Judgment ORDER:- This is an application made by the appellant for initiating proceedings for contempt against respondent No. 4 Ram Nath Singh and his son Vijendra Singh. It is alleged that despite the fact that this Court had on 19th December, 1986 after hearing learned counsel for the parties granted special leave and also passed an order directing maintenance of status quo as in the High Court in the presence of learned counsel for respondent No. 4, three days after i.e. on 22nd December, 1986 respondent No. 4 Ram Nath Singh and his son Vijendra Singh filed a criminal miscellaneous petition No. 4841/86 (R) before the Ranchi Bench of the Patna High Court alleging inter alia that respondent No. 4 had the right to collect slurry, deliberately and wilfully suppressed from the High Court the fact that this Court had directed maintenance of status quo, and thereby obtained an order from the High Court dated 3rd January, 1987 in the said proceedings by which respondent No. 4 was allowed to transport briquettes from the area in question i.e. lands covered by the notification issued under S. 9 of the Coal Bearing Areas (Acquisition and Development) Act, 1957 including the disputed plot No. 370, and had thus wilfully and flagrantly disobeyed and violated the status quo order of this Court. 2. After hearing learned counsel for the parties at quite some length, we were satisfied that the High Court was not justified in passing the impugned order. We accordingly by order dated 23rd September, 1987 vacated the aforesaid order of the High Court dated 3rd January, 1987 and also allowed the application made by the appellant for grant of a prohibitory order and restrained respondent No. 4 Ram Nath Singh and his son Vijendra Singh and their agents and servants from lifting sludge/slurry from the lands covered by the notification under S. 9 of the Act, in terms of the registered indenture of lease dated October 20,1984 executed by the State Government in favour of respondent No. 4 and further directed that all operations carried on by them shall stop forthwith. There was a further direction made with regard to the withdrawal of the amounts deposited by respondent No. 4 and his son towards the price of slurry collected by them in pursuance of the order passed by the High Court dated, 15th January, 1985 on furnishing bank guarantee. There was a further direction made with regard to the withdrawal of the amounts deposited by respondent No. 4 and his son towards the price of slurry collected by them in pursuance of the order passed by the High Court dated, 15th January, 1985 on furnishing bank guarantee. At the conclusion of the hearing we were inclined to the view that there was no contempt. The reasons therefore follow. 3. The question whether respondent No. 4 Ram Nath Singh and his son Vijendra Singh are guilty of contumacious and wilful disregard of this Courts order must depend on the precise meaning of the words status quo as in the High Court. There is not much of a controversy as to the scope and effect of the status quo order passed by this Court. Shri L N. Sinha, learned counsel appearing for the appellant submitted that the words ,status quo as in the High Court mean status quo as prevailing between the parties when the matter was pending in the High Court and not after the High Court had passed the impugned judgment and disposed of the writ petition. The learned counsel contends that same meaning must be given to these words as otherwise the application for grant of prohibitory order would be infructuous and the order passed by this Court meaningless. He placed emphasis on the word in. in the collocation of the words status quo as in the High Court to define the scope and effect of the status quo order. According to him, the word in must mean status quo while the matter was in the High Court; it was in seisin of the High Court till the moment before the delivery of the final judgment. Once the judgment had been delivered, the matter came to an end in the High Court. In substance, the contention is that the status quo as prevailing between the parties when the matter was pending in the High Court had to be maintained. 4. In reply Shri Kacker, learned counsel for respondent No. 4 Ram Nath Singh and his son Vijendra Singh submitted that the words status quo as in the High Court must be interpreted to mean that the parties were relegated back to the position that obtained between them when the writ petition was still pending. 4. In reply Shri Kacker, learned counsel for respondent No. 4 Ram Nath Singh and his son Vijendra Singh submitted that the words status quo as in the High Court must be interpreted to mean that the parties were relegated back to the position that obtained between them when the writ petition was still pending. Upon that basis he submitted that the contemnors were governed by the terms of the earlier order passed by the High Court dated 15th January, 1985 permitting them to collect sludge/slurry from public land. It is urged that the disputed plot No. 370 is such public land from which respondent No. 4 in terms of the registered indenture of lease dated October 20, 1984 executed by the State Government in his favour was entitled to remove sludge/slurry from the lands covered by the lease. The learned counsel points out that although respondent No. 4 had been restrained by the High Court by its earlier order dated 19th October, 1984 from removing sludge/slurry from the disputed plot of land, it had by the subsequent order dated 15th January, 1985 permitted him to collect sludge/slurry on certain conditions. One of the conditions was that respondent No. 4 was required to deposit Rs. 10,000 in the High Court and that had been done. He also drew our attention to cl. (B) of that order which directed respondent No. 4 to deposit the price of slurry in court along with monthly returns and it is said that several lakhs of rupees are in deposit in the High Court on that account. 5. The expression status quo is undoubtedly a term of ambiguity and at times gives rise to doubt and difficulty. According to the ordinary legal connotation, the term status quo implies the existing state of things at any given point of time. The qualifying words as in the High Court clearly limit the scope and effect of the status quo order. In the present case, the High Court determined only one question, namely, that slurry was not coal or mineral. It refrained from entering into the question of right or title of the parties on the ground that it involved investigation into disputed questions of facts. Therefore, apart from the abstract question that slurry was not coal or mineral, the impugned judgment does not adjudicate upon the rights of the parties. It refrained from entering into the question of right or title of the parties on the ground that it involved investigation into disputed questions of facts. Therefore, apart from the abstract question that slurry was not coal or mineral, the impugned judgment does not adjudicate upon the rights of the parties. Viewed from that angle, it is obvious that status quo as in the High Court cannot mean anything else except status quo as existing when the matter was pending in the High Court before the judgment was delivered. Both the parties understood the scope and effect of the status quo order as meaning the state of things existing while the writ petition was still pending i.e. till the delivery of the judgment by the High Court. Respondent No. 4 moved the High Court in Crl. M.P. No. 4841/86 (8) without impleading the appellant herein and obtained the impugned order from the High Court dated 3rd January, 1987 which we have vacated. The proper course for respondent No. 4 to have adopted was to have approached this Court to seek clarification, if he had any doubt as to the meaning and effect of the status quo order. We highly deprecate the conduct of respondent No. 4 for having approached the High Court and obtained the impugned order by suppressing the fact that this Court had passed the status quo order. Even so, strictly speaking, no case for contempt is made out on the plain terms of the status quo order. The parties were relegated back to the position that obtained while the writ petition was pending. They were therefore subject to the order passed by the High Court dated 15th January, 1985. No other conclusion is possible looking to the terms of the status quo order. 6. We must add that there is no merit in the contention that the disputed plot No. 370 was public land and the State Government was entitled to grant a lease for removal and collection of sludge/slurry despite the notification issued under S. 9 of the Act. It is quite clear upon the terms of the notification issued that the Central Government has made the requisite declaration under S. 9(1) of the Act for acquisition of the lands measuring 778.45 acres as specified in Schedule A and it specifically includes the disputed plot No. 370 in Village Sudamdih. It is quite clear upon the terms of the notification issued that the Central Government has made the requisite declaration under S. 9(1) of the Act for acquisition of the lands measuring 778.45 acres as specified in Schedule A and it specifically includes the disputed plot No. 370 in Village Sudamdih. The appellant in paragraph 11 of the application for contempt has averred that on the publication in the official gazette of such declaration by the Central Government under S. 9(1) of the Act, the aforesaid lands vest absolutely in it free from all encumbrances. The aforesaid declaration by the Central Government under S. 9(1) further specifies as enjoined by cl. (b) of sub-s. (2) thereof that the acquisition of the right in or over lands measuring 778.45 acres described in Schedule A also carries with it the right to mine, quarry, bore, dig and search for, win, work and carry away minerals in the lands. It is pertinent to observe that respondent No. 4 Ram Nath Singh and his son Vijendra Singh have not in the counter-affidavit denied the aforesaid averment made in paragraph 11 except to say that they are a matter of record. It is plain upon the terms that the area in question i.e. plot No. 370 has been acquired under S. 9(1) of the Act together with the right to mine, quarry, bore, dig and search for, win, work and carry away the minerals thereon. It is idle to contend that the disputed plot No. 370 was open land. It is nothing but an afterthought and is illconceived. 7. It is unfortunate that the appellant rested itself content by obtaining the status quo order in terms in which it was passed. It should instead have for safeguarding its interests insisted upon a prohibitory order. In the meanwhile, we are informed that respondent No. 4 Ram Nath Singh and his son Vijendra Singh have been taking advantage of the qualified status quo order by removing sludge/slurry or briquettes worth about Rs. 50,000 per day. The appellant is at liberty to take recourse to such legal remedy as is available for the protection of its rights. We have tried to secure its interests to some extent by permitting withdrawal of the moneys deposited by respondent No. 4 Ram Nath Singh and his son Vijendra Singh in the High Court on furnishing bank guarantee. 8. The appellant is at liberty to take recourse to such legal remedy as is available for the protection of its rights. We have tried to secure its interests to some extent by permitting withdrawal of the moneys deposited by respondent No. 4 Ram Nath Singh and his son Vijendra Singh in the High Court on furnishing bank guarantee. 8. C.M.P. is disposed of accordingly. Order accordingly. $ AIR 1988 SC 130 $ 11111 11111 19-11-1987. B.C. RAY AND K. JAGANNATHA SHETTY, JJ. The Vellore Educational Trust, Petitioner v. State of A.P. and others, Respondents. Writ Petn. (Civil) No. 681 of 1986, D/- 19-11-1987. A.P. Education Act (1 of 1982), S.20 - Private Engineering College - Opening of - Trust registered in another State - Not barred from applying for permission to start educational institution for benefit of minority community provided it satisfies requirements of the Act - Permission granted to one society even after Government adopted policy not to grant permission and to another society though it had applied later than the Petitioner-Trust - Order refusing permission to Petitioner - Trust quashed with direction to reconsider its application. Constitution of India, Art.14, Art.30 (Paras 8 to 11) Judgement B.C.RAY, J :- The petitioner, Vellore Educational Trust is a Trust registered by the Registrar, Registration Department at Vellore which is in Tamil Nadu. It wants to establish an Engineering College in Andhra Pradesh for the benefit of Tamil minorities. 2. There is no dispute and indeed there cannot be any dispute that Tamils are minority community in Andhra Pradesh. The petitioner trust in order to conserve and preserve the language, script and culture of the Tamil speaking community particularly of those who have been living in the adjoining districts made an application to the first and second respondent on May 24, 1984 seeking permission u/S. 20 of the Andhra Pradesh Education Act, 1982 to establish a private engineering college with affiliation to Sri Venkateswara University, Tirupati. As the respondents did not take any action on the said application, the petitioner trust gave several reminders to the respondents to consider the application. The petitioner also made a written application to Sri Venkateswara University, Tirupati on June 22, 1985 for according affliation/recognition to the Maruti College of Engineering, Palluru, Chittoor District which is a unit of the petitioners trust. The Registrar, Sri Venkateswara University, the third respondent by his letter dt. Aug. The petitioner also made a written application to Sri Venkateswara University, Tirupati on June 22, 1985 for according affliation/recognition to the Maruti College of Engineering, Palluru, Chittoor District which is a unit of the petitioners trust. The Registrar, Sri Venkateswara University, the third respondent by his letter dt. Aug. 12, 1985 rejected the application for affiliation on the ground that the question of granting affiliation to the petitioners Maruti College of Engineering will be considered only on production of permission letter from the Government of Andhra Pradesh for starting of a private engineering college at Palluru. 3. The petitioner filed a writ petition before the High Court for a writ of certiorari for quashing the decision of the University and also for a direction against the State Government to grant permission u/S. 20 of the said Act and also for other reliefs. The said writ petition No. 12215 of 1985 was dismissed as premature by a single Judge of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh by observing as follows : - "Under S. 20(3) of the A.P. Education Act, 1982 recognition of the private Institution is mandatory and as long as that recognition is not accorded the question of its affiliation to the University does not arise. Obviously for this reason the University in their letter dt. Aug. 12,1985 informed the petitioner that his request for affiliation will be considered on his submitting a copy of the permission granted by the Government. Admittedly, no such permission has been granted so far. Therefore, the writ petition is premature. It is accordingly dismissed." 4. The petitioner thereafter filed a writ appeal No. 1260 of 1985. The Division Bench allowed the appeal with the following order ".................... The Director of Technical Education is directed to dispose of the application made by the writ petitioner on May 24, 1984 within one month from today. The writ petition is ordered accordingly. No costs. In view of the order passed in the writ petition, no orders need be passed in the writ appeal. No costs.Advocates fee Rs. 150/-" 5. The State Government i.e. respondent 1 sent a letter No. 746/EC.2/85-4 dt. 30th Jan. 1986 to the Chairman of the petitioner trust intimating that the application for permission has been rejected on the ground................ In view of the order passed in the writ petition, no orders need be passed in the writ appeal. No costs.Advocates fee Rs. 150/-" 5. The State Government i.e. respondent 1 sent a letter No. 746/EC.2/85-4 dt. 30th Jan. 1986 to the Chairman of the petitioner trust intimating that the application for permission has been rejected on the ground................ " The present policy of Government is also not to give permission to any more private engineering colleges until the existing engineering colleges get stabilised and consolidated." 6. Feeling aggrieved by this order, the petitioner has filed the instant writ petition. It has been stated in the petition that the application for permission u/s. 20 of the Andhra Pradesh Education Act, 1982 was filed as early as in May, 1984 before the respondent 1 whereas the policy not to grant permission for establishment of new engineering colleges came into force from July, 1985. It has also been stated that the authorities concerned discriminated in the matter of grant of recognition of colleges inasmuch as Chudi Ranganayakalu Charitable Trust Chilakalurupeta, Guntur District applied for permission for establishment of a private engineering college on Oct. 15, 1984 while the petitioner trust applied for permission of a private engineering college on May 24, 1984. The respondent 1 granted permission to the establishment of the private college of the Chudi Ranganayakalu Charitable Trust whereas the petitioners case was neither considered nor was granted any permission. Similarly, the respondent 1 also granted permission for the establishment of a private engineering college by Nagarjuna Education Society, Guntur vide Memo No. 854/EC2/85-2 dt. Nov. 15,1985 i.e. after enforcement of the alleged policy of the Government. It has therefore, been submitted that the respondent No. 1 acted arbitrarily in not considering the application of the petitioner for according permission for establishment of a private engineering college to be affiliated with Sri Venkateswara University. The petitioner prays for an appropriate order/direction to respondent 1 to consider the case of the petitioner and to grant permission u/s. 20 of the said Act for the establishment of an engineering college. 7. It has been contended on behalf of the respondent that in view of the policy of the Government adopted in 1985, the permission as required u/s. 20 of the said Act, was not granted to the petitioner for the establishment of a private engineering college at Palluru in the District Chittoor. 7. It has been contended on behalf of the respondent that in view of the policy of the Government adopted in 1985, the permission as required u/s. 20 of the said Act, was not granted to the petitioner for the establishment of a private engineering college at Palluru in the District Chittoor. It has also been submitted that the petitioner trust was registered in Vellore in the Tamil Nadu State and no society has been registered in the State of Andhra Pradesh and as such the petitioner cannot be granted permission to establish a college in the State of Andhra Pradesh. 8. It is evident from the Governments letter dated November 15, 1985, annexed as Annexure-I to the writ petition that the respondent No. 1 accorded permission to Nagarjuna Education Society, Guntur to establish a private engineering college subject to the fulfilment of conditions mentioned in S. 20 of the Act. Permission was accorded for establishment of a new engineering college even after the Government policy said to have been adopted in July, 1985. The respondent No. 1 also considered the application made by Chudi Ranganayakalu Charitable Trust, Guntur who applied for permission for the establishment of a private engineering college on October 15, 1984 and granted permission for the establishment of Chudi Ranganayakalu Engineering College at Chilkalurupeta in Guntur District. It may be mentioned in this connection that the application made by the petitioner was much earlier in point of time as it was submitted on ,May 24, 1984. It was also long before the policy adopted by the respondent 1. 9. As regards the objection that the petitioner trust has not got a society registered within the State of Andhra Pradesh, the learned counsel for petitioner submitted that as soon as the permission is accorded, the trustees of the petitioner trust will take immediate steps to have a society duly registered within the State of Andhra Pradesh. In our opinion, there cannot be any bar for the Trust at Tamil Nadu to apply for permission to start an educational Institution in another State for the benefit of minority communities. The Trust, however. must satisfy the requirements of the Andhra Pradesh Education Act. 10. In our opinion, there cannot be any bar for the Trust at Tamil Nadu to apply for permission to start an educational Institution in another State for the benefit of minority communities. The Trust, however. must satisfy the requirements of the Andhra Pradesh Education Act. 10. The impugned order made by the respondent 1 refusing to grant permission solely on the ground of policy of the Government is in our considered opinion not at all tenable as we have stated hereinbefore that such permission has already been accorded to establish private engineering college to Nagarjuna Education Society on Nov. 15, 1985. Moreover the application for permission was filed long before the alleged policy in question was adopted by the respondent 1. 11. Considering all these facts and circumstances, we make the rule absolute, quash the impugned order dt. Jan. 30, 1986 and direct the respondent 1 to reconsider the application of the petitioner and dispose of the same in accordance with the law. In the facts and circumstances of the case we make no order as to costs. Rule made Absolute. For Citation : AIR 1988 SC 127