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1987 DIGILAW 90 (KER)

B. K. Joy v. Tom Jose

1987-02-24

PARIPOORNAN

body1987
Judgment :- 1. The substantial prayer in this O.P. is to declare R.16 of the Kerala Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal R.1977, as illegal, ultra vires and violative of the principles of natural justice. The petitioner has filed a claim petition as O.P.M.V. No. 22/83 before the 4th respondent. Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Ernakulam. The petitioner's son Joby joy died as a result of an accident. The 2nd respondent is the driver of the vehicle, KLE 8303, at the time of the accident. The 1st respondent is the owner and the 3rd respondent is the insurer. The petitioner states that he has to prove negligence on the part of the tort feasors and for that he has to lead oral and documentary evidence. The petitioner examined one Anto on 13-11-1986. The case has been adjourned for further evidence. The deposition of Anto was not read out. It is unknown whether the Tribunal has recorded the entire deposition. It is stated that the Tribunal announced that it is not bound to record the evidence of the witnesses and get them signed by them. The award of the Tribunal is appealable R.145 and 146 of the Kerala Civil Rules of Practice enjoin the manner in which the deposition should be recorded and read over to the witnesses, etc. R.16 of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal R.1977, in so far as it provides the recording of evidence as in summary trials, is violative of the principles of natural justice. It gives the Tribunals wide and unfettered power. The said R.16 of the Kerala M.A.C.T. Rules, 1977 deserves to be struck down. The petitioner prays for a declaration that R.16 of the Kerala M.A.C.T. Rules is illegal, ultra vires and violative of the principles of natural justice and for other reliefs. 2. I heard Mr. P. Ramanujam, counsel for the petitioner. It was argued that R.16 of Kerala M.A.C.T. Rules 1977, in so far as it provides only for making a brief memorandum of the substance of the evidence of each witness and such memorandum need only be written and signed by the members of the Tribunal, is arbitrary, unfair and violates the principles of natural justice. There is no substance in this argument. As held by a Division Bench this Court in Beeran v. Rajappan (1980 KLT 210) the Claims Tribunal is not a Civil Court. There is no substance in this argument. As held by a Division Bench this Court in Beeran v. Rajappan (1980 KLT 210) the Claims Tribunal is not a Civil Court. It is not bound by the strict rules of the Evidence Act. The following observations by Venkatarama Aiyar J. in Union of India v. T. R. Varma (AIR 1957 SC 882) at p. 885 (paragraph 10) are apposite in this connection: "Now, it is no doubt true that the evidence of the respondent and his witnesses was not taken in the mode prescribed in the Evidence Act; but that Act has no application to enquiries conducted by tribunals, even though they may be judicial in character. The law requires that such tribunals should observe rules of natural justice in the conduct of the enquiry and if they do so, their decision is not liable to be impeached on the ground that the procedure followed was not in accordance with that, which obtains in a Court of law. Stating it broadly and without intending it to be exhaustive, it may be observed that rules of natural justice require that a party should have the opportunity of adducing all relevant evidence on which he relies, that the evidence of the opponent should be taken in his presence, and that he should be given the opportunity of cross-examining the witnesses examined by that party, and that no materials should be relied on against him without his being given an opportunity of explaining them. If these rules are satisfied, the enquiry is not open to attack on the ground that the procedure laid down in the Evidence Act for taking evidence was not strictly followed. Vide the recent decision of this Court in New Prakash Transport Co. v. New Suwarna Transport Co., 1957 SCR 98. ((S) AIR 1957 SC 232) (C) where this question is discussed." The Claims Tribunal is one constituted by the State Government for expeditious disposal of the matter (claims). It is more akin to a quasi-judicial authority. All the trappings of a court cannot be made applicable to it. Like other quasi-judicial authorities, the Claims Tribunal should act fairly and in accordance with the principles of natural justice. What is fair is reasonable and not arbitrary. 3. The word 'natural justice' is not capable of static or precise definition. It is more akin to a quasi-judicial authority. All the trappings of a court cannot be made applicable to it. Like other quasi-judicial authorities, the Claims Tribunal should act fairly and in accordance with the principles of natural justice. What is fair is reasonable and not arbitrary. 3. The word 'natural justice' is not capable of static or precise definition. It cannot be imprisoned in the strait jacket of a cast iron formula. All that it means, is fairness in action. No definite and fixed definition of this term has ever been given. The principles will vary with varying situations of statutory bodies and the rules prescribed by the Act under which they function. The application of the principles will depend upon the nature of the jurisdiction conferred on the authority and the nature and character of the rights of the persons affected, the scheme and the policy of the statute and other attendant circumstances. It is a very flexible principle which can be adjusted and adapted according to the exigency of the situation. The following observations of Lawton Q. in Maxwell v. Department of Trade and Industry (1974) 2 All. ER 122) at page 131 precisely highlights what those words mean: "From time to time during that period lawyers and judges have tried to define what constitutes fairness. Like defining an elephant, it is not easy to do, although fairness in practice has the elephantine quality of being easy to recognise. As a result of these efforts a word in common usage has acquired the trappings of legalism : 'acting fairly' has become 'acting in accordance with the rules of natural justice', and on occasion has been dressed up with Latin tags. This phrase in my opinion serves no useful purpose and in recent years it has encouraged lawyers to try to put those who hold inquires into legal strait jackets. It is pertinent in this connection to recall what Lord Shaw of Dunfermline said in Local Government Board v. Arlldge. This phrase in my opinion serves no useful purpose and in recent years it has encouraged lawyers to try to put those who hold inquires into legal strait jackets. It is pertinent in this connection to recall what Lord Shaw of Dunfermline said in Local Government Board v. Arlldge. 'And the assumption that the methods of natural justice are ex necessitate those of courts of justice is wholly unfounded In so far as the term "natural justice" means that a result or process should be just, it is a harmless though it may be a high-sounding expression; in so far as it attempts to reflect the old jus natural it is a confused and unwarranted transfer into the ethical sphere of a term employed for other distinctions; and, in so far as it is resorted to far other purposes, it is vacuous " The requirement of natural justice in this regard are detailed in T.R. Varma's case (AIR 1957 SC 882) by the Supreme Court adverted to above. Looked at from this angle, it is not possible to say that R.16 of the Kerala M.A.C.T. R.1977, as extracted herein below, is in any way unfair or arbitrary or violates the principles of natural justice: "16. Method of recording evidence. The Claims Tribunal shall as examination of witnesses proceeds, make a brief memorandum of the substance of the evidence of each witness and such memorandum shall be written and signed by the members of the Claims Tribunal and shall form part of the record: Provided that the evidence of medical witness, if any, shall be taken down, as far as possible, word by word." The law does not require that the deposition should be recorded verbatim, or that it should be read over and got signed by the witness, etc. Rules of natural justice are not rigid. R.16 of the Tribunal R.1977 is in accord with fair trial and the principles of natural justice. The argument to the contrary, by the petitioner's counsel is without substance. It is repelled. 4. The scheme of the Motor Vehicles Act and also the rules is in accord with the above view. S.110(C) provides that in holding any enquiry, the Claims Tribunal may, subject to any rules that may be made in that behalf, follow such summary procedure as it thinks fit. It is repelled. 4. The scheme of the Motor Vehicles Act and also the rules is in accord with the above view. S.110(C) provides that in holding any enquiry, the Claims Tribunal may, subject to any rules that may be made in that behalf, follow such summary procedure as it thinks fit. S 111(A) enables the State Government to make rules for the purpose of carrying into effect the provisions of S.110 and 110(E). It is in pursuance thereto that the State Government has framed the rules-The Kerala Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal Rules, 1977. The rule assailed is R.16 of the said Rules. The intention of the Legislature is to expedite the proceedings before the Claims Tribunals. The Legislature has authorised the Claims Tribunals to hold the enquiry and follow such summary procedure as it thinks fit, but it is subject to any rule that may be made in that behalf. The Rules so made or framed are "The Kerala Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal Rules, 1977". The summary procedure contemplated by S.110(C) has been codified in the Rules; R.16 is part of the said scheme. The above provisions of the Act and the Rules specifically provide only for a summary procedure to be followed and it specifically provides as to how the evidence should be recorded. Bearing in mind that the Claims Tribunal is a special Tribunal, constituted for the purpose of speedy disposal of claim cases and if the ordinary procedure of courts are followed it is likely, to entail delay, the Legislature has advisedly made special provision for the various matters, including the method of recording evidence. The scheme discernible from the above provisions of the Act and the Rules do not envisage, nor provide for the recording of the evidence of the witnesses in verbatim or that the depositions should be read over and got signed by the witnesses. It is open to the Legislature to make such provisions to have speedier trial and disposal of the special cases by the Special Tribunals. It has done so. The procedure enacted is also in accord with fair hearing and the principles of natural justice. 5. R.16 of the Kerala Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal Rules, 1977, is intra vires. It is valid. It is unobjectionable. It is consistent with the principles of natural justice. The contention to the contrary in repelled. The O. P. is devoid of force. The procedure enacted is also in accord with fair hearing and the principles of natural justice. 5. R.16 of the Kerala Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal Rules, 1977, is intra vires. It is valid. It is unobjectionable. It is consistent with the principles of natural justice. The contention to the contrary in repelled. The O. P. is devoid of force. It is dismissed in limine. Issue a carbon copy of this judgment to counsel for the petitioner on usual terms.