ORDER The petitioner sometime on 15th of October, 1970 joined the services of the Export Inspection Council of India as a Junior Technical Officer in the Export Inspection Agency (Jute Scheme) and in course of time became an Assistant Director in the sold Export Inspection Agency. 2. While working as Assistant Director as aforesaid, the petitioner applied for leave on 1st of March, 1982 and leave was granted to him for five days commencing from 8th of March, 1982 to 12th of March, 1982 and he was due to resume his duties on the 15th of March, 1982. 3. The petitioner proceeded for Jasidih in the district of Santhal Parganas in the State of Bihar on 7th of March, 1982 being accompanied by his daughter, aged about 15 years with a view to join his parents who are permanent residents of Jasidih. Before the petitioners arrival at Jasidih his parent had already accommodated a lady by the name of Smt. Srinanda Ghosh at their residence at Jasidih as a guest. The said lady being a private tutress of the petitioner's daughter was known to the petitioner and as a matter of fact, she had become almost a family friend of theirs. 4. However, the petitioner was taken into surprise since he was attempted to be impleaded on a criminal charge under ss. 497/498 of the Indian Penal Code on the basis of a complaint lodged by one Kalyan Kumar Ghosh, the husband of the said Smt. Srinanda Ghosh. 5. In course of the Investigation, the petitioner was taken into custody by the police on 13th or March, 1982 and be was released on bail on 14th of March, 1982 in the afternoon and his period of detention was for about 30 hours. 6. Subsequently, however the petitioner by an order dated 13th of September, 1982 was discharged from his bail bond in the absence of any dependable evidence in support of the charges under ss. 497/498 of the Indian Penal Code. 7. The petitioner, soon after his detention was put under suspension with effect from 23rd of March, 1982 in terms of Rule 6(1)(c) of the Export Inspection Agency Employees (Classification Control & Appeal) Rules, 1978 (in short, the Service Rules) (Annexure 'B'). 8. As soon as the petitioner was exonerated of the charge and was discharged from the bail bond he, by his Memo. 8. As soon as the petitioner was exonerated of the charge and was discharged from the bail bond he, by his Memo. dated 16th of September, 1982 requested the respondent no. 2 to revoke and/or to rescind the said order of suspension immediately. This was followed up by subsequent reminders (Annexures 'C' and 'C/1") 9. In reply thereto the respondent no. 2 by his letter dated 9th November 1982 informed the petitioner that the matter was being looked into (Annexure 'D'). 10. While the petitioner was anxiously waiting for his suspension order to be revoked he was served with a show cause notice dated 8th September, 1983 for holding a disciplinary proceeding on the ground that by suppression of the fact of his arrest by the police he had contravened the provisions of Rule 3(1)(iii) of the Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1964 (Annexure 'E'). 11. According to the petitioner, the issuance of the said show cause notice on a purported reference of an independent charge is void ab initio as the same could not be issued during the subsistence of an earlier order of suspension. 12. However, having failed to obtain any redress from the concerned authority the petitioner has come up before this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution for the issuance of a writ in the nature of Mandamus directing the respondent no. 2 to revoke the Order of suspension dated 23rd of March, 1982 and also to revoke and/or to rescind the show-cause notice dated 8th of September, 1983 and for certain other consequential reliefs. 13. In their affidavit in opposition the respondents nos. 2, 3, 4, and 5 have controverted the material averments made by the petitioner in the writ petition. 14. According to the respondents, the petitioner on the expiry of leave attended the office on 15.3.82, but either on the said date or on the subsequent dates, though he attended the office regularly, did not care to inform the concerned authority about his arrest by the police from Jasidih in connection with a criminal case. 15. On 18th of March, 1982 a report came out in a local newspaper to the effect that a senior Officer of the Export Inspection Agency, Calcutta was arrested by the Calcutta Police from Jasidih, Bihar on a charge of abducting a married woman from Calcutta on March, 5. 15. On 18th of March, 1982 a report came out in a local newspaper to the effect that a senior Officer of the Export Inspection Agency, Calcutta was arrested by the Calcutta Police from Jasidih, Bihar on a charge of abducting a married woman from Calcutta on March, 5. The woman was reported to be the wife of a business man. On a complaint lodged with the Missing Squad at Lalbazar, the officials raided a house at Jasidih and found the accused as well as the woman there. The accused was produced in the Court and released on bail. 16. Since the newspaper report as referred to above, did not disclose the name of the concerned officer, the Additional Director, Export Inspection Agency Calcutta, on the same day wrote a letter to the Deputy Commissioner of Police, Detective Department, Lalbazar, Calcutta about the said news item and in reply thereto the Deputy Commissioner of Police, Detective Department, Lal Bazar, Calcutta by his Memo dated 22.3.82 informed about the incident wherefrom it appeared that the accused in the said criminal case was none else than the petitioner. 17. On receipt of the said report the respondent no. 2 by an order dated 23.3.81 put the petitioner under suspension with immediate effect. 18. According to the respondents, non-disclosure of facts relating to the petitioner's arrest, and his release on bail, involvement of the petitioner in a criminal case and the pendency of the said criminal case disclosed a serious lapse amounting to misconduct. But, since investigation was pending in the matter, the competent authority thought it fit not to initiate any disciplinary proceeding against the petitioner during the pendency of the criminal case. 19. Subsequently, the petitioner having informed the respondent no. 2 about his discharge from the criminal case, the concerned authority examined the matter in details and came to the conclusion that the conduct of the petitioner amounted to misconduct and required investigation in a disciplinary proceeding and consequently the disciplinary proceeding was started against the petitioner. 20. According to the respondents, the order of suspension was continued on valid grounds and also that the petitioner's conduct being unbecoming of a senior Government Officer it is quite within the competence of the concerned authority to start a disciplinary proceeding against the petitioner and the petitioner consequently is not entitled to the relief prayed for. 21. 20. According to the respondents, the order of suspension was continued on valid grounds and also that the petitioner's conduct being unbecoming of a senior Government Officer it is quite within the competence of the concerned authority to start a disciplinary proceeding against the petitioner and the petitioner consequently is not entitled to the relief prayed for. 21. Appearing on behalf of the petitioner it was strongly contended by Mr. Mitra, the learned Counsel that after the petitioner was discharged from the criminal case and the respondent no. 2 was intimated about the said order of discharge, there was absolutely no reason to continue the order of suspension for a period of about one year when the show cause notice was issued. He further contended that the facts leading to the issuance of the show cause notice being known to the concerned authority since long before the issuance of the said show cause notice, the show cause notice should be held to be bad in law. 22. On the other hand, Mr. Jatin Ghosh the learned Counsel representing the respondents, contended that the concerned authority in view of Rule 6(5)(a) of the Service Rules was quite within its competence to allow the suspension order to continue. So far as to the delay in issuing the show cause notice, it was contended by Mr. Ghosh that the delay, under any circumstance, could not be said to be inordinate and for such delay alone the show cause notice cannot be said to be bad in law. 23. Coming now to the rival contentions of the parties, it is admitted that following a complaint lodged by one Kalyan Kumar Ghosh, a criminal case under ss. 497/498 of the Indian Penal Code was started against the petitioner consequent to which the petitioner was arrested and taken into custody by the police for allegedly having abducted a married woman Sm. Srinanda Ghosh, wife of the complainant Kalyan Kumar Ghosh. The petitioner was thereafter released on bail but the investigation continued and ultimately by an order dated 13.9.82 the petitioner was exonerated from the charge and was discharged from the bail bond. 24. Rule 6(1)(c) of the Service Rules provide that an employee of the Agency may be put under suspension where a case against him in respect of any criminal offence is under investigation, enquiry or trial. 24. Rule 6(1)(c) of the Service Rules provide that an employee of the Agency may be put under suspension where a case against him in respect of any criminal offence is under investigation, enquiry or trial. The petitioner was suspended by the concerned authority under the aforesaid Rule by an order dated 23.3.82 (Annexure 'B'). 25. The aforesaid order of suspension continued to operate and when the petitioner by his letter dated 22.10.82 (Annexure 'C/1') forwarded a certified copy of the order of the Criminal Court dated 13.9.82 exonerating him from the charge in the criminal case to the respondent no. 2, the said respondent no. 2 by his letter dated 9.11.82 (Annexure 'D') informed the petitioner that the matter was being looked into. 26. Long silence prevailed thereafter and instead of revoking the order of suspension the petitioner was served with a show-cause notice dated 8.9.1983 (Annexure 'E'). In the charge-sheet that accompanied the show cause notice it was alleged as follows: "It was incumbent on the part of Shri Majumdar to inform promptly to his official superior regarding the fact of his arrest and the circumstances connected therewith even though he was subsequently released on bail Shri Majumdar suppressed the fact of his arrest and the circumstances connected therewith to his official superior." 27. As regards the continuance of the suspension order, Mr. Ghosh, the learned Counsel representing the respondents, drew my attention to Rule 6(5)(a) of the relevant Service Rules which provides that an order of suspension made or deemed to have been made under rule 6 shall continue to remain in force until it is modified or revoked by the authority competent to do so. 28. Mr. Ghosh, accordingly, contended that in view of Rule 6(5)(a) the order of suspension made under Rule 6(1)(c) could not be said to have automatically come to an end on the petitioner being discharged in the criminal case end it was within the competence of the concerned authority to continue the said order. 29. Now, as already seen, the petitioner was put under suspension under Rule 6(1)(c) since a case against him in respect of a criminal offence was under investigation. 30. In the normal circumstances, therefore, the suspension order should have come to its logical end as soon as, the petitioner was exonerated of the charge on 13.9.82. 29. Now, as already seen, the petitioner was put under suspension under Rule 6(1)(c) since a case against him in respect of a criminal offence was under investigation. 30. In the normal circumstances, therefore, the suspension order should have come to its logical end as soon as, the petitioner was exonerated of the charge on 13.9.82. However, the suspension order was kept alive for undisclosed reasons and during its continuance the petitioner on 8th September, 1983, that is after a lapse of about one year or so was served with the show-cause notice. Incidentally, no fresh suspension order was made under Rule 6(1)(a) under which an employee can be put under suspension "where a disciplinary proceeding against him is contemplated or is pending". 31. Obviously, the concerned authority in the matter of continuing the order of suspension issued under Rule 6(1)(c) took advantage of Rule 6(5)(a) under which an order of suspension issued under Rule 6 "shall continue to remain in force unless it is modified or revoked by the authority competent to do so." 32. But since sub-rule 6(5)(a) confers unguided and uncanalised power upon an executive authority it is open to the court to scrutinise whether the respondents are guilty of exercising such power arbitrarily against the petitioner in not revoking the suspension order as soon as they came to know that the petitioner had been exonerated of the charge in the criminal case. And such scrutiny makes it clear at once that the continuation of the suspension order after the petitioner's discharge in the criminal case was in arbitrary exercise of power under Rule 6(5)(a) since there was absolutely no reason for such continuation of the order and it cannot be said that any disciplinary proceeding was even contemplated at the material time. 33. To make the point clear it may be recalled that after the publication of the relevant report in the local newspaper on 18.3.82, the concerned authority made an enquiry and on or about 23.3.82 came to know about the involvement of the petitioner and with effect from the same date the petitioner was put under suspension under Rule 6(1)(c) (Annexure 'B'). Before this the petitioner on the expiry of his leave, resumed his duty on 15.3.82 but did not disclose to his superior officer about his involvement in the criminal case or about his arrest by the police. 34. Before this the petitioner on the expiry of his leave, resumed his duty on 15.3.82 but did not disclose to his superior officer about his involvement in the criminal case or about his arrest by the police. 34. The object of such disclosure, obviously, is to enable the authority to take appropriate actions against the concerned employee with utmost promptitude. 35. But here, in spite of the petitioner having kept mum over the matter all the relevant facts came to light on or about 23.3.82 on the basis of which the respondent authority took immediate action under Rule 6(1)(c). Had the said authority really wanted to start a disciplinary proceeding against the petitioner it could have very well done so without wasting much time since the petitioner had already become liable to be so proceeded against by keeping mum over the incident from 15.3.82 to 22.3.82. 36. The continuance of the investigation in the criminal case had absolutely no relation with the petitioner's alleged misconduct in keeping obviously quite about the incident and such investigation did not obviously create any bar for the starting of the disciplinary proceeding. And such proceeding, if started, could have very well continued irrespective of the results of the criminal case. 37. It must, therefore, be concluded that no disciplinary proceeding was even in contemplation of the concerned authority at any material time and that being so there could be no earthly reason to continue the order of suspension even after the petitioner's discharge in the criminal case. But since it was so continued, it must be held that it was done in mala fide exercise of power under Rule 6(5)(a) which, as already seen, vests extraordinary powers in the hands of the concerned authority. 38. That being so, the continuance of the suspension order beyond 13.9.82 when the petitioner was discharged in the criminal case, must be held to be absolutely arbitrary and bad in law and consequently, cannot be sustained. 39. The complexion however, changed when the disciplinary proceeding was started against the petitioner on. 8.9.83, though no fresh order of suspension was issued under Rule 6(1)(a). But at any event, the suspension order between the 13.9.82 and 7.9.83 can, under no circumstances, be sustained and should, accordingly, be quashed. 40. As regards the show cause notice, it was strongly contended by Mr. 8.9.83, though no fresh order of suspension was issued under Rule 6(1)(a). But at any event, the suspension order between the 13.9.82 and 7.9.83 can, under no circumstances, be sustained and should, accordingly, be quashed. 40. As regards the show cause notice, it was strongly contended by Mr. Ghosh, the learned Counsel for the respondents, that the petitioner had no authority to challenge the same and in support of his contention he referred to the decisions of the Supreme Court in Charan Singh v Ragistrar, Co-operative Societies, Punjab & ors. AIR 1976 SC 1821 where the Supreme Court found the writ petition to be premature since no punitive action was taken and Geep Flashlight Industries Ltd. v. Union of India & ors. AIR 1977 SC 456 where also it was held that prayer for issue of writs against a show-cause notice is not maintainable. 41. The question came up for further consideration before the Supreme Court in State of Uttar Pradesh v. Brahm Datt Sharma & ors. (1987) 2 SCC 179 where the Court held that when a show cause notice is issued to a Government servant under a statutory provision calling upon him to show cause, ordinarily the Government servant must place his case before the authority concerned by showing cause and the Courts should be reluctant to interfere with the notice at that stage unless the notice is shown to have been issued palpably without any authority of law. 42. Therefore, the very vital question that falls for consideration is whether in the instant case it can be said that the notice to show cause was issued palpably without any authority of law. 43. The petitioner, as it appears, from Annexure I to the show came notice (Annexure 'E'), has been charged for having acted in a manner unbecoming of an Export Inspection Agency employee violating thereby Rule 3(1)(iii) of the Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1764. The said Rules, it may be mentioned here, have been made applicable to the employees of the Export Inspection Agency by Rule 7 of the Service Rules which provides that: "The Agency employees shall be governed by the Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1964 of the Government of India as amended from time to time." 44. The said Rules, it may be mentioned here, have been made applicable to the employees of the Export Inspection Agency by Rule 7 of the Service Rules which provides that: "The Agency employees shall be governed by the Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1964 of the Government of India as amended from time to time." 44. Incidentally, Rule 3(1)(iii) of the said Conduct Rules provides that no employee covered by the said Rules should behave in a manner unbecoming of a Government Officer. The Rules, however, have not explained what expressin-unbecoming of an officer really means and connotes. 45. It has also not been explained in the relevant Service Rules (Export Inspection Agency Employees (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1978). 46. In the instant case, the relevant Rule (Rule 3(1)(iii) has been sought to he applied to the petitioner on the ground of suppression of "the fact of his arrest and the circumstances connected therewith to his official superior" though "it was incumbent" on his part "to inform promptly to his official superior regarding the fact of his arrest and the circumstances connected therewith". 47. Incidentally, the relevant Service Rules, as it appeals do not specify which particular acts may amount to misconduct. And this is one reason which appears to have caused a lot of discomfiture to the concerned authority, since it had ultimately to take recourse to a Government Circular dated 25.2.1955 (vide item no. 2 of the List of documents supplied to the petitioner along with the show-cause notice, which has no manner of application to the employees of the Export Inspection Agency, as it will be presently seen. 48. Reference in this connection may be made to Rule 10 of the Central Civil Services (Classification Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965, which relates to suspension of the employees and Government Circular of 1955 as referred to earlier, appears under Rule 10 under the heading, "Government of India's Instructions" relating to orders of suspension. For convenience, the Circular is quoted hereunder: "(3) Report of arrest to superiors by Government servants - It shall be the duty of a Government servant who may be arrested for any reason to intimate the fact of his arrest and the circumstances connected there with to his official superior promptly even though he might have subsequently been reelased on bail. On receipt of the information from the person concerned or from any other source the departmental authorities should decide whether the fact and circumstances leading to the arrest of the person call for his suspension. Failure on the part of any Government servant to so inform his official superiors will be regarded as suppression of material information and will under him liable to disciplinary action on this ground alone, apart from the action that may be called for on the outcome of the police case against him. It is requested that the above position may kindly be explained to all Government servants with whom the Ministry of Defence, etc. may be concerned. (G.I., M.H.A., O.M. No. 30/59/54 Ests (A), dated the 25th February, 1955) " 49. Now, as regards the applicability of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965 to the employees of the Export Inspection Agency, Rule 2(n) of the Export Inspection Agency Employees (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1978 provides that: "Words and expressions used but not defined in these rules and defined in the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965, shall have the meanings respectively assigned to them in those rules." 50. This means that the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965 have only a very limited application to the employees of the Export Inspection Agency and as such, the guidelines provided by the Union Government for implementation of Rule 10 of the said Rules can have no manner of application to the petitioner, an employee of the Export Inspection Agency. 51. Significantly, however, the disciplinary authority bas solely relied upon the circular of 1955 for establishing the charge of misconduct besides the report of the Deputy Commissioner of Police dated 22.3.82 which contains only the undisputed facts regarding the petitioner's arrest, detention etc. 52. In this connection the respondents in paragraph 20 of the affidavit-in-opposition have also referred to Rule 25(2) of the Service Rules of the Export Inspection Agency which inter alia provides that "An employee summoned to attend a Court in connection with any charge against him of breach of law, shall promptly inform the Director or any competent authority and shall report also the findings of the Court." 53. The said Rule, however, does not provide that non-disclosure of such facts by the concerned employee, would amount to misconduct and make him liable to be proceeded against departmentally, as has been clearly provided in the Government Circular dated 25.2.55 as quoted earlier . And this appears to be the reason why the concerned authority found no other alternative but to take shelter under the said Circular being totally forgetful of the fact that the said circular could not be pressed into service against an employee of the Export Inspection Agency. 54. Incidentally, it has nowhere been specifically provided in the relevant Rules of Export Inspection Agency that for non-disclosure of the relevant facts as contemplated in Rule 23 2 as quoted in paragraph 20 of the affidavit-in-opposition, it could be said that the concerned employee had acted in a manner unbecoming of an Export Inspection Agency Employee, so as to bring him within the mischief of Rule 3(1)(iii) of the Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1964. 55. It has been held by the Supreme Court in A.L. Kalra v. Project and Equipment Corporation, AIR 1984 SC 1361 = (1984) 3 SCC 316 that where misconduct when proved entails penal consequences, it is obligatory on the employer to specify and if necessary, define it with precision and accuracy so that any ex post facto interpretation of some incident may not be camouflaged as misconduct. The Supreme Court further observed in that connection that what in a given context would constitute conduct unbecoming of a public servant to be treated as misconduct, would expose a grey area not amenable to objective evaluation. 56. In the instant case, as already seen, the employer has nowhere speclfied or defined what misconduct would amount to and now an ex post facto interpretation of the incident in question has been sought to be camouflaged as misconduct as will be evident from paragraph 20 and certain other paragraphs of the affidavit-in-opposition. 57. The matter possibly might have been otherwise had the Government Circular dated 25.2.55 could some how be pressed into service against the petitioner. But, as already stated, it can have no application against him. 58. As a matter of fact, this alone is sufficient to render the show-cause notice totally ineffective since the concerned authority solely blanks upon the said circular to sustain the disciplinary action against the petitioner. 59. But, as already stated, it can have no application against him. 58. As a matter of fact, this alone is sufficient to render the show-cause notice totally ineffective since the concerned authority solely blanks upon the said circular to sustain the disciplinary action against the petitioner. 59. The subsequent attempt on the part of the concerned authority to fall back upon the Service Rules as is evident from paragraph 20 and certain other paragraphs of the affidavit-in-opposition, is also of no avail for reasons as already stated. 60. So, here is a case where the show cause notice has been issued palpably without any authority of law and as such the petitioner has been quite within his rights to challenge it before this Court. 61. It is apparently clear that the concerned authority initially had no mind to proceed departmentally against the petitioner though it was fortified with all the relevant facts since practically the very beginning. 62. It was only when the petitioner was let off by the Criminal Court that the said authority started thinking in a different line and had to wait for long one year in trying to find out how the petitioner could be roped in, his discharge in the criminal case notwithstanding. 63. The Service Rules of the Export Inspection Agency being as they are, the concerned authority, in all fairness, should have revoked the suspension order as soon as the petitioner was discharged in the criminal case, allowing him thereby to resume his duties. But instead of doing so, the suspension order was kept alive in absolute mala fide exercise of rower for long one year. The outcome of this long waiting is the show cause notice, which for reasons as already stated, cannot be sustained and is liable to be quashed. 64. It appears that this Court by an interim order dated 24.11.83 allowed the respondents to continue and conclude the departmental proceeding expeditiously but not to pass any final order of punishment without the leave of the Court. 65. It was contended by Mr. Ghosh, the learned Counsel for the respondents, that in pursuance of the said interim order the disciplinary proceeding has been concluded and the final order remains to be made. 66. 65. It was contended by Mr. Ghosh, the learned Counsel for the respondents, that in pursuance of the said interim order the disciplinary proceeding has been concluded and the final order remains to be made. 66. But since the show cause notice itself is bad in law, the holding of the departmental enquiry on its basis has been purely an exercise in futility and as such, totally inconsequential. The writ petition, accordingly, succeeds. 67. The respondent No. 2 is directed by the issuance of a writ in the nature of Mandamus to revoke the order of suspension dated March 23, 1982 and allow the petitioner to resume his duties with effect from the 1st of April, 1983 and thereafter to pay him all his arrear emoluments within a period of sixty days thereafter by adjustments of the amounts already paid as substance. 68. The respondent No. 2 is also directed to revoke and/or to rescind the show-cause notice dated 8th of September, 1983 forthwith and not to give any effect to same. The parties are directed to bear their own costs. Application allowed; suspension order revoked, directions given.