T. N. SINGH, J. ( 1 ) MY only regret in disposing of the review petition is that it has had a staggered disposal which it did not deserve. Today, therefore, immediately after counsel are heard and authorities cited are reviewed. I consider it appropriate to dispose of the petition instantly to make amends for the delayed disposal of the application. ( 2 ) THIS application for review is by the plaintiff/respondent and arises out of an order passed by me on 10-8-1987 in Misc. Appeal No. 141 of 1985 (reported in AIR 1989 NOC 13) wherein I was required to interpret the provisions, inter alia, of Sections 34 and 41 of the Arbitration Act, for short, "the Act'. I took the view in that appeal that the judgment of the trial Court impugned before me was not sustainable in law because of infractions of those provisions. What is not disputed even today is that the plaintiff/respondent had instituted the suit on 19-6-1985 in which he had obtained a temporary injunction under Section 151, C. P. C. on 22-6-1985 against the defendant appellants, State of Madhya Pradesh. It is true that thereafter, the litigation had a chequered career and the matter at two stages reached at the highest seat of justice at the banks of Jamuna, a long way from Chambal. But, unhappily for the plaintiff the question mooted before me in the appeal was kept open by their Lordships of the Supreme Court. Indeed, this position, I had examined in rendering the judgment in the appeal aforesaid, at para 10 thereof. I was impressed by appellants grievance that in rendering the impugned order the learned Additional District Judge had totally ignored the application made under Section 34 of the Act by the defendant/ appellant on 21-6-1985 as he continued to proceed with the suit by not only granting ad interim injunction, but also confirming the same, over-looking the relevant provisions of the Act. ( 3 ) AT para 16 of the judgment under review, it was held as follows :"there can be no escape route for the Civil Court in which a Civil suit is pending and an application under Section 34 is pending disposal to do anything else under any other law, even under the Code of Civil Procedure, before disposing of the said application, one way or the other. To keep the application pending and doing something else by refusing to exercise its jurisdiction one way or the other under Section 34 is not legally permissible. This position is trade clear by Section 41 itself which requires a Civil Court to follow first the provision of the Act and the Court is mandated to act "subject to the provisions of the Act". ( 4 ) TRUE it is, as Shri Gupta has submitted before me today, at para 15 of the judgment, it was observed that no authority was cited before me on that date for the proposition that without disposing of an application under Section 34 of the Act, a Civil Court can exercise its jurisdiction independently, under the Code of Civil Procedure, by passing the provisions of the Act. Today, therefore, Shri Gupta took enough pains to collect a number of authorities and has placed the same before me to persuade me in hold that the view that I had taken in that matter needs to be reviewed. However, despite giving my anxious consideration to each and every submission made by learned counsel and to the decisions cited, I have not been able to agree with Shri Gupta that the view I took in the judgment under review is grossly erroneous or that it suffers a " material error manifest on the face of the order which undermines its soundness or results in miscarriage of justice". I do not think if it is necessary to reiterate in any other manner the law encapsuled in the crucial holding just quoted of their Lordships of the supreme Court on the ambit of Review jurisdiction ( See Sow Chandrakanta, AIR 1975 SC 1500 ; Col. Avtar Singh, AIR 1980 SC 2041 ). ( 5 ) HOWEVER, it is my constitutional duty to do justice to the labour expended by Shri Gupta by looking into the authorities cited and that exercise I must take with great care and pleasure. Of the several decisions cited, those of Punjab and Haryana High Court in Sir Gangaram's case 1973 0 Curlj 639 and of Calcutta High Court in Chhedilal, (1948) 52 Cal WN 45 have a common and distinctive factual feature to which reference must be made at once. Of the several decisions cited, those of Punjab and Haryana High Court in Sir Gangaram's case 1973 0 Curlj 639 and of Calcutta High Court in Chhedilal, (1948) 52 Cal WN 45 have a common and distinctive factual feature to which reference must be made at once. In both cases, the defendant had filed application under Section 34 of the Act much later, after the temporary injunction was granted and indeed in both cases, the applications were by way of replies or objections to the order of temporary injunction. It was pointed out specifically in Gangaram's case (supra) that the application under Section 34 of the Act was accompanied by another application under Order 39 Rule 4, C. P. C. Evidently, therefore, the position that obtains in the instant case never came to be examined in those two cases. At the injunction stage, the defendant in each case had himself waived his right under Section 34 of the Act and called for an order to be pronounced under Code of Civil Procedure on the merits of the prayer for injunction made under the Code. It was still noticed in the two decisions of Calcutta and Punjab and Haryana High Courts that the Civil Court seized of the matter had power to grant interim relief in terms of Section 41 of the Act. That judicial conclusion rather supports the view I have taken to which I have adverted earlier in this judgment and conforms to the view of the Apex Court in Yadav Engineers (infra ). ( 6 ) COUNSEL has also cited a judgment of a learned single Judge of this Court in the case of Daulat Ram, AIR 1964 Madh Pra 219, but I fail to read anything which would allow the applicant to entertain any hope that the decision I have rendered requires reconsideration. Therein also it was observed that "there is no reason to suppose that the Court has no Dower under Section 41 (b) of the Act read with the Second Schedule to prevent the properties in dispute from being wasted during the pendency of the proceedings before the arbitrators. " Indeed, what I rend is that the same golden thread runs through all the three decisions cited and the view taken therein agrees with apex. Court's view and also my view, as already pointed out. " Indeed, what I rend is that the same golden thread runs through all the three decisions cited and the view taken therein agrees with apex. Court's view and also my view, as already pointed out. ( 7 ) SHRI Gupta has also contended that reliance on Raman Iron Foundry, AIR 1974 SC 1265 in the judgment under review is inapposite and I had a second look, therefore, at that decision. But, I am constrained to observe that my interpretation of Section 41 (b) does not appear to run counter to the view taken by their Lordships. In that case, what had come up in appeal was an order of temporary injunction passed,by the Delhi High Court acting as a Civil Court. It was held that though an interim injunction can be passed by such Court during the pendency of an arbitration proceeding, the order cannot transgress the jurisdictional ambit of Section 41 (b) of the Act. ( 8 ) COUNSEL has, today also, placed implicit reliance on a passage, which he had read out to me at the time of admission of the review application, from the decision in Food Corporation of India v. Yadav Engineer, AIR 1982 SC 1302 . At first blush, after reading in isolation the short passage which I had quoted in the order of admission, I was convinced that the matter required reconsideration. Today, when the case is argued in detail and all decisions are examined and analysed in detail, I have to confess that my first impression was wrong because the decision not only leaves unimpaired, but rather supports, the view I had taken in the judgment under review. Their Lordships had observed, "when ex parte orders are obtained on ex pane averments the other party cannot be precluded from coming and pointing out that no case is made out for granting interim relief. " Their Lordships had the occasion to say so in the facts and circumstances of that case in construing the provisions of Section 34 with reference to the crucial expression thereof, "taking any other steps in the proceedings", and accordingly they added " it would be too cumbersome to expect the party first to apply for stay (under Section 34) and then invite the Court under Section 41 (2) of the Act to vacate the or to discharge the receiver. " Let it be made clear that this obiter statement of law had only marginal relevance to the crucial question that had fallen for decision of their Lordships in that case on the jurisdictional requirement of Section 34. ( 9 ) INDEED, what stands out in bold relief in the decision of their Lordships in Yadav Engineer (supra) is, "when in breach of an arbitration agreement a party to the agreement rushes to the court, unless a clear case to the contrary is made out, the approach of the Court should be to hold parties to their bargain provided necessary conditions for invoking Section 34 are satisfied. " Their Lordships left no doubt about the position that it was the bounden duty of the Court in seisin of an application under Section 34 to dispose of the same expeditiously and in that case action of the trial Court in doing so was upheld, setting aside the judgment of this Court taking contrary view on the footing that the defendant's reply to the prayer for temporary injunction was a step in and of the pending civil suit. Unlike the case in hand no interim injunction was granted and it was observed (in para 29 of the report) by their Lordships "it may be clearly emphasized that contesting the application for interim injunction or for appointment of a receiver would not constitute such step as would disentitle a party to an order under Section 34 of the Act. " ( 10 ) SHRI Gupta took me through the language of Section 34 to press the contention that an automatic stay of the suit is not contemplated therein in order to submit that in the judgment under review, a contrary view has been taken. Therefore, to disarm he has carried to this Court, it has become necessary for me to emphasise clearly that the holding in the judgment under review is not to that effect. What I had observed, I reiterate, is merely that the application under Section had to be disposed of and not kept pending so as to by-pass the other provisions of the Act. I reiterate further, once again, that even during the pendency of the said application, it would have been open to the party concerned to press for an order under Section 41 of the Act. I reiterate further, once again, that even during the pendency of the said application, it would have been open to the party concerned to press for an order under Section 41 of the Act. But, the Civil Court has no power to act under the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure to exercise jurisdiction thereunder when that jurisdiction was indented in terms by the provisions of Sections 34 and 41. 10a. I have no doubt that language of Section 34 clearly expresses the clear and significant mandate of the legislature circumscribing Civil. Court's jurisdiction in the manner aid to the extent prescribed thereunder as also under Section 41 of the Act. It is necessary also to stress that the provision is beneficient and its beneficiary has the option to waive or invoke the benefit envisaged thereunder, "at any time, before filing written statement or taking any other steps" in the pending civil suit. But if there is no waiver, then its mandate is clear and inexorable, as held in Yadav Engineer ( AIR 1982 SC 1302 ) (supra), to bind equally the Court and parties; it has been held that benefit under Sec. 34 shall not be deemed waived merely because the prayer for interim relief made in the pending suit is opposed. Indeed, in such a case without invoking Section 34 the opposing party can obtain an order in the pending suit in its favour by persuading the Court to reject the prayer on merits, acting under the Code of Civil Procedure. ( 11 ) SHRI Saxena, Additional Advocate General has drawn my attention to a decision of a learned single Judge of Calcutta High Court in Debendra Nath Sinha, AIR 1970 Cal 255 to support the view that I have taken in the judgment under review that even arbitrators, in the event of commencement of arbitration proceedings after stay under Section 34 is granted, would be capable of granting interim relief. True it is that the same view has not prevailed with a learned single Judge of the Allahabad High Court in the decision cited by Shri Gupta, in Anand Prakash case, reported in AIR 1968 All 22 . But, that difference of opinion would not, in any manner, impair the validity of the main conclusion that I had reached in the judgment under review so as to undermine the basic soundness thereof. But, that difference of opinion would not, in any manner, impair the validity of the main conclusion that I had reached in the judgment under review so as to undermine the basic soundness thereof. That's all for the day. ( 12 ) IN the result, I hold that the review application is misconceived and accordingly it is dismissed. As to costs, Shri Saxena submits that it is a fit case to saddle the applicant with exemplary costs, to compensate non-applicant, State, for the monetary loss it has suffered due to pendency of this review application since 2-9-1987. However, looking through the order sheets, it appears to me that parties are in pari delicto to some extent as on both sides, prayers were made for adjournment from time to time. Still, for the original sin, the applicant must suffer even nominally and for that, I hold them liable to pay Rs. 250/- as costs to the State. Interim direction made on 2-9-87 stands vacated to allow Court below to proceed. ( 13 ) AT the conclusion of the proceedings, as soon as this order is dictated, Shri Gupta stands up to make an oral prayer under Article 134a of the Constitution of India for a Certificate to appeal to the Hon'ble Supreme Court. Counsel has submitted that there is no direct authority on the question mooted, for decision in the judgment under review of the Hon'ble Supreme Court and the question involved in the appeal is substantial question of law of general importance. The prayer is seriously opposed by Shri Saxena, relying on clause (3) of Article 133 of the Constitution and I am of the view that the objection is substantial and must prevail because of the non obstante clause with which the provisions of clause (3) of Article 133 is crowned. Although under Article 133 (1), Certificate for oral leave under Article 134a is permissible, that provision has to be read subject to clause (3) of Article 133. Accordingly, the oral prayer, being barred under Article 133 (3), is rejected. It shall be open to the applicant in the facts and circumstances of the case to approach their Lordships of the Supreme Court under Article 136 of the Constitution. But, no certificate as prayed under Article 134a can be granted. Order accordingly. .