regulations to the Central Government. If one takes into account the present case, the regulations will be found to have been framed in the year 1980 and the amending Act to have come into force from 15-2-1984. If the regulations are held to be retrospective the opening part of Section 30(2) of the Act cannot be complied by the Board of Directors. Moreover, in case the intention of the legislature is that the regulations already framed should also be laid before the Parliament a specific provision would have been made in this respect. We are thus of the opinion that the newly inserted provisions of Section 30(2) of the Act by amending Central Act No. 1 of 1984 is prospective and only applies to the regulations framed by the Board of Directors after coming into force of the amending Act. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner has frankly conceded that in case it is held that the regulations are valid the Chairman will have a power to pass the impugned order. Learned counsel for the petitioner has raised an apprehension that the enquiry will hang on for a long time. We are, however, not prepared to accept this argument and do not see any reason as to why the enquiry will not be concluded at the earliest. 7. No other point has been pressed before us. 8. For the reasons stated above, the present writ petition is dismissed.