JIVRAJBHAI VRAJLAL PATEL v. STATE — 1987 DIGILAW 96 (GUJ)

P. M. CHAUHAN, J. ( 1 ) BY this petition under Art. 226 Constitution of India petitioner-detenu Jivrajbhai Vrajlal Patel has prayed for a writ of Habeas Corpus and quashing the detention order dated 16/04/1987 passed against him by the District Magistrate Surat the detaining authority under sub-secs. (1) and (2) of Sec. 3 of the Prevention of Blackmarketing and Maintenance of Supplies of Essential Commodities Act 1980 (hereinafter referred to as the P. B. Act ). The District Magistrate was subjectively satisfied and therefore with a view to preventing the petitioner from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies of commodities essential to the community found it necessary to detain him and therefore passed the impugned order of detention. ( 2 ) PETITIONERS was served with the grounds of detention of even date. In the grounds of detention it is stated that the detaining authority was informed by a social worker that the petitioner was getting groundnut oil from the Saurashtra area under the fictitious name of the commission agents and was encouraging black-marketing in essential commodity viz. oil. The detaining authority then inquired into the matter and also recorded the statements of the petitioner and various other witnesses and was satisfied that the petitioner had purchased 4 350 tins of groundnut oil rapeseed oil and Rayada oil by 14 bills through one Kishorebhai Patel and the bills were got up and no person having the name Kishorebhai Patel was available at Danapith in Junagadh from whom the petitioner is alleged to have got oil tins and made payment. Telephone No. 22440 alleged to be of Kishorebhai Patel was of some another person. The detaining authority was also satisfied that oil worth Rs. 13 3 540 was purchased by the petitioner and payment was made by drafts and amount of Rs. 1 49 20 was paid in cash by the petitioner to Kishorebhai Patel. It also transpired that fictitious Bank account were opened and drafts were credited and amount was withdrawn. Persons in whose names accounts were opened were also not available. Ultimately the detaining authority was subjectively satisfied that got-up bills were prepared in the name of fictitious firms Amar Industries Jetpur and Bhavana Industries Vanthali which were not in existence at all. It is also stated that Assistant Sales Tax Commissioner reported that the petitioner evaded 4 per cent. Persons in whose names accounts were opened were also not available. Ultimately the detaining authority was subjectively satisfied that got-up bills were prepared in the name of fictitious firms Amar Industries Jetpur and Bhavana Industries Vanthali which were not in existence at all. It is also stated that Assistant Sales Tax Commissioner reported that the petitioner evaded 4 per cent. Sales-tax and 10 per cent surcharge. The petitioner was doing activities by which huge profit be earned. The petitioner was indulging in serious criminal activities by which black-marketing and profiteering would be encouraged. It is also specifically stated in the grounds of detention that the petitioner did not maintain the stock register and accordingly violated the provisions of Clause 23 of the Gujarat Essential Articles (Licensing Control and Stock Declaration) Order 1981 and Condition 4 (1) of the licence and thereby committed breach of the provisions of Sec. 3 of the Essential Commodities Act and consequently offence punishable under sec. 7 of the said Act. Alongwith the grounds of detention the petitioner was supplied 42 documents on which the detaining authority based his subjective satisfaction. ( 3 ) THE admitted position therefore is that the petitioner was detained on 16 detention order was approved by the State Government on 22 and report was made to the Central Government on 28 and was received by the Central Government on 6-5-1987. Admittedly the report was received by the Central Government after the period of seven days. ( 4 ) MR. S V. Raju learned Advocate for the petitioner submits that the order made by the State Government under Sec 3 of the P. B. Act must reach the Central Government within seven days of the approval of the order and merely forwarding a report within a period of seven days would offend the provisions of sub-sec. (4) of Sec. 3 of the P. B. Act and as that statutory provision is not complied with infraction would invalidate the detention order. ( 5 ) AS against that Mr. H. M. Bhagat learned Additional Standing Counsel for respondent No. 3 Union of India and Mr. D. K. Trivedi learned Additional Public Prosecutor for respondents Nos. (4) of Sec. 3 of the P. B. Act and as that statutory provision is not complied with infraction would invalidate the detention order. ( 5 ) AS against that Mr. H. M. Bhagat learned Additional Standing Counsel for respondent No. 3 Union of India and Mr. D. K. Trivedi learned Additional Public Prosecutor for respondents Nos. 1 and 2 asserted that the report is required to be forwarded to the Central Government within seven days and it is not necessary that the report must reach to the Central Government within a period of seven days and therefore provisions of sub-sec. (4) of Sec. 3 of the P. B. Act are not violated. ( 6 ) FOR ascertaining the meaning of expression report the fact examined it from diverse angles viz. Legislative intent reference to other provisions of the P. B. Act comparison with certain provision of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act 1974 (hereinafter referred to as the COFEPOSA Act) meaning as can be gathered from Oxford Dictionary the context of various usage in Corpus Juris Secundum and its interpretations in judgments of the Supreme Court and High Courts. ( 7 ) TO ascertain the intention of the legislature in specifically using the word report in sub-sec. (4) of Sec. 3 of the P. B. Act it is necessary to examine the Scheme of the P. B. Act. The provisions for detention on subjective satisfaction of Government or authorised officer with a view to preventing any person from acting in any manner prejudicial to maintenance of supplies of commodities essential to the community are in sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 3 of the P. B. Act. After the detention order the District Magistrate or Commissioner of Police exercising the powers under sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 3 of the P. B. Act should forthwith report the fact to the State Government. Under sub-sec. (4) of Sec. 3 of the P. B. Act the State Government has to report the fact to the Central Government together with the grounds on which the order has been made within seven days. (2) of Sec. 3 of the P. B. Act should forthwith report the fact to the State Government. Under sub-sec. (4) of Sec. 3 of the P. B. Act the State Government has to report the fact to the Central Government together with the grounds on which the order has been made within seven days. Under Sec. 8 of the P. B. Act the authority making the order of detention should as soon as may be but ordinarily not later than five days and in exceptional circumstances and for the reasons to be recorded in writing not later than ten days from the date of detention communicate to the detenu the grounds on which the order has been made and should afford him the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order to the appropriate Government. Section ( 8 ) OF the P. B. Act provides for reference to the Advisory Board and the appropriate Government has to place before the Advisory Board the grounds on which the order has been made and the representation if any made by the detenu within a period of three weeks from the date of detention and as provided in Sec. 11 of the P. B. Act the Advisory Board has to submit its report to the appropriate Government within seven weeks from the date of detention. Section 13 of the P. B. Act provides for maximum period of six months for detention. Under Sec. 14 of the P. B. Act the State Government or the Central Government can revoke the order of detention. 10 It is therefore evident from the Scheme and provisions of the P. B. Act. that the time is prescribed for various steps and actions required to be taken by the Government for continued detention of the person detained under Sec. 3 of the P. B. Act. Maximum period of detention is only six months and therefore also it appears that time limit is prescribed in the above referred provisions of the P. B. Act. Section 14 of the P. B. Act specifically provides for revocation of the order by the State Government and the Central Government. The purpose of submitting the report to the Central Government by the State Government under sub-sec. Section 14 of the P. B. Act specifically provides for revocation of the order by the State Government and the Central Government. The purpose of submitting the report to the Central Government by the State Government under sub-sec. (4) of Sec. 3 of the P. B. Act is not an idle formality but it is with a view that the Central Government may consider the allegations against the detenu the representation of the detenu if any and the possibility of revocation of the detention order. A combined reading of sub-sec. (4) of Sec. 3 and Sec. 14 of the P. B. Act makes it clear that the purpose of making a report by the State Government to the Central Government accompanied by the grounds of detention and relevant particulars within the prescribed period of seven days is with a view that in a fit case the Central Government may exercise the power to revoke such order under Sec. 14 of the P. B. Act. Similar view is expressed by this Court in Chandravati Fakirchand Zaveri v. State of Gujarat 23 Gujarat Law Reporter 760. In that case the report was not submitted for nearly two months and therefore the detention order was quashed. However the point did not come up for consideration before the Division Bench as to whether the report should reach the Central Government within seven days from the date of approval. ( 9 ) FROM the provisions of the P. B. Act intention of the legislature that the Central Government must be informed of the detention order of the approval of the detention order by the State Government within the prescribed period to enable the Central Government to exercise the power of revocation under Sec. 14 of the P. B. Act is clear. ( 10 ) CONSIDERING other provisions of the P. B. Act in which phrase report the fact is used and also analogous provisions in other statutes relating to detention in which the word report is used the intention is clear. To appreciate this aspect in a proper perspective sub-sec. (4) of Sec. 3 of the P. B Act be extracted. Sub-sec. To appreciate this aspect in a proper perspective sub-sec. (4) of Sec. 3 of the P. B Act be extracted. Sub-sec. (4) of Sec. 3 P. B. Act provides:" When any order is made or approved by the State Government under this section or when any order is made under this section by an officer of the State Government not below the rank of Secretary to that Government Specially empowered under sub-sec. (1) the State Government shall within seven days report the fact to the Central Government together with the grounds on which the order has been made and such other particulars as in the opinion of the State Government have a bearing on the necessity for the order. "it is pertinent to note that in sub-sec. (4) of Sec. 3 of the P. B. Act specific provision is that the State Government shall within seven days report the fact to the Central Government together with the grounds on which the order has been made. ( 11 ) UNDER the provisions of the COFEPOSA Act obligation under sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 3 is on the State Government to submit the report to the Central Government. The legislature has not used the same phrase but has adopted different phraseology by providing the State Government shall within ten days forward to the Central Government a report in respect of the order. Specific provision is made in sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 3 of the COFEPOSA Act enabling the State Government to forward the report within stipulated time. The legislature has advisedly used the expression to forward the report and not shall forward the report the emphasis for the former being on to forward and in the latter on to report; in the former it is used as a noun and in the latter as a verb. While in sub-sec. (4) of Sec. 3 of the P. B. Act the word report is used as a verb and not as a noun. That must be with a specific purpose that the report along with necessary documents should reach the Central Government within a period of seven days. ( 12 ) IN sub-sec. (3) of Sec. 3 of the P. B. Act similar phrase report the fact is used making it obligatory on the detaining authority to submit the report to the State Government forthwith after the detention. ( 12 ) IN sub-sec. (3) of Sec. 3 of the P. B. Act similar phrase report the fact is used making it obligatory on the detaining authority to submit the report to the State Government forthwith after the detention. If the report is not received by the State Government and the State Government does not approve the detention order within twelve days after detention the detenu should be released from the detention. Proviso to sub-sec. (3) of Sec. 3 of the P. B. Act provides for some extended limit for the period of approval but that is not material for our purposes. It is clear from the provisions of sub-sec. (3) of Sec. 3 of the P. B. Act that the word report is used as a verb indicating that the report about the detention alongwith the grounds of detention etc. must reach the State Government forthwith i. e. immediately without any delay. The very fact that the detention order is required to be approved within a period of 12 days indicates that the report alongwith other documents must reach the Government immediately after the order of detention so that the Government can consider the grounds of detention and may also consider the advisability of revoking the order. Same phrase report the fact is used in sub-sec. (4) of Sec. 3 of the P. B. Act and that indicates the same meaning viz. that the report of the fact of detention alongwith other documents must reach the State Government or the Central Government as the case may be within the prescribed period. It is now well-settled that where the same expression is used in the same statute at different places same meaning can be given to that expression as far as possible. In Lal Chand v. Radha Kishan AIR 1977 Supreme Court 789 the Supreme Court while considering the meaning of the word tenant has expressed the above view. We are therefore of the opinion that the expression report the fact used in sub-sec. (3) and sub-sec. (4) of Sec. 3 of the P. B. Act indicates the same meaning that the fact of detention alongwith other documents must reach to the Government and if is not used in the sense that the report should be forwarded to the Government within the specified period. (3) and sub-sec. (4) of Sec. 3 of the P. B. Act indicates the same meaning that the fact of detention alongwith other documents must reach to the Government and if is not used in the sense that the report should be forwarded to the Government within the specified period. ( 13 ) WE shall now consult the dictionary to ascertain the meaning of the word report. When used as a verb or as a noun it predicates different meaning. Report when used as a transitive verb necessarily indicate the involvement of its object of notion or operation. In the New Oxford Encyclopedia Dictionary the meaning of the word report when used as verb is give formal account or statement of; make report; relate or state as result of observation or investigation; name (person) to superior authority as having offended in some way; make known to some authority that one has arrived or is present;. In the Concise Oxford Dictionary 5 Edition the meaning of the word report when used as verb is inform against (offence offender) to authorities. The word report when used as noun means common talk rumour; way person or thing is spoken of repute; account given or opinion formally expressed after investigation or consideration etc. From the dictionary meaning of the word report when used as verb it is clear that it indicates an act of presenting or communicating or imparting information to another person. In the background of our discussion indication of the phrase to report is that the fact of detention must reach the Central Govern. ment and not merely an act of forwarding the fact of detention to that Government. ( 14 ) MEANING of the word report when used as a noun or verb is considered in several judgments by American Courts. In Corpus Juris Secundum Volume 77 at page 343 while considering the meaning of word report as a verb it is stated:". . . AS a verb report is defined as meaning to give an account of to relate to tell and it has been said that to report means to convey or disseminate infor mation and as long as the desired information is looked up in ones breast and not disclosed it is not a report since that which is not made known is not reported. " (Emphasis supplied) from that also it is clear that the word report when used as a verb indicates that the fact should reach the object. ( 15 ) WE shall now refer the judgments of the Supreme Court Bombay High Court and Patna High Court in which analogous provisions are considered. Mr. S. V. Raju learned Advocate for the petitioner has referred the Bombay High Court judgment in Vinayak Ramchandra v. D. Ramchandran 1985 Criminal Law Journal 1257 while Mr. H. M. Bhagat learned Additional Standing Counsel for respondent No. 3 and Mr. D K. Trivedi learned Additional Public Prosecutor for respondents nos. 1 and 2 have referred the Patna High Court judgment in Yogendra Singh v. State of Bihar 1985 Criminal Law Journal 8and9. Provisions of sub-sec. (4) of Sec. 3 of the Maintenance of Internal Security Act 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the MISA) are practically analogous to the provisions of sub-sec. (4) of Sec. 3 of the P. B Act. ( 16 ) IN Vinayak Ramchandra Sudhakars case (supra) a reference is made to a judgment of the Supreme Court in Sher Mohammad v. State of West Bangal reported in AIR 1975 Supreme Court 2049. It is observed therein that the words and expression report the fact to the Central Government within seven days were construed by the Supreme Court in Sher Mohammads case so mean to communicate the fact within seven days. Taking the word communicate as an equivalent of the word report the Supreme Court in Sher Mohammads case has observed that sub-sec. (4) of Sec. 3 MISA obliges the State Government to communicate within seven days of the order of detention it makes or it approves that fact to the Central Government together with the grounds on which the order has been made and other relevant particulars. In other words although the statutory phraseology is shall within seven days report the fact to the Central Government the Supreme Court in Sher Mahammads case has substituted the word communicate. holding that such communication must be within seven days. This observation of the Supreme Court was made in the light of the facts of the case before it. In other words although the statutory phraseology is shall within seven days report the fact to the Central Government the Supreme Court in Sher Mahammads case has substituted the word communicate. holding that such communication must be within seven days. This observation of the Supreme Court was made in the light of the facts of the case before it. The detention of the detenu in Sher Mohammads case (supra) was made on 21/11/1972 by the District Magistrate and approved by the State Government on 2/12/1972 The communication to the Central Government was made on 1/12/1972 The Supreme Court observed that the date 1/12/1972 was beyond seven days of the District Magistrates order. On the other hand if the relevant date was approved by the State Government that date was 2/12/1972 and therefore communication of approval on 1/12/1972 was in a way premature. It is in the light of these facts that sub-sec. (4) of Sec. 3 MISA came to be interpreted by the Supreme Court. The discussion led the Supreme Court to observe as stated above namely to the effect that the report that is to say the communication of the approval of the State Government should reach the Central Government within seven days. ( 17 ) IN Vinayak Ramchandra Sudhalkars case (supra) taking a clue from the above observation in Sher Mohammads case (supra) the Division Bench has discussed this aspect in details referring to several sources where the word communicate is used. The Division Bench concluded that communication means bringing home the effective knowledge of facts. The Division Bench observed:". . . . . IN AIR 1962 SC 911 : (1962 (2) Cr. L 3. 797) Harikisan v. State of Maharashtra the Supreme Court held that communication means bringing home the effective knowledge of facts. In our view same is the import of expression report the fact as used in Sec. 3 (5) of the Act. Section 3 (5) casts a duty on the State Government to report the fact to the Central Government within seven days together with the grounds on which order has been made and such other particulars as in the opinion of the State Government have bearing on the necessity of the order. Section 3 (5) casts a duty on the State Government to report the fact to the Central Government within seven days together with the grounds on which order has been made and such other particulars as in the opinion of the State Government have bearing on the necessity of the order. Therefore unless the report sent by the State Government under Sec. 3 (5) of the Act is received by the Central Government it cannot be said that the fact of detention together with the grounds on which the order has been made is communicated or reported to the Central Government within the meaning of Sec. 3 of the Act. "it was contended before the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court as it is also done before us by Mr. H. M. Bhagat learned Addition standing Counsel for respondent No. 3 and Mr. L. K. Trivedi Additional Public Prosecutor for respondents Nos. 1 and 2 that if it is held that report means actual communication of the fact of detention i. e. reaching of the communication to the Central Government it would lead to absurd results and sometimes for no fault of the approving authority the detention order must be set aside. That contention was repelled by the Bombay High Court as we also do. No method of communication of fact of detention is prescribed in the Act and therefore we do not think it necessary to enter into that aspect since in any case the fact must be reported to the Central Government within seven days. ( 18 ) IN the case of Yogendra Singh (supra) the Division Bench of the Patana High Court has expressed the view contrary to the view expressed by the Bombay High Court in the case of Vinayak Ramchandra Sudhalkar (supra ). Provisions of sub-sec. (5) of Sec. 3 National Security Act were being considered by the Division Bench of the Patna High Court and considering the provisions relating to report of the fact alongwith the grounds of detention to the Central Government it is observed in paragraph 11 as follows:"the contention of Mr. Provisions of sub-sec. (5) of Sec. 3 National Security Act were being considered by the Division Bench of the Patna High Court and considering the provisions relating to report of the fact alongwith the grounds of detention to the Central Government it is observed in paragraph 11 as follows:"the contention of Mr. Prasad that the report ought to have reached the Central Government within seven days cannot be accepted because the obligation imposed upon the State Government under Sec. 3 (5) of the Act is that the State Government shall send a report and it is not that the report should reach within a period days. There is absolutely no ambiguity or any question of interpretation of the provision stated above and therefore the contention raised as stated above is not tenable. "the learned Judges of the Patna High Court constituting the Division Bench with respect have not considered the meaning of report as a verb and have considered it as a noun and therefore for the purpose of considering the provisions of sub-sec. (5) of Sec. 3 National Security Act observed that the State Government has to send a report to the Central Government. The expression in sub-sec. (5) of Sec. 3 National Security Act is not shall send a report but it is shall report. The difference in the employment of the word is significant. The difference with respect has been lost sight of the Division Bench. With respect therefore we are not in a position to agree with the view expressed by the learned Judges of the Division Bench of the Patna High Court. For the reasons recorded by us above we respectfully agree with the penultimate observations as referred above by the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court. ( 19 ) MR. H. M. Bhagat learned Additional Standing Counsel for respondent No. 3 tried in vain to distinguish between the effect of infraction of statutory provisions and constitutional provisions and submitted that rigour of infraction of the provisions of sub-sec. (4) of Sec. 3 of the P. B. Act should not be considered same as infraction of procedural provision of Art. 22 (5) of the Constitution of India. Mr. (4) of Sec. 3 of the P. B. Act should not be considered same as infraction of procedural provision of Art. 22 (5) of the Constitution of India. Mr. Bhagat also submitted that if the view which we are expressing is taken it would lead to undue hardship and many detenus would be required to be released for such infraction of the statutory provisions of sub-sec. (3) of Sec. 4 of the P. B Act. Submission of Mr. Bhagat deserves to be rejected as it is clear that the period of seven days is available to the State Government after the approval of the detention order for submission of the report i. e. delivery of fact about the detention and the grounds of detention etc. to the Central Government. If due deligence is exercised period of seven days is sufficient to deliver the papers to the Central Government. No practical hardship in such cases is therefore likely to arise and the provisions can be conveniently complied with. Even if any practical difficulty is likely to arise that should not be a consideration for interpreting the provisions of sub-sec. (4) of Sec. 3 of the P. B. Act in favour of the respondents as submitted by Mr. Bhagat. It also cannot be accepted that rigour of infraction of the provisions of Statute is not the same as rigour of the provisions of Art. 22 (5) Constitution of India. It is now too late to make such a submission as the law on the point is well settled by several judgments of the Supreme Court. Infraction of the procedural provision of the preventive detention statutes made in accordance with the provisions of Art. 22 (5) would certainly invalidate the detention order as liberty of the subject is curtailed by such provision. ( 20 ) THE Supreme Court in Abdul Latif Abdul Wahab Sheikh v. B. K Jha 1987 (2) Supreme Court Cases 22: (1987 (2) GLR 705 (SC) ) has observed in paragraph 5 as under:". . . IN a habeas corpus proceeding. it is not a sufficient answer to say that the procedural requirements of the Constitution and the Statute have been complied with before the date of hearing and therefore the detention should be upheld. . . IN a habeas corpus proceeding. it is not a sufficient answer to say that the procedural requirements of the Constitution and the Statute have been complied with before the date of hearing and therefore the detention should be upheld. the procedural requirements ale the only safeguards available to a detenu since the Court is not expected to go behind the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority. The procedural requirements are therefore to be strictly complied with if any value is to be attached to the liberty of the subject and the constitutional rights guaranteed to him in that regard. If a reference to an Advisory Board is to be made within three weeks it is no answer to say that the reference though not made within three weeks was made before the hearing Or the case. If the report of the Advisory Board is to be obtained with three months it is no answer to say that the report. though not obtained within three months was obtained before the hearing of the case. If the representation made by the detenu is required to be disposed of within a stipulated period it is no answer to say that the representation though not disposed of before the hearing of the case. "it is therefore clear from the aforesaid observations that such statutory provision prescribing the time-limit or providing a particular procedure be scrupulously and strictly complied with. Similar view is also expressed in Hem Lall Bhandari v. State of Sikkim 1987 (2) Supreme Court Cases 9 in which it is observed in terms that the mandate enacted in Sec. 8 (1) National Security Act should be interpreted in literally and no relaxation is permissible. In Mrs. Tsering Dolkar v. Administrator Union Territory of Delhi 1987 (2) Supreme Court Cases 69 the observations are that the law as laid down by the Supreme Court clearly indicate that in the matter of preventive detention the test is not one of prejudice but one of strict compliance with the provisions of the Act and when there is a failure to comply with those requirements it becomes difficult to sustain the order. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court also referred Bablu Das v. State of West Bengal AIR 1975 SC 1513 Khudiram Das v. State of West Bangal 1975 (2) SCR 832 and Fogla v. State of Bengal AIR 1975 SC 245 in that case. . ( 21 ) WE are therefore of the view that the fact about the detention alongwith the grounds of detention etc. should reach the Central Government within a period of seven days as provided in sub-sec. (4) of sec. 3 of the P. B. Act. That procedural requirement is not observed and therefore the infraction of the said provision vitiates the continued detention of the petitioner and on that ground the detention order should be quashed and set aside. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ( 22 ) IT is contended that the petitioner sent the representation to the President on 3-5-1987 which was received by the office of the President on 6-5-1987 and that was sent to the concerned Ministry by the Office of the President on 3-6-1987 and ultimately the Central Government rejected the representation of the petitioner. It is submitted the delay of about 27 days in the office of the President is not explained as no affidavit is filed by any officer of the office of the President explaining the delay. It is true that the delay in the office of the President is not explained hut it is also clear that the representation was submitted by the petitioner to the Governor of Gujarat State on 3 and it was received by the office of the Governor of Gujarat on 5 and it was sent to the concerned Ministry of the Government of Gujarat which received it on 6-5-1987 and the State Government after considering it rejected it on 7-5-1987 and the petitioner was informed about that by the Additional Chief Secretary and Minister of Civil Supplies Government of Gujarat on 8-5-1987. Mr. K. B. Makwana Deputy Secretary Food and Civil Supplies Department Government of Gujarat Gandhinagar has stated the aforesaid facts in his affidavit. Mr. Mr. K. B. Makwana Deputy Secretary Food and Civil Supplies Department Government of Gujarat Gandhinagar has stated the aforesaid facts in his affidavit. Mr. A. Chandrasekharan Under Secretary Ministry of Food and Civil Supplies (Department of Civil Supplies) New Delhi has stated in his affidavit that the representation dated 3-5-1987 of the petitioner addressed to the Governor of Gujarat and forwarded by the State Government of Gujarat vide letter dated 8-5-1987 was received by the Food and Civil Supplies Department Government of India on 11-5-1987. Para wise comments sent by the State Government alongwith the representation were incomplete and therefore further details were called for on 12-5-1987 and were received on 18-5-1987 and after detailed examination of the representation the file was submitted on 18-5-1987 and ultimately the representation was rejected by the Joint Secretory on the same day i. e. 18-5-1987 and the petitioner was informed through the Superintendent Central Prison Sabarmati Ahmedabad telegraphically on 19-5-1987. It is also stated by him in his affidavit that an identical representation dated 3-5-1987 addressed to the President of India was also received on 4-6-1987 forwarded by the Presidents Secretariat vide communication dated 3-6-1987. The rejection of that representation was again conveyed to the petitioner on 9-6-1987 through Ahmedabad Central Prison. From the affidavit of Mr. A. Chandrasekharan it is clear that the representations made to the Governor of and to the President of India were dated 3-5-1987 and they were identical. First representation was sent to the Central Government by the State Government and it was considered on merits by the Central Government and rejected on 18-5-1987 and the second representation was also considered and rejected on 9-6-1987. No counter affidavit is filed on behalf of the petitioner stating that the representations to the Governor of Gujarat and to the President of India were not identical. Mr. S V. Raju learned advocate for the petitioner also could not satisfy us and stated that except the fact that one representation was addressed to the Governor of Gujarat and another to the President of India there was practically no difference between the said two representations. It is therefore evident that the representation on merit was considered by the competent authority i. e. the Central Government under Sec. 14 of the P. B. Act on 18-5-1987 and again same representation was considered on 9-6-1987. It is therefore evident that the representation on merit was considered by the competent authority i. e. the Central Government under Sec. 14 of the P. B. Act on 18-5-1987 and again same representation was considered on 9-6-1987. The representation was therefore considered by the Central Government without any delay. As such the fact that the representation sent to the President of India was not forwarded to the concerned Ministry for about 27 days is therefore not material as the representation was already considered by the Central Government. A representation is submitted with the obvious purpose of considering it and with a request to order under Sec. 14 of the P. B. Act and when it is already considered on merit and decision is taken promptly the delay in consideration by same authority of same representation sent through another authority would not make any material difference. When similar representations are sent through various authorities for consideration by the same competent authorities and they are considered on merit the fact that another representation is considered after a lapse of sometime would not affect the right of the detenu and cannot be considered to be a sufficient ground for quashing the detention order. Mr. S. V. Raju learned Advocate for the petitioner submitted that the Government of Gujarat was not called upon to send the representation to the Central Government and the Government had submitted the representation of its own but that by itself would affect the right of the petitioner as the identical representation was sent to the President of India by the petitioner on the same day. On the contrary the Government of Gujarat initiated that action with a view to help the petitioner so that the Central Government may consider his representation and pass appropriate orders under Sec. 14 of the P. B. Act. It also cannot be said that any other independent right of representation to the Central Government was affected. We are fortified in our view by the Supreme Court judgment in State of U. P. v. Zavad Zama Khan AIR 1984 Supreme Court 1095. In that case in similar circumstances representation was forwarded by the State Government to the Central Government and it was considered by the Central Government under Sec. 14 National Security Act. Second representation was also submitted to the Central Government. In that case in similar circumstances representation was forwarded by the State Government to the Central Government and it was considered by the Central Government under Sec. 14 National Security Act. Second representation was also submitted to the Central Government. The Central Government duly considered the said representation which in effect was nothing but representation for revocation of detention order under Sec. 14 National Security Act. The Supreme Court observed that it was not obligatory on the part of the Central Government to consider a second representation for revocation under Sec. 14 National Security Act. After considering certain authorities it was observed that the principle that emerges from the said authorities is that the power of revocation conferred on the Central Government under Sec. 14 National Security Act is a statutory power which may be exercised on information received by the Central Government from its own sources including that supplied by the State Government under sub-sec. (5) of Sec. 3 National Security Act or from the detenu in the form of a petition for representation and it is for the Central Government to decide whether or not it should revoke the order of detention in a particular case. In the instant case the Central Government again considered the representation sent by the petitioner to the President of India. But in case had it not considered it at all that would not make any material difference as by that the right of the petitioner would not have been affected. Submission of Mr. S. V. Raju learned Advocate for the petitioner therefore deserves to be turned down. ( 23 ) FOR the reasons recorded above the continued detention of the petitioner vitiates and the detention order should be quashed and set aside. (REST of the Judgment is not material for the Reports.)RULE made absolute. .