JUDGMENT B. L. Yadav, J. 1. This is a plaintiff's appeal against the decree and judgment dated 19-4-1977 rendered by the Addl. Civil Judge, Kanpur, dismissing the suit, filed by the plaintiff appellant for the relief of permanent injunction restraining the defendant from taking possession of plot no. 535 and 510/2, area 1 bigha comprising premises no. 81-A, situate in village Mohsinpur Distt. Kanpur. 2. Plaintiff appellant filed the suit with the allegations that he was allotted plot numbers 525 and 510/2 on 12th October, 1957 by Pradhan of the Gaon Sabha, under the provisions of Rules 115-L, 115-M, 115-N, framed under the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act 1950, (for short the Act) for constructing a residential house and for running a Salt Petra Refinery Factory. The plaintiff was put in possession by the Gaon Sabha and the said construction was raised and he was running the factory. The number of construction is 81-A. Lateron the plaintiff wanted to extend the factory for which a plan was submitted to the Nagar Mahapalika in 1958 and after correspondence the Executive Engineer by his letter dated 7th June 1960 informed the plaintiff that these plots were proposed to be acquired for the purpose of Kalyanpur Panki Expansion Scheme, hence the plan submitted by the plaintiff would not be sanctioned. The plaintiff made several representations thereafter to the effect that his land cannot be acquired but ultimately it was acquired and oral undertaking was given that the appellant would be given an alternative land. The land was acquired and award was given on 29-7-63. The plaintiff filed writ petition no. 3601 of 1965, challenging the Land Acquisition proceedings, but the same was dismissed on 2-12-70. The defence was a total denial and that the plaintiff was not allotted the land by the Gaon Sabha nor any assurance was given, the land was correctly acquired and the suit was barred by res-judicata as the writ petition filed by plaintiff in the High Court challenging the Land Acquisition proceedings has been dismissed. The plaintiff has no cause of action to file the suit nor he was entitled to any relief. 3. The trial court framed a number of issues and held that no oral undertaking was given to the plaintiff nor the same was binding on the defendants. The plaintiff has no cause of action to file the suit nor he was entitled to any relief. 3. The trial court framed a number of issues and held that no oral undertaking was given to the plaintiff nor the same was binding on the defendants. It has been further held that as the certified copy of the judgment of this court dismissing the writ petition was not filed hence the suit was not barred by res-judicata, now it was barred by time, the land was not allotted by the Gaon Sabha in favour of the plaintiff nor the plaintiff has any cause of action against the Nagar Mahapalika, the plaintiff was a trespasser and as such the suit has been dismissed by the trial Court. Present first appeal has been filed by the plaintiff to set aside the judgment and decree passed by the trial court and to decree the suit. 4. Learned counsel for the appellant urged that on behalf of the defendant undertaking was given by one Sobha Ram, the Executive Engineer and that is binding on the defendant. The land was allotted by the Land Management Committee executing a lease deed in favour of the plaintiff in respect of the land in dispute and no application for cancellation of the lease deed was filed as required by section 198 of UP ZA and LR Act, 1950 and Rule 115-P framed under that Act hence the lease deed cannot be cancelled in collateral proceedings. The reliance was placed on a Full Bench decision of this Court (to which one of us Brother K. C. Agarwal, J. was a member) Similesh Kumar v. Gaon Sabha, 1977 AWC 259 . It was also urged on behalf of the appellant that the plaintiff has a cause of action and the dismissal of the writ petition shall have no effect nor it shall operate as res-judicata. On the other hand the learned counsel for the respondent urged that no assurance was given nor any evidence has been led by the plaintiff to prove the assurance and even if it was given the same was not binding on the Nagar Mahapalika as no officer has any authority to give any undertaking. On the other hand the learned counsel for the respondent urged that no assurance was given nor any evidence has been led by the plaintiff to prove the assurance and even if it was given the same was not binding on the Nagar Mahapalika as no officer has any authority to give any undertaking. It is only Nagar Mahapalika which has power to dispose of the land in view of Section 368 of U. P. Nagar Mahapalika Adhiniyam, 1959 (for short the Adhiniyam) which could give an undertaking It was further urged that the Gaon Sabha did not execute any lease deed in favour of the plaintiff. Even if any such lease was executed, the land can still be acquired under the provisions of Sec. 365 (2) of the Adhiniyam and also under the provision of the Land Acquisition' Act 1894, as modified by Chapter XIV of Adhiniyam. After acquisition of the rights of plaintiff his rights as a Bhumidhar or Sirdar would come to an end in view of Section 189 (b) and 190 (d) of UP ZA and LR Act and the suit was barred by principles of res-judicata as earlier writ petition filed by the plaintiff was dismissed by this Court. 5. Having heard learned counsel for the parties the points for determination are that whether plaintiff was given any undertaking or assurance in view of Section 368 of the Adhiniyam and whether any lease deed was executed in favour of the plaintiff, if so can it be cancelled, otherwise than by following the procedure under Sec. 198 and Rule 115-P framed under the UP ZA Act and whether the land can be acquired under the Land Acquisition Act in view of the provisions of Section 365 (2) of Adhiniyam. 6. As regards the first point about the undertaking or assurance given to the plaintiff, that he would be given an alternative land, we have been taken through the evidence on record and pleadings of the parties. In para 7 of the plaint (page 11 of the paper book), a mention was made about the oral undertaking given by the defendant that the plaintiff would be allotted alternative land in exchange of his plots. In para 7 of the plaint (page 11 of the paper book), a mention was made about the oral undertaking given by the defendant that the plaintiff would be allotted alternative land in exchange of his plots. In para 9 it was stated that the defendant by his letter dated 14-2-62 informed the plaintiff that he will have to shift his factory in the factory area where suitable land would be allotted to him. Under Order 6 rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure it has been provided that every pleading shall, contain, and contain only, a statement in a concise form of the material facts on which the party pleading relies for his claim or defence, as the case may be. The plaintiff did not mention the material facts to prove his case or cause of action. The names of the officers who gave the assurance, or wrote the letters on behalf of Mahapalika were not mentioned under paras 7 and 9 of the plant. It is only when the plaintiff entered the witness box as PW 1 (page 30 of the paper book), that he disclosed the name of Shobha Ram and B. N. Jauhari as officers who gave the undertaking or assurance mentioned above. In case material facts are omitted we are of the opinion, a party could not be allowed to raise a contention on a particular point and even if some materials are available in the evidence. All material or primary facts must be proved by a party to establish the existence of a cause or action or defence. The appellant utterly failed to give material or primary facts to prove his cause of action. See Udhav Singh v. Madhav Rao Sciendia, (1976) 2 SCR 246 = AIR 1976 SC 744 at page 752. There is another aspect, in the letter purporting to have been written by Sri Jauhari, his signature was not proved to be in his hand writing particularly when it was denied by Mahapalika. Even Shobha Ram and B. N. Jauhari who were alleged to have given assurance were not examined on behalf of the plaintiff, as is clear from the cross-examination of the plaintiff (on page 34 of the paper book). Even Shobha Ram and B. N. Jauhari who were alleged to have given assurance were not examined on behalf of the plaintiff, as is clear from the cross-examination of the plaintiff (on page 34 of the paper book). In case the plaintiff would have been given assurance the same ought to have been proved by examining those officers and proving their signature in the letter purporting to have been written by them or otherwise. We are, accordingly, satisfied that the trial court was correct in holding that no such assurance was given. 7. Reverting to the point as to whether lease deed 2-10-1957 alleged to have been executed in favour of the plaintiff appellant in respect of the land in dispute by the Gaon Sabba can be ignored and cancelled in land acquisition proceedings. Even though the learned Additional Civil Judge has disbelieved the execution of the lease deed or that it was legally executed by the Chairman of the Land Management Committee. It was further held that the plaintiff did not obtain the lease from the Gaon Sabha or the Land Management Committee in accordance with the provisions of UP ZA and LR Act and Rules. But even assuming that the lease deed was validly executed in favour of the appellant in respect of the land in dispute by the Land Management Committee, nevertheless, he cannot protect his rights which is on the basis of the lease deed inasmuch as, in view of section 189 (b) and Section 190 (d) of UP ZA and LR Act, the interest of a Bhumidhar with transferable or non-transferable rights shall be extinguished, where land has been acquired under the provisions of Land Acquisition Act or Section 365 (2) of Adhiniyam. Once the land of the plaintiff was acquired under the Land Acquisition Act as modified by Chapter XIV of Adhiniyam, there is nothing to indicate as to how he can protect his interest simply on the ground that a lease deed was executed in his favour. The acquisition proceedings have become final and the writ petition no. 3601 of 1965 filed by the plaintiff in this Court challenging those acquisition proceedings has already been dismissed on 2-12-1970 by a Division Bench of this Court. The judgment of Division Bench of this Court become final and the plaintiff appellant did not challenge the same. The acquisition proceedings have become final and the writ petition no. 3601 of 1965 filed by the plaintiff in this Court challenging those acquisition proceedings has already been dismissed on 2-12-1970 by a Division Bench of this Court. The judgment of Division Bench of this Court become final and the plaintiff appellant did not challenge the same. We are accordingly of the opinion that even assuming the lease deed to be valid but nevertheless as the acquisition proceedings have been initiated and they have become final and the rights of the plaintiff / appellant have extinguished in view of the provisions of Sections 189 (b) and 190 (d) of UP ZA and LR Act. The Full Bench case of Similesh Kumar v. Gaon Sabha (supra) strongly relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant is of no assistance and is clearly distinguishable. In that case it was held that lease granted by the Chairman Land Management Committee cannot be cancelled by the Consolidation Authorities. It can only be cancelled in view of the procedure provided under section 198 (4), or under similar provisions, in case of allotment of land of Abadi sites, under Rule 115-(?) of UP ZA and LR Rules, by an application to the Collector. The Full Bench did not lay down that even though land whether agricultural or abadi sites, if had be acquired by the State Government, under the Land Acquisition Act 1894, the rights of the lessee would still subsist. That could not have been obviously laid down in the teeth of the provisions of Sections 189 (b) and 190 (d) of the UP ZA and LR Act 1950. The Full Bench case is accordingly of no assistance to the appellant. 8. As regards the last point about the effect of the dismissal of the writ petition no. 3601 of 1965 on 2nd December 1970 we have summoned the record from the office and perused the same and are satisfied that the writ petition was actually dismissed on merits by this court and the judgment in that writ petition would operate as res-judicata and plaintiff appellant was bound by the same. It is too late in the day, now to challenge the legality or otherwise of the acquisition proceedings by filing a civil suit. In view of the premises aforesaid we do not find any merit in the appeal and the same is dismissed. It is too late in the day, now to challenge the legality or otherwise of the acquisition proceedings by filing a civil suit. In view of the premises aforesaid we do not find any merit in the appeal and the same is dismissed. Under the circumstances of the case, however, we refrain from making any order as to costs. Appeal dismissed.