JUDGMENT B.D. Agarwal, J. - This group of petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution is dealt with under this consolidated judgment since it gives rise to common questions. 2. Faced with the scarcity of Sub-Inspectors of Police available in the Civil Police Cadre in various districts the Superintendents of Police took recourse to give officiating promotions to Head Constables in the light of the provisions contained in Para 191 of the Police Office Manual. According to Para 406 (a) of the U.P. Police Regulations, Sub-Inspectors Civil Police are appointed by the Deputy Inspector General from the list of candidates, who qualify at the prescribed cadet course at the Police Training College. Officiating appointments of under officers (Head Constables) are made by Superintendents under Para 191 Police Office Manual. The provisions contained in Para 191 of the Police Office Manual are that the sanctioned allocation of Civil Police Sub-Inspectors in a district is made up of the fixed number of Civil Police Sub-Inspectors assigned to the district for permanent requirement plus a reserve to meet casual vacancies which is calculated for different districts at 14/100 of the figure arrived at by adding the number of Civil Police Sub-Inspectors allocated to the district to the number if Sub-Inspectors assigned for permanent requirement. It says that the Superintendents of Police may promote an under - officer (Head Constable) to officiate in any clear vacancy in the posts and that clear vacancy means death, retirement resignation, dismissal, removal, reduction (whether for a specified or unspecified period) and permanent promotion. A promoted under - officer is to be deemed to be a Sub-Inspector available for duty for all practical purposes. Every under - officer, so promoted, is liable to revert as soon as a Police Training College passed Sub-Inspector is posted to the vacancy. The officiation granted by the Superintendents of Police continued for a number of years against vacancies caused by the creating of new posts over succeeding years during the seventies. During June, 1982 - January, 1985, there were reversions directed enemas of such of the officiating Sub-Inspectors due to the availability of regular Sub-Inspectors after completion of training at the Police Training College. A number of writ petitions were filed in this Court. At Allahabad the view taken was that the petitioners should exhaust their remedy before the Public Services Tribunal. A number of writ petitions were filed in this Court. At Allahabad the view taken was that the petitioners should exhaust their remedy before the Public Services Tribunal. Upon the matter coming up in large number of petitions before this Court at the Lucknow Bench, it was noticed. inter alia :- " it is not the case of the petitioners that any one junior to them in the district in question has been allowed to officiate while reverting them nor is it asserted that the orders have been passed on the basis of any fault or misconduct of the petitioners. The orders cannot, therefore, be considered to be penal in nature or to amount to reduction in rank." 3. The Court dismissed those petitions on November 17, 1983, making certain observations including that it was necessary for the authorities not only to consider the question of increase in the cadre of Sub-Inspectors and Assistant Sub-Inspectors but also to apply their mind to the question of prescribing a definite promotion quota for the post of Sub-Inspectors of the Civil Police. Against the decision a number of appeals were filed before the Supreme Court. Certain writ petitions were filed directly also. The State Government made a review of the situation and issued Government Order, dated December 1, 1984, which provides : (a) That the Governor has been pleased to sanction the creation of 1300 supernumerary posts of Civil Police in the pay - scale of Rs. 515 - 860. (b) Appointments on those posts shall be made from amongst all those officiating Sub-Inspectors who are liable to be reverted and have crossed the age of 40 years on 30th September, 1984, and whose service records are satisfactory (c) Only those officiating Sub-Inspectors will be absorbed on these posts who have officiated on the posts of Sub-Inspectors for three years or more till 30th September, 1984. (d) Selection of the candidates will be done by a committee nominated by the Government on the basis of service records of the concerned candidates. (e) These 1300 supernumerary posts will be personal and the post and term thereof will expire on retirement of incumbent or termination of his service due to any other reason. (d) Selection of the candidates will be done by a committee nominated by the Government on the basis of service records of the concerned candidates. (e) These 1300 supernumerary posts will be personal and the post and term thereof will expire on retirement of incumbent or termination of his service due to any other reason. (f) No officiating Sub-Inspector promoted under Para 191 of the Office Manual falling within the above category whether he has approached the Court or not will be reverted before the decision of selection committee. If certain Sub-Inspectors falling within the above category have been reverted they may be promoted on the above posts." 4. The Supreme Court put its seal of approval on this Government Order, which was taken on record, and the respondent was directed to implement the same. Paragraphs 7, 8 and 9 of the decision recorded by the Supreme Court dated 19th April, 1985, are material for our purposes : "7. In view of the above said order all the Civil Appeals which have been filed by officiating Sub-Inspectors covered by the Government Order dated 1st December, 1984, are rendered infructuous. 8. The appeals and petitions filed by Sub-Inspectors who are below 40 years or who have officiated on the post of Sub-Inspectors for less than 3 years till 30th September, 1984 will stand dismissed. The interim order in the said appeals and petitions will stand vacated. 9. The appeals and petitions which have been preferred by officiating Head Constables, will stand dismissed as a result of this order. The Government will make fresh promotions to the post of Constables in accordance with the Rules which provides for promotion on the basis of seniority and performance. All interim orders passed in these appeals and petitions are vacated." The decision may be found reported in Chandra Pal Singh and others etc. v. State of U.P. and others, (1985) Supplementary 92. 5. Through notification dated January 1, 1985, the State Government constituted a Selection Committee. Upon scrutiny of the service record the Selection Committee found that the petitioners were unfit to be given charge of Sub-Inspectors. The Police Head Quarters, Allahabad, issued a circular dated June 7, 1986, notifying that the petitioners had been found unfit, whereupon the respective Superintendents of Police directed reversion of the petitioners making a reference to the circular received from the Police Head Quarters. The Police Head Quarters, Allahabad, issued a circular dated June 7, 1986, notifying that the petitioners had been found unfit, whereupon the respective Superintendents of Police directed reversion of the petitioners making a reference to the circular received from the Police Head Quarters. The petitioners have challenged the reversion in these petitions. 6. We have heard Sarvsri R. A. Sharma, R. A. Pandey, U. S. Awasthi, R. N. Misra, Madhur Prakash, Tej Pal, R. P. Khare, appearing on the side of the petitioners and Sri A. P. Singh, Additional Chief Standing Counsel, for the respondents. 7. Learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel submitted at the outset that the reversion became final in consequence of the earlier decision and hence it no longer remained open to be assailed in these petitions. A little probe reveals that this does not represent the correct position. The validity of the reversion impugned earlier did not come up to be decided by the Supreme Court on merits in its decision dated 19th April, 1985, aforementioned. The Government Order, dated December 1, 1984, intervened. The Supreme Court took this on record and directed its implementation. In consequence the several appeals filed by the officiating Sub-Inspectors against their reversion were rendered in fructuous and it was so specified. It is significant that the Supreme Court recorded dismissal in respect of such appeals and petitions only as were filed by those officiating Sub-Inspectors who were ineligible in term of the Government Order dated December 1, 1984, that is, who were either below 44 years or who had officiated on the post of Sub-Inspectors for less than three years till September 30, 1984. It was further clarified that the officiating Sub-Inspectors were not to be treated as reverted till the Selection Committee takes the decision. The petitioners have thus continued as officiating Sub-Inspectors promoted under Para 191 of the Police Office Manual and the Court has to decide afresh whether the reversions directed against them are otherwise than in accordance with law. The assertion for the petitioners is that the orders now impugned have been passed on the basis of fault or misconduct attributed to them through the adverse entries and that it is to be considered penal in nature as to amount to reduction in rank. 8. The assertion for the petitioners is that the orders now impugned have been passed on the basis of fault or misconduct attributed to them through the adverse entries and that it is to be considered penal in nature as to amount to reduction in rank. 8. On petitioners behalf the submission made is that the reversion is invalid because there was no opportunity of being heard accorded to them. The assertion made in reply is that the orders are not of punishment and Article 311(2) of the Constitution cannot be invoked. The petitioners are, it will be recalled, officiating Sub-Inspectors of Police promoted as such from the rank of Head Constables by the respective Superintendents of Police under Para 191 of the Police Office Manual liable to revert as soon as Police Training College Sub-Inspectors are posted to the vacancies. The reversion earlier made was indeed upon this ground. The officiating had in some cases continued for good length of time, reversion on large scale created dissatisfaction. The State Government created 1300 supplementary posts personal is character and due to expire on the retirement or termination of the incumbents. The criteria for appointment to these posts was also laid down. The three conditions specified were - (1) the officiating Sub-Inspector must have crossed the age of 40 years on September 30, 1984 ; (2) he must have officiated on the post for three years or more till the said date ; (3) his service record must be satisfactory. 9. For purposes of (3) it was envisaged that the selection will be done by a Committee nominated by he Government "on the basis of service records of the concerned candidates". A candidate duly selected who fulfills the criterial promoted as Sub-Inspector under Para 405(a) of the Police Regulations to one of the supernumerary posts. The case, therefore, is one of consideration for promotion ; the candidate not selected stand risk of reversion as Head Constable due to the absence of clear vacancy in the rank of Sub-Inspectors. A candidate duly selected who fulfills the criterial promoted as Sub-Inspector under Para 405(a) of the Police Regulations to one of the supernumerary posts. The case, therefore, is one of consideration for promotion ; the candidate not selected stand risk of reversion as Head Constable due to the absence of clear vacancy in the rank of Sub-Inspectors. The object behind the Government Order dated 1st December, 1984, which the Supreme Court endorsed on 19th April, 1985 was not to punish any officiating Sub-Inspector but to fill in the 1300 supernumerary posts from among such of them only whose conduct and performance was satisfactory and who had to their credit three years officiation in the minimum and to revert whom might seem unjust otherwise upon having crossed the age of 40 years on the specified date i. e. 30th September, 1984. The screening was, therefore, to be for selective promotion it being neither feasible nor expedient to retain all the officiating hands since the number of posts to which promotion could be given was limited. 10. It is well settled that an officiating Government servant is also entitled to the protection of Article 311(2) of the Constitution in the same manner as a permanent Government servant if the Government takes action against him meeting out, one of the three punishments, namely, dismissal, removal or reduction in rank. The two tests applicable in a matter of this description are : (1) Whether the Government servant has a right to the post or rank or (2) Whether he has been visited with evil consequences ; if either of those tests is satisfied, it must be held that the Government servant had been punished (see Parshotam Lal Dhingra v. Union of India, AIR 1958 SC 36 ). In capacity as officiating Sub-Inspectors the petitioners admittedly did not have right to the post. The evil consequences contemplated are such as forfeiture of pay or allowances, the loss of seniority in substantive rank or stoppage or postponement of future chances of promotion. P.L. Dhingra (supra) para 28 ; State of Orissa v. Ram Narayan Das, AIR 1961 SC 177 . (para 12). Stigma in an order of reversion from an officiating post may also constitute a penal consequence. State of Maharashtra v. Veerappa R. Saboji and others, (1979) 4 SCC 466 . The orders impugned in the present are not of punishment per se. (para 12). Stigma in an order of reversion from an officiating post may also constitute a penal consequence. State of Maharashtra v. Veerappa R. Saboji and others, (1979) 4 SCC 466 . The orders impugned in the present are not of punishment per se. As communicated to the petitioners these recite only that upon screening the Selection Committee did not consider them fit for absorption against the newly created posts and hence they were being reverted. In Union of India and others v. R. S. Dhaba, (1969) 3 SCC 603 . The respondent was reverted from his officiating position of Income Tax Officer, Class II, to the post of officiating Inspector. The order of reversion mentioned. "........... ..having been found unsuitable after trial to hold the post of Income Tax Officer, Class II is hereby reverted..................The Supreme Court held that : "In a case of this description a reversion on the ground of unsuitability is an action in accordance with the terms of which the officiating post is held and not a reduction in rank by way of punishment to which Article 311 of the Constitution could be attracted". 11. In State of Bombay v. F. A. Abraham, (1964) 2 SCR 190, the Inspector of Police officiating as the Deputy Superintendent of Police was reverted to the original rank of Inspector without being given any opportunity of being heard in respect of the reversion. It was held that the reversion of the respondent on the ground of unsuitability was an action in accordance with the terms on which the officiating post was being held and was not a reduction in rank by way of punishment to which Section 240 Government of India Act, 1935 would be attracted. See also State of Mysore etc. v. M. K. Gadgoli and others, AIR 1977 SC 1617 . 12. In State of Punjab and others v. Balbir Singh and others, AIR 1977 SC 629 , the respondents held substantive posts of overseers in the State ; they were promoted as officiating Sub-divisional Officers Class II but since their appointments were not approved, as required by the Service Rules, by the Public Service Commission on the ground that they were unfit for the service, they were reverted to their substantive ranks. The Supreme Court observed : "...............their reversion was not hit on account of the non - Compliance with the provisions of Article 311(2) of the Constitution or the Rules governing the disciplinary action. The reversion was not by way of punishment.". Their Lordships relied upon Samesher Singh v. State of Punjab and others, AIR 1974 SC 2192 at p. 2205. 13. We are alive to the proposition which is well-settled namely, that the form in which the order is issued is inconclusive. It may be innocuous in its contents but in a particular case that may be a camouflage or a cloak hiding its true import behind the screen. The court looks to the substance. In the words of Ray C. J. - "No abstract proposition can be laid down that where the services of a probationer are terminated without saying anything more in the order of termination than that the services are terminated it can never amount to a punishment in the facts and circumstances of the case. If a probationer is discharged on the ground of misconduct, or inefficiency or for similar reason without a proper enquiry and without his getting a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against his discharge it my in a given case amount to removal from service within the meaning of Article 311(2) of the Constitution." Samsher Singh and others, (supra para 63). 14. The test which the catena of decisions have laid down for attracting Article 311(2) is whether the misconduct or negligence is a mere motive for the order of reversion or termination of service or whether it is the very foundation of the order of termination of service of the temporary employee. The form of the order is not conducive of its true nature". The entirety of circumstance s preceding or attendant on the impugned order must be examined by the court and the overriding test will always be whether the misconduct is a mere motive or is the very foundation of the order (See : State of U.P. v. Ram Chandra Trivedi, (1976) 4 SCC 52 ; R. S. Sial v. State of U.P., (1975) 3 - SCC 113). The same rule holds good if the order passed is not for termination of service but for reversion of a Government servant from a higher post to a lower post which he holds in a substantive capacity. 15. The same rule holds good if the order passed is not for termination of service but for reversion of a Government servant from a higher post to a lower post which he holds in a substantive capacity. 15. For effective operation of this test, the court is given the power to lift the veil. Sri R. A. Sharma placed strong reliance on the recent decision of the Supreme Court in Jarnail Singh and others v. State of Punjab and others, (1986) 3 SCC 277 , which needs careful consideration. The appellants, were appointed as Surveyers upto a certain date or upto the date till the regular candidates were recommended by the Board which was later on ad hoc basis providing also in the terms of employment that their services could be dispensed with any time without any notice or reason. In order to regularise the services of all the ad hoc employees, who had completed the minimum period of one years service the Punjab Government issued a circular to the effect that the services of the ad hoc employees shall be regularised on certain conditions mentioned therein. The service of the petitioners was terminated stating that this was "because their posts are no longer required". The question arose whether the impugned order of termination of services of the petitioners could be deemed to be an innocuous order of termination simpliciter according to the terms and conditions of services without attaching any stigma to any of the petitioners or it was one in substance and in fact an order of termination by way of punishment based on misconduct and made in violation prescribed by Article 311(2) of the Constitution. Their Lordships reiterated the principle that "when the order of termination is challenged as casting stigma on the service career the court lift the veil in order to find out the real basis of the impugned order even though on the fact of it the order in question appears to be innocuous". The affidavits filed by the parties were analysed. Reference was made in para 6 to affidavit petitioner No. 2 dated 18th March, 1981 wherein he mentioned that petitioners Nos. 1, 2, 6, 8 and 12 were accused of specific shortages and misappropriations (giving particulars thereof) and also - "That similar allegations were made against the remaining petitioners and they were branded as incompetent and unfit for Government service. Reference was made in para 6 to affidavit petitioner No. 2 dated 18th March, 1981 wherein he mentioned that petitioners Nos. 1, 2, 6, 8 and 12 were accused of specific shortages and misappropriations (giving particulars thereof) and also - "That similar allegations were made against the remaining petitioners and they were branded as incompetent and unfit for Government service. Adverse entries were also made in the Annual Reports". In Para 20 their Lordships annunciated the reasons as under for holding that there was contravention of Article 311(2) - "It thus appears on a consideration of the averments made in the affidavits verified on behalf of the petitioners as well as on behalf of the respondents that the impugned order of termination of service of the petitioners had been made on the ground that there were adverse remarks in the service records of the petitioners as well as there were serious allegations of embezzlement of funds against some of the petitioners. It is quite clear that on consideration of all these adverse entries in the service record as well as serious allegations relating to misconduct, the petitioners were not considered fit by the Departmental Selection Committee to recommend the petitioners for regularisation of their service as Surveyors. The impugned orders of termination of services of the petitioners are really made by way of punishment and they are not termination simpliciter according to terms of the appointment without any stigma as wrongly stated. It is undisputed that respondents 2 and 3 did not follow the mandatory procedure prescribed by Article 311(2) of the Constitution in making the purported orders of termination of services of the petitioners on the ground of misconduct and thus there has been a patent violation of the rights of the petitioners as provided in Article 311(2) of the Constitution. There is no room for any doubt that the impugned orders of termination of services of the petitioners had been made by way of punishment as the allegations of embezzlement of funds as well as adverse remarks in the service records of these petitioners were the basis and the foundation for not considering the petitioners to be fit for being regularised in their services in accordance with the Government circular dated October 28, 1980. Therefore, it is clear and evident in the context of these facts and circumstances of the case that the impugned order of termination though couched in the innocuous terms as being made in accordance with the terms and conditions of the appointment, yet the impugned order of termination of service of the petitioners were in fact made by way of punishment being based on the misconduct." Reference must in the same connection be made to the observations contained in para 32 of the reported decision - "The position is now well-settled on a conspectus of the decisions referred to herein before that the mere form of the order is not sufficient to hold that the order of termination was innocuous and the order of termination of the services of a probationer or of an ad hoc appointee is a termination simpliciter in accordance with the terms of the appointment without attaching any stigma to the employee concerned. It is the substance of the order i. e, the attending circumstances as well as the basis of the order that have to be taken into consideration. In other words, when an allegation is made by the employee assailing the order of termination as one based on misconduct, though couched in innocuous terms, it is incumbent on the court to lift the veil and to see the real circumstances as well as the basis and foundation of the order complained of. In other words, the court in such case, will lift the veil and will see whether the order was made on the ground of misconduct, inefficiency, or not. In the instant case we have already referred to as well as quoted the relevant portions of the averments made on behalf of the State respondent in their several affidavits alleging serious misconduct against the petitioners and also the adverse entries in the service records of these petitioners, which were taken into consideration by the Departmental Selection Committee without giving them any opportunity of hearing and without following the procedure provided in Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India, while considering the fitness and suitability of the appellants for the purpose of regularising their services in accordance with the Government circular made in October, 1980. Thus the impugned orders terminating the services of the appellants on the ground that the posts are no longer required are made by way of punishment." 16. Thus the impugned orders terminating the services of the appellants on the ground that the posts are no longer required are made by way of punishment." 16. There are undoubtedly some striking features of similarity between the facts thereof and the cases before us. The appointment was ad hoc : it was liable to termination any time without notice or reason; in the ordinary course, it could continue till regular candidates were recommended by the Board; the State Governments circular made provision for regularisation upon certain conditions the Departmental Selection Committee proceeded with consideration upon the service record without following the procedure provided in Article 311(2) of the Constitution. But then the dominant distinguishing features thereof are no less striking. In the several affidavits of the State respondent. It was noticed, there were averments alleging serious misconduct against the petitioners and also, the adverse entries in the service records (para 32). We have referred above the affidavit of the petitioner No. 2 in para 8 it was noticed that these allegations were not controverted for the State in Para 9 it was noticed that the additional counter affidavit too imputed shortages and embezzlement. Para 20 recites that" impugned order of termination of service of the petitioners had been made on the ground that there were adverse remarks in the service records of the petitioners as well as there were serious allegations of embezzlement of funds against some of the petitioners". Learned counsel for the petitioners before us laid stress on contending that the allegations of embezzlement were there against some of the petitioners only in the reported decision A conjoint reading leaves little room to doubt that the adverse remarks in the service record of the petitioners therein were dominated by serious allegations of embezzlement and shortages. This is the pre-dominant theme that imparts colour to the adverse remarks in the service record denoting their shade and character. In face of these specific accusations contained on the record though not referred to in the order as communicated to the petitioners the clement of punishment implicit in the screening could be self - evident upon the veil being lifted. 17. The case of Anoop Jaiswal v. Government of India, (1984) 2 SCC 369 , relied upon therein proceeded also on specific incident of misconduct. 17. The case of Anoop Jaiswal v. Government of India, (1984) 2 SCC 369 , relied upon therein proceeded also on specific incident of misconduct. The incident was of delay on the part of the trainees in arriving at the combat practice on a particular day. "The appellant (Anoop Jaiswal) was considered to be one of the ring leaders who was responsible for the delay". and hence discharged from the service on the ground of unsuitability for being a member of the Indian Police Service. 18. In Nepal Singh v. State of U.P., (1985) 1 SCC 56 , relied upon as well it transpired that disciplinary proceeding was initiated against the appellant on the ground "that he contracted the second marriage during the lift time of his first wife and this act was done without obtaining prior permission of the Government". The disciplinary proceeding was not proceeded with. Thereafter the Superintendent of Police draw up a list to the effect that he was a corrupt officer and he was not straight forward. The order merely stated that the appellants services were not required any more and were terminated with one months pay in lieu of notice. It was held that where allegations of misconduct were levelled against a Government servant and it was a case where Article 311(2) should apply, the authority could not resort to the guise of an ex facie innocuous termination order. 19. The more recent decision, reported in Smt. Rajinder Kaur v. State of Punjab and another, (19861 4 SCC 141, by Hon'ble B. C. Ray, J. speaking for the Division Bench (comprising of Hon'ble A. P. Sen and Hon'ble B. C. Ray JJ.) dated 19th August, 1986 which decided Jarnail Singh (supra) on 7th May, 1986. Proceeds on the same ratio. An enquiry was made by the Deputy Police Superintendent into the allegation that the appellant a lady constable stayed at a particular place for 1 or 2 nights with one constable. The order of termination recited barely that she was unlikely to prove an efficient police officer. It was held that the impugned order of discharge was "really made on the basis of misconduct as found on enquiry into the allegation behind her back by the Deputy Superintendent to Police Garhwal". and though couched in innocuous terms it was merely a camouflage for an order of discharge from service on the ground of misconduct. It was held that the impugned order of discharge was "really made on the basis of misconduct as found on enquiry into the allegation behind her back by the Deputy Superintendent to Police Garhwal". and though couched in innocuous terms it was merely a camouflage for an order of discharge from service on the ground of misconduct. 20. The criterion repeatedly laid down as stated above is that an order is not passed by way of punishment, and it merely an order of termination simpliciter, if the material against the Government servant on which the superior authority has acted constituted the motive and not the foundation for the order. The answer is not always easy to be found. A valuable guideline is provided in Nepal Singh v. State of U.P. and others, AIR 1980 SC 1459 at 1460, by Pathak, J. (as he then was) in the following words : "In each case it is necessary to examine the entire range of facts carefully and consider whether in the light of those facts the superior authority intended to punish the Government servant or, having regard to the character, conduct and suitability or relation to the post held by him it was intended simply to terminate his service. The function of the court is to discover the nature of the order by attempting to ascertain what was the motivating consideration in the mind of the authority which promoted the order." (emphasis supplied). His Lordship speaking for the Division Bench in State of U.P. v. Bhoop Singh Verma, AIR 1979 SC 684 at p. 686, also formulated this consideration as is manifest for the observation. "That it was not intended to take punitive action against the respondent for his misbehaviour with Smt. Phoolmati is evident from the circumstance that thereafter the respondent was allowed an increment in salary and was regarded as in service for all purposes." 21. On a conspectus of the authorities referred to above, it sees clear that the text or the contents of the order of reversion is indecisive. The court has to ascertain lifting the veil whether the order is founded upon misconduct or it only constitutes the motive. In resolving this controversy the probable intention of the concerned authority may be of considerable relevance. The court has to ascertain lifting the veil whether the order is founded upon misconduct or it only constitutes the motive. In resolving this controversy the probable intention of the concerned authority may be of considerable relevance. Where the order proceeds on specific act or acts of misconduct attributed to the Government servant as distinct from over all assessment of the service record it may constitute a strong circumstance denoting that the authority intended to punish the employee and this could not be done without resorting to the procedure provided in Article 311(2) of the Constitution. Action taken in close sequence to specific acts of misconduct may in the circumstances of a case to strongly suggestive of being punitive in nature though it is difficult to be dogmatic about it. 22. Viewed in this light, it may be recalled that the officiating Sub-Inspectors will have had to revert in terms of their appointment upon the regular trained Sub-Inspectors being available. To mitigate the resultant hardship as also to meet the growing need, the Government created specified number of posts which were in nature personal to the incumbents. There was no intention to punish the officiating Sub-Inspectors but only to select the suitable among them for the newly created posts. This was the object behind the screening. No specific acts of misconduct immediately or shortly preceding the impugned orders are imputed to the petitioners. The petitioners too do not refer to incidents of this character in their petitions. The adverse entries including what are described as misconduct entries in Para 478 (60) of the Police Manual and constable minor punishments are no doubt referred to in the counter-Affidavits but let us not forget these constitute the material which anyone would look to into in making an overall assessment of suitability. Divorced therefrom we do not imagine appropriate estimate of performance of conduct. We do not understand either a charge-sheet being served upon a Government servant in reference to adverse entries existing against him on the service record. Where the authority has to form the judgment thereupon it does not appear that there needs be a formal departmental proceeding initiated under Article 311(2) of the Constitution. The disclosure made in the counter-Affidavits must be viewed in the correct perspective. The petitioners have, inter alia, levelled the charge of discrimination contending that some persons junior to them are retained. Where the authority has to form the judgment thereupon it does not appear that there needs be a formal departmental proceeding initiated under Article 311(2) of the Constitution. The disclosure made in the counter-Affidavits must be viewed in the correct perspective. The petitioners have, inter alia, levelled the charge of discrimination contending that some persons junior to them are retained. The respondents had to make the disclosure in order to meet these pleadings. The position under the law is lucidly explained in Manager, Government Branch Press and another v. D. B Balliappa, (1979) 1 SCC 477 at p. 485 as follows : "Conversely, if the services of a temporary Government servant are terminated arbitrarily, and not on the ground of his unsuitability, unsatisfactory conduct or the like which would put him in a class apart from his juniors in the same service, a question of unfair discrimination may arise, notwithstanding the fact that in terminating his service. The appointing authority was purporting to act in accordance with the terms of the employment. Where a charge of unfair discrimination is levelled with specificity, or improper motives are imputed to the authority making the impugned order of termination of the service, it is the duty of the authority to dispel that charge by disclosing to the Court the reason or motive which impelled it to take the impugned action. Excepting, perhaps, in cases analogous to those covered by Article 311(2). Proviso (c), the authority cannot withhold such information from the Court on the lame excuse that the impugned order is purely administrative and not judicial, having been passed in exercise of its administrative discretion under the rules governing the conditions of the service. "The giving of reasons" as Lord Denning put it in Breen v. Amalgamated Engineering Union", is one of the fundamentals of good administration", and, to recall the words of this court in Khudiram Das v. State of West Bengal, in a Government of laws, "there is nothing like unfettered discretion immune from judicial review ability". The Executive, no less than the judiciary, is under a general duty to act fairly. Indeed, fairness founded on reason is the essence of the guarantee epitomised in Articles 14 and 16(1)." 23. The discussion made hereinbefore leads us to conclude that the impugned orders are not punitive in nature and Article 311(2) of the Constitution is not attracted. 24. The Executive, no less than the judiciary, is under a general duty to act fairly. Indeed, fairness founded on reason is the essence of the guarantee epitomised in Articles 14 and 16(1)." 23. The discussion made hereinbefore leads us to conclude that the impugned orders are not punitive in nature and Article 311(2) of the Constitution is not attracted. 24. There is however another aspect of the matter which is no less important. The Supreme Court has laid down the rule of caution applicable to matters of over all assessment vide Nepal Singh v. State of U.P. and others, (1985) 1 SCC 56 at p. 60 observing : "The State, and for that matter any statutory employer, must take great care when proceeding to terminate a career on the ground of unsuitability to ensure that its order is founded in definable material, objectively assured and relevant to the ground on which the termination is effected." 25. We need also remind ourselves of the well settled proposition that Article 14 of the Constitution strikes at arbitrariness in executive/administrative action because any action that is arbitrary must necessarily involve negation of equality. But denial of equality is no longer treated as confined to comparative evaluation between two persons. An action per se arbitrary itself denies equality of protection of law. A. I. Kalra v. Project and Equipment Corporation of India Ltd., (1984) 3 SCC 316 (328). 26. The question of promotion of civil servants on the basis of remarks made in the service record came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in Gurdial Singh Fijji v. State of Punjab and others, AIR 1979 SC 1622 . Their Lordships laid down that in accordance with the rules of natural justice an adverse report in a confidential roll cannot be acted upon to deny pro-emotional opportunities unless - (1) it is .communicated to the person concerned, so that he has an opportunity to explain the circumstances leading to the report and the authorities are enabled to decide on a consideration of the explanation whether the adverse report is justified ; and (2) the explanation submitted or the representation made is duly considered . This we find reaffirmed in Amar Kant Chaudhary v. State of Bihar and others, (1984) 1 SCC 694 . 27. This we find reaffirmed in Amar Kant Chaudhary v. State of Bihar and others, (1984) 1 SCC 694 . 27. In Brij Behari Lal Agarwal v. High Court of M. P., (1981) 1 SCC 480, the case was of compulsory retirement proceeding on over all assessment of the service record. A note was taken of the fact that a copy of the remarks made in the order sheet though placed on the personal confidential file of the appellant was not communicated to him ; the good part of the report had not received balanced consideration ; more than ordinary importance had to be attached, it was remarked, to the confidential reports pertaining to the years immediately preceding the consideration there being the possibility of improvement with the passage of time. 28. Compulsory retirement asserted upon over all assessment of the service record was nullified in Baldev Raj Chadha v. Union of India and others, (1980) 4 SCC 321 , because valid material relevant to the decision had been ignored and absolute material, less relevant to the decisions had influenced the decision if the order overlooks vital facts bearing on the decision it is bad in law. Likewise if the action digs up obsolete circumstances it cannot be sustained. We refer to decisions on compulsory retirement pointedly because the criterion is over all assessment of suitability which the Selection Committee purported to apply in the instant case. 29. Reference may also be made to P. C. Pradhan v. Union of India, 1981 JLJ 128 (MP) (Division Bench)-A case relating to promotion which held that a more statement that the petitioners case was considered is not enough where it is not shown that things favourable to the petitioner and his representatives against the adverse remarks were not placed before the Promotion Committee. The decision was followed by Hon'ble Oja, (as he then was) in Dilip Kumar v. State of M. P. and others, (1984) 1 SLR 58 (MP). 30. Learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel placed before us the minutes of the Selection Committee which we have perused alongside with the affidavit exchanged between the parties. The decision was followed by Hon'ble Oja, (as he then was) in Dilip Kumar v. State of M. P. and others, (1984) 1 SLR 58 (MP). 30. Learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel placed before us the minutes of the Selection Committee which we have perused alongside with the affidavit exchanged between the parties. Grievance raised by the petitioners includes that- (i) adverse entries uncommunicated to them were also taken into consideration; (ii) against certain entries there are representations/appeal pending which have remained unconsidered; (iii) adverse entries in certain cases had been directed to be expunged but that has excepted notice; (iv) the good side of the conduct and performance was not taken into account. (v) the entries of back years including of sixties have been dug out instead of confining to the entries subsequent to 1976 or so when officiating promotion was made under Para 191 of the Police Manual; (Vi) there is miscalculating regarding eligibility by virtue of three years in the minimum as Sub-Inspector having been put in upto 30th September, 1984 as a result whereof some eligible remained unconsidered while non-eligible have been taken in. 31. From the record of the Selection Committee we do not find that the committee devoted its attention to ascertaining whether the entries in question were communicated or as to whether there are representations/appeal pending. No such note from the office appears to have been put to either before the Committee. There is not discussion in regard to most of the cases except recording the remark " Not fit" the screening made had to satisfy that there is by and large a balanced view taken The court would bot be inclined to substitute its own assessment it does not sit in appeal over the matter but the court would nonetheless scrutnize whether the screening has proceeded upon relevant considerations ignoring the absolutes or the redundant and a genuine effort made The picture which is placed before us the goods entries earned during the relevant period o r the award commendation etc. Which the petitioners claim to have secured. Hans Raj v. State of Punjab AIR 1985 SC 69 at p. 75. Which the petitioners claim to have secured. Hans Raj v. State of Punjab AIR 1985 SC 69 at p. 75. The period of officiation in a number of these cases had covered nearly a decade; this in itself could have been same time that the promotion had been accordance earlier in 1976-79 with due regard to the entries till then existing and in some cases this officiation itself was allowed on recommendation of departmental Committee headed by Deputy Inspector General of Police. 32. In our consideration opinion, many of those discrepancies would not have arisen if the Selection Committee had only thought it fit to associate the persons affected in some reasonable form with its deliberations. We reintegrate that initiation of formal disciplinary proceedings under Article 311(2) of the Constitution did not arise; the Committee was competent to proceeded in its discretion on the service record but that does not exclude giving a hearing to the petitioners concerned in order that factual cobwebs are cleared and there are no pitfalls such a s averred presently. They may assist the department too in sorting out what is relevant and picking no the grain the chaff. That would we feel help to ensure objectivity and cement the foundation for adverse order on definable and admissible material. The endeavour should after all to secure consideration by the Committee in a just and fair way vide Amar Chaudharii, 1984 (1) SCC 694 at p. 698 (supra) 33. We may now take up such of those writ petition in which the contention for the respondent is that the petitioners had not qualified by having put in three years in the minimum as officiating Sub-Inspector of Police and were thus ineligible for consideration within the terms of the Government Order dated December 1, 1984. (1) Writ Petition No. 12836 of 1986 (Kunwar Pal Singh) According to the petitioner he was selected for officiating promotion by a committee presided by the Deputy Inspector General of Police and he joined as such on December 1, 1979. There was short break during 1980-81, but minus this has continued to work as the sub-Inspector of Police. in the counter-affidavit the plea raised is that this petitioner served as such for three months and seven days only. There was short break during 1980-81, but minus this has continued to work as the sub-Inspector of Police. in the counter-affidavit the plea raised is that this petitioner served as such for three months and seven days only. We do not find anything of this sort stated in the order of reversion dated to the circular from the Headquarter dated June 13, 1986, it is stated only that the was not found fit by the committee. (2) Writ Petition No. 11726 of 1986 (Baljit singh and Others) According to the petitioners petitioners No. was appointed officiating Sub-Inspector on july 26, 1977 in pursuance of an order dated july 12, 1977; due to absence of vacancy he was reverted as head constable in December, 1977 but again appointed a Sub-Inspector in may 1979. With a short break in 1980 he has been officiating till date. Petitioner No. 2 claims to have been appointed in December, 1978 with a short break in 1980, he claims to have continued ever since 1982 again. For the petitioner No. 2 the plea is that he was appointed under Para 191 in july and has since then continued counter-affidavit the ascertain is that petitioner Nos. 1, 3 and 4 have been on the job for less than three years and that petitioner No. 2 was not appointed as Sub-Inspector of Police at all before the said order came from the supreme Court. In this case also the impugned order of reversion dated May, 3, 1986 (Annexure-4) is silent with regard to the petitioners not serving as officiating Sub-Inspector for over three years. (3) Writ Petition No. 18099 of 1986 (Tej Pal Singh) In paragraph 1 of the petition it is averred that the petitioner was selected on june 20, 1969, for officiating promotion as Sub-Inspector; he joined on December 25, 1980 Till reversion was directed earlier, he claims to have put on more than three years. In the counter-affidavit the plea is that he remained sub-Inspector of Police for five months twenty-two days only, point in this petition also. (4) Writ Petition No. 9548 of 1986 (Ram Dyal Singh and Ors.) The impugned order dated June 18, 1986 refers merely to the circular dated June, 7, 1986, and shows that the petitioners were found unfit. the petitioners assert that they have been officiating Sub-Inspector for oven ten years, which however is refuted in the counter-affidavit. (4) Writ Petition No. 9548 of 1986 (Ram Dyal Singh and Ors.) The impugned order dated June 18, 1986 refers merely to the circular dated June, 7, 1986, and shows that the petitioners were found unfit. the petitioners assert that they have been officiating Sub-Inspector for oven ten years, which however is refuted in the counter-affidavit. Regarding Roshan Lal Yadav, petitioner No. 2 in this petition, it is stated in the counter-affidavit that the selection Committee being satisfied that he had worked for over three years till September 30, 1984, he has been approved for absorption against one of the available posts. The petition is consequently rendered infructuous so far as this petitioner No. 2 this petition is concerned. (5) Writ Petition No. 14493 of 1986 (Kashi Nath Ojha) The petitioner claims to be officiating since March 30, 1976, in pursuance of the approval to the selection made on March 21, 1976, the order of reversion dated 29th June, 1986, does not talk of the period being less than three years, but in the counter-Affidavit it is maintained otherwise. (6) Writ Petition No. 16052 of 1986 (Ram Piarey Pandey) In paragraph 4 of the petition the petitioner has given a chart specifying the period during which he has functioned as officiating Sub-Inspector during January 20, 1976 to June 15, 1986, covering about seven years; the order dated June 15, 1986, as usual, makes no reference as to the period requisite being not put in ; in the counter-Affidavit the details appearing in paragraph 4 are not rebutted, but it is asserted that the period in the petitioners case has been 2 years, 6 months and 6 days only. (7) Writ Petition No. 14481 of 1986 (Brabam Deo Rai) The claim raised by the petitioner is that he has been serving as officiating Sub-Inspector since August 25, 1981 ; in the counter-Affidavit it is stated vide C. A. V. that he was given the officiating chance on July 25, 1981 and reverted thereafter on March 3, 1984 after having put in 2 years 5 months 11 days only. In paragraph 3 of the rejoinder affidavit the petitioner as well admits that he was reverted on March 5, 1984, and says that his appointment as Sub-Inspector took place on July 25, 1981. In paragraph 3 of the rejoinder affidavit the petitioner as well admits that he was reverted on March 5, 1984, and says that his appointment as Sub-Inspector took place on July 25, 1981. On the dates relevant thus there is no discrepancy between what is admitted in the rejoinder and the narration in the counter. In this case moreover the order of reversion, vide Annexure-2 to the writ petition, as well specifies that on the relevant date i.e. September 30, 1984, the petitioner had not completed three years and, therefore, he was not eligible to obtain the benefit of the Government Order dated 1-12-1984. The reversion in his case has been made on account of ineligibility therefor and not due to otherwise being found unsuitable. In the result, this petitioner can maintain no claim against the impugned reversion. (8) Writ Petition No. 10520 of 1986 (Chandrapal Sharma) In para 1 of the. petition the allegation is that the petitioner had been officiating as Sub-Inspector of Police from May 11, 1976, to January 11, 1980 when he was reversed. The reply contained in the counter-Affidavit to this is that the petitioner was deleted from the approved list on December 12, 1979. It is not refuted that he started officiating on May 11, 1976. The order of reversion dated June 13,1986, vide Annexure 1 to the petition, does not make mention of the period being less than the required minimum. In the rejoinder it has been reiterated that the reversion came in January, 1980. 34. In Writ Petition No. 7273 of 1986 - Maya Prasad Pandey v. Senior Superintendent of Police, Azamgarh and another, the petitioner, whose date of birth is July 1, 1937, passed the Head Constable course from the Police Training College on June 22, 1962. He was appointed Head Constable in January, 1963 and thereafter promoted as Assistant Sub-Inspector on December 19, 1978. He was reverted on June 14, 1983. Against this order the petitioner filed Writ Petition No. 4233 of 1982 in this Court at the Lucknow Bench. The Court directed that the petition be transferred for decision to Allahabad. There was no order obtained, however, from the Hon'ble the Chief Justice in this respect. At Allahabad the petition was dismissed on May 16, 1983 on the ground alternative remedy being available to the petitioner. The Court directed that the petition be transferred for decision to Allahabad. There was no order obtained, however, from the Hon'ble the Chief Justice in this respect. At Allahabad the petition was dismissed on May 16, 1983 on the ground alternative remedy being available to the petitioner. The petitioner sought recall of this order which was allowed by a Division Bench on December 21, 1983. Certified copy of the order is on record vide Annexure 1 to the writ petition. The petition thereafter came up for hearing on August 8, 1985 and it was disposed of finally in terms of the decision of the Supreme Court dated April 19, 1985, referred to above, vide Annexure-3 to the writ petition. Under order dated 28th May, 1986, made by the Senior Superintendent of Police, Azamgarh, the petitioner was transferred treating him Head Constable to P. S. Kotwali, vide Annexure-4 to the writ petition. For the petitioner it has been urged that this seems to have been done under the mistaken impression that the Writ Petition No. 4233 of 1982 brought by the petitioner against the order of reversion dated 14th June, 1982, had been dismissed on May 16, 1983. The order passed on December 21, 1982, recalling that order and the final decision dated August 8, 1985, do not appear to have been taken notice of. His case has remained unconsidered before the Selection Committee envisaged under the Government Order dated 1-12-1934. In view of the decision dated 8th August, 1985, in the petitioners case, referred to above, it is incumbent that the Selection Committee take into consideration his case as well along with others similarly placed. 35. The infirmities some of which are recited above could have been avoided in case the concerned petitioners were associated with the screening. The factual information available to the Selection Committee in that event might have been complete ; the Committee could be in a better position to form its conclusion in a more scientific manner upon excluding the inadmissible and without excluding from due consideration both sides of the picture. We ought not to be taken for a moment to suggest that there should have been formal charge sheet drawn as in the case of a disciplinary proceeding or an opportunity given to adduce evidence. It is not in doubt that personal hearing is ordinarily not regarded an indispensable fact of natural justice. We ought not to be taken for a moment to suggest that there should have been formal charge sheet drawn as in the case of a disciplinary proceeding or an opportunity given to adduce evidence. It is not in doubt that personal hearing is ordinarily not regarded an indispensable fact of natural justice. Settled also, however, is that there is no straight jacket formula governing situations of all types as and when they arise. In actual functioning the norms must vary depending on the facts and circumstances. Fair play in action is the objective to be just and reasonable is the infallible guideline. There would need, therefore, be a review at the level of the Selection Committee such as the State Government appoints in terms of the Government Order, dated 1-12-1984 affirmed in Chandra Pal Singh's case (supra). 36. Having regard to the foregoing discussion, the Writ Petition No. 14481 of 1986 is dismissed. Writ Petition No. 9548 of 1986 is dismissed as infructuous so far as the petitioner No. 2 (Roshan Lal) is concerned. 37. For the rest we direct that there shall be a review made by the Selection Committee appointed by the State Government in terms of the Government Order dated December 1, 1984 on the basis of the service records of the concerned petitioners and in the light of the observations contained in this judgment. The impugned orders of reversion shall remain inoperative till the Selection Committee takes decision upon review. The petitions are disposed of accordingly. 38. There will be no order as to costs.