JUDGMENT N.N. Mithal, J. -This is an appeal by the decree holder who is also the auction purchaser against an order of remand passed by the lower appellate Court in execution proceedings. 2. It is not disputed that the appellant had obtained a money decree on 10th of September, 1969 against one Smt. Jhuna which was put into execution being Execution Case No. 48 of 1970 in which the disputed property was attached on 9-7-1970. It has been pointed out by respondent that after the attachment, Smt. Jhuna died on 13-1-1971. Execution Case No. 48 of 1970 was, however, dismissed in default on 23-1-1971. Thereafter fresh execution proceedings No. 16 of 1971 was initiated on 22-2-1971 against Smt. Jhuna. The property was not to auction on 12-10-1971 which was confined in favour of the appellant on 26-11-1971 and in pursuance therefore possession was also delivered on 14-2-1972. 3. On 2-3-1972 objections were filed purporting to be under Order 21 Rule 90 C.P.C. in which it was contended that the entire execution proceedings were illegal as Smt. Jhuna had transferred the property to the objector on 17-4-1969 i.e. much before the suit against her had been decreed. It was also contended that the execution proceedings were invalid inasmuch as the heirs of Smt. Jhuna had not been brought on record after her death on 13-1-1971. Several other objections were also taken. 4. The decree holder filed a reply to this and it was contended that an objection under Order 21 Rule 90 C.P.C. did not lie and that the same was barred by limitation. The executing court, after recording evidence of the parties, came to the conclusion that Smt. Jhuna had transferred the property in favour of Bachan, respondent herein, on 17-4-1969 and since Bachan had no knowledge about the execution proceedings and the auction sale, the objection was within time and the same was maintainable according to law. The objections filed by the decree holder were accordingly rejected and respondent's objection under Order 21 Rule 90, C.P.C. was allowed. 5. Aggrieved by the Order passed by the executing court, an appeal was preferred by the appellant in the appellant in the court below. The objections filed by the decree holder were accordingly rejected and respondent's objection under Order 21 Rule 90, C.P.C. was allowed. 5. Aggrieved by the Order passed by the executing court, an appeal was preferred by the appellant in the appellant in the court below. During the arguments, it was urged that the sale deed dated 17-4-1969 had not been duly proved in accordance with law and such the objector had no right to file the same or to claim any interest in the property sold by auction. Admittedly no witness was examined by the respondent to prove the sale deed and only filed affidavits of two persons who were witnesses of the sale deed. These affidavits are dated 6-12-1974 and 7-12-1974. 6. In the lower appellate court, a preliminary objection was raised by the respondent that the appeal had abated as the village where the disputed land was situated had come under consolidation. That objection was repelled and the appeal was then heard on merits. When during the arguments it was found by the respondent that the appellant's objection that the sale deed dated 17-4-1969 had not been proved in accordance with law', this fact was conceded and it was prayed on his behalf that the appeal should be remanded to enable the respondent to prove the sale deed. According to the recitals in the judgment of the lower appellate court, this prayer for remand was not opposed and consequently the matter was remanded. It is against this order of remand that the appellant has come of in appeal and it is urged that no order of remand could have been passed by the court for the purpose of enabling the party to fill in the lacuna in evidence. It is also contended that the appellants never contended in the lower appellate court that they did not oppose the remand of the case and mention about this in the judgment is factually incorrect. An affidavit has also been filed in this Court to the effect that no such statement was made by the appellants in the lower appellate court. This affidavit has been met by a counter affidavit of the respondent. 7. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, would not like to enter into the controversy raised in this behalf. An affidavit has also been filed in this Court to the effect that no such statement was made by the appellants in the lower appellate court. This affidavit has been met by a counter affidavit of the respondent. 7. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, would not like to enter into the controversy raised in this behalf. Suffice it to mention here that where a statement of fact as to what has transpired at the hearing is found recorded in a judgment, it must be taken as conclusive and no one can be allowed to contradict such a statement either by affidavit or otherwise. The attention of the Judge who delivered the judgment must be drawn immediately in such cases while the matter is still fresh in the mind of the Judge. In State of Maharashtra v. Ramdas, AIR 1982 SC 1249 it was held as under : - "So Judge's record is conclusive. Neither lawyer nor litigant may claim to contradict it except before the Judge himself and no where else." To almost the same effect is the decision of the Supreme Court reported in AIR 1964 SC 377 which was relied upon in AIR 1982 Orissa 245. 8. Learned counsel for the appellant has, however, very strenuously urged that distinction must be made between the concession given by a counsel and any failure to oppose a particular stand of his adversory. Sri Aditya Narain is certainly right in saying that giving a concession on a point of law on fact is a positive act on the part of the counsel or party while mere failure to oppose is a manifestation of passivity on their part. However, the actual words in the judgment of the court below may be quoted here : "Learned counsel for the respondent No. 1 admitted that the sale deed has not been proved and prayed for remand of the case on this account. The appellant also did not oppose the remand of the case." 9. If what is decided in the judgment is to be taken as correct, then it was also a positive act of the counsel for the appellant when he did not oppose the remand of the case. It does signify that the counsel had applied his mind to the proposal made by the respondent and had decided not to oppose it by taking a positive stand. It does signify that the counsel had applied his mind to the proposal made by the respondent and had decided not to oppose it by taking a positive stand. It is not a mere passivity on his part which resulted in the order of remand being passed. When the appellant had not opposed the request for a remand of the case made on behalf of the respondent, it only means that he had consented to it. Mere failure to use the word 'concession' or 'agreement' of the appellant to the order of remand being passed does not make much of a difference. The manner in which the proceedings have been recorded in the judgment go to show that the appellant was agreed to the remand of the case. Hence when the remand order was passed by the lowery appellate court with a concession or by consent, express or implied, the appellant can not be heard to say now that he had not consented to the remand of the case. As a matter of fact the appellant must be deemed to be estopped from questioning the order of remand at this stage in spite of the fact that strictly speaking no order of remand could have been passed under Order 41 Rules or 27 of the Code. 10. One of the pleas taken by him was that the objection was barred by time and the objector had notice of the auction. This question has been respondent again, parties have been allowed to lead evidence as the question. Apart from the objector had pleaded the benefit of Section 17 of the Limitation Act for bringing his objection within limitation. On this point there was no evidence and the appellant certainly stood to gain if the matter was remanded as he could there lend evidence to show that Section 17 either did not apply to the facts of the case or that the benefit of that section can not otherwise be granted to the objector. In the aforesaid circumstances, it is very difficult to accept the appellant's contention that he has been prejudiced by the order of remand. It appears to on that the counsel for the appellant in the court below was fully conscious of the stakes of the appellant and it was only with that end in view that he had readily agreed to the order of remand being passed. 11. It appears to on that the counsel for the appellant in the court below was fully conscious of the stakes of the appellant and it was only with that end in view that he had readily agreed to the order of remand being passed. 11. In view of what have stated above, find merit in the appeal which is accordingly dismissed. However, in the circumstances of the present case it would be just and proper to leave the parties to bear their own costs.