Mahboob Hasan Farooqui v. Passenger Tax officer, Allahabad
1987-10-16
OM PRAKASH, R.M.SAHAI
body1987
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT Om Prakash, J. - In these writ petitions filed by different petitioners the prayer is that the orders passed by the Passenger Tax Officer levying passenger tax, additional tax, surcharge etc. be quashed. 2. As the facts are common in all these petitions, there is no need to state the facts of all, but for sample sake, we reproduce the facts of the writ petition, filed by Sri Mahboob Hasan Farooqui which shall be treated the leading case. The petitioner owns a bus, which was hired by the Indian Farmers Fertilisers Co-operative Ltd., Phulpur (for short the IFFCO), for providing transport facility to its employees, who commute between Allahabad and Phulpur, where the 1FFCO is situated. It is averred that there is no contract , between the petitioner and the employees of the IFFCO and the petitioner does not charge any fare from the employees of the IFFCO, but die payment of the bus is received by the petitioner from the IFFCO under the terms of the agreement (Annexure "2" to the writ petition). It is stated that charging Section 3 of the U. P. Motor Gaddi (Yatri Kar) Adhiniyam, 1962 (for short,the Act, 1962') is applicable only to the stage carriages and the contract carriages and not to a vehicle, which is used by a Company or by any other establishment for providing transport facility to its employees. The contention is that the petitioner is not free to permit a member of the public to get into the bus and that the entry' into the bus is restricted only to the employees of the IFFCO. It is stated that even if the bus is not full and goes empty, still the members of the public cannot get into the bus. 2A. A counter-affidavit was filed on behalf of the IFFCO, but there is no counter-affidavit for and on behalf of the Passenger Tax Officer. It is not controverted in the counter-affidavit that only the employees of the IFFCO used the bus between Allahabad and Phoolpur and that the bus remained under the control of the IFFCO. 3. We have heard learned Counsel for the parties. Learned Counsel for the petitioner relying on M/s. Tata Engineering and Locomotive Co. Ltd. v. Sales Tax Officer and Regional Transport Officer, Poona, AIR 1979 SC 343 , contends that this authority is squarely applicable to the facts of the case in hand.
3. We have heard learned Counsel for the parties. Learned Counsel for the petitioner relying on M/s. Tata Engineering and Locomotive Co. Ltd. v. Sales Tax Officer and Regional Transport Officer, Poona, AIR 1979 SC 343 , contends that this authority is squarely applicable to the facts of the case in hand. The Supreme Court considered a similar position under the Bombay Motor Vehicles (Taxation of Passengers) Act, 1958 (for short, the Act, 1958). Adverting to the preamble of the Act, 1958, to the definition of Stage Carriage under Section 2(7), to the charging Section 3 of the Act and to the definition of passenger as stated in Rule 2(i) of the Bombay Motor Vehicles Rules, 1940, the Supreme Court took the view: "that the tax can be levied only on passengers who are carried by a stage carriage, which is of the nature of a public service vehicle." 4. In paragraph 10, the Supreme Court observed: Moreover, in the instant case, it is not disputed that the transport provided to the employees of the company was reserved for them only and no other member of the public even if he wanted to pay full charges could be carried on the said vehicle. In these circumstances, therefore, it cannot be said that the transport vehicle provided to the employees by the appellants could be a public service vehicle in any sense of the term." Towards the end of para 10 on p. 346, the Supreme Court concluded: "In view of our finding that such a transport vehicle is not a public service vehicle within the meaning of the provisions of the Bombay Motor Vehicles Act " 5. The question for consideration is whether the provisions of the Act, 1962 are analogous to the provisions of the Act, 1958 and whether the rule laid down under the Act, 1958 is applicable to the case, governed by the Act, 1962. 6. Let us first see the preamble of the Act, 1962. The preamble of the Act, 1962 is as under: "An Act to provide for the levy of a tax on passengers carried in certain classes of public service vehicles in the State of Uttar Pradesh." The definition of stage carriage' as given in Section 2(g) of the Act, 1962 is similar to the one given in Section 2(7) of the Act, 1958.
Charging Section 3 under both the Acts of 1958 and 1962 are substantially the same. Thus, there is no material difference between the provisions, germane to the case in hand , under,the two Acts. 7. From the preamble of the Act, 1962, it is amply clear that the Act was enacted to provide for the levy of a tax on passengers carried in certain classes of public service vehicles in the State of Uttar Pradesh. The question for consideration is whether the vehicle belonging to the petitioner can be characterised as a public service vehicle. The expression public service vehicle has not been defined under the Act, 1962, nor has it been defined under the Act, 1958. The Supreme Court in para 8 of M/s. Tata Engineering case ( AIR 1979 SC 343 ) (supra) elucidated the expression public service vehicle thus: "It is true that the term public service vehicle has not been defined by the Act or by the Rules, but that however does not create any difficulty, because having regard to the Preamble of the Act we are of the opinion that the tax can be levied only on passengers who are carried by a stage carriage which is of the nature of a public service vehicle. The word public has got a well known connotation and means a carriage to which any member of the public can have free access on payment of the usual charges. It cannot by any process of reasoning or stretch of imagination be deemed to include employees of a private company who are given facilities not as members of the public but as holding a special status, namely, the employees of that company............" 8. Following the observation of the Supreme Court, we fully agree with the contention of the petitioner that the bus belonging to him used by the IFFCO, for their employees, who form a separate class from the public, cannot be characterised as a public service vehicle and, therefore, charging Section 3 of the Act, 1962 is not attracted to such a vehicle. The employees of the IFFCO cannot be equated with the members of the public, who can board a public service vehicle on payment.
The employees of the IFFCO cannot be equated with the members of the public, who can board a public service vehicle on payment. No member of the public can travel by the bus, belonging to the petitioner, so long as it re mains attached with the IFFCO, which had the full control on the use of the bus under the terms of the agreement. The vehicle not having been used as a public service vehicle, the petitioner cannot be asked to pay the 9. For the reasons, all the petitions are allowed, the orders parsed by the Passenger Tax Officer levying tax are quashed and the Passenger Tax Officer is directed not to realise tax pursuant to his orders. On the facts and circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.