B. L. YADAV, J. ( 1 ) BY present criminal revision, under sections 397/401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 (for short the Code), order dated 18. 7. 1986 passed by Additional Sessions Judge/special Judge, Meerut passed in Criminal Revision No. 48 of 1986 (Mohd. Islam v. State of U. P. and others) allowing. the revision and setting aside the conditional order dt. 17th April, 1984 passed by City Magistrate, Meerut in a proceeding under sections 133/1. 37 of the Code initiatedagainst Mohd. Islam Opposite party No. 2, is sought to be quashed. ( 2 ) THE facts of the case are few and simple and they are these: The applicants moved an application before the City Magistrate, Meerut purporting to be under sections 133/137 of the Code for initiating proceedings against the opposite party No. 2 as the latter runs in factory in the vicinity for manufacturing Wheel panas and during process of manufacturing, public nuisance, was created due to which the residents of the locality could not deep well not on account of unsual noise, some cracks had been created in neighbouring buildings, hence, it was prayed that opposite party No. 2 may be restrained from creating public nuisance or from running the said factory. The Kotwali Police submitted a challan report against him under section 133 of the Code for taking necessary action. The City Magistrate passed a conditional order under section 133 (1) of the Code on 18/4/1984 asking the opposite party No. 2 to show cause as to why not the said conditional order may be made absolute. ( 3 ) THE opposite party No. 2 appeared and contested the notice alleging that the same was mala fide and that no discomfort was created by the said factory which is being run for the last more than 20 years. In substances the allegations made in the notice and the application were denied and It was urged that even in 1957 similar complaint was filed but the same was dismissed, hence that order would operate as res judicata and 10 any case proceedings are liable to be quashed and the condition order deserves to be discharged. In support of the notice to Initiate proceedings under section 133 of the Code P;w. 1 Walluddin, P. W. 2 Anwar Ahmad, P. W. 3 Mohd. In support of the notice to Initiate proceedings under section 133 of the Code P;w. 1 Walluddin, P. W. 2 Anwar Ahmad, P. W. 3 Mohd. Ishqaue, P. W. 4 Hashmat Khan and P. W. 5 Sabir Ali were examined by the applicants and O. P. W. 1 Islam, O. P. W. 2 Saleem and O. P. W. 3. Babu Ibrahim were examined by opposite party No. 2 and other evidence was also led. ( 4 ) CITY Magistrate, Meerut passed conditional order dated 12/4/1984 directing Mobd. Islam, the opposite party No. 2 to close the factory manufacturing wheel panas, or. to show cause on 25. 4. 84 at 10 a. m. Indicating why not the conditional order dated 17/4/1984 may be confirmed. After taking evidence, as stated above the City Magistrate further directed the opposite party No. 2 that in case he wants to run the factory for manufacturing something other than wheel panas, then he may move an application before the court and obtain appropriate permission. Against that order, opposite party No. 2 preferred a revision which was allowed on 18-7-1986 by the Additional Sessions Judge/special Judge, Meerut and order dated 7th February 1986 was set aside and conditional order dated 17. 4. 1984 was discharged. Against that revisional order present revision has been filed. ( 5 ) MR. Tapan Ghosh learned counsel for the applicant urged that on the basis of evidence on record particularly the statements of P. W. 1 Waliuddin, P. W. 2 Anwar Ahmad, P. W. 3. Mohd. Ishaque and P. W. 4 Hashmat Khan, it was proved that in the process or manufacturing wheel-panas in the factory run by the opposite party No. 2 public-nuisance was created by its unusual sound and even the health of the residents of the locality was hadly affected and the walls of so many adjoining buildings have been cracked and during process of manufacturing, it appears that the walls would fall down and as the opposite party No. 2 has intensified the mo do of manufacturing since dismissal of earlier application hence fresh cause of action was created, therefore dismissal of earlier application in 1957, shall have no effect and the re was no justification to set aside the order dated 7/2/1986 and to discharge the order dated 17th April. 1984. 1984. It was further urged by learned counsel for the applicant that revision before Sessions Judge was not maintainable as order dated 7/2/1986 confirm in g the conditional order was an Interlocutory order. Reliance was placed on Smt. Premlata v. Ram Lubhaya. Mr. V. Sahay and Mr. B. Dayal learned counsels for the opposite party No. 2 urged that when the opposite party No. 2 appeared before the court in pursuance of the conditional order passed under section 133 (1) of the Code and he has shown sufficient cause that the conditional order dated 12-4-84 should not be made absolute as no public nuisance was created by manufacturing wheel panas, nor any obstruction was created by the same rather at any rate, it was just a private-nuisance, therefore the application under section 133 of the Code could lie, and in any case as the existence of the public nuisance was denied, and the sufficient cause was shown, as to why the conditional order may not be made absolute and reliable evidence was led in support of the denial by examining O. P. Ws, 1, 2 and 3 hence in view of section 137 (1) and (2) of the Code, proceedings under section 133 must have been stayed bi the Magistrate until existence of such right is decided by the competent court. Reliance was placed on Janeshwari Devi Dutt v. Ved Singh and others, Mahbir Singh v. State and Rekhai Singh v. State. Sri Jagdish Tewari, learned counsel for the State supported the impugned order. ( 6 ) HAVING heard learned counsel for the parties points for determination ate that as to whether the order making conditional order absolutely was interlocutory or final order and as a co sequence thereof whether the revision before the Sessions Judge was maintainable and the next point whether in the instant case nuisance complained of was a public nuisance or a private nuisance and what can be said to constitute a nuisance. The other point is whether after leading reliable, evidence in support of the denial the procedure under section 137 of the Code ought to have been followed and the proceedings under section 133 must be stayed till the controversy-was judicata upon by the competent court. ( 7 ) AS regards first point whether the revision was maintainable before the Sessions Judge and whether the order making conditional order absolute was an interlocutory order. ( 7 ) AS regards first point whether the revision was maintainable before the Sessions Judge and whether the order making conditional order absolute was an interlocutory order. The principles applicable in deciding as to whether particular order happens to be interlocutory or final has been pointed out and explained in a number of decisions including Jai Prakash Singh and another v. Radhey Shyam Singh and others, decided by me. In not shell the principle is that in case after passing an order, in a particular proceeding something more remains to be done, It is an interlocutory order and in case by passing an order that proceeding itself exhausts and nothing more remains to be done, it Is a final order. Further, the rejection of plea or the order passed In respect of a particular point or controversy If-concludes particular proceeding, same will be a final order and not interlocutory order. It Would Not be out of place to refer to the relevant; discussion from Halsburys Laws of England, Fourth Edition, Volume 26, para 505 which Is as follows: - 505 Final judgments anti orders. In general a judgment or order which deter mines the principal matter in question is termed final. A final judgment has been defined as a judgment obtained in an action by which a previously existing liability of the defendant to the plaintiff in ascertained or established and as a judgment obtained in an action by which the question whether there was pre-existing right of the plaintiff against the defendant is -finally determined In favour either of the piaintiff or of the defendant. A final order is none the less final by reason that it is subject to appeal, and a judgment may be final even though it directs inquiries, or deals with costs only or is made on an interlocutory application, or reserves liberty to apply, See Shubronk v. Tufnell, Salter Rex Co. v. Ghosh. In Salaman v. Warner, it was held al follows If their decision whichever way it is given will, if finally dispose of the matter in dispute, I think that for the purposes of these rules it is final; On the other hand, if there decisions, if given in one way, will finally dispose of the matter in dispute, but if given in the other, will allow the action to go on, then 1 think it is not final but interlocutory. In Mohanlal Manganlal Thakkar v. State of Gujarat, it was held that the meaning of the words final and interlocutory has therefore, to be considered separately in relation to the principal purpose for which it was required. Same principle has been explained in Madhu Limaya v. State of Maharashtra. In the present case as after the conditional order was passed, opposite party No. 2 appeared and has shown cause objecting the notice and after considering that conditional order was made absolutely and the Magistrate refused to stay proceedings under section 137 (2) and that order was a final order and not interlocutory order hence the revision against that order was certainly maintainable before the Sessions Judge. Smt. Prem Lata v. Ram Lubhaya (supra) relied upon by the applicant was on different facts about order to be passed under section 146 (1) in case of emergency was certainly an interlocutory order, but that analogy would not apply to an order under section 133 (1) nw s. 137 (2) of the Code, hence the case of Smt Prem Lata v. Ram Lubhaya (supra) was besides the point. In these cases of Janeshwar Devi Dutta v. Ved Singh and others and Mahabir Singh v. State (supra) relied upon by the opposite party, while interpreting the scope of the order under sections 133 and 137 (2), refusing to stay proceedings, such order was held to be final order and not interlocutory. These are relevant cases based on similar facts. ( 8 ) ADVERTING to the second point, whether in the instant case the Nuisance complained of was a public nuisance or a private nuisance and what can be said to constitute a nuisance. According to Pollock, nuisance is the wrong done to a man by unlawfully disturbing him (a) in the enjoyment of his property, or, in some cases, (b) in the exercise of a common right. Winfield and Jolowicz on Tort (Twelfth Edition; 1984) define Public Nuisance (on page 378 and 379) as follows: A public or common nuisance is one which materially affects the reasonable comfort and convenience of life of a class of Her Majesty s subjects who come within the sphere or neighbourhood of its operation. But this definition is vague and it has been rightly said that nuisance covers a multitude of sins great and small. But this definition is vague and it has been rightly said that nuisance covers a multitude of sins great and small. Public nuisance of Common law includes such diverse activities as carrying on an offensive trade, keeping a disorderly house, selling food unfit for human consumption, obstructing public high ways, throwing fire works about in the stress and holding an ill advised pop-festival. (See South port Corporation v. Esso Petroleum Co Ltd, (1954) WQB 182 per Denning ,l. J. Attorney General for Ontario y. Orange Production Ltd. (1971) 21 DLR 3 (3rd) 257. Sir Arthwar Underhill on his Law of Torts (Sixteenth Edition) page 118, describes public nuisance as under: A public nuisance is some unlawful act, or omission to discharge some legal duty, which act or omission endangers the lives; safety, health or comfort of the public or by which the public are obstructed in the exercise of some common right. No action can be brought by a private persons for a public nuisance unless he has suffered substantial particular damage beyond that suffered by the public generally. A, private nuisance has been described on page 12, Chapter V as under: A private nuisance is some un-authorised user of a mans own property causing damage to the property of another or some un-authorised interference with anothers enjoyment of his property, causing damage. Any private nuisance whereby sensible injury is caused to the property of another, or whereby the ordinary physical comfort of human existence in such property is materially interfered with, is actionable Harry Street, in his Law of Tort (Seventh Edition) 1983 observes on page 229 as follows:- The essence of the tort of nuisance is the interference with enjoyment of, land The generic conception of nuisance can readily be illustrated. It covers interference with use and enjoyment of land by water, fire, smoke smell, fumes, gas noise, heat, electricity, disease or any other like thing which may I cause such an inconvenience. Nevertheless, the term nuisance is used in different senses by the Judges and this has caused confusion both in the development and in the exposition of this branch of the law of torts. Nevertheless, the term nuisance is used in different senses by the Judges and this has caused confusion both in the development and in the exposition of this branch of the law of torts. Salmond on law of Torts (sixteenth Edition) page 52 states as follows Nuisance is commonly a continuing wrong that is to say, it consists in the establishment or maintenance of some state of affairs which continuously or repeatedly causes the escape of noxious things into the plaintiffs land (e. g. a streage of foul water or the constant noise or small factory ). An excape of something on single occasion would not ordinarily be termed a. nuisance. Nuisances are of two kinds, public and private, private nuisance is a civil wrong; a public or common nuisance is a criminal offence. ( 9 ) APART from aforesaid definitions as given by eminent authors on the Law of Torts, it is also convenient in the present case to look into the definition of Public. Nuisance as given under section 268 of I. P. C. as follows A person is guilty of a public nuisance who does any act or is guilty of an illegal omission, which causes any common injury, danger or annoyance to the public or to the people in general who dwell or occupy property in the vicinity, or which must necessarily cause injury, obstruction, danger or annoyance to persons who may have occasion to use any public rightt. ( 10 ) PRIVATE nuisance affects only private individuals in contradiction to the public at large. In other words it is an act or, omission Intended to hurt or create annoyance, injury or discomfort to a private individual or to the property possessed by a private individual. In brief in some cases the same act may constitute a public nuisance as well as a private nuisance. Very often it is evident, that the nuisance and public nuisance may in few instances be overlapping. It is the quantum of annoyance or discomfort or injury which distinguishes private nuisance from public nuisance. ( 11 ) IT is better to refer the remedies available against the private nuisance and public nuisance. Sections 133 to 144 of the Code deal with public nuisance. It is in convinceable that the provisions of sections 133 to 144 can be made-applicable to private nuisance. The remedies available are both in civil and criminal nature. ( 11 ) IT is better to refer the remedies available against the private nuisance and public nuisance. Sections 133 to 144 of the Code deal with public nuisance. It is in convinceable that the provisions of sections 133 to 144 can be made-applicable to private nuisance. The remedies available are both in civil and criminal nature. Against private nuisance civil remedy is available under section 91 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 by filing a civil suit for declaration and injunction or for such other relief as may be appropriate in the circumstances of the case and in that suit plaintiff need not prove for he has sustained any special damage. The other remedy available is under Criminal Law by prosecution of the person responsible under different sections provided under Chapter XV (fifteen) of the Indian Penal Code. The next remedy is in the from of summary proceedings in urgent matters pertaining to the public nuisance etc. and the same has been provided under sections 133 to 144 of the Code. One more remedy is also available against public nuisance that is provided under Special or Local Laws, including Section 405 of U. P. Nagar Maha Palika Adhiniyam 1959, Section 126 of the Cantonments Act 1952 etc. In the instant case as the nuisance complained of was affecting public at large in as much as if while manufacturing wheel panas some unusual noise or disturbance was created it certainly affected the public at large and as alleged if cracks were formed in the buildings of the locality that affected the public in general and not only any private Individual. Therefore in the present case nuisance was certainly of public nuisance and the remedy available in the summary proceedings was by way of an application under section 133 of the Code. If may be clarified that the remedy against public nuisance under section 133 was essentially a civil remedy but as the matter pertains to urgent situation power to pass appropriate order was given to the Magistrate concerned, otherwise if for similar purposes some urgent remedy was provided in summary proceedings in a civil court that would have prolonged the proceeding. If may be clarified that the remedy against public nuisance under section 133 was essentially a civil remedy but as the matter pertains to urgent situation power to pass appropriate order was given to the Magistrate concerned, otherwise if for similar purposes some urgent remedy was provided in summary proceedings in a civil court that would have prolonged the proceeding. ( 12 ) ADVERTING to the last point as to whether after the opposite party No. 2 appeared and denied the existence of the public right or in, other words denied that there was any public nuisance as alleged by the application; was it necessary for the Magistrate concerned to have stayed the proceeding in view of the provisions of Section 133 read with Section 131 of the Code and direct the parties to get their rights decided by a competent civil court or instead of doing so the Magistrate must have considered the evidence on merits. In such cases it is better to apply elementary principle of interpretation that the interpretation must be sexual and contextual both. The procedure has been provided under section 137 when the opposite party appears and denies the existence of the right. As the principle of interpretation is that entire statute has to be read together, the other principle cc. related to the same is that the different parts of entire section must be read together. In the present case when the opposite party No. 2 appears and after he is served with an order under section 133 of the Code the Magistrate shall ask him whether he is denying existence of the public right. In case such denial was made, as was done in the present case, in that event it became obligatory on the part of the Magistrate to hold an enquiry into the matter under section 137 and to ascertain as to whether opposite party has produced the reliable evidence in support of the denial, Tin case be is of the view that there is just some reliable evidence and not such evidence on the basis of which rights, or title of the parties could be decided rather it must be an evidence on which prima facie reliance could be placed. Although after thorough scrutiny the evidence might not be such on which some positive finding could be recorded or on the basis of which rights of either party could be determined finally. In case there is some just prima facie reliable evidence and which is certainly not conclusive evidence, in that event, the jurisdiction of the Magistrate Is, ousted and it has been provided under section 137 (2) of the Code that be shall stay the proceedings, and direct the parties to get their rights adjudicated upon by a competent civil court and he has been directed by the Legislature not to decide as to whether public right exists or not, The use of words that be shall stay the proceedings indicates that the Legislature was conscious to make the provisions of section 137 (2) to be mandatory and imperative and not just directory. ( 13 ) IT is also to be noticed that under section 137 (1) the Legislature has used. the word that after the denial of such right by opposite party the Magistrate shall inquire into the matter and not that the Magistrate shall adjudicate upon or decide the matter or controversy between the parties. The word Tinquire, means eager, to acquire information. The word inquire, according to Shorter Oxford English Dictionary means to search into, to seek knowledge to make inquisition, to make investigation, to seek information by questioning, to seek or to try to find out. The word reliable evidence having been used and the Magistrate having been directed to inquire into the matter and not to decide or adjudicate upon, it is clear that the person, denying the public right has to put forward a just and bona fide claim. In case the Magistrate finds that there is some reliable evidence and certainly not a conclusive evidence in support of the denial of any public right he must stay the proceeding and party aggrieved has a right to get the matter decided by a competent court. I am however, of the view that the section does not make it clear as to who is the person as to whether first party or the second party, who has to approach the Civil Court. I am however, of the view that the section does not make it clear as to who is the person as to whether first party or the second party, who has to approach the Civil Court. One thing more may be clarified that in case the Magistrate finds that there is no such reliable evidence in that event he shall proceed In view of the provisions of Section 138 of the Code. In the instant case what has been done is entirely different. Even though the Magistrate confirmed the conditional order but the revision has been disposed of by the learned Additional Sessions Judge in total disregard of the pro visions of section 133 read with Section 137 of the Code. The learned Sessions Judge was exercising the came jurisdiction as was to be exercised by the learned Magistrate, He must have also proceeded to decide the case just with a view to make an enquiry as to whether there was some reliable evidence led by the opposite party No. 2 who denied the existence of such right and incase he found that there wall reliable evidence his jurisdiction ceases and it was for the civil court to decide the same. ( 14 ) A bare perusal of the impugned Older dated 18/7/1986 passed by Additional Sessions Judge would indicate that be has met the evidence as if be was to decide the rights and title of the parties on merits and not just to ascertain by enquiring into the matter as to whether there was some material and reliable evidence in support of the denial or not. On page 6 of the order of Additional Sessions Judge there is an observation to the effect that The P. Ws. have nothing to say against the noise created by those 12 other Units Naturally, they are used and accustomed to the discomfort caused by the noise made by these units. The Unit of the revisionist could also be creating some noise It is difficult to believe that the discomfort was caused to the heart patient and the students only by the Unit run by the revisionist while the other 12 Units put collectively were not causing any unbearable discomfort. By leaving this important fact out of consideration, the learned Magistrate has arrived at a finding which appears to be perverse. By leaving this important fact out of consideration, the learned Magistrate has arrived at a finding which appears to be perverse. In the next paragraph Additional Sessions Judge has proceeded with the observation, A perusal of the judgment of the learned Magistrate would show that he has not made any serious effort to scrutinize the evidence on record. ( 15 ) IN this view of the matter it is crystal clear that the Additional Sessions Judge had decided the revision in complete disregard of the mandatory provisions of Section 137 of the Code. He must have ascertained whether the learned Magistrate has made an enquiry just to ascertain whether there was any reliable evidence in support of the denial of the public right. The learned Additional Sessions Judge has proceeded to scrutinize the evidence on the record particularly the statements of the P. Ws. He did not proceed to ascertain if there was some reliable evidence in support of the denial. In this view of the matter the order passed by learned Sessions Judge is vitiated and cannot be sustained In the case Rekhai Singh v. State (supra) relied upon by the learned counsel for the opposite party No. 2, the order of the Magistrate refusing to stay proceedings under section 139a of old Section 137 (2) of the present Code. ( 16 ) UNDER similar facts, the order of Magistrate was set aside. There appears to be reliable evidence in support of the denial of public right, hence it is eminently just that the proceedings under section 133 of the Code must be ordered to remain stayed until the matter of existence of such public right has been decided by a competent Civil Court. It is however made clear that the party aggrieved may file a civil suit in the civil Court for appropriate relief. ( 17 ) IN the result, the revision succeeds and is allowed in part. The impugned order dated 18/7/1986 pased by Additional Sessions Judge and that of the Magistrate dated 7/2/1986 are modified to the exetent that the proceedings under section 133 of the Code are directed to be stayed until the matter of, existence of such public right has been decided by a competent civil court. Revision allowed in part. .