JUDGMENT S.D. Agarwala, J. - The petitioners were initially working in the department of agriculture in the State of Uttar Pradesh. They were sent on deputation to work as Secretaries in the various mandi samities of the State of Uttar Pradesh. The Mandies have been established under the U.P. Krishi Utpadan Mandi Adhiniyam, 1964 (hereinafter referred to as the Mandi Act). When the petitioners were not absorbed as secretaries of the Mandi Samities and repatriated, they challenged the orders of repatriation by means of a writ petition filed in the Lucknow Bench of the High Court. Their petitions were allowed and the respondents were directed to reconsider the cases of the petitioners again after giving them an opportunity of being heard. The petitioners were aggrieved by the decision of the Lucknow Bench and they approached the Hon'ble Supreme Court. The Hon'ble Supreme Court did not accept their contention. Thereafter, their cases were considerably the respondents and again the respondents came to the conclusion that the petitioners were not fit to be absorbed and, hence, the petitioners were repatriated to their parent department. Having lost one innings in this court as well as in the Supreme Court, they have again filed the present petition which is nothing but an abuse of the process of the Court. Nevertheless since we have heard learned Counsel for the parties, it is necessary for us to consider the questions raised by the petitioners. In order to appreciate the contentions raised by the petitioners, it is necessary to consider the various provisions of the Mandi Act and the rules framed thereunder. 2. The Mandi Samities were constituted under Section 12 of the Mandi Act Section 12 provided that for every market area, there shall be a committee to be called a Mandi Samiti of that market area which shall be a body corporate having perpetual succession and an official seal and subject to restrictions or qualifications, if any, as may be imposed by the Act. It was empowered to sue or sued in its corporate name and acquire and hold and dispose of property and enter into contracts. Chapter IV of the Mandi Act deals with Officers and Servants of the Committee. It was empowered to sue or sued in its corporate name and acquire and hold and dispose of property and enter into contracts. Chapter IV of the Mandi Act deals with Officers and Servants of the Committee. Section 23 specifically provided the subject to the provisions of the Act and the rules made in this behalf, the Committee, its Chairman or Secretary to the extent empowered under the bye-laws or resolutions passed by the Committee, may appoint such officers and servants as may be necessary for carrying out the purpose of the Act on such terms and conditions of service as may be provided for in the bye-laws of the committee. Section 23(2) which is relevant for the purposes of this is as follows :- "Every committee shall have a secretary and such other officers as may be considered necessary by the board for the efficient discharge of the functions of the Committee, appointed by the Board on such terms and conditions as may be provided for in the regulations made by it." 3. Initially the persons serving in the agriculture department as well as in the department of agriculture marketing were sent on deputation to work as Secretaries of the Mandi Samitis. Section 23-A empowered the Board to constitute a centralised service and to transfer the employees to the said service. Initially the persons serving in the agriculture department as well as in the department of agriculture marketing were sent on deputation to work as Secretaries of the Mandi Samitis. Section 23-A empowered the Board to constitute a centralised service and to transfer the employees to the said service. Section 23-A, sub-sections (1) and (2) which are relevant for the purposes of the present case are quoted below :- "(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other provision of this Act, the Board may constitute cadres of Secretaries and such other officers common to all Committees as it may deem fit to appoint under sub-section (2) of Section 23, (2) Every person who was holding a post comprised in a cadre referred to in sub-section (1) in any committee (including a Government Servant serving on deputation) shall on and from the date of constitution of the cadre) hereinafter in this section referred to as the said date) become a member of the cadre and shall hold his office or service therein by the same tenure, at the same remuneration, and upon the same terms and conditions, and with the same rights and privileges as to pension, gratuity and other matters as he would have held the same on the said date but for the constitution of the cadre and shall continue to do so until his employment as a member of a cadre is terminated or until his remuneration or other terms and conditions of service are revised or altered by the Board under or in pursuance of any law or in accordance with any provisions which for the time being govern his service : Provided that nothing contained in this section shall apply to any such person who, by notice in writing given to the State Government, may within such time as the State Government may, by general or special order specify, intimates his intention of not becoming a member of the said cadre : Provided further that the services of any employee referred to in the preceding proviso under the State Government or under a Committee, as the case may be, shall stand terminated on account of abolition of the post held by him and he shall be entitled from the State Government or the Committee concerned, as the case may be, to the compensation equivalent : (a) in the case of a permanent employee to three months remuneration ; (b) in the case of a temporary employee to one months' remuneration. (3) ............................." The Uttar Pradesh Krishi Utpadan Mandi (Amendment) Ordinance (U.P. No. 13 of 1984) was promulgated on 11th of June, 1984. Sub-section (2) of Section 23-A was substituted. The substituted sub-section (2) is quoted below : "(2) Subject to the provisions of sub-section (2B) - (a) every person, other than a Government servant, serving in any committee on deputation, who holds a post comprised in the cadre referred to in sub section (1), and (b) Every Government Servant, serving in any committee on deputation on a post in the said cadre, who is not found to be unsuitable, suitability being determined in such manner as may be laid down in regulations, shall on and from the date of the constitution of the said cadre (hereinafter in this section to be referred to as the said date) become member of the cadre on the terms and conditions mentioned in subsection (2-A). (2-A) Every person, who becomes a member of the cadre under subsection (2) shall hold office by the same tenure, at the same remuneration, upon the same terms and conditions, and with the same rights and privileges as to pension, gratuity and other matters as he could have been entitled to on the said date but for the constitution of the cadre and shall continue to be so entitled until his employment as a member of the cadre is terminated or until his remuneration or other terms and conditions of service are revised or altered by the Board under or in pursuance of any law or in accordance with any provision which for the time being governs his service, (2-B) Nothing contained in sub-section (2) shall apply to a person who, by notice in writing, given to the State Government, within such time as the State Government may, by general or special order specify intimates his intention of not becoming a member of the said cadre. (2-C) The service of an employee, under a committee, who opts against absorption, shall stand terminated on the ground of abolition of post and, on such termination, he shall be entitled to receive from the concerned committee compensation equivalent to, - (a) three months emoluments in case of permanent employee ; (b) one month emoluments in case of temporary employee; (2-D) A Government servant serving in any committee on deputation on any post in the cadre, referred to in sub-section (1) who opts against absorption or who is not found suitable, shall be reverted to his parent department and, if having regard to his seniority, a post is not available for him in the parent department his services shall stand terminated with effect from the date of the order of reversion on the ground of abolition of post and, on such termination, he shall be entitled to receive, from State Government, compensation equivalent to the amount mentioned in sub-section (2-C)." 4. In exercise of the powers conferred under Sections 25-A and 26 of the Mandi Act, the State Agricultural Produce Markets Board with the approval of the State Government created centralised service of Secretaries. Regulations were made on 1st of August, 1984. They were named as Uttar Pradesh Agricultural Produce Market Committees (Centralised Service) Regulation, 1984. Under Regulation 4, the cadre of Secretariats consisted of Secretaries Grade-I for A Class markets, Secretaries Grade II for B class markets. Secretaries Grade III for C Class markets and Secretaries Grade IV for D Class markets. Regulation 19 of the Centralised Service Regulation, relevant for the purposes of the decision on these petitions, is quoted below which relates to retention and reversion of employees on deputation- "19(1) The Director shall prepare a list of all such Government servants who on the date of coming into force of these regulations, were serving on deputation and forward the same to a committee, constituted for the purpose consisting of the Director, the Additional Director and a nominee of the Secretary to the Government in the agriculture department, together with all the relevant papers including character rolls and service books, if any. (21 The Committee shall consider the papers referred to in sub-regulation (1) to judge the suitability of such servants for retention in the Centralised service and sense its recommendation to the appointing authority, (3) The appointing authority shall consider the recommendation of the Committee and those servants, who are found suitable shall, by an order of the appointing authority become members of the cadre under clause (b) of sub-section (2) of Section 23-A, provided that if no orders are passed within six months of the enforcement of these regulations, all such servants shall be deemed to be suitable and shall become members of the cadre." Ordinance No. 13 of 1984 referred to above was repealed and substituted by U.P. Act No. 20 of 1984. Section 1, sub-clause (2) of the Amendment Act provided that Section 23-A, sub-clause (2) as substituted would come into effect on October 4, 1983. The effect of the above statutory provision was that by Section 23-A, sub-clause (2) as amended by U.P. Act No. 20 of 1984 with effect from 4th October, 1983, every Government servant serving in any committee on deputation on a post in the cadre of secretaries who is not found to be unsuitable, suitability been determined in such manner as may be laid down in the regulations, shall on and from the date of the constitution of the said cadre become member of the cadre on terms and conditions mentioned in sub-section (2-A), while the Government servant who is not found suitable was to be reverted to his parent department. In accordance with Regulation 19 of the Centralised Service Regulations, 1984, the committee considered the cases of all the deputationists and ultimately submitted its recommendations. The recommendations of the committee were considered by the Director Mandi Parishad under clause (3) of Regulation 19, as he is the appointing authority. After considering the recommendations, the Director Mandi Parishad passed an order on 25th January, 1985 absorbing deputationists who were found suitable. The centralised service Regulations came into effect, as stated above, on 1st August, 1984. Under sub-clause (3) of Regulation 19, the appointing authority had to pass orders within six months of the enforcement of the regulations, namely, 1st of August, 1984. The order, consequently, passed on 25th January, 1985 was within six months of the enforcement of the regulations. The centralised service Regulations came into effect, as stated above, on 1st August, 1984. Under sub-clause (3) of Regulation 19, the appointing authority had to pass orders within six months of the enforcement of the regulations, namely, 1st of August, 1984. The order, consequently, passed on 25th January, 1985 was within six months of the enforcement of the regulations. All the deputationists who were found suitable, consequently, became members of the cadre of secretaries. 5. The deputationists who were not found suitable and consequently, not absorbed in the cadre filed writ petition both in the Lucknow Bench of the High Court as well as in the Allahabad High Court. The writ petitions which were filed in the Lucknow Bench of the High Court came up tor hearing before a Bench consisting of Hon'ble S. Ahmad and Hon'ble Brijesh Kumar, JJ. The Writ Petition No. 470 of 1985, Brij Kishore v. U.P. Rajya Krishi Utpadan Mandi Parishad and others was treated as the leading case. The Bench after hearing the aggrieved petitioners in the leading petition as well as in all the connected petitions at length and after considering the validity of the provisions of the Act and Regulations ultimately by the judgment dated 18th August, 1986 allowed the petitions and directed the authorities to reconsider the cases of the petitioners as required by Regulation 19 of the Centralised Service Regulation, 1984. The operative portion of the judgment dated 18th August, 1986 is quoted below: "In the result, the writ petitions are allowed in part and the decision of the Committee finding the petitioners as unsuitable for absorption to the post of Secretaries in the centralised service is set aside and the opposite-parties are directed to reconsider the cases of the petitioners as provided under regulation 19 of the Service Regulations, 1984 in the light of observations made earlier and after giving them adequate opportunity to explain the facts and circumstances which may be adversely considered against them, there would be no orders as to costs." 6. In these petitions, vires of Section 23-A, sub-clause (2) of the Act had been challenged. The court considered all the arguments raised on behalf of the petitioners and ultimately came to the conclusion that the section was valid. The validity of Regulation 19 of the Centralised Service Regulations was also challenged. This argument of the petitioners was also rejected by this court. The court considered all the arguments raised on behalf of the petitioners and ultimately came to the conclusion that the section was valid. The validity of Regulation 19 of the Centralised Service Regulations was also challenged. This argument of the petitioners was also rejected by this court. It was held that Regulations 19 cannot be held to be bad as being unreasonable. The argument that the regulations could not be framed by the Board was also rejected. The only argument which was accepted on the basis of which the petition was allowed, was that the petitioners were not afforded an opportunity of hearing before being judged as unsuitable for absorption in the cadre. 7. Though this court by judgment dated 18th August, 1986 had quashed the orders passed against the petitioners finding them not suitable for absorption to the post of Secretaries in the Centralised Service, still the petitioners filed special leave to appeal to the Hon'ble Supreme Court being number 147-151 of 1987 - Nav Ratan Singh Chauhan v. Mandi Director, U.P. and others. This leave petition came up for orders before Hon'ble Supreme Court initially on 22nd January, 1987. The Hon'ble Supreme Court granted three weeks `time to the respondents to file a counter-affidavit. The petitioners were however, directed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court to appear before the committee constituted under Regulation 19 of the Centralised Service Regulations without prejudice to their rights and contentions. The order of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, dated 22nd January, 1987 is as follows : "Three weeks' time is granted to the respondents to file counter-affidavit. In the meanwhile, the petitioners in compliance with the directions made by the High Court shall appear before the Committee constituted under Regulation 19 of the U.P. Agricultural Produce Market Committee (Centralised) Service Regulations, 1984 without prejudice to their rights and contentions. We are informed that the meeting of the Committee will be held on 5-2-1987. The matter will be listed on 27-2-1987." The matter again came up before the Hon'ble Supreme Court on 1st of April, 1987. We are informed that the meeting of the Committee will be held on 5-2-1987. The matter will be listed on 27-2-1987." The matter again came up before the Hon'ble Supreme Court on 1st of April, 1987. The Hon'ble Supreme Court after hearing the parties dismissed the leave petition and passed the following orders : "As the respondent U.P. Rajya Krishi Utpadan Mandi Parishad has complied with the direction of the High Court for reconsideration of the cases of the petitioners before the High Court for absorption to the Centralised Services as provided by Regulation 19 of the U.P. Agricultural Produce Market Committee (Centralised) Service Regulations, 1984, the questions raised in these petitions no longer survive. That apart, even on merits, we cannot share the view expressed by the High Court that the Committee appointed under Regulation 9 of the Service Regulations had no power to delegate the function of selection of candidates to a Member. Indeed, the High Court should not have entertained the writ petition much less interfered with the selection of candidates. But that as it may, the direction of the High Court having been complied with the questions raised are now pronounce the list of the selected candidates made pursuant to the directions of the High Court within ten days from today. If the petitioners are aggrieved by the selection, they are at liberty to resort to such remedy as they may have under the law. Special leave petitions are dismissed accordingly." After the order was passed dismissing the leave to appeal, the Hon'ble Supreme Court passed another order on 16th April, 1987, directing the Committee Constituted under Regulation 19 to pronounce the list of the selected candidates. The order of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, dated 16th April 1987 was in the following terms :- "Counsel for respondent Mrs. S. Dikshit mentioned the matter. The court partly amended its earlier order dated, April 1, 1987 and allowed the time to the Committee as under :- The Committee will not pronounce the list of the selected candidates made in pursuant to the directions of the High Court within two from today." After the direction of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the Committee announced the result of the selected candidates by an order, dated 2th May, 1987. The order, dated 12th May, 1987 was to the effect that after considering the cases of all the deputationists who were not absorbed earlier only two deputationists were further absorbed, namely, Sri Gita Ram Tyagi and Sri Hari Shankar Prasad Singh. 8. It is relevant to note here that the Hon'ble Supreme Court while dismissing the special leave petitions upheld the validity of Section 23-A(2) of the Mandi Act as well as the validity of Regulation 19 of the Centralised Service Regulation and the judgment of the High Court was upheld by the Hon'ble Supreme Court and it was not interfered with. The case of the petitioners before the Hon'ble Supreme Court was that they had acquired a permanent status in the cadre of Secretaries by virtue of unamended Section 23-A of Section 3 of the Act and as such, their further case was that Regulations 19 of the Centralised Service Regulations did not apply to them, as they had already acquired a status. One of the specific grounds taken before the Hon'ble Supreme Court was further that Regulation 19 of the Centralised service Regulations which contemplated the selection of the candidates suitable and non suitable for retention is ultra vires to Article 14 of the Constitution of India. It had been further taken as the ground that regulations gave a handle to prepare a list in an arbitrary manner giving unbridled power to the executive with a view to exercise discrimination towards a particular individual was invalid. 9 Aggrieved, the petitioners were still not satisfied with the order passed after holding the selection in pursuance of the order of the Division Bench of this court, dated 18th August, 1986 and the present petitions have now been filed challenging the order, dated 12th May, 1987. In this group of petitions, most of the petitioners are those who challenged the earlier selection. The decision against them has been quashed by this Court and their cases again have been reconsidered and they have not been found suitable for absorption. There are few petitioners who had filed petitions challenging their earlier selection is the Allahabad High Court. Their petitions were not disposed of and they have challenged again the order, dated 12th May, 1987. The decision against them has been quashed by this Court and their cases again have been reconsidered and they have not been found suitable for absorption. There are few petitioners who had filed petitions challenging their earlier selection is the Allahabad High Court. Their petitions were not disposed of and they have challenged again the order, dated 12th May, 1987. There are also two petitioners before this court being petitioner in Writ Petition No. 14511 of 1987 and in Writ Petition No. 12998 of 1987, who did not challenge the earlier order finding them not to be suitable, but now have come to this court challenging the decision of the respondents finding them not to be suitable and consequently, not absorbing them. 10. We have heard learned Counsel for all the petitioners in this group of petitions and Sri B.D. Mandhyan who has appeared on behalf of respondents in all these petitions. 11. Sri B.D. Madhyan has raised two preliminary objections before us. His first objection is that the petitioners have a clear, adequate and efficacious remedy by way of filing a reference to the Tribunal constituted under the U.P. Public Services (Tribunals) Act, 1976 and as such, these petitions are not maintainable. His second objection is that the question in regard to the validity of Section 23-A as amended by U P. Act No. 20 of 1984 and Regulation 19 of the Centralised Service Regulations, 1984 having already been decided by this Court in the leading Writ Petition No. 470 of 1985, Brij Kishore v. U.P. Rajya Krishi Utpadan Mandi Parishad and others, and the said judgment having been conformed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court by the order dated 1st April, 1987, the decision on question of the validity of the Act and the regulation shall operate as res-judicata in the present petitions and it is not open to the petitioners again now to urge the question of the validity of Section 23-A of the Act and the regulations. 12. We will consider the preliminary objections first as raised by learned Counsel for the respondents. 13. 12. We will consider the preliminary objections first as raised by learned Counsel for the respondents. 13. Section 4 of the U.P. Public Services (Tribunals) Act, 1976 provides that if any person who is or has been a public servant claims that in any matter relating to employment he has been dealt with in a manner which is not in conformity with any contract or in the case of a Government servant, it is not in conformity with the provisions of Article 16 or Article 311 of the Constitution or in the case of a servant of a local authority if the order is violative of Article 16 of the Constitution of India or with any rules or regulations, such claim shall be referred to the Tribunal. Section 4 of the aforesaid Act is quoted below: "4. Reference of claims to Tribunal. If any person who is or has been a public servant claims that in any matter relating to employment as such public servant his employer or any officer or authority subordinate to the employer has dealt with him in a manner which is not in conformity with any contract, or - (a) in the case of a Government servant, with the provisions of Article 16 or Article 311 of the Constitution or with any rules or law having force under Article 309 or Article 311 of the Constitution. (b) In the case of a servant of a local authority or a statutory corporation, with Article 16 of the Constitution or with any rules or regulations having force under any Act or Legislature constituting such authority or corporation ; he shall refer such claim to the Tribunal and the decision of the thereon shall, subject to the provisions of Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution, be final." Section 12 sub-clause (2) of the Mandi Act specifically provides that the Committee shall be deemed to be the local authority for the purposes of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and any other law for the time being in force. In view of the specific provision, it is clear that the Mandi Samiti is a local authority within the meaning of Section 4 sub-clause (b) of the U.P. Public Services (Tribunals) Act, 1976 quoted above. In view of the specific provision, it is clear that the Mandi Samiti is a local authority within the meaning of Section 4 sub-clause (b) of the U.P. Public Services (Tribunals) Act, 1976 quoted above. The deputationists who are the petitioners before us are clearly Government servants, even otherwise if for the sake of argument it is taken that since they had been working as Secretaries in the Mandi Samities then they would be servants of the local authority, as Mandi Samiti is a local authority and their case would clearly fall under sub-clause (b) of Section 4 quoted above. 14. In this view of the matter if the petitioners claim is they have been dealt with in a manner which is not in conformity with the provisions of Article 16 or Article 311 of the Constitution or with any rules or regulations framed under the Mandi Act, then the remedy available to them is to file a claim before the Services Tribunal Constituted under Section 3 of the U.P. Public Services (Tribunals) Act, 1976. Section 4 of the Act has been widely worded. It includes all claims of the public servants or Government servant or servants of a local authority to urge any matter relating to employment before the Tribunal. The Tribunal is a very high powered Tribunal consisting of a Judicial Member as well as Administrative Member. In the circumstances, we are of the opinion that the petitioners have a forum, namely, the Services Tribunal before whom they can lodge their claim, which is, in or opinion a very adequate and efficacious remedy available. In this view of the matter, all the questions relating to the merits of the non-absorption of the petitioners after having found them unsuitable could be raised by them before the Tribunal. 15. In support of the preliminary objections, learned Counsel for respondents has relied on a few cases decided by this court as well as by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. We will refer only to two decisions one of this court and one of the Hon'ble Supreme Court where the principle of alternative remedy has been discussed in detail. 16. In Titaghur Paper Mills Co. We will refer only to two decisions one of this court and one of the Hon'ble Supreme Court where the principle of alternative remedy has been discussed in detail. 16. In Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Orissa, AIR 1983 SC 603 the question raised was as to whether against an assessment order under the Orissa Sales Tax Act, the petitioner can approach the High Court directly under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, their Lordships opined as follows : - "The Act provides for a complete machinery to challenge an order of assessment, and the impugned orders of assessment can only be challenged by the mode prescribed by the Act and not by a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. It is now well recognised that where a right or liability is created by a statute which gives a special remedy for enforcing it, the remedy provided by that statute only must be availed of." 17. In Prem Shankar Lal v. State of U.P., 1984 UPLBEC 1344 a Division Bench of this court, of which one of us was a member, had an occasion to consider the scope of Section 4 of the U.P. Public Services (Tribunals) Act, 1976 and as to whether the said remedy provided by the Act was an efficacious remedy. It was held by the Bench that the claim before the Tribunal was an efficacious remedy and that the Tribunal has the power to consider all the questions including question relating to violation of Article 16 of the Constitution of India. We respectfully agree with the decision given in this case. 18. We will now consider the cases relied upon by learned Counsel for the petitioners in relation to the question of alternative remedy. 19. The first case relied upon is the decision in Giri Raj Kishore v. Indian Institute of Technology, Kanpur and others, 1983 LIC 1089 : 1983 UPLBEC 545. This is a decision of a Division Bench of this court. The court in this case, upheld the objections raised by the opposite parties, namely, an appeal lay against the impugaed order in that case, but did not exercise its discretion to hear the matter, as according to the court, the writ petition had crossed the preliminary hearing and the affidavits of the parties had been exchanged. The court in this case, upheld the objections raised by the opposite parties, namely, an appeal lay against the impugaed order in that case, but did not exercise its discretion to hear the matter, as according to the court, the writ petition had crossed the preliminary hearing and the affidavits of the parties had been exchanged. This case only lays down that it is discretion of a court whether to relegate the parties to a forum available to them by way of filing an appeal, but it does not lay down that in every case where the affidavits have been exchanged, the matter should be heard by the court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 20. The second case relied upon is the decision in M/s. Baburam Prakash Chandra Maheshwari v. Antarim Zila Parishad, AIR 1969 SC 556 . In this care the Supreme Court laid down that there are two well-recognised exceptions to the doctrine with regard to the exhaustion of statutory remedies. The first exception laid down is a case where proceedings are taken before a Tribunal under a provision of law, which itself is alleged to be ultra vires and the second exception laid down in a case where the impugned order has been made in violation of the principle of natural justice. In the instant case, there is no challenge to the vires of the Constitution of the Services Tribunal constituted under the U.P. Services (Tribunals) Act, 1976. In regard to the second exception also the question as to whether there has been a violation of principle of natural justice is seriously in dispute. The allegations that the petitioners have not been heard in pursuance of the judgment of this court, dated 18th August, 1986 have been emphatically denied in the counter-affidavits. Here the question whether the principles of natural justice have been followed or not is itself seriously in dispute. The petitioners have been heard but the dispute is as to whether they have been given an opportunity as contended by the petitioners. This disputed question of fact, cannot, appropriately be determined by the High Court under its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India as that would require production and perusal of evidence. 21. The third case relied upon by learned Counsel is the decision in Tata Engineering and Locomotive Col. This disputed question of fact, cannot, appropriately be determined by the High Court under its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India as that would require production and perusal of evidence. 21. The third case relied upon by learned Counsel is the decision in Tata Engineering and Locomotive Col. Ltd. v. Assistant Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, AIR 1967 SC 1401 . In this case it has been laid down that the High Court leaves the party aggrieved to take recourse to the remedies available under the ordinary law if they are equally efficacious and declines to assume jurisdiction to enable such remedies to be by-passed. One exception laid down is where action is being taken under an invalid law or arbitrarily without the sanction of law. I such a case, the High Court may interfere to avoid hardship to a party. This principle is not applicable to the present case. The validity of Section 23-A(2) and Regulation 19 of the Centralised Service Regulations have all ready been upheld by this court. The petitioners do have an equally efficacious remedy by way of filing a claim before the U.P. Services Tribunal. This case, in our opinion, also does not advance the arguments raised on behalf of the petitioners. 22. The next case relied upon is the decision in State of U.P. v. M/s. Indian Hume Pipe Col. Ltd., AIR 1977 SC 1132 . In this case the Hon'ble Supreme Court has laid down that it is always a matter of discretion with court and if the discretion has been exercised by the High Court not unreasonably or perversely, it is the settled practice of the Supreme Court not to interfere with the exercise of discretion by the High Court. In this case it is not disputed that it is the discretion of the High Court whether to relegate the parties to the alternative remedy available. 23. The next case relied upon is the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 5547 of 1982, M/s. Jaswant Sugar Mills Ltd., Meerut v. State of U.P. decided on 7th December, 1984. 23. The next case relied upon is the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 5547 of 1982, M/s. Jaswant Sugar Mills Ltd., Meerut v. State of U.P. decided on 7th December, 1984. The court after considering the various cases on the question of alternative remedy opined as follows "It is evident that the existence of an alternative remedy is not a bar to the exercise of the power under Article 226 of the Constitution where the prayer is for a writ of certiorari. The court can of course take into consideration the bar of alternative remedy, but it is within the discretion of the court to grant the relief or to relegate the party to seek alternative remedy available under the law. The law has been further clarified that where the order is violative of the principles of rules of natural justice the High Court would be justified in exercising its power under Article 226 of the Constitution, it is well established that where an order is per se illegal or without jurisdiction or a nullity the court would not in the exercise of its powers direct the petitioner to seek the alternative remedy. It is also well settled that where the court finds that it is necessary in the interest of justice to exercise the power under Article 226 of the Constitution for quashing the impugned order, the court would do so notwithstanding the existence of an alternative remedy." We agree with the principles laid down in the above mentioned decision, but in our opinion, it is not a case where we should exercise our jurisdiction in entertaining the petitions and not relegate the parties to the alternative remedy available to them. This Court by judgment, dated 18th August, 1986 in Writ Petition No. 470 of 1985 had already held that Section 23-A(2) of the Mandi Act was not ultra vires to the Constitution. It has been further held that Regulation 19 is also a valid regulation. The only question which remains to be determined is whether the orders have been passed in accordance with the direction issued by this Court on 18th August, 1986. It has been further held that Regulation 19 is also a valid regulation. The only question which remains to be determined is whether the orders have been passed in accordance with the direction issued by this Court on 18th August, 1986. By this order, the authorities were directed to consider the cases of the petitioners after giving them an opportunity to explain the facts and circumstances which may be adversely considered against them and thereafter, determine the suitability of the petitioners as to whether they should be absorbed or not on the post of Secretaries. According to the respondents, the opportunity has been afforded to the petitioners in accordance with the direction issued by this court. These are disputed questions of fact and each individual case has to be considered on its own facts, in the circumstances, in our opinion, it is not a fit case where we should exercise our discretion in not relating the parties to the Tribunal particularly when it is an adequate efficacious alternative remedy. On the facts and circumstances, it is not a fit case where this court should convert itself into a court of appeal by examining each case on its own facts as observed above. Here the question whether there was a violation of principle of nature justice is seriously is dispute. The impugned orders are not per se illegal or without jurisdiction. In view of these circumstances, the principles laid down in the cases levied upon by learned Counsel for the petitioners, do not, in our opinion, help them. 24. Our conclusion that in so far as the petitioners' grievance on the merits of their claim is concerned they have an affective alternative remedy by way of approach to the Public Tribunal and that therefore, this is not a fill case for interference is fortified also by the following observations of the Supreme Court while dismissing the Special Leave Petition on 1-4-1987: "Indeed the High Court should not have entertained the writ petition much less interfered with the selection of the candidate." 25. In view of the above, we are clearly of the opinion that the petitioners have an adequate, efficacious and alternative remedy by way of filing a claim before the U.K Services Tribunal. The preliminary objection raised by learned Counsel for the respondents is upheld. 26. In view of the above, we are clearly of the opinion that the petitioners have an adequate, efficacious and alternative remedy by way of filing a claim before the U.K Services Tribunal. The preliminary objection raised by learned Counsel for the respondents is upheld. 26. In regard to the second preliminary objection raised by learned Counsel for the respondents, it will be necessary to enumerate the contentions raised on behalf of the petitioners. It has been contended as follows:- (1) Section 23-A sub-clause (2) of the Mandi Act violates the doctrine of promissory estoppel, (2) Section 23-A(2) does not lay down the norms to find out the suitability or unsuitability of deputationists and the delegation to frame norms by means of regulations is discriminatory and is hit by Article 14 of the Constitution of India and suffers from the vice of excessive delegation to legislative powers. (3) Regulations do not lay down the norms for judging the suitability of the deputationists. The norms having been left to a Committee, Regulation 19 of the Centralised Service Regulations is ultra vires. (4) Norms laid down by the Committee are wholly irrational and arbitrary. (5) Under Regulation 19 sub-clause (3), the order for absorption by the opposite patties should be within six months from 18th August, 1986, the date of the judgment of this court but since the order was passed on 12th May, 1987 which is beyond six moths, this order, dated 12th May, 1987 is invalid. (6) The Committee has not afforded an adequate opportunity of being heard to the petitioners as required by the judgment of this court, dated 18th August, 1986. While elaborating this contention, it has also been alleged that the adverse entries have been relied upon, which in many cases have not been communicated and in some cases representations against the same are pending with the authorities concerned and as such, it is urged that disputed adverse entries could not be relied upon. Individual petitioners urged that on the norms laid down by the Committee, they should have been absorbed. 27. The first four contentions mentioned above relate to the validity of Section 23-A(2) as well as Regulation 19 of the Centralised Service Regulations. These question were decided against the petitioners by judgment, dated 18th August, 1986. These contentions could have been raised by the petitioners in Writ Petition No. 470 of 1985. 27. The first four contentions mentioned above relate to the validity of Section 23-A(2) as well as Regulation 19 of the Centralised Service Regulations. These question were decided against the petitioners by judgment, dated 18th August, 1986. These contentions could have been raised by the petitioners in Writ Petition No. 470 of 1985. The arguments now raised are merely additional grounds for challenging the validity of Section (2) and Regulation 19 of the Centralised Service Regulations. In our opinion, for the reasons given hereinafter, the decision in the Writ Petition No. 470 of 1985 will clearly operate as res judicata and the petitioners cannot be permitted to raise these questions again by means of the present petitions. So far as question questions Nos. 5 and 6 are concerned, they are clearly questions which can be raised before the U.P. Public Services Tribunal in a claim petition by the petitioners, if they are so advised, may file before it. The relevant portion of Section 11 of the Civil Procedure Code which deals with res-judicata along with Explanation IV, which is relevant for the purposes of this case is quoted below :- "No Court shall try any suit or issue in which the matter directly and substantially in issue has been directly and substantially in issue in a former suit between the same parties, or between parties under whom they or any of them claim, litigating under the same title, in a court competent to try such subsequent suit or the suit in which such issue has been subsequently raised, and has been heard and finally decided by such court. Explanation IV. - Any matter which right and ought to have been made ground of defence or attack in such former suit shall be deemed to have been a matter directly and substantially in issue in such suit." The Explanation IV quoted above clearly provides that any matter which might and ought to have been made ground of defence or attack in such former suit shall be deemed to have been a matter directly and substantially in issue in such suit. This Explanation IV came up for interpretation before the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Forward Construction Co. v. Prabhat Mandai, AIR 1986 SC 391 . This Explanation IV came up for interpretation before the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Forward Construction Co. v. Prabhat Mandai, AIR 1986 SC 391 . The Hon'ble Supreme Court opined as follows : - "So far as the first reason is concerned, the High Court in our opinion was not right in holding that the earlier judgment would not operate as res-judicata as one of the grounds taken in the present petition was conspicuous by its absence in the earlier petition. Explanation IV to Section 11, C.P.C. provides that any matter which might and ought to have been made ground of defence or attack in such former suit shall be deemed to have been a matter directly and substantially in issue in such suit. An adjudication is conclusive and final not only as to the actual matter determined but as to every other matter which the parties might and ought to have litigated and have had it decided as incidental to or essentially connected with the subject matter of the litigation and every matter coming within the legitimate purview of the original action both in respect of the matters of claim or defence. The principle underlying Explanation IV is that where the parties have had an opportunity of controverting a matter that should be taken to be the same thing as if the matter had been actually controverted and decided. It is true that where a matter has been constructively in issue it cannot be said to have been actually heard and decided. It could only be deemed to have been heard and decided. The first reason, therefore, has absolutely no force." The principle laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court fully applies to the present case. In Writ Petition No. 470 of 1985 decided on 18th August, 1986 and in other connected petitions, the petitioners had canvassed in detail the vires of Section 23-A sub-clause (2) as well as the vires of Regulation 19 of the Centralised Service Regulations on various ground. This Court upheld the validity of these provisions. The contentions 1 to 4, which are now sought to be raised, could have been raised by the petitioners in the sard writ petition and in effect they ought to have been raised in order to challenge the validity. If they so desired on these grounds. This Court upheld the validity of these provisions. The contentions 1 to 4, which are now sought to be raised, could have been raised by the petitioners in the sard writ petition and in effect they ought to have been raised in order to challenge the validity. If they so desired on these grounds. They are not the grounds which came into existence after the decision of this Court. No party can be permitted to raise different grounds by mean of different petitions, challenging the validity of the same provisions which have been upheld by this court. This would result in multiplicity of the proceedings, which would ultimately amount to nothing but an abuse of process of the Court. The petitioners after having failed to get the provisions of the Act and regulations struck down, cannot, in our opinion, be permitted again to challenge the said provisions on additional grounds. After all, the litigation between the parties have to come to on end. It is for this very reason that the principles of res judicata are made available. The principles laid down in Section 11 of the C.P.C. will fully apply in such cases. 28. The petitioners however, have sought reliance in this connection on a decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Mathura Prasad v. Dossbai, AIR 1971 SC 2355 . The portion relied upon by the petitioners is an extract from paragraph 10 of the judgment which is in the following terms : "where, however, the question is one purely of law and it relates to the jurisdiction of the Court or a decision of the Court sanctioning something which is illegal, by resort to the rule of res judicata a party affected by the decision will not be precluded from challenging the validity of the order under the rule of res judicata, for a rule of procedure cannot supersede the law of the land." 29. We have gone through the entire decision given in the case of Mathura Prasad (supra). The observations made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court have to be read as a whole in the context of the earlier paragraphs. We have gone through the entire decision given in the case of Mathura Prasad (supra). The observations made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court have to be read as a whole in the context of the earlier paragraphs. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has clearly held in paragraph 9 as follows:- "A question of jurisdiction of the Court, or of procedure, or a pure question of law unrelated to the right of the parties to a previous suit, is not res judicata in subsequent suit." The extract from paragraph 10 of the judgment has to be read along with the proposition of law laid down in paragraph 9 quoted above. In our opinion, the Supreme Court has laid down that where there is a pure question of law unrelated to the rights of the parties, then only resort to the rule of res-judicata cannot be taken but where the pure question of law relates to the rights of the parties in the previous suit, the decision of the said pure question of law would operate as res judicata. In the circumstances in our opinion, it cannot be held on the basis of the decision in the case of Mathura Prasad (supra) that the decision of the earlier writ petition between the same parties does not operate as res judicata. The second preliminary objection raised by learned counsel for the respondents, in our opinion, therefore, is also well founded. 30. In view of the above, we are clearly of the opinion that now the petitioners cannot be permitted to challenge the validity of Section 23-A (2) of the Mandi Act as well as the Regulation 19 of the Centralised Service Regulations and that the only remedy available to them so far as the individual grievance of each of them is concerned is to approach the U.P. Public services Tribunal constituted under the U.P. Public Services (Tribunals) Act, 1976. 31. As observed above, there are few petitioners whose petitions remained pending in this Court and there are two petitioners who did not file petition before the Hon'ble Supreme Court. 31. As observed above, there are few petitioners whose petitions remained pending in this Court and there are two petitioners who did not file petition before the Hon'ble Supreme Court. In order to set at rest the controversy raised by the petitioners, so that there is no further delay in the enforcement of the policy of absorption of Secretaries in the Mandi Samitis, it is necessary, in our opinion, to also dispose of all the contentions raised in regard to the validity of Section 23-A (2) as well as Regulation 19 of the Services Tribunal, so that the Tribunal will be free to adjudicate upon any claim which might be filed by any of the petitioner before it. We are, accordingly considering the contentions raised by the petitioners in this regard. 32. The first contention raised by the petitioners is that Section 23-A(2) of the Mandi Act is violative of the principles of promissory estoppel and, as such, is hit by Article 14 of the Constitution of India. This argument of the petitioners has been raised on the basis that Section 23-A unamended gave a right to the petitioners who are deputationists and who are holding the posts of Secretaries in the Mandi Samiti to become the members of the cadre. By the amendment of Section 23-A and substitution of sub-section (2), this right has been taken away and as such, it is hit by the principles of promissory estoppel. In this connection the petitioners placed reliance on a decision of the Supreme Court in Surya Narain and others v. Bihar Electricity Board, AIR 1985 SC 941 . The question before the Supreme Court was as to whether the trainee engineers, who were, from time to time, treated to be the members of the class, could now be denied the right to be absorbed on the basis of principles of promissory estoppel. 33. In the case before the Supreme Court, the trainee engineers had altered their position to their prejudice and were, in fact, treated as members belonging to category of Assistant Engineers or Junior Engineers. It was specifically laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that the principles of promissory estoppel will apply where the persons aggrieved have altered their position to their prejudice because of the representation and promises made by the authorities. 34. In the instant case, the petitioners are deputationists. It was specifically laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that the principles of promissory estoppel will apply where the persons aggrieved have altered their position to their prejudice because of the representation and promises made by the authorities. 34. In the instant case, the petitioners are deputationists. And although Section 23-A(ii) (D) states that services of those who are found unfit for absorption shall stand terminated, the factual position is that learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel, Sri A.P. Singh has made a categorical statement before us that the present department in prepared to take them back. Indeed the Head of the Department has already issued an order recalling these employees. Net result, therefore, is that the petitioners continued to retain their lien their original post in the present department. Their position has not been altered due to any supposed representation having been made in the impugned statute. The principle of promissory estoppel is hence not attracted. 35. In regard to the second contention the argument of learned counsel is that since Section 23-A(2) of the Mandi Act does not by down the norms to find out the suitability or unsuitability of the deputationists it is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution India, and suffers from the vice of excessive delegation of legislative powers. 36. It is now well settled that if it appears from the relevant provisions of the Statutes that the powers which have been delegated include powers which can legitimately be regarded as essentially legislative powers then the legislation is bad and it introduces a serious infirmity in the Act itself. On the other hand, if the legislature lays down its legislative policy in clear and unambiguous terms and leaves it to the delegate to execute that policy by means of making appropriate Rules then chat delegation is not impermissible. Reference in this connection may be made to the decision in Lakhan Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1964 SC 381 and Hari Shanker Bagla v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1964 SC 465. 37. Reference in this connection may be made to the decision in Lakhan Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1964 SC 381 and Hari Shanker Bagla v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1964 SC 465. 37. Section 23-A (2)(b) of the Mandi Act clearly lays down that every Government servant serving in any Samiti on deputation on a post in the said cadre, who is not found to be unsuitable, suitability being determined in such a manner as may be laid down in the regulations, shall on and from the date of the constitution of the said cadre become member of the cadre. From this provision, it is clear that the legislative policy has clearly been laid down by the legislature to the effect that every Government servant who is on deputation, if found suitable, shall become a member of the cadre, but if not found suitable, he shall not become a member of the cadre. How the suitability is to be determined has to be laid down in the regulations to be framed under the Act. The legislative policy has been clearly laid down in unambiguous terms, it cannot be said that the essential legislative powers have been delegated to the regulation making authority. 38. So far as the norms are concerned it is, no doubt, true that in Section 23-A(2) of the Mandi Act, the norms have not been specifically laid down, but it has been specifically laid down that the question whether a deputations is unsuitable or suitable has to be determined in the manner, as laid down by the regulations. The regulations under the Act have to be framed under Section 2-A read with Section 26-X of the Act. Section 26-X of the Act provides that the Board may, with the previous approval of the State Government, make regulations not inconsistent with the Act and Rules made thereunder for the administration of the affairs of the Board, it is apparent that the State Government has kept the control of the framing of the regulations by the Board with itself. The regulations have to be made with the previous approval of the State Government and which are not inconsistent with the Act and the Rules made thereunder. This is, in our opinion, sufficient safe-guard so that the e is no arbitrary exercise of power. The regulations have to be made with the previous approval of the State Government and which are not inconsistent with the Act and the Rules made thereunder. This is, in our opinion, sufficient safe-guard so that the e is no arbitrary exercise of power. In view of the above provision, it cannot be said that merely because the norms have not been laid down in Section 23-A(2) of the Mandi Act, the Section gives arbitrary power to the authorities and, as such, is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 39. In support if this submission the learned counsel has relied upon two decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court. The first decision relief upon is in State of Mysore v. S. R. Jaya Ram, AIR 1968 SC 346 . In this case the Supreme Court was called upon to examine the validity of Rule 9(2) of the Mysore Recruitment of Gazetted Probationers Rules, 1959 which is in the following terms : - "9 (2) While calling for applications, the candidates will be asked to indicate their preferences as to the cadres they wish to join. The Government, however, reserves the right of adpointing to any particular cadre, any candidate whom it considers to be more suitable for such cadre." 40. The Hon'ble Supreme Court struck down this rule as it was of the opinion that it gave to the Government an arbitrary power of ignoring the just claim of successful candidate for recruitment in the offices under the State. It was consequently held to be violative of Articles 14 and 16(1) of the Constitution of India and was consequently struck down. 41. In the instant case the Government has not kept any arbitrary power with itself of determining the suitability or unsuitability of the deputationists. The manner in which the selection is to be made has been directed to be laid down by the regulations framed under the Act with previous approval of the Government. It cannot, therefore, be said that the Government has reserved itself an arbitrary power of ignoring the just claim of a person who is equally placed. The principles laid down in this case in our opinion do not apply to the facts of the present case. 42. The next decision relied upon is in Air India v. Nergesh Meerza, AIR 1981 SC 1829 . The principles laid down in this case in our opinion do not apply to the facts of the present case. 42. The next decision relied upon is in Air India v. Nergesh Meerza, AIR 1981 SC 1829 . In this case regulation 47 of the Air India Employees Service Regulation was under consideration. Regulation 47 provided that the services of any employee may, at the option of the Managing Director on the employee being found medically fit, be extended by one year beyond the age of retirement, the aggregate period not exceeding two years. This provision shall apply to the employees who retire at the age of 58. So far as the Air Hostages are concerned, under the same regulations the discretion was to be exercised by the Managing Director to extend the period upto 10 years. The Supreme Court after analysing regulation 47 held that the extension of the retirement of Air Hostage was entirely at the mercy and suitability of the Managing Director and consequently it was held that the conferment of such a wide and uncontrolled power on the Managing Director, is clearly violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India and the provision suffers from the vice of excessive delegation of powers. 43. In our opinion again on the facts of the present case the principle laid down in the case of Air India (supra) does not apply to the present case. Here no particular authority has been given by an uncontrolled power to select a deputationist and to hold him suitable or unsuitable, the question of suitability has to be in the manner prescribed by the regulations. Regulation 19 which has been framed clearly contemplates of constitution of a committee consisting of three high officers of the State namely the Director, the Additional Director and nominee of the Secretary to the Government in the Agriculture Department. It cannot, therefore, be said that the uncanalised power has been given to any particular authority in order to give him an arbitrary power of selection. In this view of the matter in our opinion the decision in the case of Air India (supra) docs not help the petitioners. 44. In view of the above we are of the opinion that the second contention raised on behalf of the learned counsel for the petitioners has no substance. 45. In this view of the matter in our opinion the decision in the case of Air India (supra) docs not help the petitioners. 44. In view of the above we are of the opinion that the second contention raised on behalf of the learned counsel for the petitioners has no substance. 45. The third contention raised on behalf of the petitioners is that regulation 19 of the Central Service Regulation is ultra vires as the regulation does not lay down the norms for judging the suitability and leaves it entirely to the discretion of the committee. 46. This contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners also in our opinion is without substance. Regulation 19(1) which has already been quoted above provides that the list of the deputationists as framed by the Director shall be forwarded to the committee together with all the relevant paper including character roll and service book if any. Their clause clearly gives a guideline to the committee constituted under the said clause to consider the relevant papers and in particular character roll and service book, if any. This is our opinion is a sufficient and relevant guidelines given to the committee so that the committee examine the cases of the deputationists on the basis laid down therein. It cannot, therefore, be said that regulation did not lay down norms for determining the suitability. The norms are there and it is thereafter left to the discretion of the committee which is a high powered committee consisting of senior most officers of the department to consider each case individually. This committee has only been given power to recommend and thereafter the anointing authority under sub-clause (3) has to consider the recommendation of the committee and pass consequential order whether the deputationist is found suitable for becoming the member of the cadre. In this view of the matter we do not find any force in this contention. 47. The next contention raised by learned counsel for the petitioner is that the norms laid down by the Committee are irrational and arbitrary. 48. In this view of the matter we do not find any force in this contention. 47. The next contention raised by learned counsel for the petitioner is that the norms laid down by the Committee are irrational and arbitrary. 48. In paragraph 8 of the counter affidavit of Sri A.K. Saxena filed on behalf of the Mandi Parishad in Writ Petition No. 9711/87, Inderjit v. Rajya Krishi Utpadan Mandi Parishad, it has been stated that for the purpose of judging the suitability of the deputationists the committee so constituted under Regulation 19 laid down three criteria namely ; (i) during the entire service tenure if the integrity of the employee was withheld : (ii) during the period of deputation of five years if there was single adverse entry; (iii) during the period of five years if the income of the Mandi Samiti was reduced by more than 10% during any of the years, for any of the three events existing the deputationists would not be suitable for being absorbed. These guidelines were laid down in the meeting of the Committee held on 16-1-1985. This fact is not disputed by the petitioners. 49. We have examined the three norms laid down in the event of which the deputationists would not be held to be suitable for being absorbed. We do not find any of the norms to be irrational. It is always open to a Committee to lay down its own guidelines in order to find out suitability. By laying down the guidelines, the Committee acted in a most fair manner so that none of the deputationists are discriminated against. In the circumstances we do not find any force in this contention also made on behalf of the petitioners. 50. In regard to the 5th contention raised on behalf of the petitioners reliance is placed on Regulation 19(3) of the Centralised Service Regulations. Particular reliance has been placed on the proviso which is in the following terms:- "Provided that if no orders are passed within six months of the enforcement of the regulations all such servants shall be deemed to be suitable and shall become members of the cadre." 51. The arguments on behalf of the petitioners is relying upon this proviso that since the High Court has quashed the initial selection by a judgment dated 18-8-1986 the next selection should have been made within six months. The arguments on behalf of the petitioners is relying upon this proviso that since the High Court has quashed the initial selection by a judgment dated 18-8-1986 the next selection should have been made within six months. Since it was made on 12th May, 1987 after six months and as such the petitioners became automatically members of the cadre. In our opinion this contention is wholly fallacious. The proviso to clause (3) quoted above clearly lays down that when the regulations are enforced the appointing authority has to give his decision within six months. The regulations came into force from 1-8-1984. The appointing authority gave its decision within six months of that date on 25-1-1985. Once this decision was given the proviso to clause (3) exhausted itself. The fact that the petitioners challenged the said decision by means of writ petition and in the writ petition a fresh order was passed directing reconsideration of all the cases of petitioners by judgment dated 18-8-1986 does not revived the effect of the proviso. The question of now taking decision within six months consequently does not arise. This argument is wholly without substance. 52. In regard to the last contention raised on behalf of the petitioners, questions raised by different petitioners relate to their individual grievances which can be raised before the U.P. Service Tribunal constituted under the U.P. Services Tribunals Act, 1976. Section 4 of the said Act is wide enough to include all disputed relating to employment. This court cannot act as an appellate court. If and when a claim is filed by any particular petitioner the said claim shall be adjudicated by the U.P. Services Tribunal. 53. Before closing the arguments, learned counsel for the petitioners made two further submissions one was that Section 23-A (2D) of the Mandi Act was ultra vires as if a deputations is not absorbed then his services will stand terminated. Other was that selection in pursuance of the order of this Court date 18th August, 1986 was only a make belief and in fact, the authorities had already taken their decision in this regards. 54. Other was that selection in pursuance of the order of this Court date 18th August, 1986 was only a make belief and in fact, the authorities had already taken their decision in this regards. 54. In so far as the vires of Section 23(2D) is concerned, it is not necessary to go into this submission in detail as learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel Sri A.P. Singh appearing on behalf of State had given an undertaking that none of the petitioners who are not absorbed will be terminated. They shall be taken back in their parent department on the same terms and conditions as they are entitled to in law. Two affidavits have also been filed in Writ Petition No. 12988 of 1987. Ram Nath Maurya v. Direction, Mandi Parishad and others Learned counsel for the respondents has stated that both the affidavits may be taken into consideration in respect of all the petitioners before this Court. One affidavit has been filed Dr. B.N. Tyagi, who is director of Agriculture. In paragraph 3 of the affidavit, it has been stated that the deputationist who will not be absorve by the Mandi Parishad as Secretary will be taken back by the department on repatriation. His services will not be terminated, he will continue to enjoy the same status and benefits which was available to him from the department before repatriation. To the same effect is the affidavit or Brahmanand Sharma who is State Agriculture Marketing Officer, U.P. 55. In regard to the other submission, in our opinion, merely because the order has been issued by the Director of Agriculture recalling the deputationists a and that selection on some of the posts of Secretaries have been made, did not by itself amount to any mala fide act on the part of the respondents nor can from these facts it be inferred that the consideration of the case of the petitioners by the respondents was a mere make belief. 56. With the observations and conclusions the petitions are dismissed with costs. The interim orders passed by this Court are whereby vacated.