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1988 DIGILAW 101 (KER)

GIRI SHENOY v. RENT CONTROL COURT

1988-02-23

G.VISWANATHA.IYER

body1988
Judgment :- 1. The 4th respondent filed a petition for eviction of the petitioners from a building on the allegation that the building bad been leased by biro to the 1st petitioner and that the latter had unauthorisedly sub-let it to the 2nd petitioner. The petition was filed under S.11 (4) (i) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (the Act for short). The landlord's case was accepted by the Rent Control Court and eviction ordered. The Appellate Authority, however reversed the order of the Rent Control Court and dismissed the petition for eviction. The 4th respondent filed a revision petition before the Revisional Court functioning under S.20 of the Act. The Revisional Court concurred with the Rent Control Court and restored the order of eviction in reversal of the order of the Appellate Authority. This order is Ext. P3. Revision Petition CRP. No. 1746/1984-E was filed in this court by the petitioners under S.115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Pareed Pillay, J. allowed the Revision Petition by bis order Ext. P4 dated 24th June 1986. The petition for eviction was dismissed. 2. The landlord 4th respondent filed a petition for Special Leave in the Supreme Court against this order Ext. P4. By that time the decision in Aundal Ammal v. Sadasivan Pillai, 1987 (1) KLT 53: AIR 1987 SC 203 had been rendered by the Supreme Court holding that revision under S.115 of the Code of Civil Procedure was not maintainable against the order of the revisional court functioning under S.20 of the Act. The Supreme Court therefore issued notice on the petition for Special Leave as follows: "Issue notice returnable on 27-7-1987 indicating why the matter should not be finally disposed of on next dale of bearing in view of decision of this Court in Aundal Ammal v. Sadasivan Pillai (AIR 1987 SC 203)". A copy of this notice is Ext. P6. When the petition for Special Leave came up for hearing, the Supreme Court allowed the application and granted Special Leave. The appeal was numbered as C. A. No. 1524/1987. The appeal itself was disposed of by the order Ext. P5, stating as follows: "Special Leave granted. A copy of this notice is Ext. P6. When the petition for Special Leave came up for hearing, the Supreme Court allowed the application and granted Special Leave. The appeal was numbered as C. A. No. 1524/1987. The appeal itself was disposed of by the order Ext. P5, stating as follows: "Special Leave granted. Since the respondents have been served according to the office report and it was stated in the notice that the matter will be disposed of finally, we dispose the appeal as follows: in view of the decision of this Court in Aundal Ammal v. Sadasivan Pillai-AIR 1987 SC. 203, the order of the High Court is set aside. The appeal is allowed to the extent indicated above." 3. The petitioners-tenants have thereafter filed this Original Petition under Art.227 of the Constitution challenging the order Ext. P3 of the revisional court. When this Original Petition came on for hearing, counsel for the 4th respondent raised a preliminary objection that this original petition was not maintainable. A counter-affidavit has also been filed by the 4th respondent pointing out that the Original Petition is not maintainable. Though a contention has been raised in the counter affidavit that the order Ext. P5 of the Supreme Court operates as resjudicata, Sri. T. P. Kelu Nambiar, counsel for the 4th respondent, submitted at the bearing that he was not basing his contention of non-mamtainablity on any plea of resjudicata, but otherwise. In view of this submission, no arguments were addressed by either side on the question of resjudicata. 4. Sri. Kelu Nambiar developed his plea of non-maintainability this way. The 4th respondent filed appeal in the Supreme Court against the judgment Ext. P-4 of this court. The Supreme Court entertained the appeal and registered it as such after granting special leave. The appeal was dealt with and it was allowed setting aside the judgment of this court. Counsel submits that when the judgment of this court is set aside, the decision of the revisional court, namely, Ext. P-3 stands restored, and substituted in the place of the judgment of this court. The petitioners do not therefore have any right to challenge the same with a fresh petition under Art.227 of the constitution. Though such an approach under Art.227 is possible in other appropriate cases as per the decision of the Supreme Court in Nataraja Chettiar v. Sulekha Amma 1987(1) KLT. The petitioners do not therefore have any right to challenge the same with a fresh petition under Art.227 of the constitution. Though such an approach under Art.227 is possible in other appropriate cases as per the decision of the Supreme Court in Nataraja Chettiar v. Sulekha Amma 1987(1) KLT. 829, it is pointed out that the Supreme Court has not reserved any freedom for the petitioners to approach this court again under Art.227 or otherwise in challenge of the order Ext. P3. A further approach to this court under Art.227 is not therefore permissible and is barred. 5. After having beard counsel for the petitioners and Sri. Kelu Nambiar for the 4th respondent I find myself unable to accept this contention raised by Sri. Nambiar. It is evident from the proceedings in the petition for Special Leave, that the Supreme Court has chosen to set aside the judgment Ext. P4 only on the limited ground that the said order has been passed in a revision petition invoking the jurisdiction under S.115 of the Code of Civil Procedure which, as per the decision in Aundal Ammal's case, was not maintainable. The order passed by the Supreme Court at the time of issuing notice on the Special Leave Petition itself shows that the Supreme Court intended to dispose of the appeal on the basis of the decision in Aundal Ammal's case on the next hearing date. This is what the Supreme Court did at the final hearing, when they allowed the appeal on the basis of the decision in Aundal Ammal's case. The Supreme Court has delineated the scope of their judgment and the extent to which the appeal is allowed by stating as follows: The appeal is allowed to the extent indicated above." In other words, the Supreme Court has allowed the appeal only to the extent of holding that the revision petition filed in this court which led to Ext. P-4 judgment was not maintainable in law as per the decision in Aundal Ammal's case. Though the appeal is allowed the judgment has to be read reasonably and in the context in which it was rendered. All that was decided was that this court should not have entertained the revision petition under S.115 of the Code of Civil Procedure and therefore the decision of this court must go. Though the appeal is allowed the judgment has to be read reasonably and in the context in which it was rendered. All that was decided was that this court should not have entertained the revision petition under S.115 of the Code of Civil Procedure and therefore the decision of this court must go. It is not as if there is an affirmation of the decision of the revisional court, namely Ext. P-3 by allowing the appeal. I have to read the decision of the Supreme Court to the manner in which Their Lordships have intended it to be treated, that the appeal is allowed "to the extent indicated above" which touches only the maintainability of the revision in this court and not anything else. 6. Every judgment or order of court has to be read in the way in which the public at large reading it will understand it to be. It is not proper to place too technical an interpretation on the words and to read them in a way which the Court itself could not have intended. A judgment is meant to have public effect and is intended to affect the acts and conduct of those who are parties to it. It must be construed objectively with reference to the language used in the judgment or order and the context in which it was rendered. I derive inspiration for this rule of construction from the judgment in Commissioner of Police v. Gordhandas (AIR. 1952 SC. 16 Para.9). So construed the only conclusion possible is that the decision is limited to holding that the revision petition in this court under S.115 of the Code of Civil Procedure was not maintainable. Nothing beyond this was intended to be done by it. 7. In this view of the matter it has to be held that the revision petition filed by the petitioners was one which was not maintainable. The decision thereon was set aside by the Supreme Court on the limited question of non-maintainability. Therefore parties stand relegated to the position which they occupied at the time the order Ext. P3 was passed by the Revisional Court. That decision is subject to review by this court under Art.227 as held by the Supreme Court in Nataraja Chettiar's case cited supra. I therefore bold that this petition under Art.227 is maintainable.