Goswamy ( 1 ) THIS appeal by the owner-landlord is directed against theorder dated 15. 1. 1985 passed by the Rent Control Tribunal whereby hisappeal against the holding of objections to the execution under section 21 ofthe Delhi Rent Control Act was also dismissed. ( 2 ) THE appellant let his property namely house No. D-192, Ashokvihar Phase 1. New Delhi ground floor to the respondent under section 21of the Delhi Rent Control Act on 10. 7. 1979. In the application under section21 it was stated that the petitioner at the relevant time was on deputation atkathmandu and after the expiry of period of deputation in February 1982 hewould come to Delhi with his family and would reside in the house in dispute. Since the appellant himself was actually on deputation, a statement to the sameeffect was made by the general attorney of the appellant. The respondent alsoagreed to take the property under section 21 and accepted the reasonings givenby the appellant Consequently the Rent Controller by his order dated10. 7. 1079 allowed the application and granted permission to let the propertyunder section 21 of the Act. ( 3 ) AFTER the expiry of the period, the appellant filed a petition for execution. In response to the notice issued to the respondent, the respondent filed his objections to the execution. Though the objection petition runs into several pages butthe main objections are to the effect that even at earlier occasions the appellanthad been letting parts of his property under section 21 of the Act and the firstfloor of the house in dispute had already been let under section 21 of the Actand this fact was not disclosed to the Rent Controller in the application or inthe statement. The objection, regarding non-disclosure of the fact that the firstfloor of the property had already been let under section 21, was upheld bythe Rent Controller as also by the Tribunal. The main ground being thatthis was a material fact which had been suppressed and as such the appellantwas not entitled to seek eviction. The Rent Controller as also the Tribunalattempted to go into the question of sufficiency of accommodation availableto the appellant on the first floor of the house. ( 4 ) I have heard the learned counsel, for the parties, at length. The Rent Controller as also the Tribunalattempted to go into the question of sufficiency of accommodation availableto the appellant on the first floor of the house. ( 4 ) I have heard the learned counsel, for the parties, at length. I find, asalready stated above, the only point which prevailed with the Tribunal was thesuppression of the fact of letting the first floor under section 21, for the samereason as was stated for letting the ground floor to the respondent. Accordingto the Tribunal, this was a material fact and should have been disclosed bythe appellant. After giving my careful consideration, I have not been able toagree with the reasoning given by the Tribunal. A material fact, according tome, is only that which if disclosed would have disentitled the appellant fromgetting an order under section 21 of the Act. Even if the appellant had statedin his application or in his statement that he had already let the first floor undersection 21 and he would like to have the entire house on his return fromkathmandu; the Rent Controller, in my opinion, had no jurisdiction to refusethe order under section 21. In fact section 21 has been enacted to facilitate thelandloards who are placed in such a situation to let the property for a limitedperiod. The Rent Controller or this court for that reason cannot sit in appealover the decision of the landlord as to how much accommodation he wouldneed. This may be a relevant consideration if the landlord seeks eviction of thetenant the grounds of bona fide requirements under section 14 (l) (e) but itcannot be a consideration for letting under section 21 of the Act. ( 5 ) THE landlord is a very high official and one of his daughters is a doctorand one of the sons is a medical student. The status of the family is such whichclearly entitles the appellant to have the whole house if he so requires. Thelandlord knew at the time of letting that he would be returning after a periodof two to three years from deputation and would like to keep the wholehouse. No exception can be taken to such a desire of the landlord, particularly,when the tenant,who was inducted knew that he was being inducted only fora limited period. No hardship, in these circumstances is caused on the tenant. No exception can be taken to such a desire of the landlord, particularly,when the tenant,who was inducted knew that he was being inducted only fora limited period. No hardship, in these circumstances is caused on the tenant. ( 6 ) SECTION 21 of the Act has already come for interpretation in variouscases before their lordships of Supreme Court and before this Court. A consistent view has been taken the effect that in a case where correct facts weredisclosed and the disclosure of these facts were sufficient to show that theproperty was available for being let for a limited period, the tenant cannot takeany objection at the time of execution. In the present case admittedly theappellant was on deputation and he was to return. This is the only fact statedand the reason given while seeking permission under section 21. In thecircumstances, I hold that the objections filed by the tenant had no merit anddeserved to be dismissed. ( 7 ) CONSEQUENTLY for the reasons recorded above, the appeal is allowedand the objections filed by the respondent stand dismissed. Mr. Marwahstates that the respondent may like to go up in appeal against this order andseeks some time. I grant one month s time to the respondent to hand overvacant possession of the premises in dispute to the appellant. The appellantwill be entitled to his costs, counsel s fee Rs. 500. 00.