JUDGMENT V.K. Khanna, J. - This is a defendant's revision under Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act against the decision of the Judge. Small Causes Court, Saharanpur decreeing the plaintiffs suit for ejectment of the applicants from the premises in dispute and also for recovery of rent and damages for use and occupation of accommodation in dispute. 2. Late Shriyans Prasad Jain had filed the suit giving rise to this revision against the defendants on the ground that he is the landlord-owner of the property in dispute and the defendants were tenants on a monthly rent of Rs. 1,000 besides the Municipal taxes of Rs. 175 per month which are to be paid in addition to the rent. According to the plaintiff the provisions of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 were not applicable to the property in dispute. The tenancy of the defendants was terminated under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act by giving a notice dated 1-8-1979 but despite service of notice the defendants failed to comply with the same and thus the suit was filed: 3. The aforesaid suit was contested by the defendants, Food Corporation of India on the ground that the provisions of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 were applicable and that the notice served on the defendants was illegal and the suit was barred by the provisions of Section 80 C.P.C. 4. The Trial Court recorded finding that the accommodation in dispute was outside the purview of the U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 and that the notice was not illegal. The plaintiff's suit was accordingly decreed. Feeling aggrieved the defendants preferred the present revision. The revision was heard by Hon'ble Mr. The Trial Court recorded finding that the accommodation in dispute was outside the purview of the U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 and that the notice was not illegal. The plaintiff's suit was accordingly decreed. Feeling aggrieved the defendants preferred the present revision. The revision was heard by Hon'ble Mr. Justice B.N. Sapru and on 22-4-1987 the following issue was remitted to the Trial Court: "Whether the plaintiff-respondent is entitled to the benefit of the proviso to Section 2, sub-Section (2) of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972, in respect of the accommodation in suit ?" In pursuance of the aforesaid direction the Trial Court has given a decision on the issue which had been remitted and recorded a finding that the building in question had been constructed substantially out of the amount of loan obtained by the plaintiff from the Life Insurance Corporation of India and, as such, the plaintiff-landlords are entitled to get the benefits of proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 2 of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. 5. It may be mentioned that the revision was against listed before Hon'ble Mr. Justice B.N. Sapru but the same was release on 14-8-1987. 6. Learned Counsel appearing for the applicants has first challenged the judgment including the finding of the ground that as the plaintiff has raised no pleading to get the benefit of proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 2 of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (hereinafter described as the "Act") an issue should not have been remitted by this Court to the Trial Court. Learned Counsel appearing for the respondent has, however, contended that in para 4 of the plaint it was specifically stated by the plaintiff-landlord that the provisions of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 are not applicable to the disputed premises and that Late Shriyans Prasad Jain had even deposed to that effect in his statement before the court that he had constructed the building in question by taking a loan from the Life Insurance Corporation of India and a certificate obtained from the Life Insurance Corporation of India to that effect has also been filed. It has thus been contended that the pleading was already there and at the time of the decision of the remitted issue the plaintiffs have only amplified their pleadings by filing evidence in support of the evidence which already existed on the record. 7. A perusal of the plaint would clearly show that in para 4 of the plaint, the plaintiff had pleaded that the provisions of U.P. Act. No. 13 of 1972 were not applicable to the disputed premises. It may be noted that the suit by the plaintiff was filed on 23rd September 1979. The first assessment of the building had been made on 1-10-1972. It, is therefore clear that it was not at all essential for the plaintiff to have taken the benefit of the extended period under the proviso as at the time of the filing the suit even the period of 10 years had not elapsed. It may, however, be noted that the plaintiff Late Shriyans Prasad Jain examined himself before the Trial Court on 5th February 1980 and in his evidence he had clearly stated that he had taken loan from the L.I.C. in connection with the construction of the disputed building. Shriyans Prasad had also filed paper No. 61-C (Exh. 20) which is a letter from the Divisional Manager of the L.I.C. which Clearly stated that the loan given by the L.I.C. had not been repaid. In these circumstances it can not be said that there was no pleading and evidence on behalf of the plaintiff as the plaintiff in the plaint had only to plead that the premises the provisions of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 were not applicable. In any view of the matter, in the referring order Hon'ble Mr. Justice B.N. Sapru has held that in order to do justice between the parties it was necessary that the matter be examined by the Trial Court and the finding of the Trial Court be remitted to this Court on the remitted issue. On the facts and circumstances of the case I am in respectful agreement with Hon'ble Mr. Justice B.N. Sapru that for proper adjudication of the case a decision on the remitted issue was necessary. 8. On the facts and circumstances of the case I am in respectful agreement with Hon'ble Mr. Justice B.N. Sapru that for proper adjudication of the case a decision on the remitted issue was necessary. 8. Learned Counsel for the applicant then contended that the plaintiff is not entitled to get the benefits of the proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 2 of the Act as the repayment of the loan was to be made within a period of 11 years. It had been contended that the words "actually repaid" and the "date of repayment" are two different things and as the date for repayment has expired the benefit of the proviso could not be availed by the plaintiff. 9. Sub-section (2) of the Section 2 of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 runs as follows : "(2) Except as provided in sub-section (5) of Section 12, sub-section (1-A) of Section 21 sub-section (2) of Section 24, Section 24-A, 24-B, 24-C or sub-section-(3) of Section 29, nothing in this Act shall apply to a building during a period of ten years from the date on which its construction is completed. Provided that where any building is constructed substantially out of funds obtained by way of loan or advance from the State Government or the Life Insurance Corporation of India or a bank or a Co-operative Society or the U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad and the period of repayment of such loan or advance exceeds the aforesaid period of ten years then the reference in this sub-section to the period of ten years shall be deemed to be a reference to the period of fifteen years or the period ending with the date of actual repayment of such loan or advance (including interest) whichever is shorter." That aforesaid proviso has widened the scope of exemption as under the general provision the exemption is for a period of 10 years. The aforesaid period of 10 years has been widened in case any building has been constructed substantially out of the funds obtained by way of loan or advance from the State Government or the Life Insurance Corporation or a Bank or a Co-operative Society or the Uttar Pradesh Avas Evam Vikas Parishad. The aforesaid period of 10 years has been widened in case any building has been constructed substantially out of the funds obtained by way of loan or advance from the State Government or the Life Insurance Corporation or a Bank or a Co-operative Society or the Uttar Pradesh Avas Evam Vikas Parishad. The further condition for extension is that the period of repayment of such loan or advance exceeds the aforesaid period of 10 years then the reference in this sub-section to the period) of 10 years shall be deemed to be a reference to the period of 15 years or the period ending with the date of actual repayment of such loan or advance (including interest) whichever is shorter. (Emphasis provided). The real thing which falls for determination is as to whether in case the agreement under which the loan had been given contemplated its repayment before the expiry of 15 years from the date of giving the loan but the loan has not been re-paid within the period agreed but has been paid after 15 years, the question then arises as to whether under the proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 2 of the Act the provisions of the Act will not apply for a period of 15 years. On a plain reading of the language of the proviso there cannot be an iota of doubt that the intention of the Legislature was that it is for the entire period during which the loan subsists, i.e., till it is not actually repaid, the exemption benefit under the proviso will be available subject to a limitation that the aforesaid period cannot be for more than 15 years. In case the loan has been repaid in less than 15 years the benefit will be till the date of actual repayment of such loan. 10. Learned counsel for the applicant has then tried to challenge the finding recorded by the Court below on the remitted issue on merits. It has been urged that no opportunity has been given to lead evidence and further that the evidence filed by the plaintiff did not prove his case. 11. The original record in this case was before the Court at the time of arguments. It has been urged that no opportunity has been given to lead evidence and further that the evidence filed by the plaintiff did not prove his case. 11. The original record in this case was before the Court at the time of arguments. From the order sheet it is absolutely clear that the applicants were given full opportunity to adduce evidence in rebuttal and there is no application on the record of the case which may show that the applicants have made any such grievance before the Court below at the time of decision of the remitted issue sent by this Court. 12. As far as the argument raised by the learned Counsel for the applicant that the plaintiff had not adduced evidence to prove that he had taken loan from the Life Insurance Corporation of India, the same is without any substance. One of the plaintiffs examined himself and also an employee of the Life insurance Corporation of India. The mortgage deed and other documents have also been filed which clearly prove that in connection with the construction of the building loan had been taken from the Life Insurance Corporation. Income-tax papers filed show that in the construction of the building a sum of Rs. 1,10,000/- was spent. The loan which was taken by the plaintiff landlord from the Life Insurance Corporation comes to Rs. 60,619.66 Paise. The Court below thus rightly held that building had been constructed substantially out of the funds obtained by way of loan from the Life Insurance Corporation. The plaintiff is thus entitled to the benefit of proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 2 of the Act. 13. It has then been urged that on the death of Sri Shriyans Prasad Jain policy matured and the heirs of Sri Shriyans Prasad Jain were entitled to the amount under the insurance policy. It has been urged that the heirs intentionally did not repay the amount of loan and thus they cannot take advantage of their own illegal acts. On this question also evidence was led before the Trial Court at the time of the decision of the remitted issue. The heirs of the deceased plaintiff led evidence that repayment could not be made because the unmarried daughter of Sri Shriyans Prasad Jain was married and the money was spent in solemnising the marriage after the death of deceased Sri Shriyans Prasad Jain. The heirs of the deceased plaintiff led evidence that repayment could not be made because the unmarried daughter of Sri Shriyans Prasad Jain was married and the money was spent in solemnising the marriage after the death of deceased Sri Shriyans Prasad Jain. In my opinion, this argument raised by the learned Counsel for the applicants have got no bearing on the controversy raised in the present revision. However, even otherwise on the finding recorded by the Court below on this question it cannot be held that the repayment was with-held just for playing a fraud and for the purposes of getting the benefit of the proviso. 14. The last argument raised by the learned Counsel for the applicants is that the notice given by the plaintiff was illegal and invalid inasmuch as the tenant of the premises in dispute was the Food Corporation of India and no notice had been given to the Food Corporation of India terminating the tenancy under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. At the very out set it may be mentioned that from the Trial Court's judgment it is clear that the invalidity of the notice pleaded before the Trial Court was on the ground that since U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 applies to the premises in dispute the notice was invalid. No such point which is now being raised before this Court had been urged before the Court below. Learned counsel for the applicant has frankly conceded that the validity of the notice had not been challenged before the Court below on the ground which is being taken before this Court. It has thus to be seen at the very out set as to whether in these circumstances the applicant should be allowed to raise this point. It has not been disputed before me that a notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act had been given to the Chairman Food Corporation of India, the Zonal Manager, Food Corporation of India, the Senior Regional Manager, Food Corporation of India and the District Manager, Food Corporation of India. The suit has also been filed against these four officers. I have carefully gone through the written statement which has been filed by the defendants. The suit has also been filed against these four officers. I have carefully gone through the written statement which has been filed by the defendants. In reply to paragraph 2 of the plaint it has been specifically alleged in the written statement that the defendants admit that they are tenants of the premises in dispute at the rate of Rs. 1175/- per month. In para 2 of the additional pleas it has been stated that the defendants are tenants in the premises in dispute since 15th April, 1972, The plea which is being raised by the applicants will involve adjudication on questions of fact and the argument raised by the learned Counsel for the applicant that the plea raised is only a plea which involves a question of law is not correct. In my opinion, in view of the admission made by the defendants in the written statement that they are the tenants of the premises in dispute, and also because no such point had been raised before the Trial Court, it cannot be said that the finding recorded by the Court below is not in accordance with law. 15. The finding recorded by the Court below is that under the Act the building will be deemed to have been constructed on 1-10-1972. As the plaintiffs are entitled to the benefit of the proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 2 of the Act, the provisions of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 will not apply for a period of 15 years starting from 1st October, 1972. The defendants are thus not entitled to the benefit of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 and the decree for ejectment passed by the Court below is thus liable to be affirmed. 16. No other point has been pressed before me. 17. For the reasons stated above, the present revision is dismissed with costs.