S. B. MAJMUDAR, J. ( 1 ) IN this petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution the petitioner has challenged the legality of the order dated 14/15-10-1986 passed by the Registrar of Co-operative Societies Gujarat State respondent No. 1 herein whereby he confirmed the order dated 19-9-1986 passed by the second respondent District Registrar of Co-operative Societies. The impugned orders are at annexures A and B to the petition. By the original order at annexure A which is confirmed by the first respondent the petitioner has been disqualified to hold any elected post for a period of four years either on the Managing Committee of Navdeep Co-operative Bank Limited Navrangpura Ahmedabad or on the Managing Committee of any other Co-operative Society. The said order has been passed by the second respondent under sec. 76-B (2) of the Gujarat Co-operative Societies Act 1961 (the Act for short ). The said order has been challenged on diverse grounds but it is not necessary to mention all of them for the simple reason that one ground put in the forefront goes to the rest of the matter and entitles the petitioner to succeed. The said ground runs as under: ( 2 ) THE competent authority exercising power under sec. 76-B (2) can order disqualification of the concerned officer of a society only if the competent authority has first passed an order of removal of such officer from the society wherein he operated at the relevant time. In the absence of any removal order passed under sec. 76-B (1) against the concerned officer no subsequent disqualification order under sec. 76-B (2) can be passed against such officer and in the present case as there is no order passed against the petitioner removing him from the society as per sec. 76-B (1) the order passed by the second respondent under sec. 76-B (2) is ex-facie without jurisdiction and null and void and its confirmation by the appellate authority viz. respondent No. 1 is also equally otiose and an exercise in futility. ( 3 ) IN order to appreciate the aforesaid contention in its true perspective it is necessary to note a few relevant facts leading to this petition The petitioner at the relevant time was working as a Director in Navdeep Co-operative Bank which is a co-operative society duly registered under the provisions of the Act. ( 3 ) IN order to appreciate the aforesaid contention in its true perspective it is necessary to note a few relevant facts leading to this petition The petitioner at the relevant time was working as a Director in Navdeep Co-operative Bank which is a co-operative society duly registered under the provisions of the Act. He was served with a show cause notice dated 30-8-1986 calling upon him to show cause why he should not be removed from the office of the Director of the said society on the grounds mentioned in the show cause notice. He was also called upon to show cause why he should not be declared disqualified from being elected as a member of the committee of any other Co-operative Society. A copy of the said show cause notice is at annexure C to the petition. It clearly covers the proposed actions under sec. 76-B76-B (1) as well as 76-B (2) of the Act. It will be profitable at the outset to have a look at the aforesaid relevant provisions of sec. 76-B: 76 (1) If in the opinion of the Registrar any officer makes persistent default or is negligent in performance of the duties imposed on him by this Act or the rules or the bye-laws or does anything which is prejudicial to the interests of the society or where he stands disqualified by or under this Act the Registrar may after giving the officer an opportunity of being heard by order remove such officer and direct the society to elect or appoint a person or a qualified member in the vacancy caused by such removal and the officer so elected or appointed shall hold office so long only as the officer in whose place he is elected or appointed would have held if the vacancy had not occurred. (2) The Registrar may by order direct that the officer as removed shall be disqualified to hold or to contest election for any office in the society from which he is removed and in any other society for a period not exceeding four years from the date of the order and such officer shall stand disqualified accordingly. ( 4 ) IT transpires that after service of the show cause notice on the petitioner he tendered his resignation as a Director of the bank on 12-9-1986. ( 4 ) IT transpires that after service of the show cause notice on the petitioner he tendered his resignation as a Director of the bank on 12-9-1986. The said resignation was accepted by the Board of Directors on 13-9-1986. This fact was also pointed out to the second respondent by the petitioner by his letter dated 17-9-1986 and he was requested to drop the proceedings proposed to be initiated against him as per the show cause notice dated 30-8-1986 as he had already ceased to be a Director of the said bank. Another application was submitted before the second respondent on 19-9-1986 However it appears that the second respondent by his order dated 19-9-1986 instead of dropping the proceedings directed that the petitioner should be disqualified from being elected to the managing committee of Navdeep Co-operative Bank or to any other co-operative society for a period of four years from the date of the order. The said order obviously was passed under sec. 76 of the Act thought the order merely mentioned sec- 76-B. The petitioner challenged the said order by filing an appeal-cum-revision under sec. 155 of the Act before the Registrar of Co-operative Societies Gujarat State. His appeal alongwith appeals of four other members of Loan Committee of Navdeep Co operative Bank who were also removed and disqualified by the Registrar for their alleged irregularities and illegalities were heard together and were disposed of by a common order. So far as the petitioner is concerned his Appeal No. was 102 of 1986 It carne to be dismissed on 14/15-10-1986 by the revisional authority which confirmed the order passed by the second respondent. The aforesaid orders at annexures A and B to the petition passed by the revisional authority and the original authority as stated earlier are brought in challenge in the present proceedings. ( 5 ) MR. Vakharia for the petitioner placing reliance on see. 76-B (1) and (2) of the Act vehemently contended that the order of disqualification under sec. 76-B (2) can be passed against the concerned officer of the society provided in the first instance the authority is satisfied about the need to remove such officer from the society and after having passed an order of removal of such officer under sec. 76-B (1) he can proceed further and pass further order under sec. 76-B (2 ). 76-B (2) can be passed against the concerned officer of the society provided in the first instance the authority is satisfied about the need to remove such officer from the society and after having passed an order of removal of such officer under sec. 76-B (1) he can proceed further and pass further order under sec. 76-B (2 ). In the facts of the present case no order of removal is passed by the second respondent against the petitioner as the petitioner himself walked out by resigning his membership in the Board of Directors and his resignation was accepted much prior to the date on which the second respondent passed his order on 19-9-1986. It was therefore contended that the very condition precedent to the passing of the order under sec. 76-B (2) is absent in the present case and hence the said order of disqualification is patently null and void and ultra vires and without jurisdiction. ( 6 ) IN order to support his contention Mr. Vakharia invited my attention to the provisions of secs. 49 61 and 73 of the Gujarat Panchayats Act 1961 and submitted that the same legislature which has enacted both these Acts has clearly made a difference in case of the exigency of situation in which the authority acting under the Gujarat Panchayats Act may deal with suitably and may disqualify any person from holding any elected post even after he resigns from the existing post. However so far as sec. 76-B (1) and (2) of the Act are concerned the State legislature has exhibited quite a different intention. The State legislature never contemplated that any order of disqualification can be passed against any officer of the society by the competent authority exercising posers under the Act unless that authority first decides to remove the concerned officer and passes proper order under sec. 76-B (1 ). I asked Mr. Trivedi for the respondents to point out whether the second respondent has passed any order of removal of the petitioner from the Board of Directors of the Navdeep Co-operative Bank. He fairly stated that there is no such order passed by the second respondent but he submitted that that was so because the petitioner had already walked out from the membership of the bank on 12-9-1986 which was accepted by the Board of Directors on 13-9-1986. He fairly stated that there is no such order passed by the second respondent but he submitted that that was so because the petitioner had already walked out from the membership of the bank on 12-9-1986 which was accepted by the Board of Directors on 13-9-1986. He further submitted that there did not appear to be sufficient evidence on record to indicate that this resignation was genuine one. In my view the said contention of Mr. Trivedi cannot be accepted for the simple reason that a mere look at the last para of the judgment of the second respondent shows that he has impliedly accepted the fact that the petitioner had already resigned as a Director and having accepted that fact he has naturally concentrated on the order which he had to pass viz. disqualification of the petitioner from being elected to the Board of Directors of Navdeep Co-operative Bank or any other co-operative society for a period of four years. It is pertinent to reproduce at this stage the English version on the relevant aspect as found in the order of the second respondent:only because resignation has been given as a Director of the Bank it is not possible to accept the contention that notice under sec. 76-B (2) should be cancelled and as it is found that you are responsible for many irregularities as mentioned in the notice it is necessary to disqualify you under sec. 76-B from being elected to the Board of management of the said Bank or any other co-operative society for a period of four years. ( 7 ) THE aforesaid reasoning adopted by the second respondent clearly indicates that he was conscious of the fact that the petitioner had already resigned as a Director of the said bank. That is the reason why he did not pass any order removing the petitioner from the membership as it would have amounted to slaying the slain. He therefore proceed to pass the only order of disqualification for a period of four years from being elected to the membership of any Managing Committee of such society. This is clearly an order under sec. 76-B (2 ). It must therefore be held that the second respondent has not passed any order under sec. He therefore proceed to pass the only order of disqualification for a period of four years from being elected to the membership of any Managing Committee of such society. This is clearly an order under sec. 76-B (2 ). It must therefore be held that the second respondent has not passed any order under sec. 76-B (1) removing the petitioner from the membership of the Board of Directors of Navdeep Co-operative Bank and straightway has passed the order of disqualification under sec. 76-B (2 ). If sec. 76-B (2) was worded on the same lines as sec. 49 (2) of the Gujarat Panchayats Act the situation might have been different. It would be profitable to reproduce sec. 49 (1) (2) of the Gujarat Panchayats Act which also deals with same type of removal of elected officers of gram panchayat and under what circumstances they can be disqualified from holding such posts in future:49 (1) The competent authority may remove from office any member of a Panchayat or the Sarpanch the Upa-Sarpanch the Chairman or as the case may be the Vice-Chairman thereof after giving him an opportunity of being beard and giving due notice in that behalf to the panchayat and after such inquiry as it deems necessary if such member Sarpanch Upa-Sarpanch Chairman or Vice-Chairman as the case may be has been guilty of misconduct in the discharge of his duties or of any disgraceful conduct or abuses his power or makes persistent default in the performance of his duties and functions under this Act or has become incapable of performing his duties under this Act. The Sarpanch Upa-Sarpanch Chairman or as the case may be Vice-Chairman so removed may at the discretion of the competent authority also be removed from the membership of the panchayat. (2) The competent authority may after following the procedure laid down in sub-sec. (1) disqualify for a period not exceeding four years; any person who has resigned his office as a member Sarpanch Upa-Sarpanch Chairman or Vice-Chairman or otherwise ceased to bold any such office and has been guilty of misconduct specified in sub-sec. (1) or has been incapable of performing his duties;provided that an action shall be taken within-six months from the date on which the person resigns or ceases to hold any such office. Secs. 61 and 73 of the Gujarat Panchayats Act are also identical in nature. (1) or has been incapable of performing his duties;provided that an action shall be taken within-six months from the date on which the person resigns or ceases to hold any such office. Secs. 61 and 73 of the Gujarat Panchayats Act are also identical in nature. They deal with removal of officers of Taluka and District panchayats. ( 8 ) A mere look at sec. 49 (2) of the Gujarat Panchayats Act and reading it in juxtaposition with sec. 76-B (2) of the present Act leaves no room for doubt that the legislature in its wisdom while enacting sec. 76-B (2) did not contemplate a situation in which the competent authority can order disqualification of an officer of the society who is not first removed by him for the alleged misconduct. In short no order of disqualification under sec. 76-B (2) can be passed by the competent authority without there being in the field as a condition precedent a valid order of removal of the concerned officer from the membership of the managing committee of the society. May be this may be a case of omission on the part of the legislature which may be wilful or otherwise. But as far as the provisions stand on the statute book there cannot be any escape from the conclusion that no order of disqualification under sec. 76-B (2) can be passed against an officer of the society in the first instance there is a valid order in the field under sec. 76-B (1) ordering his removal from the concerned office occupied by him in the managing committee of the society. Mr. Vakharias contention therefore has to be accepted. ( 9 ) MR. Trivedi then submitted that if the authorities have come to the conclusion that so called resignation of the petitioner was not a genuine one it would amount to their impliedly passing the order of removal. In this connection he invited my attention to the revisional order passed by the first respondent wherein in the penultimate page of the order at second para thereof the following observations are made by the revisional authority:it was urged that the present Appellant had tendered his resignation from the Board of Directors on 12-9-1986. In support of this a copy of the agenda dated 9 where at serial No. 3 mention is made of the item regarding resignation of the members and transfers. In support of this a copy of the agenda dated 9 where at serial No. 3 mention is made of the item regarding resignation of the members and transfers. From the records of the District Registrar it is not clear as to when and whether the present appellant had tendered his resignation and the same was accepted by the Board of Directors as enjoined by bye-law No. 29 (2) (1 ). In any case no evidence was produced to that effect. It is true that the revisional authority found that there was no clear evidence about the resignation tendered by the petitioner from the Board of Directors of Navdeep Co-operative Bank. However this is neither here nor there. It is the first authority viz. the second respondent who has to hold that so called resignation was a make-believe or was a camouflage and that the petitioner had continued to occupy the post of a Director and therefore he was required to remove the petitioner first before passing any disqualification order against him. That exercise was never undertaken by the second respondent. Instead as seen earlier assuming that the resignation was valid he did not pass any removal order but straightway proceeded to pass disqualification order. Under these circumstances the observations of the revisional authority in the aforesaid para 8 cannot be of any avail to the respondents. Ultimately the revisional authority has confirmed the order of the second respondent by dismissing the revision-cum-appeal. Therefore operative order which holds the field against the petitioner is the order passed by the second respondent directing him to be disqualified for a period of four years from holding any elected post in the concerned bank. Now that order squarely falls under sec. 76-B (2) of the Act. As there is no order passed by the second respondent removing the petitioner from the directorship of the bank under sec. 76-B (1) of the Act it must be held that the very condition precedent which must exist for passing disqualification order under sec. 76 B (2) is not available in the present case. It must be kept in view that sec. 76-B (2) in terms provides that Registrar may by order direct that the officer so removed shall be disqualified Thus the removal order under sec. 76-B (1) must precede the order of disqualification under sec. 76 B (2) is not available in the present case. It must be kept in view that sec. 76-B (2) in terms provides that Registrar may by order direct that the officer so removed shall be disqualified Thus the removal order under sec. 76-B (1) must precede the order of disqualification under sec. 76-B (2) In the present case admittedly there is no removal order in the field. Consequently disqualification order must be treated to be entirely without jurisdiction and ultra vires the scheme of the Act and de hors the provisions of sec. 76-B (2 ). ( 10 ) ONLY on this short ground this petition will have to be allowed. It is made clear that I express no opinion on the merits of the controversy between the parties or on merits of the charges levelled against the petitioner. Only on the aforesaid technical ground this petition is allowed. Rule is made absolute Orders at annexures A and B are quashed and set aside Consequently there will remain no question of the petitioner being held disqualified from being elected to Navdeep Co-operative Bank or any other co-operative society for a period of four years as earlier directed by the second respondent by the impugned order. There will be no order as to cost. As the petition is allowed and the impugned orders are set aside ad-interim relief granted by this Court earlier in the present petition will automatically stand vacated. Petition allowed; Rule made absolute. .