JUDGMENT K. C. Agrawal, J. 1. This petition under Article 226 of the Constitution has been filed by M/s. Mittan Lal Suresh Chandra and two others for declaration that the impost of additional market fee is repugnant to section 17 (iii) (b) of the Krishi Utpadan Mandi Adhiniyam and for Mandamus restraining the respondents not to realise any amount of additional market fee from the petitioners. 2. The petitioners are carrying on business of sale and purchase of specified agricultural produce at Shahjahanpur. These petitioners hold licence under the Krishi Utpadan Mandi Adhiniyam (hereinafter called the 'Adhiniyam'). In October 1983, when the State Legislature was not in session, the Governor of Uttar Pradesh promulgated an Ordinance known as U. P. Krishi Utpadan Mandi (Amendment) Ordinance (U. P. Ordinance 40 of 1983). By section 3 of the aforesaid Ordinance sub clause (c) was inserted in section 17 (iii) which reads as follows : "(c) Additional market fee which shall be payable by the producer on transactions of sale of specified agricultural produce in the market area at the rate of one percentum of the price of the agricultural produce so sold, and shall be realised in the following manner-" Subsequently, the Ordinance was not converted into an Act and, as such, it lapsed. The recovery of additional market fee continued as against the petitioners. It was this recovery that has been challenged by the petitioners on the ground of being without due authority of law. 3. Before us, it was admitted by the petitioners' counsel that a Division Bench of this Court has upheld the validity of levy of additional market fee under sub-clause (b) of clause (iii) of section 17 of the Adhiniyam. This decision has been given by a Division Bench. Counsel did not challenge the validity of that provision before us. 4. What was challenged by the learned counsel for the petitioners was that the Ordinance was since a temporary statute and had not been converted into an Act, it lapsed on the expiry of the period mentioned in Article 213 of the Constitution. As a result, additional market fee could not be realised after the expiry of the same. To be precise, the argument was that as the levy or assessment of the additional market fee had not been started, under the Ordinance when it was in force, recovery proceedings are wholly illegal. As a result, additional market fee could not be realised after the expiry of the same. To be precise, the argument was that as the levy or assessment of the additional market fee had not been started, under the Ordinance when it was in force, recovery proceedings are wholly illegal. In that connection, counsel urged that levy was a condition precedent for valid imposition and without there being imposition, recovery would be against Article 265 of the Constitution. Clause (3) of section 6 of the General Clauses Act, as amended by U. P. Legislature, reads : "Where any (Uttar Pradesh) Act repeals any enactment hereto made or hereafter to be made, then unless a different intention appears, the repeal shall not- (c) affect any right, privilege, obligation, or liability acquired, accrued or incurred under any enactment or so repealed......" 5. Under sub-clause (c), if any liability has accrued before the repeal, the liability would not cease. 6. Counsel for the petitioners urged that section 6 of the General Clauses Act does not apply to temporary Acts and as the Ordinance was in the capacity of a temporary Act, sub-clause (c) of clause (3) of section 6 of the General Clauses Act would not be applicable. Consequently, any liability accrued would come to an automatic extinction. For this proposition, counsel relied on the decisions of this Court as well as that of the Supreme Court. One of them is reported in Allahabad Theatres v. Kusum, AIR 1974 Allahabad 73. In this case the controversy was about the effect of repeal of U. P. Act III of 1947 by Act No. XIII of 1972. In that connection, this Court held that section 6 of the General Clauses Act would have no application to it. In Karam Chand v. Bal Mukund, 1976 AWC 428 (Full Bench), this Court held that section 6 would not apply to temporary Acts, but, this rule is subject to two exceptions : (i) When the temporary Act is repealed before it has expired and the repealed Act contains a provision that the provisions of section 6 will apply to the repealed Act, and (ii) When the temporary Act itself contains a provision similar to section 6 and provides that the acts already done, rights already accrued, shall be saved even after the Act expires. The instant was a case of an Ordinance promulgated under Article 213 of the Constitution when the State Assembly was not in session. The Ordinance was not converted into an Act. 7. An Ordinance has the same force and effect as an Act passed by a State Legislature. Article 367 (2) of the Constitution provides that : 'Any reference in this Constitution to Acts or laws of, or made by, Parliament, or to Acts or laws of, or made by, the Legislature of a State shall be construed as including a reference to an Ordinance..." 8. The Constitution makes no distinction in principle between a law made by a Legislature and an Ordinance issued by the Governor. In a number of cases, the nature of an Ordinance has been subject matter of consideration. Amongst these decisions, reference may be made to R. C. Cooper v. Union of India, AIR 1970 SC 564 and S. K. G. Sugar Ltd. v. State of Bihar, AIR 1974 SC 1533 . The question before us is not about the nature and power, but whether realisation of additional market fee could be made after the expiry of the Ordinance, under which it was levied. Counsel for the petitioner contended that if the assessment would have been made, the realization could be made even after the cessation of the Ordinance. He urged that for a valid recovery proceeding, levy was a must. For this proposition, counsel relied on some decisions, out of which we may make a reference to M/s. Sheo Ram Singh v. State of U. P., Writ Petition No. 454 of 1982 decided on 19-9-1986. 9. To us it appears that sub-clause (c) of Sec. 17 (iii) is automatic and on every specified agricultural produce additional market fee on transactions of sale is leviable. It does not contemplate about any passing of a formal order of assessment. The decision relied upon by the petitioners' learned counsel was of a case where the tax already imposed by a Municipal Board would become automatically chargeable from the residents of an area which was subsequently brought within the municipal limits by means of a notification. The Division Bench held that it could not be so. This decision is not on the controversy which arose for decision before us. Similarly, other decisions cited by the petitioners' counsel would be distinguishable on that ground. The Division Bench held that it could not be so. This decision is not on the controversy which arose for decision before us. Similarly, other decisions cited by the petitioners' counsel would be distinguishable on that ground. Hence, no reference is thought necessary to be made in this judgment. 10. Section 30 added to the General Clauses Act by the U. P. State Legislature has an important bearing on the controversy in hand. The relevant portion of that section need be extracted. "The provisions of this Act shall apply- (a) ............ (b) in relation to any Ordinance promulgated by the Governor under Article 213 of the Constitution..." The General Clauses Act, therefore, becomes applicable to an Ordinance promulgated under Article 213 of the Constitution. Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, the relevant portion of which has been quoted by us above, shows that despite repeal, the liability created during the period when the Ordinance was in force, is not ceased or extinguished. Because of section 30 of the General Clauses Act, the collection is in accordance with the authority of law. 11. Reliance was strongly placed on a decision of the Supreme Court in The State of Orissa v. Bhupendra Kumar Bose, AIR 1962 SC (?). In this case what happened was that the election of the Cuttuck Municipality was challenged on a ground which was upheld by the High Court. Subsequently, an Ordinance was passed curing the invalidity pointed out. It validated the electrol rolls prepared in respect of the Cuttuck Municipality in which the defect had been found and on the basis of which the election had been set aside. The Ordinance was not converted into an Act. After the Ordinance lapsed, the invalidity of the Cuttuck Municipal elections, which had been cured by the Ordinance, revived. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal preferred by the State of Orissa and others by holding that : "In our opinion, having regard to the object of the Ordinance and to the rights created by the validating provisions, it would be difficult to accept the contention that as soon as the Ordinance expired the validity of the elections came to an end and their invalidity was revived." 12. In T. Venkat Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1985 SC 724 , the Supreme Court had an occasion to consider the effect on the failure of the State Legislature to pass an Act in terms of the Ordinance. The Supreme Court repelled the argument that the Ordinance had never become effective and was void ab initio by saying : "Such a plea overlooks two important factors, namely, the language of CI. (2) of Article 213 of the Constitution and the nature of the provisions contained in the Ordinance. Clause (2) of Article 213 says that an Ordinance promulgated under that Article shall have the same force and effect as an Act of the Legislature of the State asserted to by the Governor....Article 213 does not say that the Ordinance shall be void from the commencement on the State Legislature disapproving it. It says that it shall cease to operate. It only means that it should be treated as being effective till it ceased to operate on the happening of the events mentioned in CI. (2) of Article 213." The petitioners' counsel also relied on, Gopi Chand v. Delhi Administration, AIR 1959 SC 683 and State of Punjab v. Mohar Singh, AIR 1955 SC 84 . 13. State of Punjab v. Mohar Singh (supra) was a case where the Ordinance was substituted by an Act which incorporated all the provisions of the Ordinance. The Supreme Court found that the Act since did not keep alive old rights and liabilities, section 6 of the General Clauses Act would be applicable. This decision was given on the background of its own facts. The other two decisions are also distinguishable. 14. In our opinion, the liability accrued under the Ordinance for payment of additional market fee did not cease after the expiry of the Ordinance. For what we have said above, we find that the writ petition has no substance. It is dismissed summarily. Petition dismissed.