B. C. VERMA, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioner by virtue of his employment as Administrative Manager with Everest Building Products Ltd. , Kymore (Respondent No. 3) a Company duly registered under the Companies Act was allotted an accommodation for his residence. He occupied that accommodation with his family. Petitioners services were terminated by the respondent No. 3 by order dated 29. 10. 1980 and consequently was asked to quit the accommodation so allotted to him. The petitioner alleges that he has challenged termination of his services before the appropriate forum and, therefore did not vacate those premises. Therefore, proceedings in the court of Magistrate First Class were initiated against him under section 630 of the Companies Act read with certain provisions of the Indian Penal Code somewhere in July, 1981. The petitioner appeared in those proceedings and participated. That prosecution against him is still pending. It is worth mentioning that in the complaint filed by the respondent No. 3 before the Magistrate detailed address of the petitioner is mentioned and the petitioner was duly sorted on that address. For reasons best known to the respondent No 3, it did not wait for the result of that prosecution and chose to file an application under section 25 of the Police Act, 1961- before the Sub-Divisional Magistrate who first asked for the police report but then showed extreme impatience and extra-ordinary zeal and without waiting to receive that report directed the police to enter into the accommodation and if necessary by breaking open the lock to take the belonging in its possession and submit an inventory thereof to the Court and also to handover the possession of the accommodation to the respondent No. 3. No notice of these proceedings was served upon the petitioner as it was the allegation in that complaint that the petitioner's whereabouts were not known. The local police very promptly followed the duration of the Sub- Divisional Magistrate and handed over possession of that accommodation to the respondent No. 2 who, it is not said, has made it available to one of its officers. The petitioner is aggrieved by this order. ( 2 ) SECTION 25 of the Police Act is as follows: -25. The local police very promptly followed the duration of the Sub- Divisional Magistrate and handed over possession of that accommodation to the respondent No. 2 who, it is not said, has made it available to one of its officers. The petitioner is aggrieved by this order. ( 2 ) SECTION 25 of the Police Act is as follows: -25. Police-officers to take charge of unclaimed property and be subject to Magistrates orders as to disposal: it shall be the duty of every police officer to take charge of all unclaimed property and to furnish an inventory thereof to the Magistrate of the district. The police officers shall be guided as to the disposal of such property by such orders/as they shall receive from the Magistrate of the district. T this section castes a duty on any policy-officer to take charge of certain property and to furnish its report to the Magistrate of the district, The sine qua non of the exercise of such power to take charge of the property by the police officer is that the property has to be unclaimed property. A police-Officer acting under this provision is not at all authorized and has no jurisdiction to take possession of any property which he knows or which he has reason to believe that it is claimed by or belongs to certain persons. So also, where there is dispute between two parties over the possession of certain accommodation or certain building the provisions of this section cannot be invoked. A police-officer or the Magistrate will be said to be acting in abuse of his powers if the provisions of this section are invoked to divest any persons of possession of immoveable property (may not be in actual occupation) and to assist another in securing possession of immoveable properties. Thus, where a person in lawful possession of any immoveable properties/accommodation as licence, tenant, assignee or otherwise temporarily removes his occupation and lock is the accommodation but still retains its possession, he cannot be thrown out of the accommodation by any police-officer acting under this provision. Likewise, the District Magistrate will be acting- wholly without jurisdiction in directing delivery of possession of such accommodation to its owner. This shall be particularly so where the eviction of such occupant is controlled by legislations like the Accommodation Control Acts or the Public Premises Eviction Act. Etc. Likewise, the District Magistrate will be acting- wholly without jurisdiction in directing delivery of possession of such accommodation to its owner. This shall be particularly so where the eviction of such occupant is controlled by legislations like the Accommodation Control Acts or the Public Premises Eviction Act. Etc. ( 3 ) IT is difficult to see how the word property used in section 25 of the Police Act signifies and includes immoveable propertyt as well. To us in the context in which the term is used in the Police Act, it embraces within its folds only moveable property. According to the interpretation clause (See section 1 of the Act,) the word Tproperty shall include say moveable property, money or valuable security. Ordinarily where the word defined is declared to include such and such, the definition is primalacie extensive. It is generally used in interpretation clauses in order to enlarge the meaning of the words or phrases occurring in the body of statutes. When it is so used those words and phrases must be construed as comprehending not only such things, as they signify according to their natural import but also those things, which the interpretation clause declares that they shall include. In this sense it adds to the word or phrases meaning which does not naturally belong to it. This will be particularly so when it is said to include things that would not properly fall within its ordinary connotation. At time one may find interpretation clause worded as is deemed to include. In such a case the definition is an inclusive or tensile definition and such form is used to bring in by a legal fiction something within the word defined which according to its ordinary meaning is not included within it. (See Principles of Statutory Interpretation by G. P. Singh. C. G. 3rd Edition page 142 ). Nevertheless, there can be no inflexible rule to show that the word Tinclude should be read always as word of extension without reference to the context. It may be equivalent to mean and include and becomes exhaustive of the meaning to be given to it. Definition of the particular term signifying to include should be taken as extensive or exhaustive in the context in which it is used. It may be equivalent to mean and include and becomes exhaustive of the meaning to be given to it. Definition of the particular term signifying to include should be taken as extensive or exhaustive in the context in which it is used. Such is the rule laid down in Dilworth v. Commissioner of Stamps1 This view still prevails and has been applied by the Apex Court of this country in many cases. In South Gujarat Roofing Tile Manufacturers Association v. State of Gujarat2 while interpreting the expression potteries Industry as used in explanation to entry 22 of Part 1 of Schedule to the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 which provided that for the purpose of that entry Potteries Industry includes the manufacture of 9 articles enumerated under that explanation, it was observed that the term includes occuring in that explanation was one of limitation and extensive of the meaning which must be given to words pottery industry for the purpose of that entry. While pointing out that the term does not have any extending force, it was observed that if the object specified are also articles of pottery then those objects are already comprised in the expression pottery industry. The inclusion of list of objects which are all well recognised articles of pottery, observed the court, makes it plain that the extension was added to the entry not even by way of any abundant caution nor with a view to emphasize comprehensive character of the entry. The learned Judges finally held that the list of potteries given under the explanation was exhaustive of the meaning, which must be given to the pottery industry for the purpose of that entry. See also the Municipal Council. Raipur and another v. The State of M. P. 3 Dadaji v. Sukhdeobabu4 and Hindustan Aluminium Corporation v. State of U. P. 5 ( 4 ) IT cannot be doubted that the proceedings under sections 25, and 27 of the Police Act are of a summary nature. It is the District Magistrate's satisfaction, which may warrant an order directing the property to be handed over to the claimants. It is the District Magistrate's satisfaction, which may warrant an order directing the property to be handed over to the claimants. If, however, he is not satisfied as to the claim laid by the particular person, he may sell the property and the proceeds shall be placed at the disposal of the State under section 27 of the Police Act and the person aggrieved is left to establish his right to that property in a Civil Court. The orders contemplated are executive in nature and no detailed judicial inquiry as to title is contemplated. Such being the nature of the provision, it is reasonable to think that it shall apply only to moveable properties which may be found lying unclaimed and of which the police is supposed to take charge in exercise of its function under section 2s of the Police Act. Again if the term Tproperty was also to include immoveable property it was not necessary for the legislature to say in the interpretation clause that the term property shall include any moveable property money or valuable security for the term property does include moveable property in the ordinary sense. In our opinion the word property in the interpretation clause of the Act means only moveable property and includes money or valuable security. In our opinion, such an interpretation of the term was rightly put by the learned single Judge of the Rajasthan High Court in Chhuttan lal v. State of Rajasthan6. Honble Sohani, J. of. This Court relying upon the aforesaid decision of the Rajasthan High Court and also on the decision of Dilworth v. commissioner of Stamps (supra) has also taken the similar view and in our opinion, very rightly. No decision taking a contrary view was cited at the Bar. We would, therefore, hold that the term property used in section 1 of the Police Act does not include immoveable property and consequently section 25 of the Police Act is wholly inapplicable to any immoveable property. It is applicable only to all moveable properties including money and valuable security, lying unclaimed. ( 5 ) WITH our aforesaid conclusion that section 25 of the Police Act does not apply to immoveable property it does not detain us at all to conclude that the entire proceedings before the Sub- Divisional Magistrate taken on the application filed by the respondent No. 3 on 3. 1. ( 5 ) WITH our aforesaid conclusion that section 25 of the Police Act does not apply to immoveable property it does not detain us at all to conclude that the entire proceedings before the Sub- Divisional Magistrate taken on the application filed by the respondent No. 3 on 3. 1. 1984 under section 25 of the Police Act (Annexure-F) and Annexure-H including the order passed by the Sub- Divisional Magistrate directing the Police to handover the possession of the accommodation to the respondent No. 3 as detailed in that order (Part of Annexure-H) and all subsequent proceedings taken by the police in handing over possession to the respondent No. 3 are entirely without the authority of law and are without jurisdiction. They arc hereby quashed. The respondents are directed to put back the petitioner in possession of those premises within a month from today and if necessary for that purpose, the respondent No. 3 or any person occupying the premises on its behalf shall he evicted from those premises. ( 6 ) BEFORE parting, we may mention that the Sub-Divisional Magistrate in the present case has antonly abused his authority and so also has done the police. They have shown complete ignorance and indifference to the provisions of law as enacted under section 25 of the Police Act. If we may say so they seem to have acted as an instrumentality of the respondent No. 3 to sub-serve its ends in somehow securing possession of the premises, which were in possession and occupation of the petitioner. We cannot refrain from saying that the officers of the respondent No. 3 mentioned in their application that the address of the petitioner was not known whereas in their complaint filed earlier the petitioner's detailed address was mentioned. He was served on that address and appeared before the Magistrate to face his prosecution. In this context, we may mention only to reject the contention on behalf of the respondent No. 3 that the petitioner should not be afforded any assistance by issuance of a prerogative writ as he has withdrawn from the accommodation, has removed all his belongings to Delhi and the premises are lying vacant only locked from outside. In our opinion, the boot is on the other leg. The Petitioners services have been terminated and according to him wrongly. He is vindicating his grievance before the appropriate authority. In our opinion, the boot is on the other leg. The Petitioners services have been terminated and according to him wrongly. He is vindicating his grievance before the appropriate authority. The respondent No. 3 has taken proceedings under section 630 of the Companies Act but without waiting for its result has proceeded to secure possession by unfair means. The petition is allowed and a writ shall issue in favour of the petitioner and against the respondents in above terms. The petitioner shall also get costs of this petition from the respondent No. 3 Hearing fee Rs. 200. 00. Petition allowed. .