J. P. DESAI, J. ( 1 ) THERE is overwhelming evidence on record to establish that the Appellant No. 7 original accused No. 10 fired a Tamancha which caused injuries to the deceased Dhana Rava. The evidence of medical officer who performed Post-Mortem examination on the dead-body of Dhana Rava shows that there was injury on the person of the deceased which is possible by a fire-arm. The evidence shows that there was an entry wound as well as exit wound. This shows that the prosecution evidence gets corroboration from the medical evidence that deceased Dhana Rava was injured by a fire-arm. The accused No. 10 is therefore rightly held responsible by the learned trial Judge for having caused this injury to the deceased. The Medical Officer stated in his evidence that there was also another injury on the head of the deceased which is possible by a sharp-cutting instrument like dharia. The prosecution evidence does not disclose who caused that injury to the deceased. The evidence of Medical Officer recorded before the trial Court shows that the cause of death was injury to the brain as a result of the injury caused on the head and injury caused to the lung by a fire-arm. There was only one fire-arm injury on the person of the deceased and that shows that the injury was caused by accused No. 10 The Medical Officer did not specifically depose about the nature of the two injuries; one caused by a fire-arm and the other caused by a dharia. In view of this the Medical Officer was summoned before this Court to give evidence in this regard by an order passed by this Court on 27-2-1986. The Medical Officer appeared before this Court on 28-3-1986. He was questioned about the nature of two injuries. He stated that the injury which was caused to the brain was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. As regards the injury caused by a fire arm to the lung the Medical Officer stated that the said injury was not sufficient in ordinary course of nature to cause death. He deposed that it was only likely to cause death. He even deposed that if proper treatment by a competent surgeon is given such an injury can be cured and patient can survive. He deposed that it was only likely to cause death. He even deposed that if proper treatment by a competent surgeon is given such an injury can be cured and patient can survive. He specifically stated that the said injury to the lung coupled with the corresponding injury was likely to cause death. This shows that the person who gave dharia blow would definitely be guilty of the offence of murder but so far as the accused No. 2 who fired a Tamancha on the deceased cannot be held guilty either of the offence of murder or for the offence of culpable homicide not amounting to murder though we may say that by firing Tamancha at the deceased the accused No. 10 intended to cause his death. For holding a person guilty either for the offence of culpable homicide not amounting to murder or for the offence of murder it must be established that the death was the result of the injury caused by that person looking to the evidence of the Medical Officer recorded in this Court on 28-3-1986 it appears that the deceased very probably died on account of the injury sustained by him by dharia on his head. The Medical evidence does not show that the cause of death was the injury caused to the lung. When there were two injuries found on the person of the deceased one sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death and the other only likely to cause death it cannot be said with certainty that the deceased died of the injury which was likely to cause death. It can be said from the evidence of the Medical Officer recorded in this Court on 28-3-1986 that the deceased very probably died not on account of injury sustained by him by Tamancha hut by the injury sustained by him by dharia on his head. In view of this accused No. 10 who fired Tamancha cannot be held responsible for causing the death of the deceased. In view of this conviction of the accused No. 10 for the offence of murder cannot be sustained. He cannot be held guilty even of the offence punishable under Sec. 304 of the I. P. Code because the evidence does not establish that his act has resulted in the death of the deceased. In view of this conviction of the accused No. 10 for the offence of murder cannot be sustained. He cannot be held guilty even of the offence punishable under Sec. 304 of the I. P. Code because the evidence does not establish that his act has resulted in the death of the deceased. ( 2 ) THE next question is as to of which offence this accused No. 10 can be convicted This accused fired a Tamancha at the deceased. The inquest panchanama shows that there was some blackening on the body of the deceased at the site where Tamancha injury was caused. This shows that Tamancha was fired not from a very long distance. We can definitely say that the accused No. 10 by firing a Tamancha intended to cause the death of the deceased though his act does not appear to have resulted in the death. If the deceased had died of the injury sustained by him at the hands of accused No. 10 the accused No. 10 should have been guilty of offence of murder. In view of this we are inclined to say that the accused No. 10 can be held guilt) of the offence punishable under Sec. 307 of the I. P. Code. We are therefore. inclined to set aside the conviction of the accused No. 10 Raidhan Vira of the offence punishable under Sec. 302 of the I P Code and acquit him of the same but in its stead convict him of the offence punishable under Sec. 307 of the I. P. Code. We are therefore. inclined to set aside the conviction of the accused No. 10 Raidhan Vira of the offence punishable under Sec. 302 of the I P Code and acquit him of the same but in its stead convict him of the offence punishable under Sec. 307 of the I. P. Code. Looking to the nature of the weapons with which the accused were armed and which were used in the commission of these offences we would have been inclined to hold that the common object was to Commit murder or at any rate that the accused must have known that the offence of a murder was likely to be committed in prosecution of the common object whatever the common object be and hold all the accused guilty under Sec. 302 read with Sec. 149 of the I. P. Code FOr attracting established is that the common object of the unlawful assembly was to commit a particular offence or that the accused who were the members of unlawful assembly must have known that a particular offence was likely to be committed in prosecution of the common object of the unlawful assembly even if the common object may be different. The learned trial Judge has held that the accused No. 10 might be holding Tamancha and others might not have seen it. There is nothing on record to show that the accused No. 10 had taken out Tamancha from his pocket and then fired the same. Apart from this fact when four other accused were armed with deadly weapons which are visible and hence the common object could be none else than to commit murder. At any rate it can be said that the persons who formed an unlawful assembly must have known that the death was likely to be caused in prosecution of the common object of the unlawful assembly even if we take it that the common object was only to cause hurt or grievous hurt. In view of this the accused could have been convicted of the offence punishable under Sec. 302 read with Sec. 149 of the I. P Code even if the common object was not to commit murder. In view of this the accused could have been convicted of the offence punishable under Sec. 302 read with Sec. 149 of the I. P Code even if the common object was not to commit murder. This question does not arise for our consideration in the present appeals firstly because we are inclined to hold that there was no unlawful assembly as held by the learned trial Judge and secondly because the State has not filed any appeal against the acquittal for the offence punishable under Sec. 149 read with Sec. 302 of the I. P. Code. (REST of the Judgment is not material for the Reports.)CRI. App. 1035 of 1982 partly allowed. Cri. App. 1282 of 1982 dismissed. .