JUDGMENT R.R.K. Trivedi, J. - Petitioners in all the aforesaid writ petitions are employees of District Co-operative Bank Limited, Fatehpur. They were employed on different dates and on different posts on daily wages or on ad-hoc basis as stop gap arrangements. However, services of Petitioners have been terminated on different dates in the year 1989. In all the writ petitions the questions of law and facts for determination are identical and all these petitions can be disposed of by a common judgment. Writ Petition No. 21438 of 1989 shall be the leading case. 2. The main grievance of the Petitioners is that they were employed by District Co-operative Bank Limited, Fatehpur (hereinafter referred to as the Bank) on ad-hoc basis. Though appointments were made for short spells of 89 days but they have served continuously without any break upto the date of termination. Their claim is thit they have worked for long time and they became entitled in law to be regularised on their posts but the respondents illegally terminated Petitioners from service in gross violation of law. 3. I have heard Sri K.P. Agarwal, learned Counsel for petitioners, and Shri A. Kumar alone with Shri H.R. Misra, counsel for respondents 1 and 2 and learned Standing Counsel at length. 4. Learned Counsel for the Petitioners in his fervent and appealing arguments vehemently submitted that once the Bank employed Petitioners on the basis of stop gap arrangement and allowed them to work on their posts for a long time without any interruption though not strictly in accordance with the U.P. Co-operative Societies Employees Service Regulations, 1975 (hereinafter referred to as the Regulations), they cannot be permitted to deprive the Petitioners of their jobs all of a sudden taking the stand that now they have become law abiding If the respondents Nos. 1 and 2 have not acted in accordance with law, they cannot be permitted to take advantage of their own fault at this juncture. 1 and 2 have not acted in accordance with law, they cannot be permitted to take advantage of their own fault at this juncture. The action of respondents is arbitrary and capricious and violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution Relying on a number of judgments of Hon'ble Supreme Court dealing with the problem of daily wagers and ad-hoc employee in various organisations (which shall be discussed at the appropriate places) it has been submitted that the action of the respondents is against the spirit and philosophy of the Constitution particularly Article 41 which defines the objectives and goals which the State must endeavour to achieve over a period of time. Ft has been further submitted by Shri Agarwal that Regulation 5 provides that the recruitment for ail appointments in co-operative societies shall be made through U.P. Cooperative Institutional Service Board (hereinafter referred to as the Board). However, the Board which is the single centralised agency for purpose of recruitment of the employees has been reduced to be a non-functional body as it cannot cope with the demand of large number of recruitments in respect of more than one lakh co-operative societies spread all over the state. Submission of Shri Agarwal is that the provisions of Regulations 5 and 15 prohibiting the employment otherwise than through the Board is arbitrary and violative of Article 14 As there is no explanation for not acting according to law, the exercise of power or non-exercise of power has become a whimsical act for the Board and the committees of management of the Cooperative Societies in matters of employment. After over five years, the ad-hoc employees are regularised. The purpose and object behind framing Regulations 5 and 15 are not being served and there is no useful purpose in keeping these provisions on the Statute book. The Committee of Management and the Board must act within the period contemplated and in case they are not able to act, the employees working on daily wages or on ad-hoc basis must be deemed as regularised. 5. It has further been submitted that once the respondents employed Petitioners and have allowed them to work for such a long time, it is not open to them to plead that appointment was not legal and in accordance with the provisions contained in the Regulations of 1975. They are estopped under law. 5. It has further been submitted that once the respondents employed Petitioners and have allowed them to work for such a long time, it is not open to them to plead that appointment was not legal and in accordance with the provisions contained in the Regulations of 1975. They are estopped under law. The alleged contract in the circumstances is unconscionable. The termination of the appointment of Petitioners from their posts amounts to retrenchment and inviolation of Section 6N of U.P. Industrial Disputes Act and the orders are illegal and void as the Petitioners have already worked for more than 240 days on their posts. As the termination is illegal and void, Petitioners are entitled to be reinstated on their posts. 6. Shri A. Kumar, on the other hand, has submitted that it is not disputed that the appointments of Petitioners were made after 1972 when the U.P. Co-operative Institutional Service Board was established by Gazette Notification published on 4-3-1972 and the enforcement of Regulations of 1975 The appointments could only be made in accordance with the provisions contained in the Regulations of 1975. The appointments of Petitioners are illegal, hence they cannot claim any benefit. 7. It has been further submitted that the appointments of Petitioners were for a difinite period as is clear from the appointment order filed and hence they cannot be termed as retrenched employees in view of the amended definition of retrenchment in 1984. Submission of learned Counsel is that in view of Article 254, the Central Act dealing with the same subject shall prevail over the State Act. Thus the daily wages and fixed term employees cannot claim benefit of Section 6N of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act. 8. Shri Kumar has placed reliance on Dr. Smt. Bimla Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh 1985 (II) SLR 501 . He has submitted that appointment in contravention of the provisions of law shall be void even though made by mistake by the committee of management and no benefit can be claimed from such orders appointments which are void in law. Such appointment is a fresh appointment under the Regulations and has been made in the exercise of powers given under the relevant provisions. Shri Kumar has placed reliance on Virendra Pal Singh and Others Vs. District Assistant Registrar, Cooperative Societies, Etah and Another, (1980) 4 SCC 109 , in support of his submissions. 9. Such appointment is a fresh appointment under the Regulations and has been made in the exercise of powers given under the relevant provisions. Shri Kumar has placed reliance on Virendra Pal Singh and Others Vs. District Assistant Registrar, Cooperative Societies, Etah and Another, (1980) 4 SCC 109 , in support of his submissions. 9. It has been further submitted by Shri Kumar that a Co-operative Society is not a State or authority within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution and no relief can be granted to the petitioners. He has placed reliance on Racha Charan Sharma v. U.P. Co-operative Federation 1982 UP LB EC 89 (FB) and Sri Konaseema Co-op. Central Bank Ltd. v. N. Seetharama Raju AIR 1990 AP 171 . It has been further submitted that Petitioners have not pleaded or proved as to how the District Co-operative Bank is covered by Article 12 of the Constitution. Writ of mandamus as prayed by Petitioners cannot be thus issued. It has also been submitted that for the posts in respect of which claim has been made by petitioners, persons have already been selected by the Board and their rights are involved. They are regularly selected candidates and their rights cannot be defeated. Petitioners have participated in the selection proceedings conducted by the Board and some of them have been selected for appointment. They are estopped now from questioning the rights of the persons selected to be appointed on the post. The daily wages workers cannot claim themselves to be ad-hoc employees and so cannot be appointed or regularised on the post on which they had worked. The regulations of 1975 have been framed u/s 122 of the U.P. Co-operative Societies Act in accordance with law and do not suffer from any unconstitutionality as argued for Petitioners. It has been further submitted that it is not the case of Petitioners that they were appointed or continued with the consent of the Board and thus the Board cannot be blamed in any manner. 10. Shri A. Kumar has also submitted that employees of category IV are employed by the committee of management and not through Board and as such they cannot claim benefit of regularisation. 11. 10. Shri A. Kumar has also submitted that employees of category IV are employed by the committee of management and not through Board and as such they cannot claim benefit of regularisation. 11. Lastly, it has been argued that as the Petitioners case is that their services have been terminated in breach of the provisions of Section 6N of U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, they cannot be permitted to invoke the remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution as they have an equally efficacious alternative remedy under the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act. Learned Counsel has relied on the Full Bench case of this Court Chandrama Singh v. Managing Director U.P. Cooperative Union Lucknow (1991) 2 UP LB EC 898. 12. The submission of learned Counsel is that in view of the fact that Petitioners have alternative remedy, according to the view taken by the Full Bench of this Court, Petitioners writ petitions are not legally maintainable as they can raise their grievance before the forum provided under the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act. 13. Learned Standing Counsel submitted that in spite of the letters written on 9-1-1991 and 20-2-1991 no body has turned up to file counter affidavit in the case and in the facts and circumstances he expressed his helplessness to argue the case. So far as the legal submissions are concerned, learned Standing Counsel submitted that he adopts the arguments made by Shri A. Kumar. 14. Shri K.P. Agarwal in rejoinder has submitted that writ can be issued to any non-statutory body or a private person for enforcement of statutory obligation. Sukhdev Singh, Oil and Natural Gas Commission, Life Insurance Corporation, Industrial Finance Corporation Employees Associations Vs. Bhagat Ram, Association of Clause II. Officers, Shyam Lal, Industrial Finance Corporation, AIR 1975 SC 1331 , Ramana Dayaram Shetty Vs. International Airport Authority of India and Others, AIR 1979 SC 1628 and Ajay Hasia and Others Vs. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi and Others, AIR 1981 SC 487 , for the aforesaid submission. It has been further submitted by Shri Agarwal that District Co-operative Bank functions under the Reserve Bank of India and it discharges public functions, hence it is an authority within Article 12 of the Constitution. Shri Agarwal has placed reliance on Synthetics and Chemicals Ltd. v. G.C. Kumar 1972 (25) FLR 146 (SC) , The Praga Tools Corporation Vs. It has been further submitted by Shri Agarwal that District Co-operative Bank functions under the Reserve Bank of India and it discharges public functions, hence it is an authority within Article 12 of the Constitution. Shri Agarwal has placed reliance on Synthetics and Chemicals Ltd. v. G.C. Kumar 1972 (25) FLR 146 (SC) , The Praga Tools Corporation Vs. Shri C.A. Imanual and Others, AIR 1969 SC 1306 ., J.K. Ravon v. Union of India 1978 (36) FLR 375 , Andi Mukta Sadguru Shree Muktajee Vandas Swami Suvarna Jayanti Mahotsav Smarak Trust and Others Vs. V.R. Rudani and Others, AIR 1989 SC 1607 . It has further been submitted that in any view of the matter Respondent No. 2 Co-operative Societies Service Institutional Board is a statutory body and writ can be issued against it. 15. So far as the bar of alternative remedy is concerned, Shri Agarwal has submitted that Petitioners have questioned the vires of the statutory provisions which can only be adjudicated by this Court, hence there is no question of relegating the Petitioners to alternative remedy. 16. It has also been submitted that bar of alternative remedy in exercise of powers under Article 226 of the Constitution is not absolute. It is a matter of policy and convenience and should be considered and decided on the facts of each individual case. According to Shri Agarwal the position of law as expressed by the Fall Bench is not applicable to the present case. Learned Counsel for Petitioners has further submitted that only one person has been selected by the Board. However, as the very constitution of the Board is under challenge, there cannot be any estoppel against Petitioners as argued on behalf of respondents. Petitioners have worked on the post for seven years and their rights cannot be destroyed. Only two of the Petitioners appeared and have been selected and rights of other Petitioners cannot be affected. The employers failed to discharge their legal obligation and they can be compelled by this Court to regularise the Petitioners on their posts for which they are legally entitled. 17. Only two of the Petitioners appeared and have been selected and rights of other Petitioners cannot be affected. The employers failed to discharge their legal obligation and they can be compelled by this Court to regularise the Petitioners on their posts for which they are legally entitled. 17. The submission of learned Counsel for respondents that District Cooperative Bank Limited, Fatehpur (hereinafter referred to as the Bank) is not a State or authority within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution and as such no relief by issuing an order or direction in the nature of mandamus can be granted to the Petitioners in the present writ petition and further that Petitioners have an alternative remedy under the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act and thus the writ petition is not maintainable are preliminary in nature and need be considered and decided before deciding the claim of the Petitioners on merits. 18. Taking the first objection of learned Counsel for respondents as to whether an appropriate order or direction in the nature of mandamus can be issued against respondent Bank, it has to be seen as to whether the rights claimed are purely of private character and no mandamus can be issued and whether the Bank is purely a private body having no public duties to perform, as these are the two exceptions where writ of mandamus cannot be issued. Learned Counsel for respondents has cited two Full Bench cases in support of his submission that Bank cannot be an authority within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India. There is no depute so far as the legal position determined by the aforesaid Full Bench cases that Co-operative societies cannot be an authority within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution is concerned However, under Article 226 writ can be issued against any person or authority and the work "authority" used in this Article should not be confused with the word "authority" used in Article 12 of the Constitution. Article 12 is relevant only for the purpose of enforcement of fundamental rights under Article 32, whereas under Article 226 writs can be issued for enforcement of non-fundamental rights. Article 12 is relevant only for the purpose of enforcement of fundamental rights under Article 32, whereas under Article 226 writs can be issued for enforcement of non-fundamental rights. As such, even a nonstatutory authority or a body which is not an instrumentality of the State may have legal duties to perform and in such cases writ of mandamus cm be issued Hon'ble Supreme Court in Shri Anandi Mukta Sadguru S.M.V.S.J.M.S. Trust v. V.R. Rudani AIR 1989 SC 1607 has considered this distinction in the following words: The term "authority" used in Article 226, in the context, must receive a liberal meaning unlike the term in Article 12. Article 12 is relevant only for the purpose of enforcement of fundamental rights under Article 32. Article 226 confers power on the High Courts to issue writs for enforcement of the fundamental rights as well as non-fundamental rights. The words "Any person or authority" used in Article 226 are, therefore, not to be confined only to statutory authorities and instrumentalities of the State. They may cover any other person of body performing in public duty. 'The form of the body concerned is not very much relevant. What is relevant is the nature of the duty imposed on the body. The duty must be judged in the light of positive obligation owned by the person or authority to the affected party. No matter by what means the duty is imposed. If a positive obligation exists mandamus cannot be denied. 19. Service conditions of the Bank employees are governed by statutory regulations and the Bank has several legal obligations to discharge in connection with matters of its employees. Regulations have been framed to regularise the ad-hoc employees, hence it cannot be said that the Bank is a wholly private body having no public functions to perform and the light claimed by the Petitioners viz. the regularisation on the post is wholly contractual. Even their termination is being challenged as illegal in view of the provisions contained in Section 6N of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act. If a case is made out, the writ of mandamus cannot be refused on mere technicalities. the regularisation on the post is wholly contractual. Even their termination is being challenged as illegal in view of the provisions contained in Section 6N of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act. If a case is made out, the writ of mandamus cannot be refused on mere technicalities. Hon'bie Supreme Court in the aforesaid case in paragraph 21 has further observed about the scope of writ of mandamus which can be gainfully quoted below: Here again we may point out that mandamus cannot be denied on the ground that the duty to be enforced is not imposed by the statute, Commenting on the development of this law, professor be Smith states: "To be enforceable by mandamus a public duty does not necessarily have to be one imposed by statute. It may be sufficient for the duty to have been imposed by charter." (Judicial Review of Administrative Act 4th Ed. p. 540). We share this view. The judicial control over the fast expanding meze of bodies affecting the rights of the people should not be put into water-tight compartment. It should remain flexible to meet the requirements of variable circumstances. Mandamus is a very wide remedy which must be easily available 'to reach injustice wherever it is found.' Technicalities should not come in the way of granting that relief under Article 226. We therefore, reject the contention urged for the appellants on the maintainability of the writ petition. 20. The objection of the learned Counsel for the respondent if considered in view of the aforesaid legal position, it will not be a proper case to refuse relief claimed by the Petitioners on the ground that Bank is not an authority within the meaning of Article 12 and this objection raised on behalf of the respondents deserves to be turned down. 21. New serious objection raised on behalf of the learned Counsel for respondents is on the ground of altarnative remedy which is available to the Petitioners under the U.P. Industrial Disdutes Act. Strong reliance has been placed by the Petitioners on the Full Bench case of Chandrama Singh mentioned above. 22. I have throughly considered the view expressed by the Full Bench and in my opinion the position of law as explained in the Full Bench cannot be disputed that normally when a suitable alternative remedy is available, writ petition under Article 226 should not be entertained. 22. I have throughly considered the view expressed by the Full Bench and in my opinion the position of law as explained in the Full Bench cannot be disputed that normally when a suitable alternative remedy is available, writ petition under Article 226 should not be entertained. However, in Full Bench as well as in several other judgments of Hon'ble Supreme Court, it has been said that if the alternative remedy is not adequate or efficacious, writ under Article 226 cannot be refused. There can be circumstances where in-spite of the existence of an alternative remedy, writ petition can be entertained. The correct position is that it has to be determined in facts of every case as to whether Petitioner should be relegated to the alternative remedy or he can be permitted to assert his rights in writ petition. A three Judges Bench of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Century Spinning and Manufacturing Company Ltd. and Another Vs. The Ulhasnagar Municipal Council and Another, AIR 1971 SC 1021 observed as under in Para 8: The High Court may, in exercise of its discretion, decline to exercise its extra ordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. But the discretion is judicial if the petition makes a claim which is frivolous, vexatious, or prima facie unjust, or my not appropriately be tried in a petition invoking extra ordinary jurisdiction, the Court may decline the entertain the petition. But a party claiming to be aggrieved be the action of a public body or authority on the plea that the action is unlawful, high-handed, arbitrary or unjust is entitled to a hearing of its petition on the merits. Apparently the petition filed by the Company did not raise any complicated questions of fact for determination, and the claim could not be characterised as frivolous, vexatious or unjust. The High Court has given no reasons for dismissing the petition in limine, and on a consideration of the averments in the petition and the materials placed before the Court we are satisfied that the Company was entitled to have its grievance against the action of the Municipality, which was prima facie unjust tried. 23. Now considering the facts of the present case there is no controversy regarding facts that Petitioners were employed by the Bank and they were terminated from service after they worked for long time. 23. Now considering the facts of the present case there is no controversy regarding facts that Petitioners were employed by the Bank and they were terminated from service after they worked for long time. It is also not denied that if the conditions are satisfied they may be entitled for being regularised on their post. In these circumstances, it cannot be said that the claim of the Petitioners is vexatious or unjust on the face of it. The relief under the Industrial Disputes Act in the present case, in my opinion, will not be equally efficacious. Petitioners are out of employment since 1989. If they are relegated to the alternative remedy, they are bound to remain out of employment for a long time. They will have to first approach the conciliation officer and then the State Government for making reference to the Industrial Tribunal or Court. All this procedure is quite time-taking. In my opinion, it will not be proper, not to entertain the writ petitions on the ground of the said alternative remedy. There is one more reason. The Petitioners have questioned the vires of the Regulations framed which cannot be raised and heard before any other forum. Thus in the facts and circumstances of the case, in my opinion, the writ petitions can be appropriately heard and decided by this Court. 24. Shri K.P. Agarwal, learned Counsel for petitioners, submitted that Regulations 5 and 15 prohibiting employment otherwise than through the Board are illegal and arbitrary and violative of Article 14 as the Board is admittedly incapable of recommending suitable candidates for appointment to large number of Cooperative Societies as it is a single Centralised body for recommending suitable candidates for appointment in all the Co-operative Societies speed over the entire State. In other words, the submission of Shri Agarwal is that the Board is a non-functional body and Regulations 5 and 15 are not serving the purpose and object for which they have been enacted and their remaining on the Statute Book is facilitating the whimsical act of the authorities in matter of employment. The submission is that the provision are thus ultra vires and violative of Article 14. The submission is that the provision are thus ultra vires and violative of Article 14. This submission of the learned Counsel for Petitioners cannot be accepted Regulations of 1975 have been Earned under Sub-section (2) of Section 122 of U.P. Co-operative Societies Act, 1965 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) by the Board, The object behind framing these Regulations is to regulate the appointments of the employees in Cooperative Societies so that management of the Cooperative Societies, which is general hands of the elected persons, may not be misused by appointing persons of choice and liking and the cliam of the qualified and competent persons may be ignored. The Regulations also provide protection to the employees againest arbitrary actions of the management. The validrty of these Regulations cannot be questioned on account of alleged non-functioning of the Board. The vires of the Statute cannot be judged or questioned on the basis of its defective implementation or non-implementation. A statute validly enacted cannot lose its usefulness or its power merely because of disuse or lapse of time. Shri Agarwal has not has not been able to cite any authority to substantiate his aforesaid submission. For the reason stated above submission of the learnued Counsel for petitioners challenging vires of Regulations 5 and 15 and the constitution of the Board cannot be accepted. 25. Before examining the claim of Petitioners on merits regarding regularisation on the basis of their continuance for long time, it would be more appropriate to examine the Provisions of the Uttar Pradesh Regularisation of Ad-hoc Appointments (of post within the purview of the U.P. Cooperative Institutional Board) Regulations, 1985. Regulation 4 of the aforesaid Regulations provides as under: 4. Regularisation of ad hoc appointment, (1) Any employee who- (i) was directly appointed on any post on ad basis in any Cooperative Society falling within the purview of the Board on or before May 1, 1985 and is continuing in service, as such, on the date of commencement of these regulations; (ii) possessed requisite qualifications prescribed for regular appointment at the time of such ad hoc appointment; and (iii) has completed or as the case may be. after he has completed three years continuous service, shall be considered for regular appointment in permanent or temporary vacancy as may be available on the basis of his record and suitability before any regular appointment is made in such vacancy in accordance with the relevant rules, regulations or orders. Explanation--In computing the period of continuance service every break in the service for a period not exceeding thirty day shall be ignored and the employee shall be deemed to be continuing in service. 26. Aforesaid Regulation 4 has been considered by a Division Bench of this Court in the case: Jai Kishan v. U.P. Co-operative Bank Ltd. Lucknow (1989) 2 UP EC 140. The Division Bench has held that the cut off, date, i.e. 1-5-1983 mentioned in Regulation 5 is arbitrary and discriminatory and as such hit by Article 14. Para 42 of the judgment of the Division Bench may be quoted here: 42. As observed earlier nothing has been shown on behalf of the State to establish the rational principle and the object which was sought to hi achieved by classifying the ad-hoc appointees by fixing a particular date, namely 1-5-1983 and making the benefit of the regularisation rules available to those who were appointed prior to 1-5-1983 and not extending the benefit to the employees appointed thereafter. Under the provisions of Regulations of 1985 as existing, those who had to complete three years service even after 30-7-1985 were to be considered. Fixation of date in Regulation 4 (1) of Regulations "of 1985 is arbitrary and discriminatory and that part of the regulation is hit by Article 14 of the Constitution of India, as a result of which we hold without ourselves fixing any cut off date, that those Petitioners who were appointed atleast on or before the date of notification i.e. 30-7-1985 are also entitled for consideration for regularisation according to Regulations of 1985 before these posts are regularly filled. 27. Thus, applying the aforesaid judgment given by the Division Bench, persons employed in the Co-operative Societies upto 30-7-1985 on the posts coming within the purview of the Board shall be entitled to be regularised under the aforesaid Regulations if they fulfil the conditions mentioned under Regulation 4 The Regulations of 1985 have been amended by U.P. Regularisation of Ad-hoc Appointments (on posts within the purview of the U.P. Co operative Institutional Service Board) First Amendment Regulations, 1990. By this amendment Regulation 9 has been added and the benefit of regularisation has been, extended also to the persons directly appointed on ad-hoc basis on or before October I, 1986 and continuing in the service as such on the date of the commencement of the U.P. Regularisation of Ad-hoc Appointments Regulations, This amendment case in force from the date of its publication, i.e. 25th August, 1990, Regulation 9 is quoted below: 1. Is niyamawali ke uobandh yatharashyak parivartan sahit kisi aiyse vyakti par bhi Laago honge jo dinaank 1 October, 1986 ko ya iske poorva tadartha aadhar par seedhey niyukti kiya gaya ho aur (Uttar-Pradesh Uttar Pradevh Sahkarita Sansthtagat Seva Manilal ke chetrantargat padon par tadarth niyuktivonka viniyamitikaran (Pratham Shanshodhan) viniyamawali 1990 ke prarambh ke dmiank ko is praku seva me bona raha ho. 28. Learned Counsel for Petitioners supplied a chart giving the date of appointment of the Petitioners in each writ petition and the date of their termination. The chart is being reproduced below for appreciating as to which of the Petitioners were appointed before 1-10-1986 and can be held entitled for being regularised under the Regulations of 1985 as amended by 1st Amendment of 1990. 1. Writ Petition No. 21438 of 1989. Name Date of Date of appointment Termination1. Vijaya Kumar Singh 6-10-1983 7-10-19892. Ram Babu Singh 13-6-1987 " "3. Nadan Pandey 25-11-1983 " "4. Triloki Nath Singh 25-11-1983 " "5. Krishna Kumar Singh 21-5-1984 " "6. Ravindra Kumar Siugh 1-3-1981 " "7. Awadesh Kumar Singh 1-3-1984 " "8. Rai Babudur Singh 11-5-1987 " "2. Write Petition No. 21434 of 1989 Name Date of Date of appointment Termination1. Ashok Kunmr Sirmh 23-12-1987 2-1-19892. Israfeel 23-12-1987 " "3. Writ Petition No. 21435 of 19891. Rajendru Kumar Bajpai 11-4-1986 7-10-19892. Ramadhani Uttam 1984 7-10-19894. Writ Petition No 21436 of 19881. Radhey Shyam 26-12-1981 25-10-19895. Writ Petition No. 21437 of 19891. Ram Naresh Singh 6-6-1987 7-10-19896. Writ Petition No. 21439 of 19891. Abhaya Singh Chauhan 8-11-1983 28-10-19897. Writ Petition No. 8699 of 19871. Radhey Shyam Singh 25-11-1981 25-10-19892. Abhai Singh 8-11-1983 28-10-19893. Vinava Kumar Singh 12-4-19854. Triloki Nnth Singh 25-11-1983 7-10-19895. Ravindra Kumar Smgh 1-3-1984 7-10-19896. Awadhesh Kumar Singh 1-3-1984 7-10-19897. Jasvir Singh 3-8-19858. Ram Drmni 6-4-19839. Rajendra Kumar 9-3-198510. Sri Namfan Pandey 25-11-1983 7-10-198911. Vijaya Kumar Sinuh 6-10-1983 7-10-198912. Krishna Kumar Chauhan 18-5-198413. Santosh Kumar Singh 16-12-198414. Ashok Kumar Singh 6-9-198315. Jasvir Singh Chauhan 17-12-1984 Note: 1. Abhai Singh 8-11-1983 28-10-19893. Vinava Kumar Singh 12-4-19854. Triloki Nnth Singh 25-11-1983 7-10-19895. Ravindra Kumar Smgh 1-3-1984 7-10-19896. Awadhesh Kumar Singh 1-3-1984 7-10-19897. Jasvir Singh 3-8-19858. Ram Drmni 6-4-19839. Rajendra Kumar 9-3-198510. Sri Namfan Pandey 25-11-1983 7-10-198911. Vijaya Kumar Sinuh 6-10-1983 7-10-198912. Krishna Kumar Chauhan 18-5-198413. Santosh Kumar Singh 16-12-198414. Ashok Kumar Singh 6-9-198315. Jasvir Singh Chauhan 17-12-1984 Note: 1. All the employees have worked for more than 240 days 2. All excepting the Petitioners in Writ Petition No 21434 of 1987 have worked for more than 2 years. 29. A perusal of the aforesaid chart shows that except live persons whose names have been underlined, all the other Petitioners were appointed before 1-10-1986 and they have continued upto 1989 and have been terminated from service on different dates in the year 1989. They have all completed more than three years of service. Thus applying the ratio of the Division Bench case Jai Kishun v. U.P. Cooperative Bank Ltd. (supra) they are entitled to be regularised before the posts are filled by appointing regularly selected candidates. 30. Sri A. Kumar, however, submitted that the Petitioners cannot be entitled for regularisation as the appointments of the Petitioners were made for short span of 89 days and they were continued on the posts without authority and without permission of the Board. 31. I have thoroughly considered the contention raised by the learned Counsel for the respondents. A Division Bench of this Court in case Munish Kumar Sharma v. District Inspector of Schools Dehradun (1990) 1 UP LB EC 223 while considering ad-how appointments by managing committee u/s 16 of the U.P. Higher Education Service Commission Act, 1980, rejecting objection of the employer relating to illegality committed in appointment have held in the following words: The management cannot turn round after nearly three years and claim that since it did not notify the vacincy as contemplated u/s 16 of the Act or it did not select and appoint Petitioner as provided in the Statute, therefore, he should quit. It would amount to deriving advantage of your own wrong. That is where equitable principle of estoppol intervene. Any person on whose assurance the other party alters his position is estopped from turning round or going back on his promise. It would amount to deriving advantage of your own wrong. That is where equitable principle of estoppol intervene. Any person on whose assurance the other party alters his position is estopped from turning round or going back on his promise. The Management, therefore, cannot be permitted to dispense with services of Petitioner for not appointing him in accordance with procedure provided in the Act or Rules. 32. In the present case also it is not denied that Petitioners were appointed and they have worked on the post for number of years. Now, when the Regulations of 1985 as amended by 1st Amendment of 1990 have come into force and they are to get a chance of regularisation on the post, it is bring said that their appointment was illegal. The respondents cannot be allowed to raise this plea after such a long time. The Regulation 5 of the Regulations clearly contemplates appointment pending selection by way of stop gap arrangement by appointing authority for such period as the Board may consider necessary. In intimation of such appointment should be given to the Board within a month of such appointment. From a perusal of the provisions contained in Regulation 5 of the Regulations of 1975, it is clear that the managing committee of the Co-operative Society could make appointments for a limited period pending selection for the post to be filled in by direct recruitment. Such a stop-gap arrangement could be made for 180 days which could be extended for a period of 120 days by the Board A perusal of the provisions of Clauses (2) and (3) clearly shows that all these formalities were to be performed between the committee of management and the Board. The employee Petitioners have nothing to do with it. and they have no say in the matter They may not even be aware as to whether the managing committee has intimated the Board about the appointment, whether proper requisition has been made for the post and whether the appointment has been permitted for 180 days or 120 days or whether the stop gap arrangement has at all been permitted or not In these facts and circumstances if the appointment was made and it was allowed to be continued for such a long time, initial appointment could not be questioned for a want of these formalities. Hon'ble Supreme Court in case Bhagauti Prasad v. Delhi State Mineral Development Corporation AIR 1990 SC 361 while considering identical objection observed as under: The main controversy centres round the question whether some Petitioners are possessed of the requisite qualification to hold the posts 30 as to entitle them to be confirmed in the respective posts held by them. The indisputable facts are that the Petitioners were appointed between the period 1983 and 1986 and ever since, they have been working and have gained sufficient experience in the actual discharge of duties attached to the posts held by them. Practical experience would always aid the person to effectively discharge the duties and is a sure guide to assess the suitability. The initial minimum educational qualification prescribed for the different posts is undoubtedly a factor to be reckoned with, but it is so at the time of the initial entry into the service. Once the appointments were made as daily rated workers and they were allowed to work for a considerable length of time, it would be hard and harsh to deny them the confirmation in the respective posts on the ground that they lack the prescribed educational qualifications in our view, three years' experience, ignoring artificial break in service for short periods created by the respondent, in the circumstances, would be sufficient for confirmation. 33. A similar objection that casual labourers were not regularly recruited and as such they are not entitled for equal wages was rejected by Hon'ble Supreme Court in Daily Rated Casual Labour Employed under P and T Department Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Others, AIR 1987 SC 2342 was rejected in the following words: ...It may be true that the Petitioners have not been regularly recruited but many of them have been working continuously for more than a year in the Department and some of them have been engaged as casual labourers for nearly ten years. They are rendering the same kind of service which is being rendered by the regular employees doing the same type of work.... Hon Supreme Court refused to accept the challenge regarding the illegality in the appointment. The Division Bench of this Court in Jai Kishun's case (supra) also refused to accept the similar objection regarding continuance of the employees for such a long tune i. e. beyond period of 180 days of extended period 120 days. 34. Hon Supreme Court refused to accept the challenge regarding the illegality in the appointment. The Division Bench of this Court in Jai Kishun's case (supra) also refused to accept the similar objection regarding continuance of the employees for such a long tune i. e. beyond period of 180 days of extended period 120 days. 34. In Sri Rabinarayan Mohapartra Vs. State of Orissa and others, AIR 1991 SC 1286 , Hon'ble Supreme Court while considering regularisation of the teachers in aided educational institutions, rejected the objection regarding continuance on the post with approval of the educational authorities in the following words: The appellant was appointed on July 12, 1982 and has been working with the approval of the authorities for almost 4 years with short breaks. The managing committee is still utilising his services though there is no approval by the educational authorities for the period subsequent to 1986. It is no body's ease that his services were ever terminated on grounds of inefficiency or misconduct. The case of the appellant is, thus, fully covered by Section 3 of the Validation Act. We are of the view that the High Court erred in denying the benefit of the Validation Act to the appellant on the ground that his initial appointment for 89 days was conditioned by the stipulation that he would continue until replace I by a candidate from the select list. 35. The aforesaid view taken by Hon'ble Supreme Court squarely applies to the facts and circumstance; of the present cave. The respondent can not be allowed to deny the benefit to the Petitioners of regnlarisation after taking service from them for such a long time. There no complaint against their suitability or competency regarding work done during this long period. So far as the submission of learned Counsel for respondents on the question of short spells is concerned, the Explanation to Regulation 4(i) of Regulations of 1985 provides that a break in service up to 30 days shall be ignored in computing period of continuous service. Thus the fact that Petitioners were being appointed for short spells of 89 days is of no consequence and they cannot be denied benefit of the provision; of Regulation 4 of Rules of 1985. Hon'ble Supreme Court in The Dharwad Distt. P.W.D. Literate Daily Wages Employees Association and others, etc. Vs. Thus the fact that Petitioners were being appointed for short spells of 89 days is of no consequence and they cannot be denied benefit of the provision; of Regulation 4 of Rules of 1985. Hon'ble Supreme Court in The Dharwad Distt. P.W.D. Literate Daily Wages Employees Association and others, etc. Vs. State of Karnataka and others etc., AIR 1990 SC 883 , after noticing the judgements of Hon'ble Supreme Court in cases: Randhir Singh Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Others, AIR 1982 SC 879 , Dhirendra Chamoli and Another Vs. State of U.P., (1986) 52 FLR 147 , Surinder Singh and Another Vs. Engineer-in-chief, C.P.W.D. and Others, AIR 1986 SC 584 and several other decisions, have concluded in para. 11 in the following words: We have referred to several precedents all rendered within the current decade to emphasise upon the feature that equal pay for equal work and providing security for service by regularising casual' employment within a reasonable period have been unanimously accepted by this Court as a constitutional goal to our socialistic polity, Article 141 of the Constitution provides how the decisions of this Court are to be treated and we do not think there is any need to remind the instrumentalities of the State be it of the Centre or the State, or the public sector that the Constitution makers wanted them to be bound by what this Court said by way of interpreting the law. 36. The claim of Petitioners if considered in the aforesaid legal background, there is no option but to accept the same. 36. The claim of Petitioners if considered in the aforesaid legal background, there is no option but to accept the same. It is true that appointments on ad-hoc basis or on casual basis for long time have been seriously criticised by Hon'ble Supreme Court as well as by this Court and such appointments have not been appreciated it can also not be denied that regularisation of such ad-hoc appointments not made strictly in accordance with the provisions applicable, may permit lawlessness in matters of employment and the employers may feel encouraged to appoint more and more persons on ad-hoc basis and to continue them under hope that they will be regularised but till the agency constituted, namely the Board does not function in its full capacity and speed so as to cater to the need of the Cooperative Societies by recommending suitable candidates, such a situation has to be tolerated and a balance has to be struck to protect the interest of the employees who have worked on the adhoc basis for such a long time, as it shall be hard for the employees if they are deprived of their employment after serving for 3-4 years. Considering this aspect of the matter the legislature invented and enacted the Regulations of 1985 regularising such appointments. But how it is high time for the respondents to think over this matter and devise means to avoid appointments on ad-hoc basis and to take swift and sure action in matters of appointment on regular basis. 37. Shri A. Kumar placed much reliance on case Virendra Pal Singh and Others Vs. District Assistant Registrar, Cooperative Societies, Etah and Another, (1980) 4 SCC 109 , for saying that the appointments of the Petitioners cannot be legal and valid being in violation of the Regulations and they cannot be regularised under Regulations of 1985. The judgment relied on by Shri A. Kumar is of two Judges Bench while the various judgments of the Apex Court noticed in the case: Dharwar District P.W.D. Literate Daily Wages Employees Association v. State of Karnataka and Ors. (supra) are decisions of three Judges bench and the decisions referred to have been given during this decade and after the aforesaid case relied on by the learned Counsel for the respondent. (supra) are decisions of three Judges bench and the decisions referred to have been given during this decade and after the aforesaid case relied on by the learned Counsel for the respondent. There appears to be unanimity to provide regularisation to the casual employees within a reasonable period and it has been accepted to be as a constitutional goal. The view expressed by Hon Supreme Court fully applies in the facts and circumstances of the present case. Further, in Jasraj Singh Sajwan v. Distt. Cooperative Bank Ltd. Pauri Garhwal (1991) 2 UP LB EC 998 a learned Single Judge of this Court has held that even though the appointment was in contravention of Regulations 5 and 15 of Regulations, 1975, the employees will be entitled for being regularised under Regulations, 1985. The respondents are thus under legal obligations to regularise all the employees who were appointed on or before 1-10-1986 and have completed more than three years' service and satisfy the conditions contemplated for being regularised. 38. Now coming to the question as to whethej the Petitioners could be terminated from service in violation of Section 6N of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, Shri A. Kumar submitted that in view of the amended definition of the word "retrenchment" in the Central Act, namely Industrial Disputes Act, 1987, which deals with the same subject shall prevail over the State Act and the Petitioners cannot claim benefit of Section 6N as their appointments were for a definite period. Shri A. Kumar has relied on Article 254 of the Constitution of India. This question has also been considered and decided by the Division Bench of this Court in Jai Kishun v. U.P. Cooperative Bank Ltd. (supra) and it has been held that so far this State in concerned, Section 6N will continue to apply. In view of the judgment of the Division Bench, with which I respectfully agree, there is no necessity of considering this question in detail. There is no dispute that services of the Petitioners were terminated in violation of Section 6N of U.P. Industrial Disputes Act though they have worked for more than 240 days. In view of the judgment of the Division Bench, with which I respectfully agree, there is no necessity of considering this question in detail. There is no dispute that services of the Petitioners were terminated in violation of Section 6N of U.P. Industrial Disputes Act though they have worked for more than 240 days. As the termination from service in violation of Section 6N of the Industrial Disputes Act has been held to be illegal and viod, in Jai Kishun's case and several other decisions, the Petitioners who have completed 240 day's of service, are also entitled to be reinstated on their posts. 39. Shri A. Kumar also submitted that the petitioners were employed on daily wages and they are not ad hoc employees and so cannot be entitled for regularisation. In fact, considering the provisions of Regulation 5 of the Regulations of 1975, the appointments are by way of stop-gap measure. They could be given any name. They could be rated as daily wagers, they could be alleged to be ad-hoc employees or casual employees but all such employees are distinguishable from regular appointments contemplated under Regulation 5 and can be covered by the phrase "stop-gap measure" and all such employees will be entitled for regularisation under Regulations of 1985 if they satisfy the conditions, mentioned therein. 40. Shri A. Kumar further submitted that some of the Petitioners have participated in regular selection and have also been selected for appointment and as such they are not entitled for any relief. This submission of the learned Counsel for respondents cannot be accepted in view of the provisions of Regulations of 1985. After the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in Jai Kishun's case, since the cut-off date of 1-5-1983 has been held to be illegal and arbitrary has been struck down, the Petitioners also became entitled for being considered for regularisation, as most of them were appointed before 30-7-1985 and 1-10-1986. If the Petitioners became entitled for a benefit under the Statute they cannot be deprived of the same on the basis of participation in the selection proceedings before the Board. It is well established that there cannot be estoppel against the Statute. The position that the Petitioners are also entitled for the benefit, emerged out only after judgment of the Division Bench of this Court. The submission of the learned Counsel thus cannot be accepted. 41. It is well established that there cannot be estoppel against the Statute. The position that the Petitioners are also entitled for the benefit, emerged out only after judgment of the Division Bench of this Court. The submission of the learned Counsel thus cannot be accepted. 41. It has lastly been submitted by Shri A. Kumar that Petitioners of Writ Petition No. 21438 of 1989 belong t> category 4 and appointments of such employees do not come under the purview of the Board. In my opinion, the contention of the learned Counsel is not correct. If the appointment on a post continues to in under control and approved of the Board it would be treated to be within the purview of the Board. A perusal of Clause 5 of Regulation 5 will show that only selection committee have been provided separately for the employees of category 4 but Clauses 6 says that selection made by the selection committee referred to in Clause 5 and appointments made on the basis thereof shall be provisional and subject to approval of the Board. The provisions contained m Clause 6 thus provide no room for doubt that even the appointment of the employees of Category 4 is within the purview of the Board ant even the employees of Category 4 will be entitled for the benefit of Regulation of 1985 for being considered to be regularised on the post held by them before they are filled by regularly selected candidates. 42. For the reasons recorded above, the writ petitions are allowed. The termination of the Petitioners from service in violation of Section 6N of the Industrial Disputes Act is illegal and invalid and as such they shall be entitled to be reinstated on their post with full back wages and shall be deemed to be continuing in service. The Petitioners who were appointed on or before 1-10-1986 and those who have completed three years' service shall be entitled to be considered for being regularised under the Regulations of 1985. There will be no order as to costs.