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1987 DIGILAW 90 (BOM)

Retired Employees of Non-Government CollegeAssociation, Nagpur & others v. State of Maharashtra through Secretary to Government of Maharashtra in Education & Youth Department & others

1987-02-26

C.S.DHARMADHIKARI, H.W.DHABE

body1987
JUDGMENT - C.S. DHARMADHIKARI, J.:---This writ petition is filed by the retired employees of the Non-Government College Association, Nagpur, praying for writ of mandamus that the date prescribed by the Government in the Government Resolution dated 21-7-1983 extending the pension-cum-gratuity scheme to the teaching and non-teaching staff of the non-agricultural Universities and affiliated non-Government colleges to the persons who retire or retired on or after 1-10-1982, be declared as violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. According to the petitioners, the date prescribed viz. 1-10-1982, is not only arbitrary but also makes a hostile discrimination between the persons similarly situated but who retired prior to 1-10-1982 and the persons who retired thereafter. According to the petitioners, this prescription of the date is void ab initio since it violates the petitioners' fundamental right guaranteed under Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 2. The petitioner No. 1 is an association of the employees of the Non-Government colleges in the Vidarbha region. The petitioner No. 2 Shri Ramchandra Ambadas Tijare is a retired Professor and Secretary of the association. The petitioner No. 3 is also a retired Professor. The petitioner No. 2 Shri Tijare retired in the year 1973, and the petitioner No. 3 retired in the year 1981. According to them, since the date prescribed by the aforesaid G.R is 1-10-1982, they are denied the benefits of the pension-cum-gratuity scheme though they are similarly circumstanced with the teachers who retired after 1-10-1982. The petitioners carried out a long correspondence with the Government but did not received any reply. The only reply which they received from the Government was that the matter is under consideration. Since the various representations made by them were of no avail, they were ultimately constrained to file the present writ petition on 16-12-1985. The respondent State Government filed its return. However, no explanation has been given as to why the date 1-10-1982 was chosen. After the matter was fully agreed, a further time was asked by Shri Badar and Shri Tayade, Counsel appearing for the respondents to seek further instructions. To-day they have produced before us a telegram which only states that the date 1-10-9182 was fixed in view of the assurance given by the Government in the Assembly. No other reason has been disclosed either in the return filed before us or even during the course of arguments. 3. To-day they have produced before us a telegram which only states that the date 1-10-9182 was fixed in view of the assurance given by the Government in the Assembly. No other reason has been disclosed either in the return filed before us or even during the course of arguments. 3. Shri Deshpande, the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners, contended before us that the new pattern of education was introduced vide G.R. dated 11-6-1976. In view of this new pattern, the 11th and the 12th classes are conducted by the junior colleges while after the 12th standard, the education starts in the senior colleges. The pension, gratuity and other retirement benefit scheme was made applicable to the teaching staff in the recognised and the aided non-government secondary schools in Maharashtra from 1-4-1966 vide G.R. dated 4-11-1968. If this is so, then according to Shri Deshpande, the same date should have been prescribed for extending the same benefits to the teaching staff in the non-government colleges. He also submitted that Kothari Education Commission was appointed by the Government of India vide resolution dated 14-7-1964, and the Commission submitted its report on 29-6-1966. The grant-in-aid system for colleges was introduced under the G.R. dated 13-12-1962 which came to be subsequently amended by a further G.R. dated 8-1-1964. Therefore, for deciding the relevant date for applying the retirement benefit scheme to the retired teachers of the private colleges, the said date was the only relevant date. Thereafter the Committee headed by Shri Sen submitted its report to the University Grants Commission in the year 1973. Para 2 of the said report contained the recommendations for providing retirement benefits to the teachers in colleges generally. In principle, the Committee's report came to be accepted by the Government. The Government of Maharashtra, Education Youth Services Department vide Resolution dated 25-10-1977 prescribed the pay scales etc. For the said class of teachers with effect from 1-1-1973. By this every resolution the age of superannuation was also fixed vide Clause VIII of the said Resolution. Therefore, in any case, the pension benefits ought to have been made applicable to this class of teachers from 1-1-1973 with effect from which date the pay-scales were implemented and even the age of superannuation was prescribed. By this every resolution the age of superannuation was also fixed vide Clause VIII of the said Resolution. Therefore, in any case, the pension benefits ought to have been made applicable to this class of teachers from 1-1-1973 with effect from which date the pay-scales were implemented and even the age of superannuation was prescribed. It was contended by Shri Deshpande that the petitioners 2 and 3 as well as the members of the association are persons who have retired after 1-1-1973. Therefore, in any case, the said scheme should have been made applicable to them. An artificial date chosen by the Government to make the scheme applicable is not only arbitrary but is also discriminatory. No reason for prescribing the said date is given in the return and the reason now disclosed during the course of arguments that the said date was chosen in view of the assurance given by the then Minister for Education to that effect on the floor of the Legislature is neither relevant nor has got any rationale nexus with the object sought to be achieved and, therefore, it is wholly violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. In support of this contention, he has placed strong reliance upon a decision of the Supreme Court in (D.S. Nakara and others v. Union of India)1, A.I.R. 1983 S.C. 130. It was also brought to out notice that so far as the Nagpur University teachers are concerned, such as scheme is made applicable to them from 1-4-1972. On the other hand it is contended by S/Shri Badar and Tayade, learned Government Pleaders that the date 1-10-1982 was chosen in view of the assurance given by the Minister for Education to that effect in the Legislature and, therefore, the said date is wholly reasonable. It is also contended by them that the matter as to whether the said scheme should be made applicable to the persons who retired prior to 1-10-1982 is still under consideration of the Government. In that context, they have drawn out attention to the letter by which information regarding the number of employees both teaching and non-teaching who have retired during the period April 1967 to 30-9-1982 was called for by the Director of Education (Higher Education), According to them, the said matter is still under consideration of the Government. In our view, the Government had enough time to consider the question. In our view, the Government had enough time to consider the question. From the events catelogued in the writ petition, it is quite clear that the petitioner association is knocking the door of the Government for the last several years. It is also stated in the representations as well as in the petition that because of the delay in deciding the matter, various eligible persons are being denied the benefits as in the meanwhile some of them have died. Any further delay in deciding this writ petition is likely to cause further damage and will amount to negation of justice. According to Shri Deshpande, in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in Nakara's case and the inability of the State Government to give any rational reason for prescribing the said date, the conclusion is inevitable that the date prescribed is wholly irrational and has no nexus with the object sought to be achieved. According to him, in any case, there is no rational reason for denying the said benefits to the persons who have retired prior to 1-10-1982 but after 1-1-1973. We find much substance in this contention of Shri Deshpande. 4. Law on the point is by the now well settled. In this context a reference could usefully be made to the observations of the Supreme Court in paras 32, 42 and 43 of the judgment in Nakara's case, which read as under:--- "Having succintly focused our attention on the conspectus of elements and incidents of pension the main question may now be tackled. But, the approach of Court while considering such measure is of paramount importance. Since the advent of the Constitution, the State action must be directed towards attaining the goals set out in Part IV of the Constitution which, when achieved, would permit us to claim that we have set up a welfare State. Article 38(1) enjoins the State to strive to promote welfare of the people by securing and protecting as effective as it may a social Order in which justice social, economic and political shall inform all institutions of the national life. In particular, the State shall strive to minimise the inequalities in status, facilities and opportunities. Article 38(1) enjoins the State to strive to promote welfare of the people by securing and protecting as effective as it may a social Order in which justice social, economic and political shall inform all institutions of the national life. In particular, the State shall strive to minimise the inequalities in status, facilities and opportunities. Article 39(d) enjoins a duty to see that there is equal pay for equal work for both men and women and this directive should be understood and interpreted in the light of the judgment of this Court in (Randhir Singh v. Union of India)2, (1982)1 S.C.C. 618 . Revealing the scope and content of this facet of equality, Chinnappa Reddy, J., speaking for the Court observed as under (Para 1) : "Now, thanks to the rising social and political consciousness and the expectations roused as a consequence and the forward looking posture of this Court, the under-privileged also are clamouring for their rights and are seeking the intervention of the Court with touching faith and confidence in the Court. The judges of the Court have a duty to redeem their constitutional oath and do justice no less to the pavement dweller than to the guest of the " Five Star hotel". Proceeding further, this Court observed that where all relevant considerations are the same, persons holding identical posts may not be treated differently in the matter of their pay merely because they belong to different departments. If that can't be done when they are in service, can that be done during their retirements? Expanding this principal, one can confidently say that if pensioners form a class, their computation cannot be by different formula affording unequal treatment solely on the ground that some retired earlier and some retired later. Article 39(e) requires the State to secure that the health and strength of workers, men and women, and children of tender age are not abused and that citizens are not forced by economic necessity to enter avocation unsuited to their age or strength. Article 41 obligates the State within the limits of its economic capacity and development, to make effective provision for securing the right to work, to education and to provide assistance in cases of unemployment, old age, sickness and disablement, and in other cases of underserved want. Article 41 obligates the State within the limits of its economic capacity and development, to make effective provision for securing the right to work, to education and to provide assistance in cases of unemployment, old age, sickness and disablement, and in other cases of underserved want. Article 43(3) requires the State to endeavour to secure amongst other things full enjoyment of leisure and social and cultural opportunities". Then in paras 42 and 43, the Supreme Court observed:--- "42. If it appears to be undisputable, as it does to us that the pensioners for the purpose of pension benefits form a class, would its upward revision permit a homogenous class to be divided by arbitrarily fixing an eligibility criteria unrelated to purpose of revision, and would such classification be founded on some rational principle? The classification has to be based, as is well settled, on some rational principal and the rational principle must have nexus to the objects sought to be achieved. We have set out the objects underlying the payment of pension. If the State considered it necessary to liberalise the pension scheme, we find no rational principle behind it for granting these benefits only to those who retired subsequent to that date simultaneously denying the same to those who retired prior to that date. If the liberalisation was considered necessary for augmenting social security in old age to Government servants then those who retired earlier cannot be worse off then those who retire later. Therefore, this division which classified pensioners into two classes is not based on any rational principle and if the rational principle is the one of dividing pensioners with a view to giving something more to persons otherwise equally placed, it would be discriminatory. To illustrate, take two persons, one retired just a day prior and another a day just succeeding the specified date. Both were in the same pay bracket, the average emolument was the same and both had put in equal number of years of service. How does a fortuitous circumstance of retiring a day earlier or a day later will permit totally unequal treatment in the matter of pension. One retiring a day earlier will have to be subject to ceiling of Rs. 8,100/- p.a. and average emolument to be worked out on 36 months's salary while the other will have a ceiling of Rs. How does a fortuitous circumstance of retiring a day earlier or a day later will permit totally unequal treatment in the matter of pension. One retiring a day earlier will have to be subject to ceiling of Rs. 8,100/- p.a. and average emolument to be worked out on 36 months's salary while the other will have a ceiling of Rs. 12,000/- p.a. and average emolument will be computed on the basis of last ten months, average. The artificial division stares into face and is unrelated to any principle and whatever principle, if there be any, has absolutely no nexus to the objects sought to be achieved by liberalising the pension scheme. In fact this arbitrary division has not only no nexus to the liberalised pension scheme but it is counter productive and runs counter to the whole gamut of pension scheme. The equal treatment guaranteed in Article 14 is wholly violated inasmuch as the pension rules being statutory in character, since the specified date, the rules accord differential and discriminatory treatment to equals in the matter of commutation of pension. A 48 hours' difference in the matter of retirement would have a traumatic effect. Division is thus both arbitrary and unprincipled. Therefore, the classification does not stand the test of Article 14. 43. Further, the classification is wholly arbitrary because we do not find a single acceptable or persuasive reason for this division. This arbitrary action violated the guarantee of Article 14. The next question is what is the way out ?'' If the principle laid down in the said judgment is applied to the present case, in our view the conclusion is inevitable that the cut out date prescribed by the Government viz. 1-10-1982 is wholly irrational and results in hostile discrimination between persons who have retired before 1-10-1982 or after that date. It is not disputed that the person who have retired either prior to 1-10-1982 or thereafter are similarly circumstanced and belong to the same class. But for the statement made during the course of arguments, there is nothing on record to show as to why the date 1-10-1982 was chosen. If it was chosen because as assurance was given by the then Minister for Education on the floor of the House on that day, then it has no nexus with the object sought to be achieved by the pension-cum-gratuity scheme. If it was chosen because as assurance was given by the then Minister for Education on the floor of the House on that day, then it has no nexus with the object sought to be achieved by the pension-cum-gratuity scheme. In this context, it is worthwhile to note that in view of the recommendations made by the Kothari Commission and the Sen Committee, the pay-scales for the said class of teachers came to be prescribed with effect from 1-1-1973. Superannuation age was also prescribed by the said resolution. Pension or gratuity is payable under the scheme in view of the superannuation of the person concerned. If this is so, then the said scheme must apply even to the persons who retired on or after 1-1-1973, when, for the first time the age of superannuation and pay scale came to be prescribed for them. Therefore, without deciding the larger question as to whether the said scheme should apply even to the pensioners who retired prior to the date 1-1-1973, it can safely be held that the members of the petitioner association, the petitioner Nos. 2 and 3 as well as the persons who retired after 1-1-1973 are entitled to this pension-cum-gratuity scheme. Prescription of the cut out date viz. 1-10-1982 being irrational is wholly violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. Hence rule is made absolute and it is declared that the date fixed by the G.R. dated 21-7-1983 i.e. 1-10-1982, for entitlement of retirement benefits is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution and the petitioners and other employees similarly circumstances who retired on or after 1-1-1973 will also be entitled to the benefits granted by the said G.R. As a necessary consequence of this, the Government will have to prescribe a reasonable date, for exercising necessary option by such employees. The Government to pass necessary orders in that behalf within a period of one month from to-day. Hence rule made absolute with costs. Rule made absolute. -----