JUDGMENT - DHABE H.W., J.:—All these writ petitions can be conveniently disposed of by this common judgment as they involve a common question of law, viz. whether the property tax and the educational cess are leviable upon the educational institutions run by the petitioners-societies within the limits of the Corporation of City of Nagpur. In all these cases, notices were issued by the Nagpur Corporation to the petitioners levying upon the property tax under the City of Nagpur Corporation Act, 1948 (for short 'Corporation Act') and an educational cess under the Maharashtra Education and Employment Guarantee (Cess) Act, 1962 (for short 'Education Cess Act”). In the cases of some of the petitioners even notices for auctioning the property of the petitioners were issued for failure to pay the property tax and the education cess. Being aggrieved by the said notices issued by the Corporation, for payment of the property tax and the education cess, the petitioners have moved this Court challenging the levy of the said taxes. 2. The principal ground raised in these petitions is that petitioners-societies are running the educational institutions and since the educational purpose is a charitable purpose, they are exempt from payment of the property tax under section 116 of the Corporation Act and the education cess under section 7 of the Education Cess Act. It is, however, contended on behalf of the Nagpur Corporation that in the facts of these petitions the petitioners cannot claim exemption from payment of property tax or the education cess under either section 116 of the Corporation Act or under section 7 of the Education Cess Act. It is, therefore, necessary to consider provisions regarding the exemption under section 116 of the Corporation Act and section 7 of the Education Cess Act. 3. A perusal of Clause (a) of sub-section (1) of section 116 of the Corporation Act shows that the buildings or lands or portions thereof exclusively occupied for public worship or for charitable purposes or for public burial or burning or for the disposal of the dead are exempt form the levy of the property tax thereunder. 3. A perusal of Clause (a) of sub-section (1) of section 116 of the Corporation Act shows that the buildings or lands or portions thereof exclusively occupied for public worship or for charitable purposes or for public burial or burning or for the disposal of the dead are exempt form the levy of the property tax thereunder. Further Clause (ii) of sub-section (2) of section 116 of the Corporation Act provides that the buildings and lands in respect of which rent is derived by the owners or occupiers, shall not be deemed to be exclusively occupied for the purposes specified in Clause (a) of sub-section (1) of section 116 of the said Act irrespective of the question whether such rent is or is not applied exclusively towards the purposes specified in that clause. A similar exception regarding exception from the levy of the education cess is carved out in the Explanation (1)(b) of section 7 of the Education Cess Act. 4. It is the submission on behalf of the Corporation that these societies receive rent from the State Government for the buildings housing their schools in the grant-in-aid which they receive from the State Government which fact is admitted by them in their instant writ petitions and, therefore, although they may be exclusively utilising the aforesaid rent for the charitable purpose of running their schools and colleges, they would not be exempted from the payment of the property tax and the education cess in view of the provisions referred to above. 5. The question, thus, is whether the petitioners-societies receive rent for the school/college buildings they own or occupy. As regards the secondary schools run by the petitioners in these petitions, it is not in dispute that they are governed by the provisions of the Secondary Schools Code for the purpose of the payment of maintenance grant to them by the State Government. The relevant provisions in the Secondary Schools Code for payment of admissible grant are in Rule 89.1, in which it is stated that the items of expenditure listed in Schedule-A would be admissible for maintenance grant from the Government. The relevant item in Schedule A is Item No.2 relating to “Rent, Taxes and insurance” and Clause (iv) therein deals with the buildings owned by the schools. The relevant item in Schedule A is Item No.2 relating to “Rent, Taxes and insurance” and Clause (iv) therein deals with the buildings owned by the schools. The said Clause (iv) is as follows : “In the case of building owned by a school, a reasonable nominal rent to be calculated on the following basis namely : (a) 7½ per cent of the capital value of the building plus Municipal taxes; (b) Six per cent of the cost of the site on which the building is constructed; plus (c) 10½ per cent of the cost of sanitary fittings and water supply fittings of the building: Provided the Executive Engineer of the Public Works and Housing Department having jurisdiction certifies that the amount of rent charged is reasonable. Where site for construction of school building was granted by Government to a management free of charge, that is without charging any occupying price, the question of any rent on the cost of the site would obviously not arise.” (Emphasis supplied). 6. It is clear from the above provision contained in Clause (iv) in Item 2 of Schedule A that in regard to the secondary schools run by the petitioners, who own the school building, they are entitled to get reasonable nominal rent as provided therein and also the municipal taxes upon the said buildings from the State Government as it is an item of expenditure made admissible for the maintenance grant paid by the State Government. If such educational societies receive the payment on account of municipal taxes itself, it is beyond our comprehension how it could be said that such educational societies would not be liable for payment of property tax and education cess upon their school buildings to the Corporation. It may be seen that the maintenance grant is given on items of expenditure which means that the owners or occupiers actually incur the expenses upon the said items for which the State Government reimburses them by payment of the maintenance grant. As regards payment of reasonable nominal rent of the school building to the owner/occupier it is clear that the said payment is made for the up-keep or the maintenance of the school building. As regards the municipal taxes there cannot be any doubt that payment of municipal taxes is made because the said expenditure is actually incurred by the school owner/occupier. As regards the municipal taxes there cannot be any doubt that payment of municipal taxes is made because the said expenditure is actually incurred by the school owner/occupier. It is, thus, clear to us that the secondary schools run by the petitioners-societies which are admittedly governed by the provisions of the Secondary Schools Code and are entitled to the maintenance grant under Clause IV-a, Item 29, Schedule A of the said Code are liable to pay the property tax and the Education Cess to the Corporation as they cannot claim any exemption in the regard in view of the provisions of section 116(2)(ii) of the Corporation Act and the Explanation (1)(b) of section 7 of the Education Cess Act. 7. As regards the colleges run by the petitioners which are not governed by the provisions of Secondary Schools Code, there is no material placed in these petitions by the parties to arrive at any conclusion either way on this question. During the arguments, the learned Counsel for the petitioners Shri S.V. Manohar, Advocate, has placed before us the Government Resolution dated 3rd October, 1979, issued in respect of the colleges, under which, according to him, the rent is reimbursed by the State Government only when it is actually paid. However, it is not possible for us to give any firm finding in regard to the said question about the colleges, because it is not possible for us to ascertain whether there is any other Government Resolution or any other provision or Rule under which the petitioners are entitled to get rent for the college buildings which they own. 8. However, it is not possible for us to give any firm finding in regard to the said question about the colleges, because it is not possible for us to ascertain whether there is any other Government Resolution or any other provision or Rule under which the petitioners are entitled to get rent for the college buildings which they own. 8. It is, therefore, necessary for the competent authority of the Corporation to consider the objections of the petitioners in respect of taxes in question upon the college buildings owned by them and if it is found that in regard to college buildings their cases are not actually covered by Clause (ii) of sub-section (2) of section 116 of the Corporation Act or the Explanation (1)(b) of section 7 of the Education Cess Act since the educational purpose is itself a charitable purpose as held by the Supreme Court in the case of (Municipal Corporation of Hyderabad v. Hyderabad Race Club)1, A.I.R. 1987 S.C. 92, for which purpose building in question is occupied and is exclusively used, the petitioners would be entitled to exemption from the levy of the property tax under section 116(1)(a) of the Corporation Act and from the levy of education cess under section 7(e) of the Education Cess Act. A finding will have to be reached in this regard by the competent authority of the Corporation after giving hearing to the petitioners. 9. The learned Counsel for some of the petitioners, Mr. C.P. Kalele, Advocate, urged before us that in regard to the secondary schools also the matter should be remanded to the competent authority of the Corporation and the petitioners should be given hearing in that regard also. On perusal of the objections raised by them, it is clear that the only objection raised is in regard to the exemption which they claim under section 116(1)(a) of the Corporation Act and section 7(e) of the Education Cess Act which as shown above they cannot get. It is not, therefore, necessary to remand the case to the competent authority of the Corporation in regard to the school buildings owned buy the petitioners. 10. It is not, therefore, necessary to remand the case to the competent authority of the Corporation in regard to the school buildings owned buy the petitioners. 10. In the result, the instant writ petition shall stand disposed of in terms of the following order:– The claim of the petitioners about exemption from the levy of the property tax and the education cess upon their school buildings by the Corporation shall stand rejected. It is, however, directed that the Corporation should not proceed with the auction notices issued by it in respect of school buildings and should grant reasonable time to the petitioners, if prayed for by them, for payment of taxes upon their school building, and if the same are not paid within the time granted by it then only it may proceed to take further coercive steps for recovery of the taxes under the Corporation Act. As regard the imposition of property tax and education cess upon the buildings of the colleges conducted by the petitioners, which are not governed by the Secondary Schools Code, the demand notices are quashed and the competent authority of the Corporation is directed to make fresh enquiry and to pass fresh orders in that regard in the light of the observations made in this judgment giving due opportunity of hearing to the petitioners before passing the orders. However, in the circumstances, there would be no order as to costs in these writ petitions. Order accordingly.