JUDGMENT 1. - By this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution for a writ in the nature of habeas corpus, the petitioner challenges his detention under the National Security Act, 1980 (here in after to be referred to as 'the Act' or 'NSA'). 2. As per averments disclosed in the petition, the petitioner was arrested on March 21, 1987 in a proceeding under Sections 107 & 151, Cr. PC and also for violating the prohibitory order issued by the District Magistrate, Bhilwara under Section 144, Cr. PC. The City Magistrate passed an order on the same day releasing him from custody on his furnishing bail bonds. He furnished the bail bonds, but before he could be released from jail, the District Magistrate, Bhilwara issued order Annexure-15 on March 24, 1987 for the detention of the petitioner under Section 3 of the NSA. The grounds of detention were communicated to him after much delay on April 17, 1987. The petitioner made representation before the State Government, which was rejected. His case was also placed before the Advisory Board and the Advisory Board held that there was sufficient cause for the detention of the petitioner. The State Government approved the order of the District Magistrate on April 1, 1987, but this approval was not reported to the Central Government within seven days. The detention was challenged on several grounds, namely, the grounds of detention were not communicated to the petitioner, no material was supplied to him in support of the grounds of detention, the grounds of detention were vague and stale having no nexus to the detention, the non-application of mind by the detaining authority and the non-compliance of the provisions of Sub-section (5) of Section 3 of the NSA. 3. In the return filed by the State, the grounds challenging the detention were refuted. It was alleged that the petitioner was an active communal worker who was fanning the fire of communal tension in the town of Bhilwara. His activities were prejudicial to the maintenance of the public order and as such his detention became necessary to quell the communal tension. As regards the non compliance of Section 3(5) of the Act, it was alleged that the detention order passed by the District Magistrate on 21st March, 1987 was approved by the State Government on 1st April, 1987. This approval was reported to the Central Government on March 3, 1987. As regards the non compliance of Section 3(5) of the Act, it was alleged that the detention order passed by the District Magistrate on 21st March, 1987 was approved by the State Government on 1st April, 1987. This approval was reported to the Central Government on March 3, 1987. The approval was despatched on April 3, 1987. The duty of the State Government under Section 3(5) of the Act was to report the approval to the Central Government. We have heard at length Mr. D.S. Shishodia learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned Additional Advocate General Mr. J.P. Joshi. 4. Though several grounds were taken in the petition to challenge the detention of the petitioner, Mr. Shishodia, during arguments confined and concentrated his contentions only to the non-compliance of the provisions of Section 3(5) of the Act. 5. It was argued by Mr. Shishodia that the detention order was passed by the District Magistrate on March 21, 1987 and it was approved under Section 3(4) of the Act on April 1, 1987. This approval was reported to the Central Government on April 3, 1987. The approval was sent by Post. The reply of the respondents does not show as to when this approval reached the Central Government. It was argued that a mere despatch of the approval is not sufficient under Section 3(5) of the Act. What is required is that the approval must be communicated to the Central Government within seven days of the date of approval. If the approval does not reach the Central Government within seven days, the detention thereafter becomes invalid. Reliance in support of the contention was placed on Sher Mohammed v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1975 SC 2049 , Vinayak Ramchandra and Ors. v. D. Ramchandra etc. 1985 Cr. LJ 1257 decided by a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court) and Gurucharan Singh v. Superintendent Central Jail, Bar eilli and Ors. 1986 Allahabad Law Journal 1172 , decided by a Division Bench On the basis of these authorities, it was argued that the approval made by the State Government under Section 3(4) of the NSA must be received by the Central Government within seven days of the order of approval. 6. 1986 Allahabad Law Journal 1172 , decided by a Division Bench On the basis of these authorities, it was argued that the approval made by the State Government under Section 3(4) of the NSA must be received by the Central Government within seven days of the order of approval. 6. It was on the other hand, submitted by the learned Additional Advocate General that what is required under Section 3(5) of the NSA is that the State Government should report the fact of the approval of the detention order to the Central Government within seven days. It is not, at all necessary under the said provision that the order of approval should be received by the Central Government within seven days. Reliance in support of the contention was placed on Yogendra Singh v. State of Bihar 0986 Cr. LJ 889 . It was also argued by the learned Additional Advocate General that the use of word "communication" in Sher Mohammed's case (supra) was made in a casual manner. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court never intended to mean that the word "report" used in Section 3(5) of the NSA means "communication". The matter before the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Sher Mohammed's case was entirely different. We have taken the respective submissions into consideration. 7. It would be useful to first read Sub-section (5) of Section 3 of the NSA, which reads as under: 3(5) When any order is made or approved by the State Government under this section, the State Government shall, within seven days, report that the fact to the Central Government to get her with the grounds on which the order has been made and such other particulars as in the opinion of the State Government, have a bearing on the necessity for the order. 8. The word "report" which occurs in Sub-section (3) also occurs in Sub-section (4) of the same section. The word "report" has been used in both these Sub-sections, because the matter is to be reported by a subordinate to the superior, under Sub-section (4) by the District Magistrate to the State Government and under Sub-section (5) by the State Government to the Central Government The use of any other word like "communicate" would be entirely misfit. The word "report" has been used in both these Sub-sections, because the matter is to be reported by a subordinate to the superior, under Sub-section (4) by the District Magistrate to the State Government and under Sub-section (5) by the State Government to the Central Government The use of any other word like "communicate" would be entirely misfit. Therefore, we are to see whether the word "report" mentioned in Sub-section (3) simply requires that a report is to be despatched or whether it implies that the report must be received by the Central Government within the specified time of seven days. 9. In Yogendra Singh's case (supra)' the learned Judges of the Patna High Court took the view that what is required under Section 3(5) is that the State Government should make a report to the Central Government within seven days. It does not require that the report of the State Government should be received by the Central Government within even days. They further held that the obligation upon the State Government under Section 3(5) is that the State Government should send a report and it is not that the report should reach within a period of seven days to the Central Government. It may be mentioned at once that Sher Mohammed's case (supra) was not brought to the notice of the learned Judges of the Patna High Court. 10. In Sher Mohammed's case (supra), the provisions of Section 3(4) of the MISA (Act No. XXVI of 1971) were examined. The provisions of Sections 3(4) of the MISA are identical and pari materia with those of Section 3(5) of the NSA. The word used in Section 3(4) of the MISA is "report". In para 3 of the judgment, their Lordships observedA fair reading of Section 3 indicates that the State Government may directly issue an order of detention or, if it is done by a lesser authority, approve of such detention order as provided in the statute. Sub-section (4) of Section 3, which we have extracted, obligates the State Government to communicate, within seven days of the order of detention it makes or it approves, that fact to the Central Government, together with the grounds on which the order has been made and other relevant particulars. Sub-section (4) of Section 3, which we have extracted, obligates the State Government to communicate, within seven days of the order of detention it makes or it approves, that fact to the Central Government, together with the grounds on which the order has been made and other relevant particulars. Even assuming that the order is made by the District Magistrate and is approved by the State Government the communication has to be made to the Central Government within the time specified. This procedural mandate is invoidable except on peril of the order being voided. 11. Their Lordships took the view that the word "report" is synonymous with the word "communicate". The use of word communication" in para 3 was discussed at length by the learned Judges of Bombay and Allahabad High Courts in the cases quoted above. 12. In Vinayak's case (supra), the learned Judges of the Bombay High Court, relying upon Sher Mohammed's case, observed "Section 3(5) casts a duty on the State Government to report the fact to the Central Government within seven days together with grounds on which order has been made and such other particulars, as in the opinion of the State Government, have bearing on the necessity of the order. Therefore, unless the report sent by the State Government under Section 3(5) of the Act is received by the Central Government, it cannot be said that the fact of detention together with the grounds on which the order has been made is communicated or reported to the Central Government within the meaning of Section 3(5) of the Act. 13. It may be pointed out that the contention of the Central and State Government that mere sending of a report is enough under Section 3(5) of the Act and it is not necessary that the report should also be received by the Central Government within the period of seven days, was repelled and rejected. 14. In Gurucharan Singh's case (supra), the learned Judges of the Allahabad High Court, in view of the law laid down in Sher Mohammed's case held "Therefore, it is quite obvious that unless the fact of the detention is communicated to the Central Government within seven days, it cannot be said that the mandate of Section 3(5) is complied with. 15. In Gurucharan Singh's case (supra), the learned Judges of the Allahabad High Court, in view of the law laid down in Sher Mohammed's case held "Therefore, it is quite obvious that unless the fact of the detention is communicated to the Central Government within seven days, it cannot be said that the mandate of Section 3(5) is complied with. 15. It was contended by the learned Additional Advocate General that the word "communication" was inadvertently used in para 3 of the judgment in Sher Mohammed's case. Only a casual reference was made to the word "communication" and it should not, therefore, he inferred that their Lordships of the Supreme Court took the word "communication" as synonymous for the word "report" used in Section 3(5) of the Act. We are unable to agree with him. Para 3 of the judgment, which we have reproduced above, clearly shows that the word "communication" was not unmeaningfully used by their Lordships. Observations made in para 3 are not casual observations. The word "communication" was used to lay emphasis that the report under Section 3(5) of the NSA should be received by the Central Government within seven days. In our opinion, the State Government cannot be relieved of its duty merely by despatching the report under Section 3(5) of the Act. If the mere despatching of the report is taken as sufficient under Section 3(5) of the Act at times, it may cause a serious harm to the detenu. If the report is lost in transit, the Central Government may not come to know of it. In order to avoid such contingencies, it is necessary that the report under Section 3(5) should reach the Central Government within seven days. 16. In the instant case, the order of the District Magistrate was approved by the State Government on April 1, 1987. According to the return filed by the respondents, the order of approval was sent by post on April 3, 1987. It has been mentioned in the reply as to when this approval reached the Central Government. We allowed several opportunities one after the other to the learned Additional Advocate General to let us know as to when the approval reached the Central Government. The learned Additional Advocate General, however, could not furnish this information to us. It cannot be, therefore, said that the approval reached the Central Government within seven days from April 1, 1987. We allowed several opportunities one after the other to the learned Additional Advocate General to let us know as to when the approval reached the Central Government. The learned Additional Advocate General, however, could not furnish this information to us. It cannot be, therefore, said that the approval reached the Central Government within seven days from April 1, 1987. It appears that the approval was not received by the Central Government. The duty of the State Government does not come to an end, under Section 3(5) of the Act, by a mere despatch of the approval. The State Government must ensure that the approval reaches the Central Government and that too within seven days of the date of approval. We cannot draw a presumption or inference merely from the despatch of the approval by post that it must have been received by the Central Government and that too within the span of seven days. Thus, here is clear violation of the mandatory provisions of Section 3(5) of the Act. 17. It would be pertinent here to notice Section 14 of the NSA. Under Clause (b) of Section (1) of Section 14, the order of detention may revoked or modified by the Central Government at any time. The Central Government can revoke or modify the detention order only when the approval is communicated to it under Section 3(5) of the Act. If the approval is not received by the Central Government, the detenu stands materially prejudiced because the Central Government has no occasion to revoke or modify the detention order. In the State of Punjab v. Jagdev Singh, AIR 1984 SC 444 it was observed by their Lordships: Preventive detention is a necessary evil, but essentially an evil. Therefore deprivation of personal liberty, if at all, will have to be on the strict terms of the Constitution, nothing less. Preventive detention is considered so treacherous and such an anathema to civilised thought and democratic polity that the safeguards against undue exercise of the power to detain without trial, have been built into the Constitution itself and incorporated as fundamental rights. There are two sentinels, one at either end. Preventive detention is considered so treacherous and such an anathema to civilised thought and democratic polity that the safeguards against undue exercise of the power to detain without trial, have been built into the Constitution itself and incorporated as fundamental rights. There are two sentinels, one at either end. The Legislature is required to make the law circumscribing the limits within which persons may be preventively detained and providing for the safeguards prescribed by the Constitution and the Courts are required to examine, when demanded, whether there has been any excessive detention, that is, whether the limits set out by the Constitution and Legislature have been transgressed. It has always been the view of the Supreme Court that the detention of individuals without trial for any length of time, however short, is wholly inconsistent with the basic ideas of our Government and the gravity of the evil of community resulting from anti-social activities can never furnish an adequate reason for invalidating the personal liberty of citizen except in accordance with the procedure established by law. It is well-settled that the law of preventive detention is hard law and, therefore, it should be strictly construed. 18. We may state that under the preventive detention laws, the personal liberty of the citizen is curtailed down. When liberty is curtailed down under the preventive detention it is imperative that a faithful compliance should be made of the provisions of the law of preventive detention. The citizen, who has been detained under the law of preventive detention, has a right to contend that the provisions of the law have been breached and as such his detention is illegal. In the instant case, there is a clear breach of the mandate contained in Section 3(5) of the Act. The prolonged detention of the detenu is, therefore, invalid. The petition should be allowed and the detenu should be freed. 19. In the result, the petition is allowed and the respondents are directed to forthwith release the detenu Mishri Lal, if not wanted in any other case.Petition allowed. *******