JUDGMENT 1. - This second appeal has been filed against the judgment of the learned District Judge, Banswara dated April 13, 1979 by which he allowed the appeal and set aside the judgment of the Civil Judge, Banswara dated April 19, 1978, decreeing the suit for the recovery of Rs. 700/- as arrears of rent and ejectment. The facts of the case giving rise to this appeal may be summarised thus : 2. On 18.8.75, the plaintiff-appellant filed a suit for rent and ejectment against the defendant-respondent with the allegations, in short, that he let out suit shop to him on monthly rent of Rs. 100/- on 1.12.1973, rent has not been paid from November 1974 to May, 1975, he is carrying on his business in a rented shop situated in Bhavsarwara, Banswara, his landlord is pressing hard to vacate it, he is residing with his family consisting of 11 members in a room situated behind the suit shop with great difficulty and, therefore, the suit shop is reasonably and bonafide required by him for his business and residence. By amendment, he further averred that the suit shop is also required for the business of his son and he would suffer greater hardship if the ejectment decree is not granted in his favour. The defendant resisted the suit and stated that rent was regularly tendered to the plaintiff, the suit shop is not required by him, the plaintiff has two other shops at his disposal for his business, he has sufficient accommodation for his residence and the suit shop is not suitable for his business. After framing necessary issues and recording the evidence of the parties, the learned trial Court held that the defendant has committed default in payment of rent from November, 1974 to May, 1975 and the suit shop is required for his business and accordingly decreed the suit by its judgment dated 19.4.78. On appeal, the learned District Judge held that the defendant has not committed any default in payment of rent, the suit shop is not reasonably and bonafide required by the plaintiff as he has not even disclosed the nature of business which he wanted to start in this shop and accordingly allowed the appeal. 3. On appeal, the learned District Judge held that the defendant has not committed any default in payment of rent, the suit shop is not reasonably and bonafide required by the plaintiff as he has not even disclosed the nature of business which he wanted to start in this shop and accordingly allowed the appeal. 3. On 29.1.1980, this second appeal was admitted on the following substantial question of law, namely:- "Whether the defendant-respondent has committed default in payment of rent during the pendency of the suit and whether this ground can be raised for the first time in this second appeal ?" 4. Before the commencement of argument, the learned counsel for the plaintiff-appellant moved an application under Section 100(5), C.P.C., permitting him to argue on the substantial question of law relating to the reasonable and bonafide necessity. Its copy was duly given to the learned counsel for the respondent. No reply was filed by him but he seriously opposed it. 5. It has been contended by the learned counsel for the plaintiff-appellant that admittedly, defendant-respondent did not deposit the amount of rent every month during the pendency of the suit as required under sub-section (4) of Section 13 of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950 (hereinafter to be called as 'the Act'), the defence should have been struck off and the suit should have been decreed. He also contended that the learned first appellate Court seriously erred in not holding the defendant-respondent as a defaulter. 6. In reply, it has been contended by the learned counsel for the defendant-respondent that the learned first appellate Court has rightly held that the defendant did not commit default in payment of rent. 7. The appeal has been admitted on the limited point relating to the default in payment of rent during the pendency of the suit. Admittedly the amount of rent and interest was not determined by the learned trial Court as required under Section 13(3) of the Act. The question of deposit of rent during the pendency of the suit arises only after the determination of the amount of rent and interest and its payment within the time fixed by the Court. Admittedly, this was not done in this case. The question of deposit of rent during the pendency of the suit arises only after the determination of the amount of rent and interest and its payment within the time fixed by the Court. Admittedly, this was not done in this case. As such there arose no question for the deposit of rent of the subsequent period during the pendency of the suit arises only after the determination of the amount of rent and interest and its payment within the time fixed by the Court. Admittedly, this was not done in this case. As such there arose no question for the deposit of rent of the subsequent period during the pendency of the suit. 8. As regards the application moved under Section 100(5) C.P.C., the learned counsel for the plaintiff-appellant contended that the learned first appellate Court has gone out of record in holding that the suit shop is not reasonably and bonafide required by the plaintiff as he did not even mention the nature of business which he intended to start therein. 9. In reply, it has been contended by the learned counsel for the defendant-respondent that at this stage of the appeal, the plaintiff-appellant cannot be permitted to raise other points in support of his appeal and they do not involve any substantial question of law. 10. It is clear from the judgment of the learned first appellate Court that he did not hold the reasonable and bonafide necessity of the suit shop for the business purpose on the ground that the nature of the business which was intended to be started therein was not disclosed by the plaintiff in his plaint and for the residential purpose on the ground that the plaintiff did not disclose in his statement on oath that he required it so. Both these findings of the learned first appellate Court are against the record. The plaintiff has categorically stated in para No. 5 of the plaint that he would carry on his own business in the suit shop. It has been stated in the title of the case that he carries on his profession of karigar. The defendant admits in his statement on oath that the plaintiff carries on the business of sharpening knives, daggers, scissors etc. in his rented shop situated in Bhavsarwara. Banswara. It has been stated in the title of the case that he carries on his profession of karigar. The defendant admits in his statement on oath that the plaintiff carries on the business of sharpening knives, daggers, scissors etc. in his rented shop situated in Bhavsarwara. Banswara. It cannot, therefore, be said that the plaintiff did not disclose in his plaint the nature of the business which he intended to start in the suit shop. 11. The plaintiff Mansukhlal has clearly stated in his examination-in-chief the suit shop is also required for the residential purpose. As such it cannot be said that the plaintiff did not disclose in his statement that the suit shop is required for the residential purpose. As a matter of fact, he has not been cross-examined by the defendant on this point. 12. It is well proved from the evidence on record that the plaintiff is residing in a room situated behind the suit shop, his family consists of eleven members and his eldest son Bharat is married. It is correct that he admitted in his cross-examination that his three daughters are married. Even taking into consideration their marriages, there still remains eight members in his family including one married son. It may be mentioned here that during the pendency of the second appeal, the plaintiff Mansulkhlal died and his ten heirs have been brought on record. The amended cause title of the second appeal shows that the age of his sons Ghatu and Ramesh is 22 and 21 years. They are also of the marriageable age. They would also require some shop for their business and additional accommodation for their residence after their marriages. 13. It is correct that the plaintiffs own two more shops. It is, however, the admitted case of the parties that these shops are in possession and occupation of the tenants. They are not at the disposal of the plaintiffs where they can carry on their business. In view of these facts and circumstances, it is very difficult to endorse the views of the learned District Judge, Banswara. On the evidence on record, it can safely be held that the suit shop is reasonably and bonafide required by the plaintiffs. 14. The learned first appellate Court did not consider about the comparative hardship as he dismissed the suit for ejectment. On the evidence on record, it can safely be held that the suit shop is reasonably and bonafide required by the plaintiffs. 14. The learned first appellate Court did not consider about the comparative hardship as he dismissed the suit for ejectment. The defendant's witness Mohammod Ishaq has stated in his examination-in-chief that the defendant would be put to a little inconvenience if he was required to vacate the disputed shop. As such it cannot be said that the defendant would suffer greater hardship if he is ejected from the suit shop. Under the facts and circumstances of the case, the plaintiffs would suffer greater hardship, if the suit for ejectment is a not decreed. 15. Admittedly, the suit shop is one-door shop. There arises no question of its partial eviction. As such the appeal deserves to be allowed. 16. In the result, the appeal is allowed with costs. The judgment and decree of the learned District Judge, Banswara are, set aside. The judgment and decree of the Civil Judge, Banswara are restored. The defendant will get three months to vacate the suit shop.Appeal allowed. *******