JUDGMENT S. C. Mathnr, J. 1. This petition is directtd against order for delivery of possession of immoveable property, passed by the Additional District Magistrate (Civil Supplies), Lucknow, opposite party no. 1, under section 18 (3) of the U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (Act No. XIII of 1972). The dispute in the petition pertains to first floor of house No. 109/16, Model House, police station Aminabad, Lucknow. 2. Admittedly the above house previously belonged to Sri Mauji Ram Gupta. It appears that the house had been let out by Sri Mauji Ram Gupta When the tenant vacated the accommodation, Sri Mauji Ram Gupta applied for release of the said house. Meanwhile the petitioner and others applied for allotment thereof. By order dated 25th February, 1976 only the ground-floor of the house was released in favour of Sri Mauji Ram Gupta and his application for release in respect of first floor was rejected. The first floor was thereafter allotted in favour of the petitioner by order dated 23rd July, 1976. She obtained possession over the allotted accommodation on 25th July, 1976. The allotment in favour of the petitioner was challenged before the District Judge by Rama Kant Srivastava. an applicant for allotment. While the revision was pending Mauji Ram Gupta sold the entire house to Pawa through sale-deed dated 18th July, 1977. The revision was allowed and allotment order dated 23rd July, 1976 was set-aside and the case was remanded to the Additional District Magistrate who again allotted the accommodation to the petitioner through order dated 4tb January, 1978. This order had been passed without notice to Pawa who applied for review of the order which was allowed and the allotment order was cancelled by order dated 14th December, 1981. By this order not only the allotment order made in favour of the petitioner was cancelled, the first floor of the house was released in favour of Sri Pawa. Against this order the petitioner preferred revision before the learned District Judge. The learned IInd Additional District Judge, before whom the revision came up for hearing, allowed the same by judgment and order dated 18th January, 1983 and set-aside the order dated 14th December, 1981. Against this order the petitioner preferred revision before the learned District Judge. The learned IInd Additional District Judge, before whom the revision came up for hearing, allowed the same by judgment and order dated 18th January, 1983 and set-aside the order dated 14th December, 1981. Aggrieved by the judgment of the learned Additional District Judge, Sri Pawa preferred writ petition in this court which was allowed by me by judgment and order dated 20th January, 1984. The operative portion of the judgment reads as follows :- "...Accordingly the writ petition is allowed and the order dated 18-1-1983 passed by the learned Second Additional District Judge, Lucknow, Annexure 1, is hereby quashed. The allotting authority will reconsider the opposite party no. 3's application for allotment after giving notice to the petitioner...." The petitioner challenged the order of this Court Before their lordships of the Supreme Court. The challenge however failed. A copy of the judgment and order passed by their lordships on 5th November, 1986 is on record. 3. It appears that after the order of this Court Sri Pawa applied to the Additional District Magistrate under section 18 (3) of the Act for being put in possession of the first floor by eviction of the petitioner. His plea was that since the allotment order passed in favour of the petitioner has been set-aside, the petitioner was not entitled to remain in possession of the accommodation in question. Copy of this application was not served upon the petitioner. All the same she appeared before the Additional District Magistrate on 1st February, 1984. From his order dated 1st February 1984, which is on record, it appears that the Additional District Magistrate heard both the sides and came to the conclusion that more detailed hearing was required. He accordingly adjourned the case to 7th February, 1984. Before final orders could be passed on Pawa's application, the petitioner approached their lordships of the Supreme Court and obtained stay order on 1st March, 1984 copy of which was filed before the Additional District Magistrate on 5th March, 1984 In view of the interim order passed by their lordships, further proceedings before the Additional District Magistrate, in pursuance of the judgment of this Court as also in pursuance of the application under section 18 (3), became stayed. After their lordships dismissed petitioner's appeal, Sri Pawa moved another application under section 18 (3) before the Additional District Magistrate (Civil Supplies) on 7th November, 1986. This application, it appears, was directed to be put up on 10th November, 1986. Till 21st November, 1986 no orders for petitioner's eviction had been passed and accordingly Sri Pawa moved yet another application on 21st November, 1986 seeking delivery of possession. This application was filed before the District Magistrate who endorsed the same to Additional District Magistrate (Civil Supplies) for disposal. On this application the Additional District Magistrate (Civil Supplies) passed order for petitioner's eviction on 22nd November, 1986-annexure 4. So far as the application dated 7th November, 1986 is concerned it appears that Additional District Magistrate had directed the same to be put up on 10th November, 1986. However, there was no progress on this application. IT is this order dated 22nd November, 1986 which is under challenge in the present petition. 4. The impugned order has been challenged by the petitioner on the following grounds : 1. The order has been passed in violation of principles of natural justice as no notice was issued to the petitioner of the application under section 18 (3) filed by the opposite party ; 2. The order is in violation of the earlier order passed by the A. D. M. on 1st February, 1984 whereby he had directed that both the parties shall be heard ; 3. The impugned order is violative of the judgment and order passed by this Court in the writ petition of Sri Pawa ; and, 4. Section 18 (3) of the Act has no application to the facts of the present case. I shall take up the last ground first. Fourth Ground : 5. The argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that section 18 (3) of the Act applies only when an order is rescinded and it is not applicable when a case is remanded to the authority below. The learned counsel submits that under sub-section (2) of section 18 the revising authority has three options in respect of an order impugned before him under sub-section (2) of section 18. These three options, according to him, are (i) to confirm the order, (ii) to rescind the order, and (iii) to remand the case to the District Magistrate for re-hearing. The learned counsel submits that under sub-section (2) of section 18 the revising authority has three options in respect of an order impugned before him under sub-section (2) of section 18. These three options, according to him, are (i) to confirm the order, (ii) to rescind the order, and (iii) to remand the case to the District Magistrate for re-hearing. The submission of the learned counsel is that although sub-Sec. (2) speaks of three alternatives, sub-section (3) deals with only one of the three alternatives, namely, rescission of the impugned order. It is on this basis that he argues that sub-section (3) does not apply to cases of remand. 6. An order of allotment is passed under section 16 of the Act. Subsection (1) of section 18 prescribes that no appeal shall lie from an order under section 16 but the District Judge may revise the order on the grounds enumerated in sub-clauses (a) to (c). Sub-sections (2) and (3) of section 18 reads as follows :- "(2) The revising authority may confirm or rescind the final order made under sub-section (1) or may remand the case to the District Magistrate for rehearing, and pending the revision, may stay the operation of such order on such terms, if any, as it thinks fit. Explanation-The power to rescind the final order under this sub-section shall not include the power to pass an allotment order or to direct the passing of an allotment order in favour of a person different from the allottee mentioned in the order under revision. (3) Where an order under section 16 or section 19 is rescinded, the District Magistrate shall, on an application being made to him on that behalf, place the parties back in the position which they would have occupied but for such order or such part thereof as has been rescinded, and may for that purpose use or cause to be used such force as may be necessary." The operative portion of the judgment of this Court has already been reproduced herein above. The submission of the learned counsel is that the judgment of this Court is of remand and not of rescission and therefore subsection (3) of section 18 is not attracted. The argument is devoid of merit. Sub-section (3) does not speak of the authority who passes the order of rescission. The submission of the learned counsel is that the judgment of this Court is of remand and not of rescission and therefore subsection (3) of section 18 is not attracted. The argument is devoid of merit. Sub-section (3) does not speak of the authority who passes the order of rescission. Thus the order of rescission may be passed ever by the authority which passed the order which is subsequently rescinded or it may be passed by a higher authority. The higher authority prescribed in section 18 (1) is the District Judge. The higher authorities prescribed in the Constitution are this Court and the Supreme Court. 7. In the present case the proceedings before the court below arose from an order of allotment made in favour of the petitioner by the Additional District Magistrate (for short A.D.M.). The first allotment order was made on 23rd July, 1976 and the second on 4th January, 1978. The first allotment order was rescinded by the District Judge in the revision preferred by one of the applicants for allotment and the case was remanded for reconsideration of applications for allotment. It was in the remand and proceedings that the second allotment order was made by the A.D.M. in favour of the petitioner on 4th January, 1978. This order was rescinded by the A.D.M. himself in review proceedings at the instance of the landlord under section 16 (5) of the Act by his order dated 14th December, 1981. By this order he did two things. First, he rescinded the order of allotment made in favour of the petitioner and second he released the accommodation in dispute in favour of the landlord-opposite party. The Additional District Judge by his judgment dated 18th January, 1983 completely set aside the order of the A.D.M dated 4th January, 1978, the consequence of which was that the allotment order in favour of the petitioner was revived and the order of release in favour of the landlord-opposite party stood set aside. This court in the writ petition of the landlord upheld his claim that the allotment order in favour of the petitioner was invalid as the same had been passed without giving him opportunity of hearing. Consequently the judgment of the learned Additional Judge was set aside and the order of the A.D.M. so far as it rescinded the order of allotment in favour of the petitioner was maintained. Consequently the judgment of the learned Additional Judge was set aside and the order of the A.D.M. so far as it rescinded the order of allotment in favour of the petitioner was maintained. After maintaining the A.D.M.'s order of rescission of the allotment order the A.D.M. was directed to reconsider the petitioner's application for allotment. Thus the remand follows rescission of the allotment order. It cannot, therefore, be said that there is no order of rescission within the contemplation of section 18 (3). It may be that apart from the order of rescission there is also an order of remand. The remand follows the rescission of the allotment order. The right under section 18 (3) flows from the order of rescission and not from the order of remand. While remanding the case to the A.D.M. the order of allotment has not been maintained. Since the order of rescission of the allotment order is maintained, sub-section (3) of section 18 is clearly attracted. 8. The next submission based on section 18 (3) is that the provision requires placing the parties in the position which they would have occupied but for the order which has been rescinded. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner opposite party Sri Pawa was not in occupation of the accommodation in question and he was not even owner of the house when the petitioner "was put in possession of the first floor in pursuance of the first allotment order and therefore in compliance of sub-section (3) of section 18 it is not possible to put Sri Pawa in possession of the disputed accommodation. According to the learned counsel only that person can be put in possession under section 18 (3) who was in possession of the accommodation when the rescinded order was enforced. Section 18 (3) requires the placing of parties in the position which they would have occupied but for the order which has been rescinded. The question for consideration therefore is what position the petitioner and opposite party Sri Pawa would have occupied vis-a-vis the accommodation in dispute but for the allotment order which has been rescinded. 9. The petitioner is not the owner of the property in question. The petitioner could have the right to occupy the property only as a lessee or as a licensee. She does not claim right of occupation or possession on the basis of licence. 9. The petitioner is not the owner of the property in question. The petitioner could have the right to occupy the property only as a lessee or as a licensee. She does not claim right of occupation or possession on the basis of licence. Since the property is admittedly governed by U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972, the petitioner could occupy the same as a tenant or lessee only if she had an allotment order in her favour under section 16 (1) (a) of the Act. Since the allotment order obtained by her earlier no longer subsists she has no right to remain in occupation as a lessee or tenant also. Therefore in implementation of the mandate of section 18 (3) the petitioner cannot claim any right to remain in occupation of the accommodation in dispute. 10. I may now examine the right of the landlord-opposite party. Opposite party is the owner of the house. An owner of a house is always entitled to remain in possession of his house. In respect of a house governed by the Act his right to occupy his own house is taken away when the same is allotted to someone under section 16 (1) (a). It is true that under section 16 1) (b) read with section 13 the owner of a house is also required to obtain an order of release in order to enable him to occupy his own house, but this provision has to be reasonably interpreted. Once a house has fallen vacant its occupation or possession cannot remain in vacuum. The possession and occupation of the house will have to vest in someone. In the absence of allotment order the only person in whom the right of possession and occupation can vest is the owner of the house. Section 15 obliges the landlord to intimate vacancy to the District Magistrate. Once he has done this, he has discharged his obligation under the Act. If he wants release of the house in his favour he has to make an application in that behalf. Till an order of allotment or release is passed he remains in possession and occupation by virtue of his ownership. If an order of release is passed his possession and occupation is perfected. If he wants release of the house in his favour he has to make an application in that behalf. Till an order of allotment or release is passed he remains in possession and occupation by virtue of his ownership. If an order of release is passed his possession and occupation is perfected. If his application for release is rejected and an order of allotment is made, his right to remain in occupation is lost and therefore he must yield occupation to the lessee. In taking this view I have the support of several decisions of this Court. In Smt. Saraswati v. IVth Addl. District Judge, 1979 U. P. Rent Control Cases 266 it was observed as follows : ".........Whenever a tenant vacates a building and if other tenant does not occupy the same immediately thereafter the landlord is entitled to lock the premises although he may not occupy physically and use the building for his own purposes. The landlord as owner of the building is entitled to the possession of the house subject to any allotment order which may be passed under the Act, "although landlord is not entitled to use or occupy the building unless he obtains a release order in his favour but the fact remains that no other person is entitled to physically occupy the building merely because there is no order of release in favour of the landlord............" (emphasis supplied). To the same effect is the decision of Hon'ble N. D. Ojha. In Triloki Nath Trivedi v. Rent Control and Eviction Officer, Ballia, 1983 (1) Allahabad Rent Cases 857, in paragraph 6 it has been observed as follows : "It is settled law that on an accommodation being vacated by its tenant the landlord, as owner of the building is entitled to remain in possession over the said accommodation subject to any order of allotment being passed under the Act in favour of some other person. This would be so even if no order of release bad been passed in favour of the landlord, inasmuch as on an accommodation being vacated by a tenant the said accommodation cannot be permitted to remain in the position of a no man's land till either an order of allotment or release is passed by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer. There is no provision in the Act reliance on which could be placed for creating such an anomalous situation." (emphasis supplied) 11. This was also a case under section 18 (3) and the argument on behalf of the allottee, whose allotment order had been cancelled, was that at the time he was put in possession in pursuance of the allotment order, the owner was not in physical possession of the accommodation and therefore he was not entitled to invoke section 18 (3) of the Act. Rejecting the argument it was observed in paragraph 5 thus : "Even without going into the question I am of opinion that even if for the sake of argument it may be accepted that the petitioner was not in actual physical possession over the accommodation when possession thereof was taken by respondent no. 2 it would make no difference and section 18 (3) of the Act would still apply and the petitioner would be entitled to be put back in possession over the accommodation in question on the order of allotment passed in favour of respondent no. 2 under section 16 of the Act being rescinded." This judgment is complete answer to the petitioner's plea. 12. Great strees was laid by the learned counsel for the petitioner on the word "back" used in the phrase "put the parties back in the position" appearing in Section 18 (3). The learned counsel submits that the use of the word "back" suggests restoration of the position obtaining at the time the lessee was put in possession of the house and if this position cannot be restored, resort cannot be had to Section 18(3). The argument is that at the time the petitioner was put in possession of the disputed accommodation in pursuance of the first allotment order, Mauji Ram was the owner of the house in question and he alone could claim restoration of possession under Section 18 (3) provided he continued to be the owner. Since, admittedly, he has ceased to be the owner of the house he cannot get possession under section 18 (3) and the petitioner cannot get possession because he was neither the owner nor in occupation of the disputed accommodation at that time. This, according to the learned counsel, is the only way of giving full effect and meaning to the word " back " used in section 18 (3). This, according to the learned counsel, is the only way of giving full effect and meaning to the word " back " used in section 18 (3). The argument is fallacious. Section 18 (3) does use the word " back " but what it enjoins is to put the parties in the position which they would have occupied but for such order. " This position has already been discussed hereinbefore. According to that discussion between the person whose allotment order has been cancelled and the owner, the latter has preferential right of possession. Therefore, once the allotment order is rescinded, opposite party Sri Pawa would be entitled to possession of the property in dispute and the right of possession is not deferred till the passing of the release order under Section 16 (1) (b). The learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon my judgment in Jaheer Ahmad v. Mohammad Askari, 1981 ARC 490 for submitting that it is only that owner or landlord from whom possession had been obtained by the allottee who will be entitled to get possession under Section 18 (3). In paragraph 4 of the judgment I have of course observed- "Thus, it was the duty of the District Magistrate under the above provision to put opposite party no. 1 back into the house as the possession of the house was given to the petitioner after evicting opposite party no. 1 therefrom." But this observation was made on the facts of that case. I have not laid down in that case that when the ownership of the accommodation has changed hands the new owner cannot invoke Section 18 (3) for obtaining possession from the person whose allotment order has been cancelled. This authority is therefore of no assistance to the petitioner ; rather it is against her, as 1 have specifically laid down that once the allotment order is cancelled it is the duty of the District Magistrate to put the person entitled to possession in possession of the accommodation. 13. In view of the above I am of the opinion that the fourth ground of challenge is not sustainable. Third Ground : 14. The impugned order is alleged to be violative of the judgment of this Court in the writ petition of Sri Pawa. 13. In view of the above I am of the opinion that the fourth ground of challenge is not sustainable. Third Ground : 14. The impugned order is alleged to be violative of the judgment of this Court in the writ petition of Sri Pawa. According to the learned counsel, under the judgment of this Court it was obligatory for the allotting authority to reconsider the application for allotment made by the petitioner but that has not been done so far and instead the impugned order has been passed. The judgment of this Court was delivered on 20th January, 1984. The petitioner herself approached their lordships of the Supreme Court to challenge the said judgment and obtained an order of stay. The stay order was vacated only on 5th November, 1986 when the petitioner's appeal was dismissed by their lordships. Immediately thereafter on 7th November, 1986 opposite party Pawa applied for delivery of possession and when no action was taken thereon he moved another application on 21st November, 1986 on which the impugned order was passed the next day i.e., on 22nd November, 1986 against which the present writ petition was filed on 24th November, 1986 when an interim order was passed staying the operation of the eviction order. On 5th May, 1987 the court passed an order summoning the record of the authority below. The record was received in this court and is here since then. Between 7th November, 1986, when the judgment of the Supreme Court was communicated to the Additional District Magistrate, and Nth May, 1987, when the record was received in this Court, it was, of course, possible for the Additional District Magistrate to reconsider the petitioner's application for allotment if no application for release had been made by opposite party Pawa. But on account of the delay in the disposal of the remanded matter, it cannot be said that the impugned order violates the judgment of this Court because the judgment of this Court does not prohibit the Additional District Magistrate from taking action under Section 18 (3). 15. The third ground of challenge also accordingly fails. Grounds 1 and 2 : 16. These grounds can be taken up together. The material question involved in both these grounds is whether a person who is sought to be evicted under Section 18 (3) has a right of hearing. 15. The third ground of challenge also accordingly fails. Grounds 1 and 2 : 16. These grounds can be taken up together. The material question involved in both these grounds is whether a person who is sought to be evicted under Section 18 (3) has a right of hearing. Section 18 (3) has already been reproduced herein before. There is no requirement under that provision to give notice to the person who is sought to be evicted, but there is no prohibition either. Principles of natural justice require that no adverse order should be passed against a person without giving him opportunity of hearing and this principle applies even though the statute does not require notice to be given to the affected person. But this opportunity of hearing is to be given at the stage of adjudication of rival claims. Where rival claims have already been adjudicated upon and the rights of the parties have become crystalised in an earlier proceedings, and only the order passed in that proceeding is to be executed, there is no question of giving further opportunity of hearing in execution proceedings. It has therefore to be considered whether proceeding under Section 18 (3) is a proceeding for determination of rights of the contesting parties or it is an execution proceeding. 17. Section 18 (3) refers to two earlier proceedings viz. (1) proceeding under Section 16, and (2) proceeding under section 19. Section 16 deals with allotment or release of a building. Release is made in favour of owner of building while allotment is made in favour of a person who is not owner of the building. In allotment proceedings if any dispute arises it may be (i) between the owner of the building, and applicants for allotment, and (2) when there are several applicants for allotment, amongst the applicants inter se. At this stage the dispute may be whether any allotment should be made at all or whether it should be made in favour of this applicant or that applicant. The real question involved at this stage is who has preferential right to occupy the building ? The person who is found to have preferential right, gets the order in his favour. In this proceeding the owner of the building has got the right to put forward his point of view. Similarly various applicants have got the right to put forward their claims. The person who is found to have preferential right, gets the order in his favour. In this proceeding the owner of the building has got the right to put forward his point of view. Similarly various applicants have got the right to put forward their claims. This naturally involves adjudication of right, that right being the right to occupy the building. In this proceeding, therefore, concerned parties have the right to be heard and consequently if an order is passed in such proceeding without giving opportunity of hearing to the concerned person the same would be bad in law whether the statute provides for opportunity of hearing or not. In the instant case the second allotment order was made in favour of the petitioner without giving opportunity of hearing to the opposite party Pawa and for that reason it was rescinded by the Additional District Magistrate whose order was upheld by this Court in earlier writ petition. The Additional District Magistrate had rescinded the order in proceeding for review under Section 16 (5). In this proceeding both the parties had full opportunity of hearing and similar opportunity they had before the Additional District Judge in revision under Section 18 (1) and before this Court and before their lordships of the Supreme Court. This was the proceeding relating to right to occupy the accommodation in question. The petitioner who is not owner of the house did not have any right to occupy the accommodation in question except on the strength of the allotment order dated 4th January, 1978 which now stands rescinded. She desparately fought upto the Supreme Court to preserve that order but unfortunately for her, she has failed. 18. Since section 19 is not involved in the present case I may omit its consideration. After the proceedings under Section 16 and Section 18 (1) and (2) are over, comes the proceeding under Section 18 (3). Under this provision all that the District Magistrate is to be satisfied about is that the order under Section 16 or Section 19 has been rescinded. Once he is satisfied about this, the legislative command to him is to "place parties back in the position which they would have occupied but for such order ". Such order refers to the order which has been rescinded. The legislative command is positive- "the District Magistrate shall". He has not been given any discretion in the matter. Once he is satisfied about this, the legislative command to him is to "place parties back in the position which they would have occupied but for such order ". Such order refers to the order which has been rescinded. The legislative command is positive- "the District Magistrate shall". He has not been given any discretion in the matter. This irresistibly leads to the conclusion that the proceeding under Section 18 (3) is in the nature of execution proceeding. It contemplates execution of an order passed in an earlier proceeding or a follow up action. In such a proceeding there is no question of opportunity of hearing. The petitioner cannot therefore assail the order on the ground that principles of natural justice have been violated. 19. Once it is held that the petitioner had no right of hearing, such a right cannot flow from the Additional District Magistrate's order dated 1st February, 1984 on which strong reliance has been placed by the petitioner's learned counsel. Further that order was passed at a time when the petitioner had either actually approached their lordships of the Supreme Court or was contemplating such approach. ONCE the petitioner's plea was entertained the Additional District Magistrate's order dated 14th December, 1981 fell in jeopardy. ONCE the order fell in jeopardy its execution could ?be deferred. In fact their lordships specifically passed an interim order protecting petitioner's possession over the disputed accommodation during the pendency of the appeal. Now that order of the Additional District Magistrate had attained complete finality. There is no forum where no occasion to allow the petitioner opportunity of hearing on the basis of the order dated 1st February, 1984. 20. In view of the above discussion, grounds no. 1 and 2 also fail. The net result is that the writ petition is liable to be dismissed. Accordingly the petition is dismissed but there shall be no orders as to cost. The petitioner shall vacate the accommodation in question within one month. Petition dismissed.