A. M. AHMADI, J. ( 1 ) THE short question which arises for our consideration in this appeal is whether the Claims Tribunal was right in holding that since the appellants had received an amount of Rs. 21 600 by way of compensation under the Workmens Compensation Act 1923 they were barred by virtue of sec. 110-AA of the Motor Vehicles Act 1939 from claiming compensation under the latter Act ? The brief facts leading to this appeal may be stated as under. ( 2 ) THE appellants who are the original petitioners are the parents of deceased Bharat Harivadan Modi who died in a vehicular accident which occurred on 8/10/1979 A jeep car GRG 97 belonging to Jagdish Electric Company driven by Rajendraprasad Pande ran into a stationary tanker GTB 6022 which was parked partly on the tar road without the tail light switched on. The jeep was proceeding on National Highway No. 8 from Ahmedabad to Bhalod with four passengers including the deceased when the collision in question occurred. In the accident Bharat and one another were seriously injured and they succumbed to the injuries. Bharat died on the next day at the S. S. G. Hospital Baroda. ( 3 ) THE Claims Tribunal came to the conclusion that the accident was on account of the sole negligence of the tanker driver in parking the vehicle partly on the tar road without the tail light switched on. The owner driver and the Insurance Company of the tanker were therefore held liable to compensate the appellants the parents of the deceased. In the course of evidence before the Tribunal it however transpired that the parents of the deceased had received an amount of Rs. 21 600 under the provisions of the Workmens Compensation Act from the Court of the Civil Judge Senior Division Vadodara the authority under the Workmens Compensation Ace. Placing reliance on sec. 110-AA of the Motor Vehicles Act the Claims Tribunal came to the conclusion that since the appellants had already exercised their option to receive compensation under the Workmens Compensation Act they were not entitled to claim compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act. The Claims Tribunal however determined the amount of compensation at Rs. 89 875 with proportionate costs and interest to which the appellants were entitled but for the bar of sec. 110 AA of the Motor Vehicles Act. The Claims Tribunal however determined the amount of compensation at Rs. 89 875 with proportionate costs and interest to which the appellants were entitled but for the bar of sec. 110 AA of the Motor Vehicles Act. Against this decision of the Claims Tribunal the original petitioners the parents of the deceased have preferred this appeal. ( 4 ) THE short question which therefore arises for consideration is whether the Claims Tribunal was right in holding that in view of sec. 110-AA of the Motor Vehicles Act the appellants were not entitled to compensation since they had already received compensation under the Workmens Compensation Act. In order to determine whether this view of the Claims Tribunal is well-founded it would be proper to reproduce the relevant provision at this stage. Section 110-AA reads as under:110 Notwithstanding anything contained in the Workmens Compensation Act 1921 where the death of or bodily injury to any person gives rise to a claim for compensation under this Act and also under the Workmens Compensation Act 1923 the person entitled to compensation may claim such compensation under either of those Acts but not under both. It may here be mentioned that by a subsequent amendment introduced by Act 47 of 1982 for the words may claim such compensation the words figures and letter may without prejudice to the provisions of Chapter VIIA claim such compensation came to be substituted. However since the accident occurred in October 1979 and the claim petition was filed in 1980 we will be concerned with the provision as it stood at that point of time. ( 5 ) ON a plain reading of sec. 110-AA it is clear that where death gives rise to a claim for compensation under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act as well as Workmens Compensation A ct the party entitled to compensation can claim compensation under either of those Acts but not under both. The words may claim make it clear that the option is left to the person entitled to compensation to choose whether he would seek the remedy available under the Motor Vehicles Act or the Workmens Compensation Act. He has to choose either of these two remedies but not both. The words may claim make it clear that the option is left to the person entitled to compensation to choose whether he would seek the remedy available under the Motor Vehicles Act or the Workmens Compensation Act. He has to choose either of these two remedies but not both. It is therefore obvious that if he has exercised his option and has chosen one of the two remedies available to him he would be entitled to compensation under the chosen remedy only. Once he has exhausted his right to seek compensation under either of the two statutes he cannot claim compensation under the other statute. In other words if he opts to claim compensation under the Workmens Compensation Act he cannot at the same time or subsequently claim compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act. Therefore if it is established that in the present case the appellants had chosen their remedy tender the Workmens Compensation Act there can be no doubt that they would hot be entitled to compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act. It is therefore a question of fact in each case whether or not the person entitled to compensation had exercised his option under either of the two statutes. In the present case the Claims Tribunal has observed that the applicants have already exercised their option to receive compensation under the Workmens Compensation Act. However what the father had admitted in the course of his deposition was that he had received Rs. 21 600 from the Court of the Civil Judge Senior Division Baroda an authority under the Workmens Compensation Act by way of compensation. The father in his evidence has merely stated that he had received Rs. 21 600 from the authority under the Workmens Compensation Act. In the observation of the Claims Tribunal extracted above also we find the use of a similar expression Mr. Mehta therefore submitted that mere receipt of compensation under the Workmens Compensation Act will not denude the appellants of their right to claim compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act because under the latter statute a right to claim compensation is conferred and that right can be taken away only if the person entitled to compensation has made a claim under the Workmens Compensation Act. He submitted that the expression may claim denotes a voluntary conscious act on the part of the person entitled to compensation to choose his remedy under either of the statutes. However if he has not applied for compensation or claimed compensation under the Workmens Compensation Act he cannot be deprived of his remedy under the other statute merely because he has received compensation under the former Act. In order to appreciate this contention it would be advantageous to refer to a few of the provisions under the Workmens Compensation Act. ( 6 ) THE Workmens Compensation Act was enacted to provide for the payment by certain classes of employers to their workmen of compensation for injury by accident. Section 3 casts an obligation on the employer to pay compensation if personal injury is caused to a workman by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment. The amount of compensation to be paid by the employer is set out in sec. 4 of the Act. That section provides for compensation at varying rates in cases where death results from the injury or the injured suffers a permanent total disablement on account of the injury. Section 4-A obligates the employer to pay compensation as soon as it falls due failing which on the expiry of one month he becomes liable to pay interest and penalty as provided therein. It will be clear from the above provisions that under the statute the employer is under an obligation to pay compensation to the person who has suffered an injury in the course of employment within the prescribed period. If he fails to pay compensation within the said period he becomes liable to payment of interest and penalty as may be imposed. We may next turn to sec. 8 which requires the employer to deposit the amount of compensation with the Commissioner appointed under sec. 20 of the Act. After the amount is deposited the Commissioner has to apportion the amount payable to each dependent and disburse the same. The form for depositing the amount has been prescribed by the Rules framed under the Act. It is obvious from the aforesaid provisions of the Act that the dependents of the deceased may receive compensation without any application made by them on the amount having been deposited by the employer as required by the statute. The form for depositing the amount has been prescribed by the Rules framed under the Act. It is obvious from the aforesaid provisions of the Act that the dependents of the deceased may receive compensation without any application made by them on the amount having been deposited by the employer as required by the statute. The employer would naturally be keen to deposit the amount which is due to the dependents of the deceased to avoid payment of interest and penalty. Mr. Mehta is therefore right that the mere fact that the appellants had received compensation under the Workmens Compensation Act is not sufficient to deprive them of their remedy by virtue of sec. 110-AA of the Motor Vehicles Act. In the present case Mr. Mehta submitted that the appellants had not applied for compensation under the Workmens Compensation Act. This submission is not controverted. He therefore submitted that merely because the appellants had received compensation deposited by the employer suo motu to discharge his obligation under the statute it cannot be said that the appellants had exercised their option to claim compensation under the said statute and were therefore debarred from claiming compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act. We see considerable force in this submission. We have already pointed out earlier that under sec. 110-AA of the Motor Vehicles Act the person entitled to compensation may claim such compensation under either the Workmens Compensation Act or the Motor Vehicles Act but not both. The words may claim clearly indicate that the option is with the person entitled to compensation and that option cannot be taken away by the act of a third party discharging his obligation under the Workmens Compensation Act. The appellants could not have prevented the employer from discharging his obligation under the said statute by depositing the amount of Rs. 21 600 to which the appellants were entitled under that statute. Therefore on the employer having deposited the amount for the performance of the obligation cast on him by sec. 4 of the Workmens Compensation Act it cannot be said that the appellants had made a claim under that statute for compensation. In order to negative the claim made under the Motor Vehicles Act it must be shown that the person entitled to compensation had made a claim for compensation under the Workmens Compensation Act. 4 of the Workmens Compensation Act it cannot be said that the appellants had made a claim under that statute for compensation. In order to negative the claim made under the Motor Vehicles Act it must be shown that the person entitled to compensation had made a claim for compensation under the Workmens Compensation Act. The key words are may claim such compensation under either of the statutes. These words clearly indicate that the person entitled to compensation must take a conscious decision and opt for compensation under one or the other statute. Deposit of compensation money by a third party in discharge of his obligation under the Workmens Compensation Act can never tantamount to the opinion being exercised by person entitled to compensation. We are therefore of the opinion that receipt of compensation money deposited by the employer in discharge of his obligation under sec. 4 of the Workmens Compensation Act without the appellants having made any claim for compensation under that statute cannot debar the appellants from claiming compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act by virtue of sec. 110-AA thereof. Such deposit of compensation money and receipt thereof by the dependents of the deceased will not amount to making a claim by the dependents of the deceased under the provisions of the Workmens Compensation Act. It must be realised that the Motor Vehicles Act being a benevolent legislation if two interpretations are possible the one which advances the legislative intent of providing just compensation to the victims of a motor accident must be preferred. Any provision which purports to take away or abridge the right to claim compensation under the said statute must receive strict interpretation. In the present case we are however of the opinion that the language of sec. 110-AA is clear and it unambiguously conveys that the option is with the dependents to choose their remedy under either of the statutes and mere deposit of compensation money by a third party and receipt thereof by the dependents cannot amount to exercise of option for to do so would tantamount to foisting an option not exercised by the dependents. The language of sec. 110-AA in our opinion is not capable of two meanings but even if it were so we would have preferred the meaning which would have furthered the legislative policy of granting just compensation to the victims of motor accidents. The language of sec. 110-AA in our opinion is not capable of two meanings but even if it were so we would have preferred the meaning which would have furthered the legislative policy of granting just compensation to the victims of motor accidents. ( 7 ) IN this view that we take we are of the opinion that the Tribunal was in error in coming to the conclusion that the appellants had exercised their option on receipt of compensation from the authority under the Workmens Compensation Act even though they had in fact not preferred any claim under that statute and were therefore debarred from claiming compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act. We are therefore of the opinion that the appellants were entitled to compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act. ( 8 ) THE Claims Tribunal has determined the compensation at Rs. 89 875 The claimants had however made a claim of Rs. 77 875 only. They cannot therefore get more than what they had claimed Out of this amount Mr. Mehta fairly conceded that Rs. 21 600 received by the claimants from the authority under the Workmens Compensation Act may be deducted. He also concedes that the claimants have received Rs. 15 000. 00 from the New India Assurance Company which too may be deducted. That leaves a balance of Rs. 41 975 There will therefore be an award against the original opponents No. 1 and 5 only in favour of the appellants in the sum of Rs. 41 275 with costs calculated on the total amount of Rs. 77 875 and interest at 9 p. a. on Rs. 41 275 from the date of the claim application till payment. Out of the amount awarded Rs. 10 0 nay be paid to the appellants in cash and the balance may be deposited in a long term fixed deposit of fie years in any scheduled bank with a provision that interest thereon will be paid to the appellants quarterly. No advance or loan will be granted on the said fixed deposit nor will the fixed deposit be permitted to be used as security for any other loan without the express permission of this Court. The appeal is allowed accordingly with costs. Appeal allowed. .